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GUIDE  
TO  
THE WRITING  
OF  
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY

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A FORMULATION  
BY THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONDENSED BY THE EDITORS OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

## FOREWORD

The publication of this provisional treatise on the writing of military history supports the principle of "nothing ventured, nothing gained." While the time to produce a thoroughly acceptable manual on this subject would probably preclude its appearance during the current year, the necessities of the moment demand that at least a tentative treatise be assayed as "straw man" on which to invite comments.

Under the stress of a time limit this target for suggestions and comments has resulted. It is hoped that it will prove of utility to students and instructors of the service schools and to others engaged in advanced studies. The comments of the novice, the scholar, and the fighting men, who have made and are making history, are invited. By a frank expression of views they will assure that a revised and better Guide appears before long.

If all will be as bold in making comments as the beginners were in initiating the project, a great contribution can be made to the development of the writing of American military history.

ORLANDO WARD  
Major General, USA  
*Chief of Military History.*

Department of the Army  
Washington 25 D C  
20 December 1950

## PREFACE

The *Guide to the Writing of American Military History* is the composite work of a number of individuals in the Office of the Chief of Military History. It is a project of the Special Studies Division of that Office which, like other Department of the Army agencies and many individuals of the service, has use for such a work.

Among those who made important contributions to the *Guide* are the following: Lt. Col. Marcel Brunow, GSC, who made the original outline, made important contributions on libraries and archives, and, assisted by Mrs. Edna Salsbury, did the basic research for bibliographical material and arranged it in tentative form; Dr. John Miller, Jr., who wrote the draft of Chapter IV, Part One; Mr. W. Brooks Phillips, who prepared Chapter V, Part One, and made many suggestions for the improvement of the work; Col. F. Stansbury Haydon, Arty USAR, who made important contributions on the use of archival material and wrote the draft of Chapter VIII, Part Three; Dr. Stetson Conn, who assisted in compiling the bibliographies for Chapters III and IV, Part Three, and reviewed and assisted in arranging the bibliographical material in Part Three; Lt. Col. Bell I. Wiley, SS USAR, who rearranged the outline and added considerable material during an active duty tour; Mr. R. S. Thomas and his assistant, Capt. R. M. Paone, who compiled the tentative bibliography for Chapter VII, Part Three; Miss Michael Burdett who prepared the Editorial Branch's Style Manual incorporated as Part Two; Mrs. Frances T. Fritz of the Editorial Branch, who made many suggestions for the improvement of the work and assisted in editing the manuscript; and Miss Mary Ann Bacon who assisted in editing the manuscript. Mrs. Irene Wilhelm and Miss Mildred Bucan were also of great help in typing and proofing the copy.

P. M. ROBINETT

*Brigadier General USA, Retired  
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Washington 25 D C

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\*Omitted in this condensation

# INTRODUCTION

## Chapter I

### PART ONE: RESEARCH AND WRITING

#### PURPOSE

This *Guide* is intended as an aid in the study and writing of military history. Its immediate objective is to provide basic guidance for Army students who are faced with the problem of writing research papers in service schools and at civilian institutions. In addition to serving this end, the manual will also be of use to others who have occasion to explore the field of American military history.

#### ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED FROM THE STUDY OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY

##### *General*

American military history has been greatly neglected in spite of the fact that it offers unusual opportunities for self improvement and for original and valuable contributions to the service. A real opportunity exists which should serve as a challenge to military students and to all others interested in military affairs. Great captains such as Caesar, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon, as well as many lesser ones, have stressed the value of history in the instruction of military men. Innumerable quotations could be cited to prove the point. Frederick the Great was not only an avid student of history, but a historian of parts himself. If not the founder of the modern general staff system, he at least laid the intellectual foundation upon which it was built. Napoleon, who was certainly one of the greatest and cleverest practitioners of war, rated the study of history as of great importance in the military profession. One remark among others which he made bearing upon the question shows clearly the importance he attached to history: ". . .

the knowledge of the higher arts of war is not acquired except by experience and the study of the history of wars and the battles of great captains."<sup>1</sup>

Machiavelli, Jomini, Clausewitz, du Picq, Mahan, Foch, Douhet, and Fuller are some of the writers who have profoundly influenced the profession of arms. Few of them can be called great captains, but most held assignments that permitted them to gain a firsthand impression of war and warriors. As a result of their study they were able, within their limitations to delineate the fundamental principles of war. In one form or another these principles have been modified and adopted as the basic doctrines in all modern armies and therefore constitute a professional guide for military men. On occasion, certain principles lifted from the context of the balanced whole and followed blindly brought great harm, if not catastrophic results, to the army and the nation concerned. For example, the French Army, over-emphasizing the principle of the offensive prior to 1914 and the principle of the defensive in 1940, suffered accordingly.

##### *Research in Military History*

Just as in other fields, research in military history will give valuable training in planning a project, gathering and organizing data, interpreting findings, and presenting a clear and logical narrative. Intensive investigation not only affords specialized knowledge of a definite phase of history but also promotes independent thinking. An understanding of the methods by which historical data are as-

<sup>1</sup>Napoleon. *Mémoires de Sainte-Hélène*. Monthonal. London, 1823. II. 51.

sembled, authenticated, and woven into an accurate account should lead to the creation of a healthy skepticism concerning what others have written, as well as an appreciation of the work that lies back of serious historical studies. Historical research also gives valuable training in evaluating opposing points of view on controversial questions, past and present. Finally not the least of the fruits of historical investigation is the sense of accomplishment which comes from observing isolated, formless data assembled from scattered sources grow, through the researcher's efforts, into a smooth, significant, balanced narrative—perhaps even into one that contributes something new to the existing body of knowledge.

The study of the initial phases of military operations—those periods of shifting a scene in cast or setting—deserves special attention. These are periods of operations that mark the introduction of new weapons, new tactics, or inexperienced troops, that involve a sudden shift in type of terrain, in defensive arrangements, in weather, or in seasonal conditions. It is in these periods that inadequate or impractical training, inefficient weapons, failures of leadership and of communications, inadequate logistical support, faulty co-ordination of the various arms, unforeseen effects of weather and terrain, and many other things, some almost intangible, create a state of confusion which should challenge every military student. Knowledge gained through a study of the initial phases of past operations will pay untold dividends to those who may later be involved in similar situations.

The study of military history should not be confined to the problems of the high commands. Study should be solidly based on those of the individual, squad, platoon, company, and battalion. Here, where results of decisions and actions are most immediate, wisdom and a knowledge of the American soldier gleaned from the past can be most

readily and decisively used. Military history, if carefully studied, furnishes students many clues to the quality of troops and the reasons for noticeable variations. But here again many historians have been lacking in frankness, in depth, or in knowledge. If writings colored by prejudice or deficient in vital and detailed information are allowed to influence instruction, training, and operations, they will prove both harmful and dangerous. Only complete and factual histories should be used.

### *Military History and the Development of Military Personnel*

Professional advantages to be derived from a study of military history are so obvious that the subject hardly needs elaboration. Every individual in the military service, from the basic private to the Chief of Staff of the Army, will find a knowledge of military history, and especially of American military history, valuable in the solution of problems, both in peace and in war. This is true because military problems cannot be solved without an understanding of the past in which they are rooted. As expressed in the words carved in stone at the entrance to *National Archives*,—"What is past is prologue."

An Army officer should have a broad cultural education in addition to a professional and technical education. This can be acquired by one's own efforts during the course of his service. One of the more fruitful subjects for serious study is history, and military history in particular. Not only will it improve an officer's professional abilities but it will also open the door to countless fields of intellectual inquiry that would not otherwise be explored. If earnestly pursued, it will lead to improvement in reading foreign languages since the best sources of any country's military history are to be found in its own language. It will also lead the student into classical writings and open vistas of thought, inquiry, and knowledge not ordinarily en-



countered in the normal course of military service. In addition to serving the all-important function of bettering an officer's professional training, it will contribute in a very large degree to his intellectual and cultural development.

### *Military History in Instruction and Training*

Military history is the very foundation of our knowledge of tactics and strategy. It is also the foundation on which the theoretical and practical training of troops and the development of training directives is based. An instructor who is not grounded in military history appropriate to the level of his instruction is dry and pedantic and will accomplish no great results. On the other hand, one who knows not only the principles but who can also illustrate them by historical examples, giving facts concerning troops, commanders, weapons, supply, communications, terrain, and weather, can give life to his instruction and make it useful. This is just as true in troop training as in formal instruction in military schools. Above all else, however, military history gives an interesting and deep insight into the minds and hearts of men, into tactical and strategical methods, procedures, and principles, and into the relation between war, politics, economy, philosophy, and the mentality of nations and races.<sup>2</sup>

If military history is to serve as a basis of instruction and training it must be factual and objective. Propagandistic history or censored history is dangerous and should not be used as the basis of instruction in military schools or in training. Such history can provide no sound lessons or basis of intellectual and professional training. It leads to false conclusions. It fosters one of the worst evils

in professional military thinking—self deception.

To be of value in teaching military leadership, history should be factual and frank. Histories written during the lives of the actors or too near their era are generally tinged with partisanship, colored by self-interested flattery, and influenced by the selective treatment of source material. Histories written too long after the time of the participants are frequently fictional or sentimental. Neither type of history is satisfactory for teaching leadership. History cannot, therefore, serve as an entirely satisfactory basis for instruction in leadership until it is written in such a manner that it portrays the participants, their merits and deficiencies, their temperaments, doubts, and ambitions, their Janus faces, their tensions and contrasts, and their physical and mental conditions.<sup>3</sup> When it becomes possible to write of public men as one would write of property, the greatest value to be derived from military history probably will be its influence on the development, training, and selection of honorable, skilled military leaders. Such writing cannot be done in official histories written contemporaneously with events. It is an appropriate field for the independent historian who writes after passions and partisanship have been stilled by time.

If military history is to be of greatest value in instruction and training it must be more than a logical, factual record or account of events. After the facts have been synthesized into an effective record there is a final step in the project—the analysis of the facts and the formulation of conclusions based on that analysis. This last step can be taken only by one who is both well grounded in historiography and professionally qualified to deal with the military organization and the operations recorded. At the very highest level of

<sup>2</sup>MS #B-295 (Blumentritt). OCMH files. Pp. 7-9. This study on the writing of military history was written in 1946 by General der Infanterie Guenther Blumentritt, formerly chief of staff to the German Commander in Chief West.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*



treatment this entails a knowledge of national policy, of strategy and grand tactics, of the tactics, logistics, and techniques of the combined arms, and of weapons. At the lower levels of military organization and operations it entails a knowledge of the tactics, logistics, and techniques of the combined arms and a knowledge of weapons.

### *History in the Development of Esprit de Corps*

A knowledge of military history can play a vital role in the development of *esprit de corps* in the Army but has rarely been fully exploited for this purpose. Army posts are generally named for widely known military men, buildings and streets for others or for military organizations, and colors and standards decorated with streamers carrying the names of battles or campaigns in which the unit has honorably participated. For many years *Retreat* has included the strains of music inspired under the "rocket's red glare." In many units mounts and vehicles have borne the names of distinguished soldiers of the past. These things can be turned to advantage by those who will take the trouble to weld the deeds and records of the past to the task in hand. Thus the Army in being comes to live and function in the best traditions of the past.

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### *Military History and Mutual Respect in the Armed Forces*

A comprehensive knowledge of military history will facilitate mutual respect and understanding in the armed forces: the broad problems of the higher commanders will be more readily comprehended by subordinates, and the complex human, material, and physical problems of the soldier and of the small unit commanders better appreciated by superiors.

### SUMMARY

Military history is of vital importance in the preparation of military leaders, in the training of troops, and in the day-by-day work of all officers. Without a sound knowledge of military history an officer cannot draw upon the experience of others. An officer who is not prepared in correct historical methodology and professionally qualified at the level of his grade is not fully equipped to draw conclusions or lessons from a study of history. Those officers of highest attainment should combine the scholarly erudition of the historian with broad military knowledge. Factual military history which has not been competently analyzed and reduced to conclusions based thereon cannot be most advantageously used in Army instruction. Nonfactual history is dangerous, however used.

## Chapter II

### LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES: HOW TO USE THEM

#### LIBRARIES: GENERAL INFORMATION

##### *Researchers and Libraries*

Upon initial contact with a library, a researcher should make his identity and purpose known to the authorities concerned. At the same time, he should inquire about the rules and regulations of the institution—and be ready to abide by them. Librarians can attest to the need for this caution.

Next, he should familiarize himself with the operational methods of each establishment visited. In view of the fact that library procedures are quite likely to vary from place to place, this may save much time. It should also reduce requests for assistance from library personnel. Some of the more important variations in such procedures are summarized in *Library Procedures*, below.

Finally, the researcher should early ascertain the extent of the resources and facilities available in the library in which he plans to work. Some libraries issue a brochure, sometimes only a typewritten sheet, to inform readers on the general scope and arrangement of their collections.

##### *Libraries and Research Work*

Webster describes a library as: “. . . a building, devoted to a collection of books, manuscripts, etc., kept for use but not for sale . . . an institution for the custody, circulation, or administration of such a collection. . . .”

Despite a multiplicity of designations, there are but three types of libraries: general libraries, whose interests cover practically the entire range of human knowledge, research libraries, dedicated to one or more, usually closely correlated, fields of investigation; and

special libraries, which are generally established for the benefit of particular groups.

Regardless of title or type, the value of any library to the researcher rests solely upon the nature and importance of its holdings, and on the degree of accessibility to the information which they contain. To students of military history libraries are, primarily, repositories of historical source and reference materials.

Obviously, researchers cannot always have access to major libraries, such as the Library of Congress or the Hoover War Library, whose facilities and resources are so great that they are internationally famous. Nevertheless, libraries can no longer be judged by their size or location: first, because many of the smaller institutions may contain unique materials; secondly, because modern developments, such as interlibrary loans and the microfilming of books or documents, have tremendously increased the usefulness of the “local” libraries.

Reference to publications such as the *Special Libraries Directory*, issued by the Special Libraries Association in 1935, or to the *American Library Directory*—1948 published by the R. R. Bowker Company of New York, will provide detailed information concerning American and Canadian libraries. Furthermore, since in many cases these publications also give the names and addresses of librarians, it should be relatively easy to ascertain in advance what is actually or potentially available in a particular library.

#### LIBRARY PROCEDURES

##### *The Library Shelf*

The term “shelf” is frequently used by librarians, hence, such expressions as “open

shelf," "closed shelf," "shelving," merit some explanation. From the researcher's standpoint, for example, it makes a great deal of difference whether or not he is granted "shelf privileges." That in turn, depends on whether or not a library maintains "open shelves."

To librarians "shelving" means: the placing of books on library shelves in proper order. In other words, the library shelf is the heart of the institution, because it represents actual resources, properly arranged, in suitable equipment, and duly recorded. Consequently, from a technical point of view, a "shelf list," then, is a record of books, arranged in the order in which they stand on the shelves.

In line with this same terminology, "open shelves" are those library shelves to which readers have direct access for the examination of books while, conversely, "closed shelves" are those which are not available to the public or which, as in a university or in a private library, are open to a limited group only. It should be noted that the terms "shelf" and "stack" are interchangeable; for example, "open shelf" and "open stack" are synonymous expressions.

"Stack privileges" indicate that the holder thereof, usually identified by means of a "stack card," has been granted permission to examine books on certain shelves or stacks that are, therefore, "open" to him and that may be "closed" to others. This is a very valuable privilege, because it enables the researcher to make a rapid survey of materials on library shelves without going through the normal time-consuming routine.

### *Library Catalogues*

According to the *A.L.A. Glossary of Library Terms* (American Library Association, Chicago, 1943), a library catalogue is: "A list of books, maps, etc., arranged according to some definite plan. As distinguished from

a bibliography it is a list which records, describes, and indexes the resources of a collection, a library, or a group of libraries . . ." Such a list may be in card form, with entry on a separate card, or it may be in book form, wherein entries follow each other in some sort of sequence. More specifically, as well as normally, a card catalogue is one in which entries on separate cards are arranged in a definite order in library card trays or drawers.

Most of the American libraries now employ such card catalogues. Many of them have also adopted the so-called "dictionary catalogue" system wherein carded entries (whether by author, title, subject), and related references, are arranged together under a single alphabet.

Various schemes are used in connection with library cataloguing processes to insure that materials described in the catalogues, whether in card or book form, can be readily identified or located: a procedure known as classification.

### *Classification Systems*

There are many types of classifications but only book classification need be considered here. Briefly, classification is a scheme for arranging books and other material according to subject and form. Its purpose is to facilitate the use of reading materials. Its function is to group similar things together.

Before entering upon his work in any library, a researcher should familiarize himself with the classification system in use. This will permit him to compare the book title with the assigned classification number on the catalogue card and to assure himself at a glance that title and subject are not at variance, and that the book in question is or is not pertinent to his study. Of far more importance, perhaps, especially where the researcher has been granted "stack" privileges, such knowledge also enables him to locate books on the library shelves with minimum

loss of time. Some libraries publish classification charts, or post copies of such charts in conspicuous places, for the guidance of readers. A classification chart is a synopsis of the classification scheme adopted by the library concerned, and it is designed to assist researchers and others in finding the books which they desire.

Library procedures may vary from one library to another and, sometimes, even within the departments of the same library.

is used by many libraries in the United States, as well as abroad. It was the first American classification to achieve international recognition; furthermore, since 1930, Dewey decimal notations have been printed on many of the Library of Congress catalog cards.

The principles of this system are summarized in a series of tables which form part of the basic manual.<sup>1</sup> The scheme divides all human knowledge into 10 main

### COMPARATIVE OUTLINE OF MAIN (SUBJECT) CLASSES OR SCHEDULES

	Dewey Decimal (1876)		Cutter Expansive (1891)		Library of Congress (1899)
000	General Works	A	References, General Works	A	General Works
100	Philosophy			B	Philosophy, Religion
200	Religion	B-D	Philosophy, Religion	C-F	History, Auxiliary Sciences
300	Sociology	E-G	Historical Sciences, Biography, History, Geography, Travel	G	Geography
400	Philology			H-K	Social, Political Sciences
500	Pure Science	H-K	Social, Political Sciences	L	Education
600	Useful Arts			M-N	Fine Arts
700	Fine Arts	L	Physical Science	P	Language, Literature
800	Literature	M-P	Natural Sciences	Q	Science
900	History, including Geography, Biography	Q-V	Useful Arts	R	Medicine
		W	Fine Arts	S	Agriculture
		X	Philology	T	Technology
		Y	Literature	U	Military Science
		Z	Bibliography, Library Sciences	V	Naval Science
				Z	Bibliography, Library Science

For example, in Washington, the Library of Congress adheres to the classification scheme that bears its name; on the other hand, the Public Library uses both the Dewey Decimal and the Cutter Expansive systems. Book classification schemes most in use in this country are outlined on the following pages.

#### *Dewey Decimal Classification*

First published by Melvil Dewey in 1876, and enlarged many times since, this system

classes, represented by arabic numerals, and expressed by 3-digit figures, as 000, 100, 200, and so forth; the "zero" (000) class being reserved for general publications such as periodicals and dictionaries, which can not be definitely assigned to any one of the other 9 classes. Each of these main classes, in turn, is divided into 10 subclasses, with fur-

<sup>1</sup>Dewey, Melvil, *Decimal Classification and Relative Index* (14th ed., rev. and enl.; Lake Placid, N. Y., 1942).



ther decimal subdivisions within each subclass, as needed. Additional subdivisions can be provided by using a decimal point and placing supplementary numbers to the right of the decimal point. For example:

A main class..900	HISTORY
Subclasses	<div> <div>{</div> <div>910</div> <div>Geography and travels</div> </div> <div> <div>{</div> <div>920</div> <div>Biography</div> </div> <div> <div>{</div> <div>970</div> <div>North America</div> </div> <div> <div>{</div> <div>973</div> <div>United States</div> </div> <div> <div>{</div> <div>973.1</div> <div>discovery—1607</div> </div> <div> <div>{</div> <div>973.9</div> <div>twentieth century 1901—</div> </div> <div> <div>{</div> <div>973.91</div> <div>early twentieth century 1901—</div> </div> <div> <div>{</div> <div></div> <div>World War I and II, 1917-1821; 1939—</div> </div>

Successive revisions of the original scheme have resulted in the incorporation of numerous refinements, such as the assignment of specific blocks of numbers to philological and to geographical subjects. Moreover, although initially designed for classification by subject matter, a special table of "form" numbers, common to all classes and to many divisions, has been provided to facilitate further breakdown by written form. The use of these numbers, called "form distinctions," is illustrated below:

- .1 Philosophies, theories, etc.
- .2 Compends, outlines
- .3 Dictionaries, cyclopedias
- .4 Essays, lectures, letters, etc.
- .5 Periodicals, magazines, etc.
- .6 Societies, associations, transactions, reports, etc.
- .7 Education, study, teaching, etc.
- .8 Polygraphy, collections, etc.
- .9 History

300	SOCIAL SCIENCES (a main class)
355	Military science
355.07	Military schools

(Note: When subject number does not end in 0, a zero is prefixed to the form number.)

600	USEFUL ARTS (a main class)
620	Engineering
620.3	Dictionary of engineering terms

Numerical notations of the decimal classification are sometimes combined with letter symbols; a modification most frequently encountered in the field of fictional literature, wherein alphabetical arrangement of books by author has become common practice.

### *War Department (Department of the Army) Decimal System*

An adaptation of the Dewey decimal classification to military subjects, this system uses a mixed notation of letters and arabic numerals. It is fully described in *War Department Decimal File System*, a publication of the Adjutant General's Office which is compiled from data furnished by various War Department agencies. First issued in 1914, it was reprinted in June 1915 and in July 1917, and an abridgment appeared in September 1917 in connection with World War I. This was followed by a complete and revised edition in May 1918. The last revised edition was released in 1943.

This system is important to military students since it is the prescribed method of classification for all Army correspondence, and a knowledge of its subject headings and symbol designations will facilitate identification of, and requests for, military records. However, this system extends back only to 1914, and before that date many War Department agencies had evolved individual classification schemes.

To cover subjects that arise subsequent to the release of the most recent issue of the *War Department Decimal File System*, the Office of the Adjutant General compiles a supplement for its own use and for possible inclusion in future editions of the manual.



*Universal Decimal Classification* (Classification Decimale Universelle)

This system, mentioned here because it is widely used by major European libraries, is an expansion of the Dewey decimal classification. It was evolved by a group of international bibliographers who first met in 1895 in Brussels, and is known as the "Brussels Classification."

Under the guidance of the International Institute of Documentation, this classification system has been revised several times. The first edition, in French, appeared 1899-1905; a second French edition, in 4 volumes, was published 1927-1933; a German edition was begun in 1934, and a so-called fourth edition, in English, was issued in 1936.

*Cutter (Expansive) Classification*

This system, evolved by Charles A. Cutter, began to appear in print in 1891. It comprises seven separate, progressively more detailed, classification schedules; the seventh and last having been completed, insofar as possible, after the author's death, and published in 1904. Each of these schedules is intended to serve libraries of a given capacity, the complexity of the classification scheme increasing with the size of the library. This evolutionary feature gives the system its present designation: *Expansive Classification*.

Basically, it arranges all books into twenty-six classes, each of which is again divided into twenty-six parts, with further subdivision into still smaller groups; hence, it is capable of almost unlimited expansion. Main classes are represented by large capitals, and subdivisions are represented by small capitals that are added to the letter which indicates main classes. These primary alphabetical notations have been supplemented by two tables of special numerical symbols; the first for form divisions, and the second, known as the "Local List," (printed separately), for ar-

rangement of materials according to geographical relation. Indexes are provided to facilitate the use of the system. There is one index for the first six classifications and a separate index for each of the completed parts of the seventh, or most detailed, classification.

The author of the *Expansive Classification* also devised two alphabetical order schemes which are extensively used by American libraries. These schemes, called "author-tables," consist of series letter or letters of surnames or words. One scheme uses two figures, the other three, and they are known as Cutter "Two-Figure" and "Three-Figure" tables, respectively. The "Cutter-Sanborn Three-Figure Table," a modern alteration of the Cutter "Two-Figure" author-table, is also in wide use.

*Library of Congress Classification*

This system, which dates from 1899, was developed by the Library of Congress to meet its own special requirements and, while it includes features of several earlier schemes, it follows the Cutter classification most closely.

Because of its complexity, this system can best be understood by studying the official *Outline of the Library of Congress Classification*, issued by the Subject Catalogue Division (published in Washington in 1942; reprinted in 1947). Subjects are broken down into twenty-one main classes, represented by letters of the alphabet. The letters, I, O, W, X, and Y, not yet used, are available for possible future classes. Subdivisions of the main classes are indicated by designated series of arabic numerals, arranged consecutively within each group, which can be further expanded by the addition of decimal notations; intentional gaps are provided within such sequence of numbers to permit insertion of new entries. In addition to the *Outline* mentioned above, Library of Congress schedules have

been issued in pamphlet form, each main class being printed separately.

To illustrate the minute breakdown of subjects which is characteristic to this system of classification, portions of the *Outline* pertaining to American military history are extracted below.

### C History—Auxiliary Sciences

- CB History of Civilization (General)
  - Special countries in DA-DU, E, F
- D History and Topography (except America)
  - EF America
- E America (General) and United States (General)
  - 11-143 America (General)
  - 31-45 North America (General)
  - 51-99 Indians of North America
  - 101-135 Discovery of America
  - 151-810 United States
  - 151-185 General history and description
    - 185 Negroes in the United States
  - 186-199 Colonial Period
  - 201-298 Revolution
  - 351-364 War of 1812
  - 401-415 War with Mexico
  - 441-453 Slavery
  - 458-655 Civil War
  - 482-489 Confederate States
  - 714-735 War with Spain
    - European war (1914-1918). See D 501-680
    - World War (1939-). See D731.
- F United States (Local) and America except the United States

### U Military Science

- U Military science (General)
- UA Armies. Organization and distribution
- UB Administration
- UC Maintenance and transportation
- UD Infantry
- UE Cavalry
- UF Artillery
- UG Military engineering
- UH Other services
  - 201-655 Medical and sanitary service

### V Naval Science

- V Naval science (General)
- VA Navies. Organization and distribution
- VB Naval administration

- VC Naval maintenance
- VD Naval seamen
- VE Marines
- VF Naval ordnance
- VG Other services of navies
  - 100-475 Medical and sanitary service

### SAMPLE CATALOGUE CARD

H11	}	-1
.N2432		
no. 27 MILLS, FREDERICK CECIL, 1892--)-2		
The structure of postwar prices. New York,		}-3
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1948		
59 p. diagrs. 23 cm. (National Bureau of Economic Research Occasional paper 27)		
4-	{	1. Prices—U.S. 2. Inflation (Finance)—U.S.
		I Title. (Series)
1-(	{	338.52
		Library of Congress 20
		-5 49-1201*)-6

### KEY:

- 1)—Call number.
- 2)—Author (or other main entry).
- 3)—Title
- 4)—Record of other headings under which the card is filed.
- 5)—Decimal classification number (for libraries using this system).
- 6)—Card number.

Library of Congress catalogue cards are used by a large number of other libraries, American and foreign. This is a reproduction of a sample card, together with an explanation thereof.

### Archive Collections

Before attempting to use archival records, the researcher should familiarize himself with some of the peculiarities inherent to that type of material.<sup>2</sup>

Manuscript records, as distinct from published volumes, require considerable preliminary study, as well as special handling, because under normal conditions collections of

<sup>2</sup>One of the best works on the general subject is *A Manual of Archival Administration* by Hilary Jenkinson and F. W. Maitland (London, 1937).

manuscripts can be catalogued only in general form; in fact, it is rarely possible to obtain for groups of manuscripts the precise subject classification one finds for books.

Great care should be exercised in using archival material, since in most cases the records are unique and if mutilated or lost may be irreplaceable. In view of the fact that records are usually not permanently bound, close attention should be paid to their original order and arrangement when used. Any disturbance in their original arrangement will invalidate the finding aids and result in great loss of research time. Like the "stack privilege" in the library, the privilege of using archival records is a valuable one. It should not be abused.

It is a general principle for archival work that records will be housed in an archive in the same physical form as they were when first removed from their initial repository, hence, to use them it is necessary normally to employ the same indexes and finding media as were employed by the personnel who originally serviced them. This rule is not true of small collections of personal papers but, except for these groups and for occasional collections of great historical importance, archive and manuscript collections will not be indexed independently by the archival agency.

Obviously, to search records as they were searched by the agency that created them requires that the researcher be reasonably familiar with the organization of the agency whose records he is using. Thus, he will be able to determine where he should find records about a particular subject by knowing what subordinate division did that particular work; moreover, he should also be familiar with the record-keeping methods used at various times by various agencies concerned.

The collections of original records and documents are vast and are located in a number of different depositories. They form the actual substance of a majority of all

primary source material. Many unofficial documents bearing upon the military are to be found in the Library of Congress. In general, original military records are located in three principal agencies of custody, depending on the date span of the materials: *The National Archives* for the period 1776-1939; *The Adjutant General's three records centers* from 1940 to 1945; and partly in the Adjutant General's records centers and partly in the originating offices from 1946 to the present.<sup>3</sup> These cut-off dates are only a broad guide, and there are numerous exceptions with respect to a number of Army branches and agencies. The Adjutant General should be consulted for specific information as to any given collection or category of documents. The following paragraphs are only a broad general guide to the major depositories and their contents, with representative examples of the more important collections.

#### *Manuscript Division of Library of Congress*

The Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress contains the private papers of many notables in American history. The private papers of most of the Presidents of the United States and of many important military figures are included in the collection. The Library of Congress has issued guides to its manuscript holdings, but these are so out of date that it would be advisable for the prospective researcher to request information concerning the material on the subject in which he is interested. This can be done satisfactorily by correspondence with the Manuscript Division.

#### *National Archives*

Permanently valuable governmental records no longer needed by a federal agency in the transaction of business are generally filed in the National Archives. Its holdings

<sup>3</sup>For further detail see SR 345-920-1, March 1949.

are already very great. Some of the records date from the late 17th century; others are of very recent date. Naturally, it will be impossible here to describe in detail these records.

The National Archives has issued a *Guide*, the latest edition of which appeared in 1948. In the *Guide* are listed the various record groups. For each record group there is given a very short administrative history of the governmental agency or part of an agency that created the records in the group. For example, the Federal Trade Commission would be considered a record group while in a large department such as the Department of the Army, the Adjutant General's Office would be considered a separate record group. Following the administrative history of the record group there is a brief description of the records and of their bulk.

In addition there are prepared "Preliminary Inventories" or "Check-lists" which in the main follow the pattern of the *Guide*, but state in greater detail the contents of the holdings in a particular record group, their beginning and terminal dates, bulk, and method of arrangement. If there is an index available to the records, it is noted. National Archives Preliminary Checklists available in 1950 include:

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the Adjutant General's Office

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the War Department General Staff

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1921

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of Headquarters, United States Army, 1825-1903

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the Bureau of Freedmen Refugees and Abandoned Lands

Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Chemical Warfare Service

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the Office of the Commissary General of Subsistence, 1818-1912

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the Office of The Inspector General, 1814-1939

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (War), 1808-1942

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the National Guard Bureau, and of its Predecessors, 1822-1941

Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Office of the Paymaster General

Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 1800-1942

The *Guide* may be purchased from Government Printing Office while the "Preliminary Inventories" are available upon request at the National Archives.

### *Military Libraries*

There are a number of official Department of the Army libraries which are devoted largely to military works. For military personnel these libraries may constitute the most readily accessible depositories of source material. Most of these libraries have liberal exchange privileges that allow Army personnel access to works in libraries otherwise out of reach. To obtain these exchange privileges one works simply through a local military library.

Among larger military libraries are: Army Library, Pentagon, Washington 25, D.C.; National War College, Fort Leslie J. McNair, D. C.; Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.; Army War College and Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.; and libraries at various branch schools such as that at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

### *State, Local, and Special Collections*

Many depositories throughout the United States have collections rich in military materials. Outstanding are the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.; the Boston Athenaeum, Boston, Mass.; the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich.; the



New York Historical Society, New York, N. Y.; the Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Va.; the Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wis.; the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.; the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penn.; the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.; the Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Ill.; the Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Ill.; the University libraries of Columbia, Harvard, Yale, Princeton, University of Texas, Duke University, University of North Carolina; and departments of archives and history of the other states. Guides are available for many of these collections. For information concerning these depositories, consult *Historical Societies in the U.S. and Canada: A Handbook*, edited by C. C. Crittenden and Doris Goddard, published by the American Association for State and Local History, Washington, 1944.

## AMERICAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND RECORDS

### *Major Changes in the Military Records System*

Effective research in military history requires some knowledge of military records and the manner in which they were indexed and filed during the past. A brief description of some of the various systems that have been used follows:

(a) *The "Book Period," 1800-1889.*—During this period incoming correspondence was registered and outgoing letters were copied in large record books. Orders, descriptive rolls, musters, marches, changes of station, as well as other important information, were also copied therein. These books were supplemented by a "document file," consisting of the originals of letters received, orders, reports, and related papers.

(b) *The "Record Card Period" 1890-1917.*

—From 1890 to 1917 information formerly entered in record books was copied on large cards.

(c) *The "Decimal Classification Period" 1917 to the present.*—Since 1917, incoming papers and copies of outgoing correspondence have been arranged in one file and classified by subject according to the War Department (Department of the Army) decimal classification scheme.

### *Types of Historical Records*

(a) *Regimental Records.*—These records are divided into two basic groups. The first group consists of muster rolls, which were periodic listings for pay purposes. Hence, they usually give little information beyond names, dates of enlistment and of last payment, together with a notation of important facts such as wounds, deaths, illnesses, desertions, discharges, and so forth.

The second group of regimental records, descriptive rolls, in certain cases were the original muster-in rolls; these furnish much more information, including age, place of birth, marital status, civilian occupation, personal description and, sometimes, a brief individual service history. During the book period descriptive rolls were copied in the regimental books and maintained as continuing records. The descriptive roll, or book, is a mine of information.

Other important regimental rolls include morning reports and strength returns, proceedings of general and of special courts-martial, and inspection reports; also, operational records such as field orders and journals, and combat reports.

(b) *Post Records.*—These records consist of strength returns, orders which are sometimes filed with the strength returns, and records of events (otherwise filed with strength returns).

(c) *Brigade, division, corps, and army records.*—These are generally of the same



type as the regimental records except that, depending upon the importance of the organization concerned, they usually become progressively more elaborate in the higher echelons of command.

(d) *Military territorial command records.*—Since 1813, the United States has been divided into geographical areas for purpose of military command. The resulting territorial subdivisions, as well as their designations, have been changed from time to time. For changes in boundaries, composition, and commanders of such geographical units previous to 1880, see *Military Geography of the United States, 1813-1880*, by Raphael P. Thian, and published in Washington in 1881.

#### AMERICAN MILITARY RECORDS AND COLLECTIONS

##### *Records in National Archives*

These records vary so much in character and have emanated from so many different sources, some of which also underwent changes, that it is difficult to cover them all. Among the most important are the following, with page references to the *National Archives Guide*: the Headquarters of the Army, page 392; the Office of the Secretary of War, pages 387-91; the Office of Quartermaster General, pages 347-53; the Adjutant General's Office, pages 353-61; the Office of the Paymaster General, page 375; the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, pages 396-98; the Office of the Surgeon General, pages 399-400; the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, pages 483-85; the National Guard Bureau, and its predecessors, page 497; the Office of the Judge Advocate General, pages 475-80. It should be noted that the courts-martial records for the period 1805-1938 contain a vast amount of invaluable material, practically unexploited, on discipline, morale, quality of leadership at lower echelons, character of the soldiers, judicial procedure, and the nature of military justice. The records of the

Office of the Inspector General, pages 487-88, especially the collection of inspection reports covering the period 1814-1939, are of unusual historical value because, like the courts-martial records, they are largely unexploited and contain a wealth of information on many aspects of military history.

##### *Collections in the Records of the Adjutant General's Office*

The Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, is the principal custodian of current original records and documents. The major collections are maintained and administered by the Departmental Records Branch, and are located at the Federal Records Center, King and Union St., Alexandria, Va.

In general, the data span of the records in this depository covers the period 1939 through 1945. Original records and documents which have not been retired to the Departmental Records Branch are maintained in the office, agency, or headquarters of origin. There are many individual exceptions to the cut-off dates of various collections, and the officials of the Departmental Records Branch should be consulted for exact information. This branch maintains custody of all headquarters records of all branches, agencies, and component organizations of the War Department and the Army. These records are organized and arranged in various collections. Among specially notable collections are the following groups:

1. Records of the Office of the Secretary of War.
2. Records of the divisions of the General Staff, of which the War Plans Division and Operations Division collection are of particular importance.
3. Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff.
4. Records of the Arms, Services, and Branches.

5. Combat records of World War II, including combat operations reports, journals, periodic reports, after action reports, and other records, from army group to regiments and separate battalions.

6. Combined British-American records, World War II, which include the records of Allied Force Headquarters, Africa and Mediterranean Theater of Operations (AFHQ), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, European Theater of Operations (SHAEF), General Headquarters Southwest Pacific (GHQ, SWPA), Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), either in original form or in microfilm.

7. Records of the major commands under the War Department reorganization of 1942, including those of the Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces.

8. War crimes records, including those pertaining to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.

9. Collections of captured German documents, which include a wide variety of materials, mostly in the original, some of which has been translated.

The records of the Army Air Forces have been transferred to the custody of the U.S. Air Forces.

The Historical Records Section of the Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office, maintains a variety of catalogues, inventories, and indexes to the various collections. At the present time, a series of uniform guides is in preparation, which is expected to be completed by the middle of 1951. Among those already published are *Guide to the Records of the Office of the Secretary of War*; *Guide to the Records of Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1942-46*; *Guide to the Records of the Adjutant General's Department, 1940-45*. There are also available numerous special *Reference Aids* prepared and published as a guide to specialized subjects and collections.

Of special interest is the Historical Program File in the collections of the Historical Records Section. This comprises a large quantity of basic research materials relating largely to the technical services, for use in the preparation of monographic studies. Most of the studies themselves are in the collections of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

#### *Collections in Other Army Agencies, Washington, D. C.*

In addition to the bulk of the records contained in the agencies of the Adjutant General's Office, there are others that are maintained in other Army agencies in the Washington area. Three of these are as follows:

1. Engineer records, comprising special categories of materials in the custody of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, are located at Gravelly Point, Va., and some at Fort Belvoir, Va. These supplement the engineer records in the custody of the Adjutant General's Office.

2. Records of the Surgeon General's Office, which include special categories of materials maintained in the custody of the Office of the Surgeon General. There are also valuable historical materials in the Army Medical Library.

3. Records of the Office of the Selective Service System, which include all the central records relating to the draft in World War II, maintained in the custody of the Director of the Selective Service System.

#### *Military Collections in Locations other than Washington, D. C.*

1. *Records Administration Centers of the Adjutant General.*—In addition to the collections maintained in the Adjutant General's Office in Washington, major depositories of important Army records and documents are located in the Records Administration Centers at St. Louis, Mo., and Kansas City, Mo.

The Records Administration Center in St. Louis contains large collections relating to personnel records, financial accounts, and all Army contracts records. The date span varies. Some demobilized personnel records cover the period from 1913 to date.

The Records Administration Center in Kansas City maintains custody of table of organization unit records for all overseas commands and some of the interior commands, including those of World War II; and headquarters records of all zone of the interior commands, including posts, corps area, service commands and their subordinate organizations and units.

Information concerning these depositories may be obtained by addressing correspondence as follows:

Chief, Organization Records Branch  
Records Administration Center, AGO  
4300 Goodfellow Blvd  
St. Louis, Mo.

Commanding Officer  
Kansas City Records Center  
601 Hardesty Ave.  
Kansas City 1, Mo.

2. *US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.*—The Academy records include Post Orders, and Superintendents' and Adjutants' Letter Books. They also include a variety of cadet records from which the Academy career of any of the graduates can be recreated. Cadet records from the Class of 1918 and subsequent years have been transferred to the Kansas City Records Administration Center. Personal papers and memorabilia with few exceptions, are related to the history of the Academy and the history of the Army. Significant groups of letters are by the following:

John Q Adams  
Robert Anderson  
John Armstrong  
Jacob W Bailey

Charles Gratiot  
Ferdinand R Hassler  
Samuel P Heintzelman  
Andrew Jackson

Rufus L Baker  
Philip N Barbour  
William H C Bartlett  
Eugene B Beaumont  
Pierre G T Beauregard  
Henry W Benham  
James G Benton  
John G Bourke  
Alexander H Bowman  
Braxton Bragg  
Jacob Brown  
Paul D Bunker  
John C Calhoun  
De Witt Clinton  
William H Crawford  
George W Cullum  
Hannibal Day  
David B Douglass  
James Duncan  
William Dutton  
William Eustis  
William Frazer  
James Gadsden  
Robert S Garnett  
Samuel L Gouverneur  
Ulysses S Grant

Gouverneur Kemble  
Jacob Kingsbury  
Alexander Macomb  
James Monroe  
David Parker  
Alden Partridge  
Thomas Pinckney  
Joel R Poinsett  
Josiah Quincy  
James Renwick  
Wirt Robinson  
Stephen Rochefontaine  
Thomas Ruger  
Winfield Scott  
William T Sherman  
Albert Svirha  
Alexander J Swift  
Joseph G Swift  
Sylvanus Thayer  
George Totten  
Christopher  
Vandeventer  
Anthony Wayne  
Jonathan Williams  
William Jenkins Worth

3. *Additional Collections.* — There are numerous other depositories, outside Washington, of lesser and specialized importance, which cannot be fully covered here. Examples are: Ordnance records at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.; records at the Engineer Historical Section, Baltimore, Md.; the Signal Corps Photograph and Film Collection, Long Island City, N.Y. The Adjutant General (Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch) should be consulted for complete coverage of these special collections, their contents, and location.

#### PUBLISHED DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL

##### *Reports of Agencies of the Military Establishment*

These include the *Annual Reports of the Secretary of War*, which contain the Annual Reports of the Chief of Staff, and sections providing statistical reports on the strength, composition, organization, and distribution

of the Army. These reports are brief, but are highly valuable as a guide to problems, policy, major events and developments, and changes within the Military Establishment that can be further explored in detail in the original records and documents. *The Annual Reports of the Militia Bureau* (after 1933 *Annual Reports of the National Guard Bureau*) are a primary source for the organization, strength, distribution, problems, policies, and administration of the National Guard. Of equal value are the Annual Reports of various chiefs of branches, such as those of the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Field Artillery, The Surgeon General, and the Chief of Coast Artillery. Some of these, such as the reports of The Surgeon General, were issued in printed form. Others were published with limited distribution in mimeograph.

#### *General and Special Statutes Relating to the Army*

Noteworthy examples include the National Defense Act of 1916, whose provisions formed the basis of the organization and structure of the Army at the end of World War I, and the National Defense Act of 1920 and its subsequent amendments which provided the permanent basis of the Military Establishment's framework and organization to the present time. The edition of January 1945 includes all amendments to that date, together with all cognate acts and the sources of all provisions in effect. This composite statute is an indispensable source for the basic organization and structure of the Army. Examples of collected legislation pertaining to this period are *Laws Relating to National Defense Enacted by the 76th Congress* (compiled by E. Lewis, Washington, 1941), and *Laws Relating to National Defense Enacted by the 77th Congress* (compiled by E. Lewis, Washington, 1943). Other specific military legislation may be found in *United States*

*Statutes at Large* for the years covered by this period.

#### *Congressional Documents*

The mass of documents relating to Congressional proceedings on military affairs provides a valuable source of historical material. Debates in the Senate and House on military questions are printed in the *Congressional Record*. Of special importance are the published *Hearings before the Committees on Military Affairs* of both houses of Congress. *The Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations* which record proceedings on the Army appropriation bills each year are of particular value. Among hearings on specific subjects which provide important historical materials may be cited the *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, and *Hearings before the Select Committee on Post War Policy*, which related to the proposals to establish a single Department of Defense.

#### *Army Regulations*

The large series of Regulations covering the years under consideration, together with their revisions, changes, and modification, provides an indispensable source for tracing the history of Army organization, administration, and operation. These supply the details not covered in the general legislation cited above.

#### *War Department Circulars, Bulletins*

These supplement the various regulations and provide equally valuable material for the organization, administration, and operations of the Army. For example, War Department Circular 59, March 9, 1942, contains the specific provisions of the War Department reorganization of that year.

#### *War Department General and Special Orders*

These orders also contain much material relating to the administration and operation



of the Army, and in addition provide a valuable source of biographical data, since many general and special orders relate to individual personnel.

### *Training Literature, Regulations, and Manuals*

These are indispensable for tracing the history and development of training principles, doctrine, techniques, and the changes therein over a period under consideration. They constitute a very large and varied body of source material of a specialized nature.

### *Miscellaneous Documents*

In addition to the major categories mentioned above, numerous miscellaneous types of official documents provide a further body of source material for the historian. Such documents include staff regulations, bulletins, Executive Orders, technical manuals, technical bulletins, tables of organization and equipment, tables of allowances, published reports of board proceedings, and various other papers.

### UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS

In addition to the several categories of official documents listed above there is a steadily increasing number of works relating to World War II. Much of this unpublished material is in the custody of various agencies of the Military Establishment. In general it includes unpublished studies, monographs, reports, and other papers in the several higher schools of the Army, as well as similar materials in the collections of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

### *National War College Studies and Monographs*

Individual studies and committee reports on politico-military subjects are prepared by students reported principally from Army,

Navy, Air Force, and State Departments. Also, files are maintained of lectures by visiting experts on political, military, economic, and psycho-social aspects of our national and international policies. Not all of these experts come from within US governmental agencies. None of this material can be considered as representing the official attitude of the Government or of the Departments concerned, since one of the prime purposes of the College is to encourage breadth of thought by the students in consideration of problems.

### *Industrial College of the Armed Forces Studies and Monographs*

Established as Army Industrial College in 1924. From its establishment in 1924 to its suspension in December 1941, documents—studies, monographs, reports, including annual reports rendered to the War Department, and lectures of the College—were generally in manuscript form, though some have been reproduced and bound. On reopening the College in 1943, policy as to documentary materials was revised: all major materials are now published in regular series by category and chronologically. They are deposited in the Library of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Basic series of publications maintained by the College include: (a) Research and Miscellaneous Reports (Code "R"); (b) Lectures (Code "L"); (c) Seminars (Code "S"); (d) Student Reports (Code "SR").

### *Command and General Staff School (College) Studies*

These studies, monographs, reports, and such papers, relating to tactical, logistical, staff, and administrative subjects on the division, corps, and army levels, are prepared by student officers in the college. There are also special studies by faculty members. The college maintains an excellent index of sub-



jects. A periodic list of subjects is published.

## GUIDES TO LIBRARY MATERIALS

### *Guides to Reference Works*

Mudge, Isadore G. *Guide to Reference Books*. 6th ed.; Chicago, 1936. Lists principal guides, bibliographies, and reference books to major fields of study. The sections on military subjects are inadequate largely because of the lack of suitable material.

Shores, Louis. *Basic Reference Books: An Introduction to the Evaluation, Study and Use of Reference Materials*. Chicago, 1939. This is a shorter list than Mudge. The descriptions are longer and more complete.

### *Selected Historical Atlases*

Lord, Clifford L., and Elizabeth H. Lord. *Historical Atlas of the United States*. New York, 1944. It has a good coverage of economic, political, and social geography and a small section on wars.

Adams, James Truslow, ed. *Atlas of American History*. New York, 1943. Less statistical than Lord's work but more interesting to the military historian.

Paullin, Charles O., and John K. Wright. *Atlas of Historical Geography of the United States*. New York, 1932. Includes many old maps and detailed economic, political, and social coverage.

Shepherd, W. R. *Historical Atlas*. 7th ed.; New York, 1929.

### *Guides to Maps*

Claussen, Martin P., and Herman R. Friis. *Descriptive Catalogue of Maps Published by Congress*. Washington, 1941.

Library of Congress. *Author List of Geographical Atlases in the Library of Congress*. Washington, 1920. This is especially good for old maps.

National Geographic Maps. Washington, D. C. A list of maps produced by the National Geographic Society.

Ristow, Walter W. *Maps, How to Make Them and Read Them: A Bibliography of General and Specialized Works on Cartography*. New York, 1943.

Smith, Harold T. U. *Aerial Photographs and Their Applications*. New York, 1943.

Thiele, Walter. *Official Map Publications*. Chicago, 1938.

U. S. Army Map Service. *Indexes for Selected Map Coverage*. Washington, 1941-1943.

U. S. Army Map Service. *General Map Catalog*. Washington, D. C.

Winterbotham, Harold S. J. L. *A Key to Maps*. 2d ed.; London and Glasgow, 1939.

### *Guides to Magazines*

Gregory, Winifred, ed. *Union List of Serials in the United States and Canada*. 2d ed.; New York, 1943. This union list catalogue shows where copies of over 70,000 different magazines of all periods may be found in United States and Canadian libraries. It is indispensable to one working with older magazines. It does not index the articles in the magazines.

*Magazine Subject Index, 1907-*. Boston, 1908.

This magazine index is intended as a supplement to *Poole's Index* and the *Reader's Guide*. It specializes on historical articles, particularly those on local history.

*Poole's Index to Periodical Literature, 1802-1881*.

Rev. ed.; Boston, 1891. 2 vols. Supplements bring the coverage through 1906 in 5 volumes, Boston, 1887-1908. About 590,000 articles from 470 American and English periodicals are listed. Nonfictional material, including reviews of books, is indexed by subject only. For a fuller description of this and other periodical indexes and guides, see Mudge, *Guide to Reference Books*. In order to locate a magazine referred to in the index use the *Union List* mentioned above.

*Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, 1900-*

New York, 1905. This is a modern cumulative magazine index, kept up to date monthly. Articles are listed under author, title, and subject when necessary. In addition, the Wilson Company publishes other magazine indexes of a more specialized nature.

### *Guides to Newspapers*

Brigham, Clarence S. "Bibliography of American Newspapers, 1690-1820," in the *American Antiquarian Society Proceedings* (Vols. 23-37, with some volumes omitted). This gives historical sketches of newspapers published in the period, with frequency and dates and a checklist of copies to be found in various libraries in the United States. For other checklists of early newspapers see Mudge.

Gregory, Winifred. *American newspapers, 1821-1936*. New York, 1937. This is a new union

list of the newspaper holdings of nearly 5,700 depositories including private collections. It attempts to cover all United States newspapers published in the period.

The Library of Congress has also published checklists of the 18th century American newspapers and of the foreign newspapers among its holdings.

*New York Times Index, 1913-*. New York, 1913.

This is a carefully made index to items appearing in the *Times*. It includes cross references and brief synopses of many items.

Because of the immense number of items to be covered, newspaper indexes are quite rare. The Historical Records Survey, Works Progressive Administration, prepared topical indexes for a number of newspapers which make the files of these papers usable within the time indexed. Some work of a similar nature has been done by other agencies. A list of the newspapers so covered is given in H. O. Brayer, "Preliminary Guide to Indexed Newspapers in the United States," reprinted from the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, September 1946 (Vol. 33, no. 2).

Slauson, A. B., comp. *Check List of American Newspapers in the Library of Congress*. Washington, 1901. It lists newspapers by states and towns, and gives historical sketch of each with its frequency and dates of publication.

## GUIDES TO ARCHIVES AND MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS

### National Archives

National Archives, *Guide to the Records in the National Archives*. Washington, 1948. This guide is issued periodically. It is indispensable to the researcher in American military history. The National Archives has also prepared a series of checklists and inventories of the Army records it holds, previously listed.

### Library of Congress

Fitzpatrick, John C. *Handbook of Manuscripts in the Library of Congress*. Washington, 1918. The collections are listed alphabetically by principal name or subject with an index for every name and many subjects. The collection is also

generally broken down into small groups of papers with the dates and topics of each.

Garrison, Curtiss W. *List of Manuscript Collections in the Library of Congress to July 1931*. Washington, 1932. It includes material in the *Handbook* plus additions received to July 1931, but in less detail. Arrangement of collections is by period.

Powell, C. Percy. *List of Manuscript Collections in the Library of Congress July 1931 to July 1938*. Washington, 1939. It contains additions since the Garrison *List* with much the same arrangement. Detailed finding media to all its collections exists in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, where the documents listed in the above three references are housed.

### Manuscript Collections

Griffin, Grace G., comp. *A Guide to Manuscripts Relating to American History in British Depositories, Reproduced for the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress*. Washington, 1946. The Carnegie Institution has issued a series of other guides to manuscript collections in the United States and foreign countries that contain material bearing on American history. Historical Records Survey, Works Progress Administration. *Guide to Depositories of Manuscript Collections in the United States*. Washington, 1938; arranged by state. It lists the principal historical manuscript repositories in 18 states with their holdings. It also lists guides to these holdings where available. The survey has not been completed. Only California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin are covered.

Library of Congress. *Checklist of Collections of Personal Papers in Historical Societies, University and Public Libraries, and Other Learned Institutions in the United States*. Washington, 1918. This is the first important attempt to list the collections of "personal papers" in the U.S. Principal names or subjects are listed alphabetically with a detailed rearrangement by periods which is in effect an index.

Library of Congress. *Manuscripts in Public and Private Collections in the United States*. Washington, 1924. An enlargement of the above *Checklist*, arranged by states with a detailed index.

Commercially published guides to specific col-

lections are available in increasing number and excellence and may be secured from the repositories concerned.

## GUIDES TO PUBLISHED GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

### General Documents

Boyd, Anne M. *U. S. Government Publications as Sources of Information for Libraries*. 3d ed.; New York, 1941.

Clark, Edith E. *Guide to the Use of United States Government Documents*. Boston, 1918.

Schmeckebier, L. F. *Government Publications and Their Use*. Washington, 1936.

Wyer, James I., Jr. *United States Government Documents, Federal, State, and City*. Rev. ed.; Chicago, 1933. This guide is designed to assist in the use of government publications.

### Federal Documents

Ames, John Griffith. *Comprehensive Index to the Publications of the United States Government, 1881-1893*. Washington, 1905. This index bridges the gap between Poore's *Catalogue* and the *Document Catalogue*.

Poore, Benjamin Perley. *Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Publications of the United States, September 5, 1774-March 4, 1881*. Washington, 1885. The catalogue is arranged chronologically with a general but insufficiently detailed index. The full title, author, date, and

location of each document is given, with a brief summary of its contents.

U. S. Superintendent of Documents. *Catalogue of the Public Documents of Congress and of All Departments of the Government of the United States*. Washington, 1893-. This is the permanent and complete catalogue of government publications for the modern period, comprehensively indexed. It is usually called *Document Catalogue*.

### State and Local Documents

Bowker, Richard R. *State Publications*. New York, 1899-1909. 4 vols. It is not up to date, but helpful in locating state documents published prior to 1909.

Thorpe, Francis N. *Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and Colonies* . . . . Washington, 1909. 7 vols. This is useful as a comprehensive collection of the basic legislation governing state military forces.

U. S. Library of Congress. *Monthly Check-List of State Publications*. Washington, 1910-. This is a current bibliography of official state documents, maintained since 1909, arranged by states, and indexed broadly by subject.

For additional document catalogues and checklists, including those of foreign governments, consult Mudge, *Guide to Reference Books*, or other similar guides.

## Chapter III

### STEPS IN RESEARCH

#### CHOOSING A SUBJECT

The wise choice of a subject is basic to the preparation of a good historical paper. Naturally the writer should possess a good general knowledge of the field in which he desires to work. To the professional officer, military history, especially that of the United States, should offer the most possibilities. Appropriate topics can be found in "Suggested Fields for Theses of Military Students in the Fields of the Social Sciences and Business Administration," which is distributed annually by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

Once the general field has been determined, several considerations must be kept in mind in choosing a topic. It must possess unity and be sufficiently restricted in scope to be amenable to thorough investigation and detailed presentation. It must deal with a significant subject. It must make an original contribution. It should investigate some new topic, or add new knowledge to some known subject, since it is possible that the student can, by re-examination of old evidence coupled with a study of new evidence, correct old errors or reinterpret matters that have been covered earlier. A study possessing these characteristics is called on a monograph, and normally lies well within the scope of a student in a graduate school. Such a student should not attempt a comprehensive survey of a broad field, as such surveys usually require years, decades, and even lifetimes of research. Thus the beginner should avoid such topics as "The Allied Campaigns against Japan during World War II," or "Eisenhower's Campaigns in Northwest

Europe," for these cannot be properly dealt with in less than several volumes. To write a comprehensive history of even one of the U.S. Army's campaigns in World War II requires two to three years' work by an experienced scholar.

An example may best illustrate some of the steps involved in selection of a good topic. Assume that a hypothetical student officer served in a field artillery battalion in the Guadalcanal Campaign. Quickly deciding not to write on the entire campaign because it was too big and has already been covered by other writers, he elects to write a history of artillery operations in support of the infantry, tentatively entitled "The Employment of Artillery in the Guadalcanal Campaign." His researches quickly disclose that the Guadalcanal Campaign embraced landings on Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and the Russells as well as on Guadalcanal. Deciding that a discussion of artillery in all these invasions would take too long, he cuts his subject down to "The Employment of Artillery on Guadalcanal, 7 August 1942-9 February 1943." But further researches disclose that antiaircraft artillery was employed, and he does not wish to involve himself and his readers in discussions involving radar, gun-laying directors, and remote-control systems. Further, he discovers that from time to time warships lay offshore giving fire support to the infantry. But he does decide to discuss, as much as possible, the Japanese employment of field artillery on Guadalcanal. Therefore the topic he finally selects is "The Employment of Field Artillery on Guadalcanal, 7 August 1942-9 February 1943."



### THE TENTATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY<sup>1</sup>

As the writing of history is an organic process, no two subjects ever call for exactly the same steps in research. The steps listed below are merely suggestions, and the student actually engaged in research will probably vary from them in accordance with the needs of his subject. Concrete examples may best illustrate the early steps.

The hypothetical student, already referred to, has elected to write on "The Employment of Field Artillery on Guadalcanal, 7 August 1942-9 February 1943." From personal experience, from a study of newspapers and news magazines, and from general reading he has some familiarity with the nature and course of World War II in the Pacific. His professional military education and experience have made him familiar with military operations in general, and have particularly qualified him to understand the nature, functions, and special problems of the field artillery, and to explain all these points to a nonprofessional reader.

#### Books

The officer's first step is to prepare a working bibliography to be used as a guide to the books, articles, documents, and other sources to be consulted. His first move is probably to consult the card catalogue of the library where he is working to find the books that deal with his subject. For most subjects, a formidable bibliography can be assembled by consulting author, title, and subject entries in the card catalogue. In assembling the bibliography, all relevant data concerning each book should be entered on separate cards or small slips of paper. These data include: names of authors, or editors; the full title as

it is printed on the book's title page; series title, if any; edition, if other than the first; the volume number and total number of volumes if more than one; and the name of the publisher, place published or publisher's home office, and date of publication.

In the case of a series, or of a multivolume work, the initial and terminal years should be listed. If the series is not complete, the first year should be shown followed by a dash. Noting the library's call number on the card will save time if the book is needed again. However, the call number does not appear in the final bibliography included in the monograph. No more than one title should be entered on a single card; thus the cards can be later filed in logical order. In addition to the data listed above, other bits of information that throw light on the value and authoritativeness of the book should be entered. Important among these are those items or parts that deal with his subject, the author's position if it qualified him as an authority, the scope of the book, and finally, a brief evaluation by himself.<sup>2</sup>

In the case of the Guadalcanal Campaign, the bibliographical problem is more difficult than usual, for the campaign occurred so recently that a large body of historical literature bearing on it has not yet been developed. But the military student is doubtless aware that the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,<sup>3</sup> is preparing a comprehensive series on the recent war, entitled UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Finding these volumes presents some difficulty, but the ingenious will discover that in most libraries the volumes are shelved with U.S. Government Publications. They are usually listed in the

<sup>1</sup>A fairly detailed treatment of the steps involved in preparing a tentative bibliography, but related to general history, may be found in Homer Carey Hockett, *Introduction to Research in American History* (2d ed.; New York, 1949), pp. 7ff.

<sup>2</sup>For methods of determining something about the quality of a book before reading, see section in this chapter entitled "Evaluating Material."

<sup>3</sup>Predecessor agencies were the Historical Branch, G-2, WDGS, and Historical Division, SSUSA.



card catalogue in the section showing the United States as author, although each volume in the series lists the author or authors by name. The bibliographic card for *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive*, with the student's comment, should be something like this:

[call number]
(U.S. Department of the Army. Historical Division.) Miller, John, Jr. <i>Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (History of the War in the Pacific: UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II</i> , Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor) Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1949
Book based on journals, action reports, war diaries, and JCS and OPD files. Covers USMC, U. S. Army, and Japanese ground opns; air and naval opns are summarized. Considerable attention to arty.

Once a few titles have been selected from the card catalogue and complete card entries filled out, the student or historian should examine the books. He can either check them out or obtain a permit to enter the library stacks and look at them there. Some of these prospective titles, proving valueless, will be discarded after a brief examination has been made.

The observant researcher may note an inconsistency. The average library card catalogue lists the Government Printing Office as publisher of *Guadalcanal*, but the title page of the book shows the publisher to be Historical Division, Department of the Army. Since the book's title page is the authority, "Historical Division, Department of the Army" should be written on the card, not "Government Printing Office."

In the case of a subject such as the Guadalcanal Campaign, some additional published material may be found, but this will not compare favorably with the mass of material available to one working in an earlier period of history. In any case, he will find it advisable to organize and classify his file of cards under appropriate headings such as "General

Histories," "Monographs," "Magazine Articles," and later organize entries regarding documentary sources.

Once the card catalogue has yielded all possible information, the bibliographies and footnotes of the books themselves should be studied to obtain additional titles, and cards should be filled out. American historical scholars generally include in their bibliographies, or footnotes, or both, all the information needed for a bibliographic file. These volumes should then be examined and appraised. Books not available in a given library can usually be purchased by the library, or obtained through the system of interlibrary loans.

### *Periodicals and Newspapers*

Magazine and newspaper articles as well as government publications used in a study will be cited in footnotes and listed in the bibliography. The student will find in *Guadalcanal's* Bibliographical Note a list of useful magazine articles, several of which pertain to his subject. He should enter on a card the author's name, title of the article (in quotation marks), title of magazine (in italics), the volume and number, date, and the page reference if desired, although it is not absolutely necessary. For example:

Casey, Capt. John F., Jr. "An Artillery Forward Observer on Guadalcanal," <i>Field Artillery Journal</i> , XXXIII, 8 August, 1943.
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Follow this with notes on the scope and value of the article.

For articles in encyclopedias, the same form

can be employed, but the number of the edition should be shown. When they do not fill entire volumes, articles in reports, and other papers, published by scholarly organizations can be listed like those in periodicals. In citing newspapers, give the name of the paper as it appears on the first page, and the date of the issue. If the name of the city wherein the paper is published does not appear in the title, insert it in brackets. It is not necessary to show the page and column number of a newspaper article in a formal bibliography, but it will often save time to indicate them on the bibliographic entry, such as:

*The Washington Post*, 2 May 1950  
(Gen. Geo. C. Kenny reported saying war with Russia coming—p. 3, col. 1).

The following are examples of bibliographical entries from such sources:

National Archives, Industrial Records Branch,  
Records of the Office of Secretary of Labor,  
Correspondence File, 1916-1920.

38th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate,  
*Executive Document No. 5*,  
"Annual Report of the Secretary of War."

### *U. S. Government Publications and Documents*

Much of the writing in American military history must be done in primary source material using government documents and manuscripts. To do effective work, one must understand the various filing systems used by the Army throughout the years, and must know of the major repositories and the extent of materials located in them. If the subject chosen deals with a current or very recent problem it is possible that all source material used may be of a primary nature.

A brief discussion of the various collections of official documents, records, and manuscripts, and the guides for their use is included in Chapter III, Part One, of this Guide.

United States Treasury Department, War Finance  
Division, *The Army at War*, Government Printing  
Office, Washington, 1944.

### *Army Records*

It is in U. S. Army records that the greatest difficulty in footnotes and in bibliographic entries will probably be encountered, for there is no generally accepted practice for citing the manifold printed, typewritten, mimeographed, multilithed, and handwritten Army regulations, general orders, reports,

planning papers, letters, memoranda, journals, radiograms, and messages that constitute U. S. Army documents. Part Two gives the system used by the Editorial Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Records in the Department of the Army fall into four general categories: (1) letters, memoranda, and other communications; (2) archival material of a nonmanuscript character; (3) field records of military units and commands, and (4) records of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. In the case of letters, memos, radiograms, and other communications that are usually filed in binders bearing numbers, the bibliographic entry should indicate the character of the documents, the general subject matter, the file or binder identification number, and the file location when consulted. Official abbreviations and short titles can be used for the tentative bibliography, but in the final bibliography only the most obvious abbreviations should be used. As in the case of books, the bibliographic entry should be followed by the researcher's addition of appropriate data. For example:

USAFISPA File No. 381

Preliminary Planning COMSOPAC and COMGENSOPAC,

Jan 1943-June 1943.

Filed in Org Rec Br, Rec Admin Center  
AGO, St. Louis, Mo.

Contains letters and memos between Halsey's and Harmon's hq, and recommendations of the New Georgia Planning Committee dealing with planning for New Georgia invasion. Is the best single source on genesis of ground force tactical plans.

or:

IN and OUT logs of the CofS, USA, for [any given period] Filed in Stf Comm Office, Office, Secy, GSUSA.

The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Consists of rads between CofS and theater, area, and task force commanders. CofS studied these incoming messages daily. Give clear picture of strategic situation as it then appeared and summarizes important events, plans, and decisions.

2. The second category, archival material of a nonmanuscript character, presents new difficulties. It includes material like Army general orders, manuals and Army regulations which can often be cited like books, but the titles should not be italicized. File locations need not be given.

3. The field records of military units and commands tend to overlap into the first category of letters, memos, and communications. It will be noted that the first example cited above is derived from a field command. But there is a wide range of documents relating to combat that are submitted by field units and commands. The bibliographic entries for these should show the unit or command, character of the record or its title, or both, its date, and present file location. For example:

USAFISPA, ACofS, G-2

The Japanese Campaign in the Guadalcanal Area,  
7 August 1943.

Filed in Military Intelligence Library, G-2, GSUSA.  
The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Based on enemy records captured on Guadalcanal and on results of POW interrogation. Deals only with first months of campaign. Appears careful and conservative.

or:

GHO SWPA, G-3 Journal (for a given period).

Filed in Hist Rec Sec, Dept Rec Br,  
Admin Serv Div, AGO, Dept of the Army.  
The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Contains the Secret, but not the Top Secret, entries, plans, orders, messages, and other papers.

4. The fourth category embraces materials which are not, strictly speaking, U. S. Army documents, but are the papers of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and subordinate committees which are essential to an understanding of the strategy of World War II. These documents fortunately are available in the Department of the Army. Sample entries:

JCS, Minutes of Meetings from 26th Mtg to 50th Mtg, 28 July 1942-19 January 1943.  
 Filed in Research and Records Sec. JCS, Dept. of Defense. The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.  
 [Or] Filed in Gen Research Sec, G-3, GSUSA  
 The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

JPS 67/2, Proposed Directive for a Campaign Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 4 Jan 1943, OPD File 381 Japan (8-27-42), Sec 1.  
 Filed in Research and Records Sec, JCS, Dept. of Defense. The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.  
 [Or] Filed in Gen Research Sec, G-3, GSUSA,  
 The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

### Interviews

Most history is written from documents. The documents themselves, the primary sources, are usually written by participants or eyewitnesses. But a student of the history of World War II often has direct access to eyewitnesses of and participants in the events of the war, and whenever possible he should interview them to gain a better understanding of the events, to check statements in the records, to determine the varying points of view in the case of disputes, and to increase

the vividness and precision of his narrative.

Unless they can be interviewed on the spot during a given series of events such as a military campaign, participants and eyewitnesses should only be interviewed after the student or historian has studied nearly all the records. This will save time and avoid error. Once all available written materials have been studied, he will know if there are any large gaps in the story. He can then phrase specific questions to be put to the person interviewed: questions relating to events of which the person could be expected to have direct knowledge. The interviewer, with his broad knowledge, can detect inaccuracy, vagueness, and imperfect recollection on the part of the person interviewed.

Unfortunately, it is not always possible to conduct interviews at the ideal time. Army officers' assignments are changed so often that they must be interviewed at opportune rather than ideal moments. Under these circumstances, the student should proceed with his interview when he is able to meet the subject, but should remember that the circumstances are not ideal. If the participants cannot be met face to face, a good deal of valuable data can be elicited by correspondence.

### *Preliminary Reading for General Orientation*

By this time the student will have made good progress on his bibliography and will have begun appraising it and discarding what is obviously of little use. He also will have formed a general idea of the outline of his subject. These steps, although discussed separately, are not necessarily taken separately in practice. The assembly of a tentative bibliography, the appraising of the materials, and the preliminary reading are usually conducted almost concurrently.

Once it appears that the main elements of the bibliography have been assembled, the basic sources should be scanned to obtain a



general outline of the events to be described. At this stage the author will not take many notes.

### THE TENTATIVE OUTLINE

When the preliminary reading has been completed and the general sequence of events has been determined, it is well to prepare a rough outline in order to focus the detailed, comprehensive reading that is to follow and to facilitate the taking of notes. For example, a study of *Guadalcanal* shows that the main aspects of field artillery employment included tactical support of infantry in offense and defense as well as counterbattery fire, and that the main problems of the field artillery were the difficulties of moving ammunition over rough jungle terrain, the selection of good positions, and the inadequacies of the available maps. These will constitute the main points of the outline, and it should eventually be organized in such a way as to bring out clearly the interrelationship of these points.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this outline is tentative—it will be changed frequently as new facts emerge that change the relationship of the main points.

### *Taking Notes—Some General Considerations and Suggestions*<sup>4</sup>

The first notes to be taken will probably come from the most general sources, and will be apt to provide background material. Thus the author will probably be dealing with items of common knowledge that do not require documentation. It will not be necessary, for example, to cite books to prove that the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive* will need to be cited, for if the writer wishes to compare conclusions, or if

he finds *Guadalcanal* in error, he will need to cite it.

As progress is made deeper into the subject, note taking will increase, as will skill in taking notes. As Hockett points out, the historian's instinct for the facts he needs, like the reporter's nose for news, develops with use.<sup>5</sup> No precise rules can be formulated, but a few general rules can be followed. It is worse to take too few notes than too many, but the golden mean should be sought. Do not spend time on interesting but irrelevant matters. Only extremely important, exact, or particularly vivid passages need be copied verbatim. Needless to say, any quoted passages must be quoted precisely as they appear in the original. Let any errors stand, but add [sic]. Interpolations that increase the meaning of a passage should also be placed in brackets (not parentheses), as "the 67th [Fighter Squadron] was fortunate." When words are omitted, indicate the omission by three periods, but when they are omitted from the end of a sentence use four periods. If a sentence is quoted, and part of the succeeding material is omitted, place the period close to the last letter thus: "The fire devastated the vicinity of the water hole. . . . When the 1st Battalion attacked south against its objective over a route known to have been formerly strongly held by the enemy, it encountered only minor opposition." Care should be taken to write notes in such a way that the material is kept within its context. The meaning and intent of the original must be preserved.

Note taking is a mechanical as well as an intellectual process, and the mechanics are of vital importance. The best and most convenient system involves a loose-leaf or card system. Only through such a system can material be classified or rearranged. Whether paper or cards are employed, the size to be

<sup>4</sup>For useful suggestions see Earle W. Dow, *Principles of a Note System for Historical Studies* (New York, 1924).

<sup>5</sup>Hockett, *Introduction to Research*, p. 48.



used depends on personal preference. Only one major item of information should be entered on a card. In this way, similar materials from widely separated sources studied at different times can be brought together.

As the facts or data are recorded on cards or slips of paper, many comments and ideas regarding those facts will come to mind—points regarding their significance and accuracy, interpretations of their meaning and relationship to other facts, and other such generalizations. These thoughts about the facts should be recorded at once on the same card rather than trusting to memory, for often a long time elapses between note taking and the actual writing of the paper. To avoid later confusion, the author should clearly indicate on the card which are the actual facts and which are his own comments.

Each card should have an appropriate topical heading, and should contain the important bibliographical information. If a book, enter the author's name, the title, date of publication, and the page; if a magazine, give the author, title of article and magazine, volume, number, date, and perhaps page; if a military letter or memorandum, record the sender, recipient, date, and all relevant numbers such as AGO number, date-time-group, and CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers; if an order, report, or journal, enter the issuing headquarters, nature, title, date, and perhaps the file location, if needed. For example:

Prep for arty support of XIV Corps Early Jan 53  
1st Jan Offensive.

25th Div. Arty, Rpt Action Against Enemy, 10 Jan-10 Feb 43, p. 1. In Hist Rec Sec, Dept Rec Br, Admin Serv Div, AGO, Dept of Army

Easy to select arty positions. Japanese lack of arty and air power enabled U. S. arty to ignore defile, camouflage, and concealment. Could safely emplace wpns on fwd slopes of hills. Picked positions west of Lunga. (for exact positions see later notes from arty bn rpts.)

Strategic Planning for Guadalcanal. JCS Level  
23 Jun 42

Rad, Cofs USA to GHQ, SWPA, CM-OUT-5704, 23 Jun 42. In Cofs OUT LOG for June. Stf comm, Secy, GSUSA, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Gen Marshall informed Gen MacArthur that U. S. Navy did not like MacArthur's plan for the campaign against Rabaul.

### *Arranging and Filing Notes*

With the tentative outline completed, the student has some idea of how his material is to be organized. If he has arranged the outline into chapters, sections, and subsections, the notes themselves, with their topic headings as a guide, can be arranged to conform to the outline. Guide cards of different colors, or guide cards with raised edges on which can be written such data as "Chap X: Sec 1; Subsec 1" can be used to indicate the chapters, sections, and subsections. The degree of elaborateness of the system will of course depend on the elaborateness and intricacy of the subject matter. The notes themselves should be filed in a box, file drawer, or some convenient repository.

### EVALUATING MATERIAL

The evaluation of data, the application of critical standards to the sources, is one of the most significant and essential processes of historiography. Industrious, resourceful, meticulous, and aggressive research is basic to the writing of history, but it is wasted if the historian does not carefully evaluate his data.<sup>6</sup> Through the processes of evaluation

<sup>6</sup>For good discussions of the evaluation of data, see the following: Allen Johnson, *The Historian and Historical Evidence* (New York, 1926); Hockett, *Introduction to Research in American History*, pp. 56-111; Charles V. Langlois, and Charles Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*, tr G. Berry (New York, 1912), pp. 71-211; A. P. Scott and J. L. Care, *Syllabus and Problems for History 201, Introduction to Historical Method and Historiography* (Chicago, 1945), pp. 33-92.

forgeries are exposed, anonymous writings are identified, false or erroneous statements are detected, bias is discovered, and eventually truth in relative if not in absolute form emerges. To repeat, historiography is an organic process. The gathering of data and the criticism of data are not necessarily separate. They normally will be conducted concurrently, although the criticism of data will continue until the final draft of the monograph is written.

One essential quality that all scholars must possess is skepticism. Every source, no matter how respectable its origin, must be regarded as suspect until it has been tested and found valid. There are innumerable examples in American history of reputable individuals who made serious errors in fact that either misled or puzzled historians.<sup>7</sup> The fact that one's senses are easily deceived, that several eyewitnesses of an event will often honestly give completely different accounts is also well known.<sup>8</sup> Aside from errors resulting from fading memories, ignorance, carelessness, and bad sensory perception, there are other equally serious false data in the sources, many of which arise from the self-interest of individuals or organizations. Official propaganda must always be suspect, as must the claims of individuals or units regarding their contributions to, say, a particular military campaign. In these cases, the historian's ferreting out of error is a task whose ease lies in inverse ratio to the degree of error. The more false the statements in the source, the easier they are to detect. Good (that is, effective) propaganda is usually subtle; it avoids deliberate falsehoods. It may mislead by subtle exaggeration or by suppression of pertinent facts. The historian, therefore, must be constantly on the alert against misleading statements that derive from a mul-

titude of causes. As Allen Johnson has phrased it, "In historical studies doubt is the beginning of wisdom."<sup>9</sup>

In military operations in particular evidence must be carefully weighed. It is obvious that in the excitement and confusion of battle the participants do not see, hear, or recollect with absolute clarity. Neither do they see from the same position or angle. Few men engaged in battle have any clear conception of what is going on, although with modern developments in communications it appears that the fog of war has lightened, at least for unit commanders. The necessity for censorship for security, or to bolster morale, leads to the suppression of facts, especially in news dispatches and communiques. As indicated above, military reports submitted to higher headquarters are not always completely factual or truthful. Errors and failures may be glossed over. Rumors of dubious origin spread rapidly, and sometimes find their way into official reports.

### *External Criticism*

External criticism involves those tests that seek to establish the authenticity of a particular document. It detects forgeries and false versions and identifies anonymous documents. It attempts to establish where, when, how, and by whom a document was written, for this knowledge is essential to the writing of history. This type of criticism is obviously one which the student of United States military history, especially recent history, seldom needs to employ. Forgeries and anonymous papers have been comparatively rare since the end of the eighteenth century. External criticism is used most often by historians of earlier periods who have developed elaborate skills to enable them to establish the origin of their sources. But as the average American military document is easily identified, internal analysis, comparison with other docu-

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, Hockett, *Introduction to Research*, pp. 71-72; Johnson, *The Historian*, pp. 40-52.

<sup>8</sup>See, for example, Johnson, *The Historian*, pp. 24-33.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 50.

ments, textual criticism, emendations, and variant readings need not be discussed at length.<sup>10</sup>

### *Internal Criticism*<sup>11</sup>

For the student or writer in American military history, internal criticism is, after his research, perhaps his most important single technique. Once a document has been identified, internal criticism is used to analyse the meaning of statements in the document and to determine their accuracy, trustworthiness, and sincerity. Internal criticism is also applied to data obtained by interview and correspondence.

Thus the first step in internal criticism is to determine, by careful reading and careful thinking, the exact meanings of the statements as intended by the authors. No statement should ever be torn out of its context. The propagandist's technique of quoting statements, fragments of statements, out of their context is well known, and is abjured by all reputable scholars. But every scholar must be careful not to apply his own preconceptions or subconscious prejudices to his sources in order to elicit the conclusions he thinks he ought to reach. Nor should the student be misled by figures of speech, hyperboles in disputations, or any peculiarities of style; the student of military documents is fortunate here, for good military documents are supposed to be written in exact, clear, sober language.

Once the author's meaning has been understood, it is necessary to determine the truth of his statements, for a document may be shown by external criticism to be a valid historical source and its meaning may be clear, yet it may be lacking in sincerity, accuracy, or both. For example, a biased, boast-

ful personal memoir may be both insincere and inaccurate, but still remain the best, or only, source of information on a given engagement. The task of the historian is to sift the truth from the errors, insincerities, deliberately false statements, and significant omissions. For example, estimates of enemy strength and dispositions are usually, from the nature of things, at once sincere but not accurate. In this instance only access to enemy sources will serve to correct the errors. The erroneous estimates are in themselves historical facts, since these estimates served as part of the basis for judgment, decision, and action. In the same category are entries in journals regarding progress made during offensives. They are usually sincere, but where operations are being conducted over badly mapped or rough ground the distance covered is usually overestimated by the attacking unit. On the other hand, an insincere report may be perfectly accurate as far as it goes, but may distort the truth by suppressing part of the facts.

There are several questions which the properly skeptical historian can put to his sources in the process of internal criticism.

Is the writer of a given document a good authority? Was he an eyewitness? If he was an eyewitness, can his testimony be relied on? Is he a trained observer? This necessary qualification is demonstrated by the story of the Wall Street explosion of 1920. Of nine eyewitnesses, eight testified that there were several vehicles of various kinds in the block where the explosion occurred, and three of the eight were sure that a red motor truck carried the bomb. But the ninth eyewitness, a retired Army officer, stated that the explosion took place on a small horse-drawn truck, and that only one other vehicle, an automobile, was in sight. His testimony was subsequently proved to be correct.<sup>12</sup> If the

<sup>10</sup>Hockett, *Introduction to Research*, pp. 59-79; Johnson, *The Historian*, pp. 50-75; contain adequate discussions of external criticism and cite salient examples.

<sup>11</sup>Nor to be confused with internal analysis, a term employed for tests used in external criticism.

<sup>12</sup>Johnson, *The Historian*. p. 24.

eyewitnesses are good observers, theirs is the best, in fact the ultimate, testimony. Testimony of one reliable eyewitness is good, but the best evidence is the independent testimony of several eyewitnesses. But caution is needed here. Two eyewitnesses who tell exactly the same story have probably checked their stories and agreed on an official version. Honest, independent testimony from several eyewitnesses will normally contain several variations, variations which tend to indicate that the testimony is sincere and independent.

Was the writer biased? What reasons might he have for coloring or falsifying his statements? Here, of course, the writer of any action report or any account of an organization's activities is automatically subject of suspicion. Even if there is no conscious bias or deliberate attempt to falsify, a certain amount of unconscious bias is almost inevitable. This unconscious bias will manifest itself in any number of ways: the glossing over of errors and failures; exaggeration of the unit's successes and exaggeration of enemy casualties; careful delineation of all possible reasons for a failure; blaming other units ("Because the 18th Infantry on the right halted early in the afternoon, the 46th Infantry was forced to halt to protect its flank"); failure to give credit to other units, services, or to allied forces. Commanders or participants reporting on their own activities can normally be expected to exaggerate, consciously or unconsciously, their own roles, and in dealing with quarrels, arguments, or disputes, to present their own points of view with more sympathy and understanding than their opponent's views. Personal memoirs, even those based on diaries, are automatically suspect, for the temptations to justify oneself, to absolve oneself of blame, to claim credit, to get revenge for old scores, and to be wise after the event are all too strong.

Did the writer use reliable sources? The historian who publishes a book lists the sources of his information in footnotes, bibliography, or both, and these sources can and should be checked. The writer of a military report normally does not document his report, but an action report is submitted with its supporting documents such as orders, journals, and journal files, and the report can thus be checked against its sources. It should be noted that an action report is technically a secondary account, not a primary source.

Under what circumstances was the narrative composed or the testimony given? This question is closely related to all the others, but a few sample questions may best illustrate it. Is the testimony given under oath? What is the purpose of the document? Why was it written? Does it analyse a problem or is it part of a body of documents dealing with a dispute? How long after the event was the narrative written or the testimony given? The best sources for opinions and beliefs, of course, are contemporary documents and statements.

### *Judging Books*

Useful data regarding fairly well-known authors may be derived from biographical works such as *Who's Who in America* and the *Dictionary of American Biography*. Other authorities' estimates of the value of a given book may be obtained by consulting book reviews. Since 1906 many book reviews have been summarized in the *Book Review Digest*. Most American newspapers contain book reviews, but except in the few cases where a newspaper uses qualified authorities as reviewers, newspaper reviews are generally of little value. Many papers even concoct their reviews from publishers' advertisements and notices. Reviews of historical works in learned journals are infinitely preferable to newspaper reviews, for the learned journals use the services of recognized experts



in their fields. The best historical reviews are to be found in *The American Historical Review*, *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, and such regional magazines as *The Journal of Southern History*. *Military Affairs* specializes in reviewing works on military subjects.

#### FINAL STEPS BEFORE WRITING

Now that the writer has chosen a subject, developed a bibliography, studied his material, organized his notes, and subjected his data to critical analysis, there are a few final steps to be taken before writing the draft. He should make a final check to make sure that no important sources have been overlooked. This can be accomplished by using the normal bibliographic aids and also by consulting recognized authorities in the field, if they are willing. He should also check through his material to make sure that there are no gaps in the story. If there are, more research is needed. Frequently the process of writing itself will also show where there are gaps or

omissions. Inadequate research, of course, almost always leads to errors.

The tentative outline should be rechecked and altered in accordance with the logic of the subject. This process will doubtless continue until the paper is complete.

The final step is of great importance. For it no exact rules can be stated; the student's own grasp of subject matter and logical methods must guide him. With virtually all the material collected, organized, and evaluated, the student should analyze it carefully to determine its meaning and significance and to determine what new knowledge his paper will contribute. The meaning of the paper and its contribution constitute its theme. No matter how arduous the research that went into gathering material, the author must discard that which is not relevant to his subject. He must determine which aspects of his subjects are to be emphasized, and assign proportionate space in his paper accordingly. With this step, the processes of research have been practically completed. He is ready to write the section, chapter, or entire paper.

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## Chapter IV

### WRITING THE DRAFT

#### WHEN TO WRITE

Since methods of research vary with different writers, it is impossible to prescribe in advance the precise time to begin writing. This time will depend somewhat on the nature of the material and the plan by which the book is organized. For instance, Douglas S. Freeman treats the life of Washington in large segments, chronologically arranged, and completes one segment before beginning research on another. Not many projects, however, will lend themselves to this sort of treatment.

Writing cannot profitably begin until enough research has been completed to give the author a good general view of his subject, to afford a thorough sampling of various types of material, and to make sure that valid conclusions have been reached. Nor can the writing go very far until the data have been analyzed and the organization of the book has been planned. A book must be written, just as a house is built, according to a balanced, harmonious plan. The facts disclosed by research are the raw brick and lumber; the author must now show skill as architect and builder. This organization involves the sifting of relevant from irrelevant material, the selection and emphasis of important topics and ideas, and the determination of methods best suited for the treatment of the subject in hand. Certain subjects, for example, require a topical arrangement, certain others a chronological arrangement. Early care devoted to these matters will save much wasted effort as the work proceeds.

Nevertheless, most writers begin to write too late rather than too soon. It is a common

failing to read, study, and search the material until it is "exhausted," before undertaking the work of composition. Though often due to a laudable desire for perfection, this tendency is dangerous. It leads to an undue accumulation of notes until the writer is so overwhelmed in a mass of detail that he loses sight of "the big picture." Some writers have devoted their lives to taking notes without ever writing.

For economy of effort, writing should begin before research is complete. Nothing else reveals so clearly those areas where research is ample and those where further investigation is needed. The gaps may be passed over and filled in later. Many authors find it practicable to begin writing at a point where their research is about half-way complete—but no final rule can be applied to every project. One experienced historian says that he begins to write when he is first able to "see" his subject, that is, when its main outlines take definite form in his mind. For flexibility in adding, deleting, and rearranging material, a loose-leaf form should be used.

#### HOW TO WRITE—PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPOSITION

##### *Qualities of Good Writing*

When Anatole France, one of the great stylists of his age, was asked for the secret of his art he replied: "First clarity, second clarity, and finally clarity." So important is this quality that its full attainment results almost automatically in unity, coherence, force, emphasis, and the various other qualities traditionally enunciated by rhetoricians. Recognition of the principle, however, is only the first step toward its practice.

*Practice of Good Writing*

Like every other art, writing cannot be taught by rule or precept. Strictly speaking, it cannot be taught at all—each writer must learn for himself. The following suggestions are offered as an encouragement to learn:

(a) *Attitude Toward Writing.*—The actual writing of a book should not be considered a burden but a challenge. Unfortunately some scholars regard writing as merely a painful necessity, an unwelcome adjunct to their research. In reality it is one of the greatest of the arts, mastery of which should be a cause for pride. American scholarship is second to none for its thoroughness and objectivity, yet most scholarly writing in this country is dull and flat, comparing unfavorably in its form and presentation with the work of foreign scholars. The reason is not hard to find. Only the exceptional American scholar has been thoroughly grounded in the great classics of English literature, or has much regard for writing as an art. In their passion for specialization many scholars are impatient of writing as such, somewhat scornfully relegating to poets and journalists any concern for the art of expression. So long as this attitude persists, few American historians will write like Toynbee, few biologists like Julian Huxley. Such notable exceptions as Carl Becker and Charles Beard in history, Ruth Benedict in anthropology, merely emphasize the point.

(b) *Learn to Write by Reading.*—Nothing can be done without a standard—and the standard for writers is found in the work of great writers. These standards are fundamentally the same for all kinds of writing and they are no less important for works of scientific or historical scholarship than for novels and plays. Reading with alertness and discernment the ambitious writer will be aware of form as well as content and thus, by analysis and induction, understand why cer-

tain writing is good and other writing bad. When he finds, for instance, that Bertrand Russell can express highly intricate ideas in the most simple and lucid prose, he will no longer be content with ambiguous statements, jargon-like terminology, or a sentence structure so involved as to require two readings.

(c) *Unity and Coherence.*—Unity demands a singleness of effect, a completeness and wholeness without excess in one part or lack in another. It implies a right proportion for everything. Unity is attained for the book as a whole by careful planning. It is attained for sentences, paragraphs, and chapters by presenting one idea at a time. If Chapter X re-echoes and overlaps material in Chapter II, unity has been violated. Coherence is the principle by which parts of the book are held together, a principle based on logical development. Each paragraph, each chapter, should build on what has gone before. Coherence requires not only an orderly arrangement but a proper linking of part to part by means of transitional material wherever needed. The author should not assume that his reader can supply such transitions for himself.

(d) *Emphasis.*—Emphasis is a matter of both content and form. It involves, first, a sure judgment as to the relative importance of various materials and of ideas based on those materials. The relation of one fact to another must be carefully considered. Second, emphasis involves presenting the material in as forceful a way as possible. This is partly a matter of style, partly of arrangement. Building up to a conclusion, to a sense of climax, is important for historical writing as well as fiction.

(e) *Sentence structure.* — The first requirement of sentence structure is that it should be immediately clear, with no possibility of misinterpretation or ambiguity. The author should strive for simplicity, straightforwardness, conciseness. Particular atten-

tion should be paid to the reference of pronouns; avoid using *it*, *this* or *they* without a definite antecedent.

Once clearness is assured, some attention should be paid to variety. If all the sentences are short the effect will be choppy; if they are all long, the reader's attention will tire. Nor should every sentence begin with the main clause. Monotony can be avoided by drawing on the rich store of subordinating words found in the English language, such words as *since*, *although*, *because*, *before*, *after*, *where*, *when*, and *while*. Subordinate clauses introduced by these words may be placed either before or after the main clause.

(f) *Diction*.—Selecting exactly the right word to express a particular meaning is one of the writer's hardest tasks. This task will be greatly lightened if the author has a lifelong familiarity with strong and simple idiom and direct, concrete expression, as well as with more abstract expression. Words have not merely a literal meaning—*denotation*—but a flavor, an associational value—*connotation*. For example, a writer may state either that a thing is "hard to do," or that it is "difficult to accomplish." The denotation of the two expressions is almost identical, the connotation is quite different. Thus the relative force, dignity, formality, or informality of a term is fully as important as its literal meaning. The linguistic "level" on which a book is written will depend partly on the subject matter, partly on the author's stylistic preference. Even in scholarly writing, the formal style of the nineteenth century is being replaced by more simple and direct expression.

(g) *Technical Terms and Jargon*.—Every branch of learning has its legitimate technical terms, words needed to express concepts that can be expressed in no other way. Examples of such terms in military history are *angle of approach*, *collimation*, *critical item*, *troop basis*. When technical terms are used un-

necessarily, or to conceal rather than convey meaning, they become jargon. A proper use of technical terms is indispensable, but excessive use of jargon is not only bad style but often indicates a lack of clear thinking.

(h) *Trite Expressions*.—Many words and phrases have been overused until they have lost their freshness, and hence have no clear-cut meaning. Often they had no clear meaning to begin with and came into vogue among speakers who had no clear thought to express. Note, for instance, the flat indefiniteness of such words as *worth-while* and *outstanding*. A careful writer will select a more exact word such as *excellent*, *notable*, *prominent*, *chief*, *conspicuous*, *illustrious*, *celebrated*. Only wide reading and long practice can give a sure touch in this sort of thing—but every good handbook of English contains a list of trite expressions to be avoided.

### *Authentic Background of the Period Studied*

It is a common failing of novelists and playwrights to depict a past period in terms of their own, not merely in external details but in fundamental ideas. For example, the writings of Shakespeare are full of anachronisms—a clock strikes in Julius Caesar's time, pistols are carried by soldiers of the thirteenth century, and ancient rulers express the ideals of British chivalry. Such departures from fact are perhaps not very important for poetic drama, which seeks rather to be true to human nature. They are highly important for historians, but not all historians succeed in avoiding them.

The serious student of history must make himself thoroughly familiar with the background of the period in which his work lies. The military historian must know what weapons, communications, supply facilities, maps, roads, bridges, and vehicles were available to the commanders who planned the strategy and tactics of any war in the past to which the historian turns his attention. A

present-day map will be of little value in studying Grant's campaigns around Richmond; only a map of the period will show what roads and other physical features existed at the time.

The life of the common soldier, his feelings and attitudes, are no less important. What food did he eat, what clothes did he wear, what shelter did he have? What care, if any, was taken for his health? At just what time did anaesthesia and aseptic surgery show their effect on battle casualties? What conditions affected the soldier's morale? What news of the war did he receive, what mail from home? What political and cultural ideas dominated those who were fighting to defend them?

In answering these questions the historian must take advantage of every resource available—official records, diaries, letters, autobiographies, photographs, sketches of military artists, contemporary newspapers. From these sources he should bring his narrative to life, enabling the reader to picture the terrain and the weather, understand the people who lived in the area, appreciate the personality, the genius, the limitations of the high commanders, and follow the sights and sounds of the battle as if he were there.

### *Depth of Research*

The author should probe deep for the causes of success and failure of the national military effort and of the armed forces in the field. This will necessitate a critical and definitive examination of source material bearing on the topic or subject being studied. The task is more difficult in victory than in defeat. At the highest level it should include an examination of the national potentials for war, of national objectives, of the higher organization for war, and of the relations of military policy to foreign and domestic policy and the degree of balance and co-ordination existing among these factors, and inter-allied co-ordination at the national level. At lower

operational levels it should include an examination of inter-allied co-ordination; co-ordination of the sea ground and air elements; organization; logistics; armament; tactics; training; and the actual combat in which American forces are pitted against those of the enemy.

### *Open-mindedness and Objectivity*

The author should be open minded toward his material and after critically weighing the evidence he should accept whatever facts it reveals. Laying aside all conscious prejudice, he will view his material objectively. Such a view, however, does not mean that he will merely catalogue facts without pointing out their significance. Observing the relation of these facts to each other he will inevitably draw certain conclusions—and he is in a better position to draw them than anyone else. The following instructions, given to historical officers in a World War II directive, are generally applicable to the writing of military history:

"Attention will be concentrated on major policies, problems, and accomplishments of the command together with the lessons learned."

"The history should state not only *what* was done but *how* and *why* it was done."

"... the history must include a candid and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history will not serve the purpose if purely laudatory."

### *Use of Assembled Data in Writing Draft*

Many first drafts are poorly written because the author is too much a slave to his note-slips. By following his notes too closely he loses the clearness, coherence, and "flow" that finished work should have. An experi-



enced teacher of graduate students has suggested that the writer select a block of notes which forms the basis for a chapter and assimilate it by repeated reading. The notes are then laid aside and the chapter written "with an easy elbow." Such a practice helps in avoiding too much petty detail and excessive quotation. For the final draft the notes are again consulted for greater accuracy, the insertion of quotations, and the preparation of footnotes.

### Documentation

Full and accurate documentation is the stamp of authenticity which the scholar places on his work. By this means he frankly reveals to the reader the sources of his information. The character of these sources will do much to establish the author's skill—or his lack of it—in the evaluation of evidence. The documentation will also show to what extent the author has made use of the sources available in his field and to what extent he has been able to discover sources not previously known.

Each fact stated, unless a matter of common knowledge or one which can readily be verified elsewhere, should be accurately documented in the footnotes. Since the documentation is designed to aid scholars in further study of the subject, full information should be given about the documents. The following facts should be included, in the order given: nature of the document (letter, memorandum, report); the originator; the recipient; the date; the subject, if given; the file designation. Each footnote should immediately follow the line of text containing the reference number applying to that note. A line should be drawn or typed (use the same character as for underlining) above and below the footnote to separate it from the text. This method is preferred by printers. For brevity, all standard abbreviations may be used. At times the nature of the material is

such that space can be saved and the number of footnotes reduced by consolidating all references for a paragraph in one note with several items.

Footnotes should not be too heavily loaded with discursive or explanatory material. Generally such material, if worth using at all, can be more effectively included in the main text. Though many Latin terms or their abbreviations are commonly used in footnotes, there is a growing tendency to avoid their use. For example, "above" and "below" are replacing *supra* and *infra*. *Ibid.* (*ibidem*—in the same place) should be used to refer only to material in an immediately preceding note, and it should not be used unless the reference is identical in every respect to the preceding one. It is better to repeat a citation in abbreviated form than to use *op. cit.* (*opus citatum*—the work cited) or *loc. cit.* (*loco citato*—in the place cited). It is permissible to cite a work previously cited by giving the name of the author followed by *op. cit.*

### Bibliography

Sources should be grouped according to type, and each major group of records briefly described. The physical location of the files at the time consulted should be indicated. Published works should be grouped separately and listed by author, title, and place and date of publication, and name of publisher. *Tables, Charts, Maps, Illustrations*

Each table or chart, except those that are very short and informal, should have a number and a title. Dates should also be included in the title. Maps should be numbered, titled, and dated. Those which show the action of military units should employ the "Basic Military Map Symbols." Photographs should be closely tied in with the text, and none should be used which do not definitely clarify matter in the text. The sources of all tables, charts, maps, and illustrations should be clearly indicated.

### *Manuals of Style, Dictionaries, Military Manuals*

A manual of style, prepared in the Office of the Chief of Military History, is given as Part II of this Guide. It offers in condensed form the accepted usage on matters of most concern to military historians. It not only sets the standard followed in the volumes of U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II but treats problems of military terminology and documentation not covered elsewhere.

For further consideration of the innumerable questions of punctuation, spelling, capitalization, abbreviation, and correct form in general the following works will prove invaluable:

Allen, F. Sturges. *Allen's Synonyms and Antonyms*. T. H. Vail Motter, ed., New York, 1938.

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Department of the Army. Special Regulations 320-50-1. Military Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols. 28 October 1949.

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## Part Two

### STYLE MANUAL

[*Editor's Note:* In *Military Affairs* condensation of this *Guide*, the "Style Manual" is omitted. See Table of Contents, preceding Part One.]

## Part Three

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

#### Chapter I

#### INTRODUCTION

The bibliographical aids, books, publications and source material listed herein contain many references to additional works on source material. The researcher will find the lists rather incomplete. Nevertheless, they will prove useful as a beginning. He must use his own ingenuity in developing a more complete bibliography.

#### BASIC WORKS RELATING TO THE ART OF WAR

There are a number of military or related works that have had an important influence on American military thinking. For this reason they deserve a special place in even a limited bibliographical listing of works.

- Bowman, Isaiah. *The New World, Problems in Political Geography*. Yonkers-on-the-Hudson, New York, and Chicago, 1928.
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- Goltz, Baron Colmar von der. *The Conduct of War*. (Translated by 1st Lieut. Joseph T. Dickman.) Kansas City, 1896.
- Herring, Pendleton. *The Impact of War*. New York, 1941.
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## Chapter II

# SOURCE MATERIAL FOR THE WRITING OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY: GENERAL WORKS

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- Bemis, Samuel F., and Grace Gardner Griffin. *Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775-1921*. Washington, 1935.
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- Coulter, Edith M., and Melanie Gerstenfield. *Historical Bibliographies*. Berkeley, 1935. A systematic and annotated guide with supplements.
- Dutcher, George M., and Others. *Guide to Historical Literature*. New York, 1949. This guide gives a selected, classified, and critical bibliography of the entire field of history, and includes special sections on military history.
- Frank, Emma Lucille. *Chaplaincy in the Armed Forces: A Preliminary Bibliography*. Oberlin, 1945.
- General Service Schools. *Library Catalogue, 1927*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1927. This work, with a 1929 supplement, lists 55,600 books, pamphlets and documents, and 1,160 maps and atlases.
- Griffin, Appleton Prentise Clark, comp. *Bibliography of American Historical Societies*. American Historical Association Annual Report for 1905. Washington, 1907.
- Griffin, Grace G., and Others, comp. *Writings in American History*. Washington, 1908—An annual listing of books and magazine articles published each year in American history, subjectively arranged. This is the most important reference guide to military periodical literature.
- Herring, Pendleton, and Others. *Civil-Military Relations*. Chicago, 1940. Although directed primarily towards books on civilian mobilization, this bibliography is of considerable value to the study of American military history.
- Kirk, Grayson, and Richard P. Stebbins. *War and National Policy: A Syllabus*. New York, 1942. Although designed as an outline for a college course on the broader aspects of national defense, this volume contains a highly useful list of pertinent books, critically evaluated and arranged topically.
- Lanza, Conrad H. *List of Books on Military History and Related Subjects*. 3d ed.; Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1923. A list of books on American and foreign wars and campaigns, military science, and the theory and philosophy of war, designed for use by army officers.
- Larned, J. N. *The Literature of American History: A Bibliographical Guide*. Boston, 1902. This work differs from Beers' in that it gives a brief description and evaluation of each work listed. The introduction contains information about records of each state. It has been extended by supplements to 1904.
- Lauterbach, Alfred T., and Others. *Modern War—Its Economic and Social Aspects*. Princeton, 1942. A mimeographed listing of books in English, German, and French relating to warfare on the national level. Many critical comments are given.
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- United States Field Artillery School. *Officers Reserve Corps. A Bibliography*. Fort Sill, 1946.
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### GENERAL REFERENCE WORKS

#### American History

- Adams, James T., ed. *Dictionary of American History*. New York, 1940. 5 vols. An important work by competent scholars covering the more significant episodes and institutions of American history.

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Butterfield, Roger. *The American Past*. New York, 1947.

Crittenden, C. C., and Doris Godard. *Historical Societies in the United States and Canada*. Washington, 1944. A directory of these institutions.

Johnson, Allen, and Dumas Malone, eds. *Dictionary of American Biography*. New York, 1928-1937. 20 vols. and index. A monumental work and the best source of information about deceased Americans and about the basic materials on them.

*National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*. New York, 1892-1938. 32 vols. Less critical than preceding, this work does not contain references to sources. It is, however, far more comprehensive and contains many lesser figures not

covered in the former work. For British biographies use *Dictionary of National Biography*. 1885-1949. 27 vols.

Keller, Helen R. *Dictionary of Dates*. New York, 1934. 2 vols. The most up to date of this type of book, covering the history of the world from earliest times and containing a large mass of information conveniently arranged.

Larned, Josephus N. *New Larned History for Ready Reference, Reading and Research*. Rev. ed.; Springfield, Mass. 1922-1924. 12 vols. Alphabetical dictionary of universal history.

*Statesman's Year Book*. London, 1864-.

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This is the standard reference book on members of Congress and, in recent years, a useful guide to governmental agencies. The official *Biographical Directory of the American Congress*, 1774-1927, Washington, 1928, is also valuable in this connection.

*Who's Who in America*. Chicago, 1889-. Revised and reissued biennially. The entries are prepared by biographees themselves.

*Who Was Who in America*. Chicago, 1942. A companion volume to *Who's Who in America*, containing the biographies of deceased Americans who have appeared in the latter work since 1897 with dates of death added.

#### American Military History

The following compilations contain military biographies of Continental and Regular Army officers, 1775-1950, and other useful data on military organizations and battles.

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 Thian, Raphael P. *Legislative History of the General Staff of the Army of the United States . . . 1775 to 1901.* Washington, 1901.  
 ———. *Military Geography of the United States.* Washington, 1881. This painstaking work traces year by year the geographic divisions and departments of the Army, giving areas covered, designations, and other detail.  
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Wector, Dixon. *When Johnny Comes Marching Home.* Cambridge, Mass, 1944.

West, Richard S. *Admirals of the American Empire.* Indianapolis, 1948.

Wood, Leonard. *Our Military History: Its Facts and Fallacies.* Chicago, 1916.

### *Military Periodicals*

A wealth of useful information relating to the Army and its activities, policy, development, administration, and operation will be found in the various periodical service journals. They are valuable for contemporary opinion, events, technical and tactical development, and biographical material.

*The Army, Navy, Air Force Journal* is particularly valuable for material on contemporary matters of policy, organization, and current activity, opinion, and development in Military Establishment. It also contains authoritative copies of documents, legislation, etc., affecting the Army. It is a valuable source of biographical material. *The Army, Navy, Air Force Register*, similar to the preceding journal, contains material of a like nature.

*Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, Vol. 1-61, 1879-1917. For many years this was the only American service journal. It is a good source for studying Army organization, institutions and thinking within its

period. Indexes cover volumes 1-34, 1879-1904, in volume 36; volumes 35-49, 1904-1911, in volume 51; volumes 50-59, 1912-1916, in 61.

*Military Affairs*, 1937-, and annual indexes. This publication is devoted to military history with emphasis on American affairs. Earlier titles: *Journal of the American Military History Foundation* (1937-38); *Journal of the American Military Institute* (1939-40).

*The Military Review* of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This review has published an index and digest of military periodical literature which is very useful.

The service journals contain historical studies of importance to the arm or service concerned. Most significant are the various branch journals, some of which are listed, with former titles, as follows: *U. S. Army Combat Forces Journal* (formed in 1950 by a combination of *The Infantry Journal* and *The Field Artillery Journal*); *Armor* (founded as *The Cavalry Journal*, and later known as *The Armored Cavalry Journal*); *Antiaircraft Journal* (the former *Coast Artillery Journal*); *The Military Engineer*; *The Quartermaster Review*; and *Ordnance* (formerly *Army Ordnance*).

### *Unpublished Studies*

Legere, Maj. Lawrence J. Unification of the Armed Forces. MS, Applied Studies Division, OCMH.

Rockis, Lt. Col. Joseph, and Maj. Leonard L. Lerwill. Replacement System United States Army. MS, Applied Studies Division, OCMH.

Sparrow, Maj. John C. History of United States Military Demobilization. MS, Applied States Division, OCMH.

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[Editorial Note: In *Military Affairs* condensation of this *Guide*, Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII of Part Three are omitted. See Table of Contents preceding Part One.]

# THOMAS DIGGES, AN ELIZABETHAN COMBAT HISTORIAN<sup>1</sup>

BY HENRY J. WEBB

DURING THE REIGN of Queen Elizabeth, England was involved in wars—declared and undeclared—with the French, the Spanish, and the Irish; and large numbers of men were recruited or impressed for service. Naturally, the English people were interested in the outcome of the various campaigns, but since there were no newspapers, they had to rely mainly on the information which they received along the water front, or in taverns and inns. The accounts that they heard were anything but authentic; more often than not they were the twisted and distorted tales related by returned soldiers and mariners, some of whom, like Shakespeare's cowardly Pistol, ascribed their "cudgell'd scars" incorrectly to combat wounds.<sup>2</sup>

Fortunately, an occasional pamphlet or book was written and published which served to inform the general public as to the true state of affairs overseas. These publications were not numerous—not more than thirty-odd books on military history were printed in England between 1558 and 1610<sup>3</sup>—nor were they complete. But they supplied much

needed information to a hungry-minded populace fed over-long on rumor.

One of the best of these was written by Thomas Digges, Muster-Master General of all the Queen's forces in the Low Countries. Published anonymously in 1590, two and a half years after the action described, it was colorfully entitled *A briefe and true report of the proceedings of the Earle of Leycester for the reliefe of the Towne of Sluce, from his arrivall at Vlisshing, about the end of June 1587. untill the surrendrie thereof 26. Julii next ensuing.*

The reason Digges had this book printed is made perfectly clear in his foreword to the reader. The Earl of Leicester, who had been governor general of the Dutch States from January 25, 1586 until November 10, 1587, had recently died; and rumors of his inefficiency as a governor and as an officer had pursued him to the grave. Finding such rumors to be reprehensible, because (he thought) they were untrue, and naively imagining that they sprang from Leicester's conduct before Sluce<sup>4</sup>, Digges undertook to correct the rumors by relating exactly what occurred. Or, as he put it, during Leicester's command in the Low Countries,

<sup>1</sup>Material in the paper was gathered with funds granted by the University of Utah Research Committee.

<sup>2</sup>Shakespeare, *Henry V*, V, i.

<sup>3</sup>See Henry J. Webb, "English Military Books, Laws, and Proclamations Published from 1513 to 1610," *Philological Quarterly*, (April, 1944), pp. 116-128.

<sup>4</sup>Leicester's troubles began long before Sluce. See Edward Grimeston, *A Generall Historie of the Netherlands*, London, 1609.

no one Towne, Forte, Castle or Sconce (was) lost, or foyle receaved any way by our nation . . . till the losse of Sluyce; that being the onely thing wherein either his despitiful Enemies, or ingrate friends or folowers (strangers or English) can finde any coullor to calumniate his military actions.

Therefore, he was determined to present the "true report of his Excellencies carefull proceedings, for the reliefe of Sluce."<sup>5</sup>

Digges was well qualified to write military history. Although primarily a mathematician, he was also a student of history, being particularly conversant with the great historians of Greece and Rome. Moreover, before becoming a muster-master of active forces overseas, he had shown more than an amateur's interest in military discipline, strategy, and fortification, having published two books on those subjects: *A Geometrical Practice, Named Pantometria* (1571, later republished in 1591), and *An Arithmeticall Militare Treatise, named Stratoticos* (1579).<sup>6</sup> By nature, he was a man with an observant and logical mind, an officer whose diligent attention to duty had once led his commanding officer to state, ". . . a very wyse stout fellow he ys, and very carefull to serve thorouly hir majesty."<sup>7</sup> His job, of course, was anything but historical, yet—since it did not require him to perform specific duties during combat—it gave him the opportunity to follow closely and evaluate accurately any action undertaken. He probably did this more than once, although only one "after action report" of his found its way into print.

Besides affording him the time, his job

placed him at headquarters where he could become familiar with tactical problems. If, at the same time, it removed him from front line activity, it nevertheless gave him a remarkable chance on muster days to interview men who had borne the brunt of the fight.

Time, training, inclination, and opportunity, therefore, made Digges an ideal person to write a history of a campaign. This, during the battle for Sluce, he proceeded to do with all energy. As has already been noted, his report was published two and a half years after the battle, but it was "briefely set downe while the matter was in action."<sup>8</sup> Thus, it was not something remembered in tranquility, but a transcript of "on the spot" observation.

A brief summary of this campaign may be of interest to the modern reader. Toward the end of June, 1587, Leicester arrived at Vlisshing (Flushing) with about thirty ensigns<sup>9</sup> of "newe levied Englishe souldiers," and found the town of Sluce besieged by the Duke of Parma. The Duke's main forces were on the Isle of Cassand; the remainder, except for the horsemen with some bands of foot, were in St. Ann's Land, under command of La Mote. The horsemen were deployed along the coast and straits to guard dikes "and passages in sundrie places." All of these forces were so well intrenched that it was estimated that treble their number would be needed to assault them by land. By sea, the town of Sluce was cut off by "piles, Shippes and boates," which blocked the harbor; artillery was mounted so as to play upon this blockaded harbor mouth.

In council it had been originally decided to relieve Sluce by sea and by land—the sea forces to break through the blockade and artillery fire, the land forces to approach the city from three directions: from the Isendick

<sup>5</sup>*A brieife and true report*, introduction "To the Reader," n.p. Quotations from this book are with the permission of the Huntington Library which kindly provided me with a microfilm copy of the text.

<sup>6</sup>For an analysis of these books, see Henry J. Webb, "The Mathematical and Military Works of Thomas Digges," *Modern Language Quarterly*, (Dec. 1945), pp. 389-400. *A brieife and true report* is not there discussed, for it was not then known to be Digges' work.

<sup>7</sup>*Leicester Correspondence*, Camden Society, 1844, p. 135.

<sup>8</sup>*A brieife and true report*, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>Infantry Company. Probably a unit of about 200 men, principally musketeers, but also including men with pikes.

sconce, from Cassand, and from Ostend. After deliberation, however, it was determined that the only feasible land route was from Ostend, for the march from Isendick would have to be along easily defended dikes, while a landing at Cassand would be hampered by shallow water, forcing troops to disembark a great distance from shore. From Ostend, Leicester could march his ensigns on "firme ground in militarie order."

Sir William Pelham, Leicester's Lord Marshal, was therefore dispatched to Ostend with thirty English ensigns, four cornets<sup>10</sup> of horse, and "some few Companies" of Dutch volunteers. Colonel Morgan, with additional Dutch volunteers, went to join Admiral Nassau, who was to make the attempt by sea.

Pelham arrived at Ostend on 20 July and four days later began his march along the coast toward Sluce. By noon, he had arrived at Blankenburgh, which he found strongly defended by five or six enemy ensigns. Pelham decided to attack by four in the afternoon, but Leicester (who was on ship and in view of the Blankenburgh fortifications and who, as Digges says, beheld "the strength of the place, and the impossibilitie for us to passe or to get so strong a plat in any convenient time to relieve" the besieged city) ordered Pelham not to attempt passage but to return to Ostend, and from thence to join with Admiral Nassau.

In the meantime, the Admiral had made no attempt to reach Sluce from the sea. When Leicester arrived at the rendezvous, he was still outside the haven, protesting that it was too difficult to force an entrance. Leicester pointed out that earlier, when the citizens of Vlisshing had offered to furnish the ships and men for the expedition, the Admiral had argued that he already had the best pilots, captains, and ships under his command and

that he "could and would" force an entry. The admiral admitted this fact, but added that he needed more time to inspect the approaches. And while they were thus wrangling, Sluce, "growne desperate of succour," surrendered to the Duke of Parma.<sup>11</sup>

Thus—briefly—was the abortive campaign described by Digges. But he made several other points concerning high-level planning which is of interest and significance. The Admiral's reluctance to obey Leicester and approach Sluce from the sea was laid to his devotion to the policy makers in the States of Holland. These men, it was rumored, were really not eager for Sluce (or, for that matter, any coast city in Flanders) to be free. They feared that a free Flanders would draw merchants out of Holland, that garrisons placed there would be costly, and above all, that the English queen might seize the port cities "to her owne use." Thus, the Admiral dallied when he might have acted, and Leicester, who was in supreme command, suffered the opprobrium from this inaction.

The luke-warm attitude of the Dutch States is further exemplified by Digges. The English had supplied Leicester's troops with powder, ammunition, and money with which to pay the men. The Dutch States were supposed to supply victuals, boats and skiffs to land the army, and wagons to transport supplies. Bitterly, Digges reports how poorly the Dutch carried out their part of the bargain:

For boates and Skiffes to land our men, on those flat Coasts we had not sufficient to disbarke our little Armie in one whole day. And for Waggones his Excellencie could not get enough to carrie two daies victualls with us to Blankenburgh.<sup>12</sup>

The report ends as it had begun—with a brief eulogy of Leicester who, Digges maintained, had done everything possible for the

<sup>11</sup>This account is covered in ten pages in *A breife and true report*.

<sup>12</sup>*A breife and true report*, p. 10.

<sup>10</sup>Troops.



relief of Sluce.

The modern military historian may find many faults with this sixteenth century account. The order of march from Ostend to Sluce, a description of the terrain, the type of fortifications at Blankenburgh which made it impossible for thirty English ensigns to dislodge five or six of the enemy, the precise manner of gaining intelligence about enemy strength—these, and many more facts, are wanting. Yet by and large it is a good, clear report of the action undertaken (even by modern standards) and, in the light of other publications of the day, it is truly excellent.

Yet it fails to do what Digges intended

that it should—vindicate the actions of Leicester. The Earl, one feels, should have endeavored to learn more about enemy concentrations along the route from Ostend to Sluce before sending his army from Flushing to Ostend; and once the troops had gone so far, it seems that a spirited attempt might have been made to overcome the Blankenburgh garrison. Sir William Pelham had been willing to try. In any event, Digges fails to explain fully Leicester's decision to withdraw Pelham, and later, by placing upon Admiral Nassau the blame for failing to enter into the haven of Sluce, he only divides the censure to which Leicester fell heir.

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## COPPERED BOTTOMS FOR THE ROYAL NAVY: A FACTOR IN THE MARITIME WAR OF 1778-1783

By MAURER MAURER

IN 1778 ENGLAND WAS ill-prepared for the great global war that had grown out of the conflict with the American colonies. For the conduct of the war at sea she had an inadequate number of ships, and those were in a deplorable state of disrepair. Not only was new construction impossible, but even repairs were extremely difficult to procure, and every rotten hulk that would float was called into use. With such an establishment, England had to wage a war, not only in European waters, but also in India, in the West Indies, and in North America.<sup>1</sup>

One of the many problems confronting Charles Middleton when he became Comptroller of the Navy in August 1778 was that of getting as much service as possible out of the existing fleet by keeping the ships in good sailing and fighting trim for the greatest length of time. There were many reasons why a ship might be forced out of service temporarily, but, by coppering the wooden bottoms, the able and energetic Comptroller was partially able to combat two of the predictable natural elements operating against success upon the sea, namely, barnacles and marine borers.

The *teredo navalis*, a marine borer, made leaky sieves of dozens of ships by chewing the planking into veritable honeycombs, and putting the ship in constant danger of sinking. Any attack by *teredo*, even if not severe

enough to sink a ship, necessitated lengthy and costly repairs. Modern ships six or eight months out of drydock are generally fouled by a "sea mat" of barnacles and other marine life which may be three or four inches thick, weigh as much as one hundred tons, and reduce the operating efficiency of a ship by as much as fifty percent.<sup>2</sup> The accumulation of such filth made it necessary for the ships of the Royal Navy to be cleaned periodically, either in one of the dockyards at home or on the beach of some distant station. Cleaning required time, while the filthy bottoms made a ship slow and hard to handle. Coppering retarded the accumulation of filth on the bottom and also prevented the *teredo* from working on the planking.

Long before Middleton's idea in 1778, a solution against barnacles and the *teredo* was sought by many: Archimedes had devised a lead sheath for wooden ships; the Greeks and Romans tried copper sheathing; the Chinese used a kind of varnish that was supposed to be effective; other early devices included burning and covering planks with pitch in which glass, red pepper, and other ingredients were powdered and mixed; and finally a sheathing of deal (thin planks or boards) over a coat of tar and hair. Later Spain and Portugal experimented with lead sheathing, but it was too heavy and too expensive. The East Indians of the seventeenth century used a copper sheath on their rudders to keep them from "being eaten flat

<sup>1</sup>Robert Greenhalgh Albion, *Forests and Sea Power; The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862* (Cambridge, 1926). Captain A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston, 1896).

<sup>2</sup>"Barnacles Are an Unsolved Problem," *Life*, X (April 28, 1941), 120.

by worms."<sup>3</sup> The English tried lead sheathing but abandoned it in 1553, and again rejected it in 1670. In 1708 they rejected the use of copper but in 1717 ordered copper used on the gates of the new Portsmouth basin. The modern process, however, was not initiated until 1758, when the *Alarm*, a 32-gun frigate, was coppered as an experiment.<sup>4</sup> In 1776 some of the small frigates sent to North America were sheathed.

In 1778 Middleton privately proposed to the Admiralty that the bottoms of every ship in the fleet be coppered to increase their activity with an effect that would amount to doubling the number of the force. The First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Sandwich, hesitated, as would be expected from the man who stood at the apex of the system of conservation and corruption that had brought the Royal Navy to such a state of decay. In making the business of the Admiralty subservient to party interests, he had neglected the material condition of the navy and had alienated the able Whig admirals until he probably had done "more damage to the Navy entrusted to his care than any hostile French admiral had ever done."<sup>5</sup> After several conversations, Sandwich had been persuaded to mention the matter to the King. Later he took Middleton to Buckingham House, where the Comptroller explained the whole process in so satisfactory a manner that George III approved it at once and ordered it carried into execution. A contractor was authorized to purchase any

copper available, and enough for forty ships of the line was procured from the mines of Cornwall, Devon and Wales. Material was thus readily available, the process was not expensive, and the work could be accomplished in short order whenever a ship had to come into a dockyard for repairs.<sup>6</sup> But even coppering could work a disadvantage to the fleet unless all the ships were sheathed alike. Since the speed of a squadron was only that of the slowest ship, the coppered vessels were of little use when tied to the slower units of a fleet. The goal, therefore, was to bring the improvement to every ship. Coppering was considered so important that the Comptroller even gave it precedence over the work of fitting ships with new guns (caronades).

But the foremost advantage to be gained by coppering the fleet proved to be speed, speed for observation, for convoying, for chasing, and, above all, for conducting aggressive operations with an inferior force. Speed could be the decisive factor in any engagement or campaign and had to be carefully considered in the strategic and tactical planning.

Fast ships were needed for observation, and Middleton thought that "the cleanest and coppered ships of the two-deckers" were the best for the purpose because they could "avoid or bring on an engagement" according to the opportunities of the moment.<sup>7</sup> Since England was laboring under the disadvantages of inferior naval strength, it was necessary to seize every opportunity to engage the enemy in detail. Discarding the tactics

<sup>3</sup>[Nathaniel Butler], *Boteler's Dialogues*, ed. by W. G. Perrin (N.R.S. [Navy Records Society of London] Pub.), 104; Sir John Hawkins, *The Hawkins' Voyages During the Reigns of Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth, and James I*, ed. by Clements R. Markham (London, 1878), 202; and Sir William Monson, *The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson*, ed. by M. Oppenheim (N.R.S. Publications), IV, 52-54, V, 82-83.

<sup>4</sup>A. L. Cross, "On Coppering Ship's Bottoms," *American Historical Review*, XXXIII (1927-28), 79-81. The date is sometimes given as 1761.

<sup>5</sup>Albion, *Forests and Sea Power*, 282.

<sup>6</sup>Within six weeks, twenty ships were coppered and before the war was over it had been applied to every ship fit for service. The record for sheathing was set in May 1778 when the *Centaur* (74) was sheathed in seven hours while the King was visiting the yard.

<sup>7</sup>[John Montagu], *The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich . . .*, ed. by G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen (N.R.S. Pub.), III, 178. Hereafter cited as *Sandwich Papers*.

of a passive fleet in being, the Comptroller outlined an aggressive plan of operations:

An inferior fleet of coppered ships under a judicious commander will keep the superior one that is not so in awe, and prevent their gaining any material advantage . . .

If coppered ships, on meeting with . . . the enemy, will instead of attack [-ing them] wait for opportunities, they will from circumstances of negligence and weather be sure to meet with them and generally have it in their power to turn them to advantage.<sup>8</sup>

Acting on this plan, the Cabinet decided to send Darby to sea in the fall of 1781 against a vastly superior force, knowing that he would be able to avoid a disastrous meeting with the enemy. The Admiral, in fact, did fall in "with a force infinitely superior, but by dint of copper was in no danger from them, and in the face of that superior force carried off a considerable part of their Convoy."<sup>9</sup>

In pursuit of the enemy, coppered ships were a great advantage, and Keppel's failure to overtake and capture two French ships on one occasion was laid to the fact that he had only wooden bottoms. Rodney ordered the coppered ships of the line and frigates under Graves to be ready to pursue the French to Martinique should the enemy escape from Rhode Island. In the West Indies in 1781, De Grasse complained that the English ships were much faster than the French, and that the coppered bottoms enabled Hood "to manoeuvre as he thought proper, and take any advantage that wind or weather might give him to avoid action if he judged it advisable so to do."<sup>10</sup>

In the spring of 1781, while Cornwallis

was moving north toward Virginia, and Arnold was operating in the James River district, they were cut off from the British in New York by the American Army in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Communication between the two English sectors depended entirely upon the sea. Lafayette moved to Virginia to meet Arnold, while the French Squadron at Newport sailed toward Chesapeake Bay to support the Southern Campaign. The English squadron at Long Island learned of the French sailing and took up the race for Virginia about thirty-six hours behind the enemy. When the two forces sighted each other just outside the Capes, the English were leading. In the engagement that followed, 16 March 1781, the English probably suffered more than the French, but they managed to sail into Chesapeake Bay, effect a junction with Arnold and make possible the arrival of 2,000 troops from the North, thus temporarily frustrate the Franco-American plans. The French, having only three coppered ships in the squadron, had lost the race against the faster English fleet.

The second advantage of a coppered ship has been touched on earlier, that of combating the natural elements. A clean ship handled more easily and maneuvered more readily than one that was fouled. Captain Young reported that "the advantages from the helm alone is [sic] immense, as they feel them instantly, and wear in one-third of the distance they ever did . . ." When the signal was made for the line of battle ahead, with the squadron close up and with "the wind near aft," the wooden ships were sometimes unable to form, "though six hours at it, but obliged to give it up."<sup>11</sup> A failure to complete such a tactical evolution could easily result in disaster.

<sup>8</sup>Middleton to Sandwich, 5 September 1781, and enclosure, *Ibid.*, IV, 62.

<sup>9</sup>Sandwich's Defense [January 1782], [George the Third], *The Correspondence of King George the Third*, ed. by The Hon. Sir John Fortescue (London, 1927-28), IV, 346.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>[Charles Middleton], *Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham* . . . , ed. by John Knox Laughton (N.R.S. Pub.), I, 66-67. Young to Middleton, 24 July 1780.



Foul ships operated at a disadvantage, and ships laid up on a beach or in a dockyard were completely useless. Coppered ships, however, were always ready for any enterprise and at twelve hours' notice were ready for the most distant services. Keeping the ships thus ready for duty had the effect of more than doubling their actual number. Non-coppered ships had to be cleaned, the bottoms swept and scraped at least every six months. The task could be accomplished by careening on some beach, but the job took precious time and frequently resulted in damage to the ships. The only yard on the North American station was at Halifax, but careening gear was sent out for use in any suitable port, and Howe, by his original instructions, was to send his ships to Antigua and Jamaica, or even back to England, to relieve the strain on Halifax. Repairs that could not be accomplished by heaving down had to be sent to the dockyards at home. Since coppering retarded the accumulation of filth and the working of the marine borers, cleaning and repairs were required less frequently, and ships no longer suffered great handicaps from loss of speed or ease of handling.

Kempfenfelt saw an opportunity to make the improved ships do double duty:

As our ships are now all coppered, they are always ready for service; therefore, when the enemy's fleet at the end of the [European] campaign returns to port, which hitherto has always been early in the fall, you are then at liberty to send what number of ships you might think proper to act offensively or defensively in the West Indies during the winter months, and have them home again in sufficient time for the summer service.<sup>12</sup>

Middleton also pointed out the fact that if coppering became the general practice, and

thus made fewer ships necessary, the naval requirements would enable the building to be done in the navy's own yards, a considerable advantage since, according to the prevailing naval opinion, "one ship constructed there . . . [was] of more real use to his Majesty than four purchased ones."<sup>13</sup>

And finally coppering, not only made the ships constantly ready for service by making cleaning and repairs less frequent, but it also lessened the opportunities for desertion and indirectly helped to keep the crews healthy, since the ship no longer was careened on a distant beach or laid up in a dockyard with the pressed seamen at large on shore.

By the end of 1781 nearly the whole English fleet had been coppered.<sup>14</sup> From the King down to the storekeepers, all were interested in the coppering enterprise, and many a naval officer, like Rodney, advocated coppered ships, pointing out the numerous advantages from having the fleet thus improved.

A considerable degree of any success the Royal Navy attained during the war was due to the fact that the English enjoyed the small measure of advantage to be gained by coppering. The Comptroller thought that the improvement would enable the navy to protect the colonies and provide for home service. In the heat of the war, when things were going badly for the Royal Navy, he wrote:

This first of all naval improvements seems at this critical point the means which Providence has put into our power to extricate us from present danger, and it will be the height of im-

<sup>12</sup>Middleton's Memorandum [1779-80], *Sandwich Papers*, III, 176.

<sup>14</sup>A few of the ships on foreign stations had not yet been returned for sheathing. At the end of December, Sandwich gave the following figures for ships already coppered: Line of battle ships—82; Of 50 guns—14; Frigates of 44 to 20 guns—115; and Sloops and cutters—102. Sandwich's Memoranda [December 1781], *Sandwich Papers*, IV, 285.

<sup>13</sup>"Kempfenfelt's Ideas about the Mode of Carrying on the War, 3 January 1782," *Sandwich Papers*, IV, 82.

prudence not to make use of them . . . .

Everything (under the direction of Providence) is still in our power towards humbling France and Spain, and very practicable with a coppered fleet under active officers.<sup>15</sup>

Whatever part Providence played, it is certain that Middleton was primarily respon-

sible for instituting and carrying on the coppering process. But, when it was necessary to offer a defense for the North government and for his own administration, the First Lord of the Admiralty pointed to some of the accomplishments of his regime, and the first was the coppering of the ships which he claimed was responsible for all the naval victories and escapes.

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<sup>15</sup>Middleton's Memorandum [1779-80], *Sandwich Papers*, III, 175-76.

## MARINES IN REVIEW, 1775-1950

### *A Report on the USMC Exhibition, Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum*

BY ROBERT WALKER DAVIS

THURSDAY, 18 May 1950, was an important day in the history of museums devoted to the exhibition of military and naval subjects. For on that day the Naval Historical Foundation opened the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum at 1610 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. This museum is located in the former stable of the Decatur House; built in 1819, this house was first occupied by Commodore Stephen Decatur. Mrs. Truxtun Beale, present owner of Decatur House, authorized the converting of the stable into a museum. Her late husband was a direct descendant of Commodore Thomas Truxtun, and the first exhibit of the museum was entitled "Commodores Truxtun and Decatur and the Navy of their time (1775-1812)." This excellent exhibit was concerned with the struggling Navy of the American Revolution, and with its services during the years of the Undeclared Naval War With France, the Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812.

On 10 November 1950, the 175th anniversary of the founding of the United States Marine Corps, the Truxtun-Decatur Museum opened a new exhibit, of far-reaching interest and importance, devoted exclusively to the long, glorious and bloody history of the Ma-

lines, in which a total of 200 combat landings have been made. On a wall chart at the museum a map of the world is shown, and around the map, in large red letters, the names of the chief landings. To show the world-wide scope of Marine activity, it may well be worthwhile to list a few of their engagements:

#### WAR OF THE REVOLUTION (1775-1783)

(Naval) *Bonhomme Richard* vs. British *Serapis*—23 Sep 1779.

(Land) Battle of Princeton—3 Jan 1777.

#### FRENCH NAVAL WAR (1789-1801)

(Naval) *Constellation* vs. French *L'Insurgente*—9 Feb 1799.

#### WAR WITH TRIPOLI (1801-1805)

(Naval) *Enterprise* vs. Tripolitan ship *Tripoli*—1 Aug 1801.

(Land) Capture of fortress at Derne, Tripoli—25-27 Apr 1805.

#### WAR OF 1812

(Naval) *Constitution* vs. British *Guerrière*—19 Aug 1812.

(Land) Battle of New Orleans—8 Jan 1815.

#### CIVIL WAR—(1861-1865)

(Naval) *Kearsarge* vs. Confederate *Alabama* (off Cherbourg, France) 10 June 1864.

(Land) First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas, Va.)—21 July 1861.







The following are all land engagements, some of them obscure, others almost household words:

Twelve Mile Swamp (Florida)—11 Sep 1812.  
 Quallah Batto (Sumatra)—6 Feb 1832.  
 Chapultepec (Mexico)—13 Sep 1847.  
 Shanghai (China)—4 Apr 1854.  
 Near Seattle (Washington) (versus Indians)—26 Jan 1856.  
 Ways (Fiji Island)—6 Oct 1858.  
 Capture of John Brown (Harper's Ferry)—18 Oct 1859.  
 Salee River Forts (Korea)—10-11 June 1871.  
 Santiago (Cuba)—3 July 1898.  
 Novalata (Luzon)—8 Oct 1898.  
 Tagali (Samoa)—1 Apr 1899.  
 Peking (Boxer Rebellion)—15-19 Aug 1900.  
 Leon (Nicaragua)—5 Oct 1912.  
 Vera Cruz (Mexico)—21-22 Apr 1914.  
 Puerto Plata (Dominican Republic)—1 June 1916.  
 Port au Prince (Haiti)—14-15 Jan 1920.  
 Camino Real (Nicaragua)—30 Dec 1927.  
 St. Mihiel (France)—12-16 Sep 1918.  
 Meuse-Argonne (France)—1-11 Nov 1918.  
 Tarawa (Gilbert Islands)—20 Nov-8 Dec 1943.  
 Iwo Jima—19 Feb-16 Mar 1945.  
 Inchon (Korea)—15 Sep 1950.

This partial list of engagements helps to convey the idea of a record unsurpassed in United States military and naval operations, or in that of any other country, for that matter. It is small wonder, then, that the Marines as a unit have an unrivalled *esprit de corps* which pays handsome dividends in combat when the blue chips are down. "Tell it to the Marines" has become a justly famous expression, but in this exhibit the Marines tell us, and we are glad for the opportunity to hear their story.

Among the more interesting objects on display is a Japanese battle-map found on a dead Japanese officer who had been killed shortly after the Marines landed on Iwo Jima. This map shows the Japanese dummy positions, main positions, strongly fortified positions and also the points where the enemy expected the main American attack and the alternative American attack. Needless to say the opportune capture of this map saved

many American lives and a great deal of time.

There are five life-sized models showing uniforms of the Marines from the beginning of their history to the present time. These models are well-arranged and add an additional splash of color to an exhibit that is colorful in its entirety. These models are:

Uniform of a Continental Marine of the American Revolution, the first of three green uniforms worn by the Marines.

Uniform of U. S. Marine Corps of 1810.

Uniform of U. S. Marine Corps of 1834.

Uniform of U. S. Marine Corps of 1861-1865.

Uniform of U. S. Marine Corps of 1900.

It is interesting to note that after 1867 the emblem of the Marines changed from a bugle with tassles to the more significant globe and anchor of the present.

Three pictures are outstanding in the present exhibit at the Decatur museum. One of them (also reproduced on the cover of the brochure *U. S. Marines in Review*, on sale at the exhibit along with the November-Anniversary Issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*, the latter being a collector's item, and both for a dollar) is magnificent because of its accuracy, detail, size, and color. It is a portrayal of the "Marines of *USS Wasp* in Action Against *HMS Reindeer*, 1814." This is one of the best sea-combat paintings the present writer has ever seen, and was done by John Clymer, USMCR (1907—); it is reproduced in this issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. Another painting of interest and merit is entitled "Marines Battle Seminole Indians, Florida War, 1835-1842," showing Marines being rowed through dismal Florida swamps while Seminole sharpshooters lurk behind moss-covered trees. Here again John Clymer is to be credited with doing a good job of bringing past military history to life on canvas. The third outstanding picture, this one by Tom Lovell, USMCR (1909—), is labeled "General Quitman Entering Mexico City with Battalion of Marines, Mexican

War, 1847." General Quitman, on close examination of the picture, is seen to be wearing only one shoe and his left foot bare,—an historically accurate detail. Quitman is portrayed as a bearded, martial figure; the Marines behind him, ragged, bloody, and proud, look as though they realized they were about to enter the Halls of Montezuma: the situation was obviously well in hand.

And speaking of the Halls of Montezuma, Exhibit No. 70 shows, to quote from the catalogue:

The piano-vocal score of Jacques Offenbach's comic opera *Genevieve de Brabant*, published (date unknown) by Heugel et cie, Paris. Pages 128-129 contain the first part of the song, "Couplets des hommes d'armes," a tune similar to *The Marines' Hymn*. Probably both were derived from a common source. The opera was first performed in Paris on November 19, 1859,

at the Theatre Bouffes-Parisiens. This particular song, a martial duet sung by two gendarmes, became widely popular in Paris and elsewhere.

This item was lent by the Library of Congress.

Altogether there were 102 items in the Marine exhibit which will be on display until 4 February, 1951. Weapons, flags, medals, uniforms, paintings, photographs are all arranged to show the important and vital role played by the Marines in American history. Any man or woman interested in American military and naval history will find this exhibition a *must*. As the visitor is about to leave the museum he will notice on the wall near the door the legend—

"I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM VISITING THE MARINES AT THE FRONT AND THERE IS NOT A FINER FIGHTING ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD."—General Douglas MacArthur, Korea, 21 September 1950.

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# THE BEGINNINGS OF A UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN LATIN AMERICA, 1809-1826

BY GEORGE B. DYER AND CHARLOTTE L. DYER

## *Strategic Intelligence and the Historical Approach*

Since World War I, and at an accelerated pace since World War II, the mysterious trade of the intelligence agent has been emerging from behind those veils of official secrecy which have hitherto obscured its details from the public eye. As a result mainly of official investigations—such as the Congressional inquiry into the Pearl Harbor disaster—and of the human urge of individuals to tell the world of their accomplishments—as exemplified in Herbert O. Yardley's *American Black Chamber*—it is becoming possible to define the field, and submit the subject to scholarly research and discussion in order to obtain the immense benefits to the profession which may confidently be expected to result from such a presentation. It is the belief of the present writers that the orderly submission of all those facts which—being already a matter of public record—can with propriety be presented to American scholarship, will result in nothing but good to the general practice of intelligence.

Especially in the field of strategic intelligence has this beneficent process been in operation, and such recent works as Dr. George S. Pettee's small volume (though marred by its somewhat unrepresentative title)<sup>1</sup> and Dr. Sherman Kent's more recent

and ambitious book, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, have already made real contributions to the modern scholarly consideration of this activity. It is not yet generally realized, however, what an attractive field strategic intelligence offers—an area in which historical research has unusual opportunities to produce improvements in the practice of the present through a study of the experiences of the past.

All intelligence operations are characterized by a three-step organization of the work: the collection of information; the processing of this raw material into what is known as "intelligence" (a specialized usage of a word which long has meant "news" or "information"); and the dissemination of the resulting product to those individuals or agencies that need it in their work.<sup>2</sup> The strategic intelligence process is no exception to these underlying rules, and the addition of the qualifying adjective merely means that here is a phase of the activity not primarily concerned with a localized temporary combat situation—or even with any given war as a whole—but with the long-range basic characteristics of peoples, nations, and groups of nations,—the elements, in short, which are conveniently dealt with as a major concern of political science under the heading of *The Foundations of National Power*.<sup>3</sup>

The principal factors in strategic intelligence may be said to have received their initial public clarification immediately after

<sup>1</sup>George S. Pettee, *The Future of American Secret Intelligence* (Washington, 1946). It is perhaps appropriate to remind the reader at this point of the difference between "Secret" Intelligence, which is concerned with clandestine operations, and strategic intelligence, which may derive from either overt or covert operations, but which in overwhelming measure is a product of perfectly open and legal collection methods.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Robert R. Glass and Philip B. Davidson, *Intelligence is for Commanders* (Harrisburg, 1948).

<sup>3</sup>See the outstanding book under that title by Harold and Margaret Sprout (Princeton, 1945).



World War I. This occurred principally in the publication by the Naval Intelligence Division of the British Admiralty of the series of *Handbooks* prepared c.1920 for various areas likely to be subjects of discussion in the peace negotiations.<sup>4</sup> Since the conclusion of World War II, consideration of the subject both at home and abroad has produced a generalized analysis of strategic intelligence which by common consent divides it into some six to ten major fields of study.<sup>5</sup> A typical arrangement might be as follows:

1. Historical background.
2. Geographic (including topographic).
3. Demographic (and sociological).
4. Political.
5. Economic (which may or may not exclude into independent categories natural and stockpiled resources, industry, transportation, and finance).
6. Scientific and Technical.
7. Armed Forces.

It seems evident, then, that the systematic collection, processing, or distribution of information on the above topics about any foreign country, undertaken in any period in the past, by any individual or organization, constituted what is today known as strategic intelligence operations.

Prior to the period under review, the United States had no organization worthy of the name of a strategic intelligence system in existence in Latin America. In 1809, under the aegis of the infant State Department, the initial step in the establishment of

such a system was taken. Throughout the period considered here, the State Department's organization remained the backbone of operations of this character, although there were other collectors of information at work, and other elements in the government entered into the "processing" of the incoming raw materials. By 1826, the system was firmly and permanently established, though hardly to be described even yet as extensive, and was upon the point of entering a quarter century during which little further progress along these lines was to be made.

### *The Situation before 1809*

Thomas Jefferson, in 1809, wrote of the nearest Latin American neighbor of the United States, Mexico, as "one of the most singular and interesting countries on the globe, one almost locked up from the knowledge of man hitherto." "To the great mass of the American people," writes Professor A. P. Whitaker of the University of Pennsylvania, "—to practically all but a handful of scholars and seamen who had a special interest in it—Latin America was at this time *terra incognita*, a Dark Continent." And not only to the people at large—"even the authorities at Washington were woefully ignorant in regard to Latin America," Professor Whitaker goes on. "It would be a great mistake . . . to think . . . that the United States government . . . had a clear-cut picture of the region and its people." Nor did the United States government have any satisfactory system set up, or even in contemplation, for the collection, evaluation and use of information about this vast area of land and water stretching from the Caribbean nearly to Antarctica, which less than fifteen years later was to become the subject of a famous protective statement, the "most significant of all American state papers"—the Monroe Doctrine.

<sup>4</sup>And also, apparently in the same year by the British Foreign Office. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* had long produced models of such discussions of individual nations, e.g. "Switzerland" in the 11th Edition, 1910-1911, XXVI, 238-269, especially 239-246 and map; and the U. S. War Department, AGO, in its series of "Notes" on various countries (e.g. *China*, 1900) carries the effort back at least to the turn of the century.

<sup>5</sup>E.g. *Military Review*, Oct and Sep 1947, 16 and 36 respectively; *Informations Militaires* (France) 10-25 Aug. 1948, tr. and dig. in *Military Review*, Jul 1949, 105; U. S. *Naval Institute Proceedings* Jul 1948 and Dec 1949, 803 and 1377 respectively. Also see the somewhat more confused presentation by Kent, *op. cit.*, 6, 12, 32-38.

Besides the Spanish and Portuguese sea-captains and *conquistadores*, British, French and Dutch navigators had coasted the inhospitable shores of South America, and reported what they saw from deck and mast-head and daring small boat. But the iron curtain which the Spanish and Portuguese overlords had closed down around their colonies had turned away all non-Iberian travelers and traders save the hardiest and most ingenious. Even ordinary commerce with Latin American ports was virtually excluded by Spain until the pressure of the Napoleonic wars forced her to open them to neutral shipping in 1797; and Portugal attempted with some success to maintain her monopoly of the Brazilian trade until 1808. Needless to say, under such circumstances, smuggling was prevalent. Merchants and seamen of the United States had become familiar even before 1797 with the ports and proceedings of Havana, New Orleans and even far away Valparaiso, but the information they brought back was of little general intelligence value, it was too scattered to be profitably assembled, and in any case it fell upon the deaf ears and blind eyes of a young nation too preoccupied with its own selfpreservation in the face of a hostile Old World to engage in a balanced evaluation and use of intelligence data about Latin America.

A few commercial agents had been sent to the northern Caribbean area by the United States Congress during the American Revolution. These had been withdrawn or expelled at the conclusion of the war, and "for nearly fifteen years thereafter the United States had no accredited agents in any part of Spanish America." The first "agents for commerce and seamen" went to New Orleans and Havana in 1797; and in 1798 and 1800, the United States appointed two (unrecognized but tolerated) consuls at Santiago,

Cuba, and La Guaira, Venezuela, respectively. But here again, the information supplied by these sources was of a narrow and most inadequate nature.

Prior to 1809, in other words, such travelers, observers, and reporters of Latin America as Baron Alexander von Humbolt and Francois Depons were few and far between, and the sum total of information available in the United States was out of all proportion meagre when considered in the light of the part that Latin America was upon the point of playing in American foreign relations.

#### *1809-1810. Early Instructions to Agents*

On 7 March 1809, Thomas Sumter Jr., of South Carolina, was commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Portugal; but, since the Portuguese court had fled to Brazil to escape Napoleon, he became the first United States diplomat of that rank to serve in Latin America.

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, wrote out Sumter's instructions under date of 1 August 1809: "You will not fail to communicate the earliest information of all the material occurrences in Spanish America, which may have been produced by the present contest in Spain. . . ."<sup>8</sup> This seems to have been the only written instructions given to Sumter for guidance in his all-important function of observing and reporting at a crucial turning point in Latin American affairs. It is a truism in intelligence work (as in other similar operations) that non-specific instructions will usually beget non-

<sup>8</sup>William R. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning The Independence of the Latin American Nations* (New York, 1925), a basic source for research into intelligence operations of this period. Another example from the same year was the directive given to John Quincy Adams, upon his assignment as Minister at St. Petersburg: "The President will expect from you the most exact and ample communications, for which opportunities may be found."

specific reports. But here it was a case of the blind attempting to lead the blind. It is apparent that in 1809, a United States Secretary of State did not know what he wanted in the way of information. The extent to which this situation had improved by 1826 will be suggested below. Nonetheless, in 1809 there sat Sumter, keeping his eye on the Portuguese court, and picking up and retailing such conjecture and rumor about Spain and Spanish America as could be picked up, one to three months old, in Rio de Janeiro.<sup>7</sup>

It was perhaps dissatisfaction with this slow and indirect means of securing intelligence of the violent happenings then going on in the River Plate area that led President Madison's administration to take further steps to strengthen the United States collection organization. "The year 1810," writes Professor Whitaker, "was signalized by the first systematic effort of the United States to extend its agencies in Latin America. Such agencies were badly needed, for at this time it had only one formal diplomatic representative in that region, its minister to the Portuguese court at Rio de Janeiro, Thomas Sumter, Jr.; and even in Brazil it had only one consul, Henry Hill at Sao Salvador (Bahia). The need was greatest in Spanish America and it was here that Madison's attention was now focussed."

The first move in this direction employed a familiar diplomatic device as a "cover" for the larger designs the Secretary of State had in view—the "agent for commerce and seamen," a second of the three types of agents employed by the United States at that time. In so far as they had any intelligence functions, the agents for commerce and seamen were sent where a consul would not be acceptable, and where the strictly limited and tem-

porary mission of the special agent would not supply a sufficiently longtime coverage of the area of interest.

And the inadequately covered areas of permanent interest to President Madison made a neat geographic pattern with the official already settled under the bulge of Brazil. To supplement the view from Thomas Sumter's observation post, Madison's Secretary of State (still Robert Smith) sent William Shaler to the northwestern half of the Caribbean, with headquarters at Vera Cruz and Havana (in cooperation with an agent already installed at Santiago). Robert K. Lowry went to La Guaira in Venezuela to cover activities around the southeastern margins of that sea (in support of a consulate which had been on the nearby Dutch island of Curaçao since 1793). And to virtually all the rest of Spanish America, under a blanket assignment to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, went the greatest natural strategic intelligence agent of the period, Joel Roberts Poinsett, of South Carolina.

Instructions of the observe-and-report type to William Shaler were at least as general as those handed to Sumter in the previous year.<sup>8</sup> and Lowry, according to Dr. H. M. Wriston, "seems to have been limited to commercial activities and not to have had a political errand in the sense of Poinsett. . . ."

Nevertheless, though Shaler may have been poorly "briefed" by modern standards, the records reflect that he did his best to keep his government informed of developments in Cuba until December 1811, when he moved over to Mexico, and of events in

<sup>7</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, II, 669-679; extracts representative communications from Sumter to Smith from 23 Jul 1810 to 5 Dec 1811, which also give the time lag.

<sup>8</sup>Manning's extract (I, 9) is devoid of any such element. So are the nearly identical letters of authority, both dated 16 Jun 1810, to be found in *MS Instructions to Consuls*, I, 4 Oct 1800-26 Feb 1817, General Records of the Dept. of State, Grp. 59, The National Archives. A list of U. S. Special Agents, presently in preparation in the Archives, has the notation, credited to Vol. I, *Consular Instructions*, that Shaler was "to observe conditions and report on the revolt against Spain in Cuba and Mexico."

the border areas of that country until his departure in 1813. In the last year, he was even sending in that standby of present day intelligence operations, the local foreign newspaper, in this case a one-page bilingual sheet, *El Mexicano*, published 19 June 1813 at Nachitoches.

The letter of instructions to Poinsett was a document of a very different character from those previously mentioned, as Poinsett was an individual of quite different caliber from agents cited before in this paper. Poinsett, "the man after whom the poinsettia is named," was an intelligent, energetic, tough-minded and tough-bodied person, with a flair for intelligence work, whose career stamps him as an agent with whom a Director of Intelligence in any place and period would find himself both pleased and exasperated.<sup>9</sup> The pleasure would result from Poinsett's capabilities (equalled among his contemporaries perhaps only by John Quincy Adams who later was Poinsett's "Director of Intelligence") as a sharp observer, a systematic and accurate reporter, and even a sound forecaster of coming events in the area to which he was assigned. The exasperation would be due to Poinsett's willingness to engage up to the hilt in Latin American domestic affairs, to take sides, to promote revolutions and, in short, to violate one of the principal canons of intelligence: never fight unnecessarily, but only when the information can be obtained in no other manner. As a result of this weakness, Poinsett ultimately compromised his value as an intelligence agent so thoroughly as to end his diplomatic career (1829) with the demand of the Mexican government that he be recalled from his position as minister to that

country. But in the meantime he had turned in to Washington the first strategic intelligence reports worthy of the name produced by a United States agent on the subject of any Latin American country.

Robert Smith's letter, dated 28 June 1810, to Joel Robert [sic] Poinsett, after using phrases which have since become familiar to many Americans—"you have been selected to proceed, without delay, to Buenos Ayres"—and giving Poinsett the "propaganda line" he was to pursue, continues in a far more detailed vein than any previous instructions to agents leaving for Latin America:

Whilst you inculcate these as the principles and dispositions of the United States, it will be no less proper to ascertain those on the other side, not only towards the United States, but in reference to the great nations of Europe, and to the commercial and other connexions with them, respectively: and, generally, to inquire into the state, the characteristics, and the proportions, as to numbers, intelligence, and wealth, of the several parties, the amount of population, the extent and organization of the military force, and the pecuniary resources of the country.

The real as well as ostensible object of your mission is to explain the mutual advantages of commerce with the United States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable information on the subject. In order that you may render the more service in this respect, and that you may, at the same time, enjoy the greater protection and respectability, you will be furnished with a credential letter, such as is held by sundry agents of the United States in the West Indies, and as was lately held by one at the Havana, and under the sanction of which you will give the requisite attention to commercial objects.<sup>10</sup>

Here is to be seen a primitive sense of what data are needed for the overall evaluation of national power, a sense that was to develop much further during the next sixteen years. In truth, Robert Smith had outdone himself, and also the development of strategic intelligence operations in his times. This is sug-

<sup>9</sup>Poinsett's spectacular character and colorful career have made material for at least two full length biographies; e.g. J. Fred Rippey, *Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American* (Duke University, 1936) and Dorothy M. Parton, *The Diplomatic Career of Joel Roberts Poinsett* (Washington, 1934).

<sup>10</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 7; italics added.



gested by the fact that within the month in which James Monroe took over, on 2 April 1811, the portfolio of Secretary of State, he was writing to Poinsett: "The instructions already given you [28 June 1810] are so full, that there seems to be little cause to add to them at this time. Much solicitude is felt to hear from you on all the topics to which they relate. . . ."

Somewhat over a year later, on 14 May 1812, Secretary Monroe is seen to be still sufficiently approving of his predecessor's instructions to enclose a copy of the directive to Poinsett in a letter briefing Alexander Scott, a United States agent being sent to Caracas, Venezuela. But already the man later to give his name to "the most significant of all American state papers" was beginning to improve on earlier practice. He wrote to Scott:

It will be your duty to make yourself acquainted with the state of the public mind in the Provinces of Venezuela, and in all the adjoining Provinces of Spain; their competence to self-government; state of political and other intelligence; their relations with each other; the spirit which prevails generally among them as to independence; their disposition towards the United States, towards Old Spain, England, and France; and, in case of their final dismemberment from the parent country, what bond will hereafter exist between them; what form it will take; how many confederations will probably be formed, and what species of internal government is likely to prevail.

This is, in effect, a further subclassification of the political headings in the letter to Poinsett. Scott was generously equipped with funds voted by Congress for the relief of sufferers from a recent earthquake in Venezuela—and there is no evidence that he returned exceptionally interesting reports to the Department of State.

### 1811-1815. Early Reports to Washington

"Poinsett, Shaler, Scott and Lowry were simply the first of a considerable number of agents sent to the revolutionary governments south of the United States."<sup>11</sup> To cover them all exhaustively would go far beyond the scope set for this paper, which will concentrate upon the work of the individual who represents the best of these men from an intelligence standpoint.

Thomas Sumter checked Joel Roberts Poinsett into Rio, and reported him out again and on his way southward in a letter to the Department of State dated 5 February 1811.<sup>12</sup> True to the best traditions of the "cloak and dagger" trade, the South Carolinian sailed out of Rio on an English merchant ship, carrying documents from which he would "probably . . . be taken for an Englishman." He escaped the blockade at the mouth of the Plata, and was received by the *junta* governing Buenos Aires on 13 February 1811. That same day he wrote his first report from his new territory.<sup>13</sup> Within two weeks he was venturing into that most esoteric phase of intelligence practice, prophecy—and doing it with the sound-

<sup>11</sup>H. M. Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations*, (Baltimore, 1929), 413. Dr. Wriston's conscientious work undoubtedly names most of them. As mentioned in Note 8, above, the National Archives staff is attempting to compile a complete list, supplementing the famous lists published as Part II of the *Register* of the Dept. of State for Mar 1874, 52, et. seq.

<sup>12</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, II, 672. This letter gives details of Poinsett's undercover role on the voyage.

<sup>13</sup>Poinsett's papers are far from fully represented in the General Records of the Dept. of State at the National Archives. He got many of them away from the Department in 1818, and the two main groups of his manuscripts are now to be found in the Gilpin Collection and the Poinsett Papers in the general manuscript division of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia. The 613 pieces in the former have been described in *Calendar of Joel R. Poinsett Papers*, (Philadelphia, 1941); those in the latter relating to Poinsett's South American mission, 1811-1815, are calendared in a typescript taking up the first three pages of *Special Agents*, III, 1813, J. R. Poinsett, in the Archives Record Grp. 59.

ness which characterized most of his excursions into "crystal ball gazing": "All South America will be separated from the Parent country," Poinsett announced confidently, "They have passed the Rubicon." This was on 23 February 1811—some fifteen years before the last Spanish garrison in Latin America surrendered.

Poinsett stayed in Buenos Aires, earnestly trying to improve Argentine-United States relations (and to stir up as much trouble as possible for Spain and England) until late in November 1811. From the day of his arrival to his departure for the West Coast he wrote twenty-three letters to the Secretary of State, mostly of the type which now would be known as "spot" or "periodic" reports: i.e. running accounts of events, not marked by long-range analysis of strategic factors, and at least once purely administrative. He crossed the Pampa, writing "perhaps the first [description of that country and its people] ever written by a citizen of the United States," and reached Santiago after more than a month of the hardest sort of traveling from Buenos Aires. Safely arrived in Chile, he immediately flung himself with uninhibited enthusiasm into the current disturbances, and before he returned home he had gone so far as to fight as an officer in the Chilean army against invading royalist forces.<sup>14</sup> He did not quite forget his reportorial mission, however, and in the period of his stay on the West Coast, he wrote eleven letters to Secretary Monroe which have been preserved among the Poin-

sett collection and "very few" now to be found in the National Archives. Accompanying these latter is an early example of cartographic intelligence—an interesting sketch map, in black and blue ink, with roughly shaded hachures of the terrain on both sides of the Valparaiso-Santiago-de-Chile highway, and a descriptive report on the island of Cuba (probably produced in 1818 or 1822) which might well serve as the earliest prototype of a strategic intelligence report were there not available better later examples of this genre from the same hand.<sup>15</sup>

Poinsett returned home to Charleston, South Carolina, on 28 May 1815, but this was not to be the end of his intelligence reporting, even for this first trip to Latin America.

### *1815-1818. A Flood of Information*

Professor Whitaker writes: "... in 1815 the government as well as the people of the United States still needed to be educated about Latin America. In the course of the next few years this need was supplied by a flood of information and ideas about Latin America that flowed in from many sources. The three principal sources were, first, letters and reports from American citizens who had visited Latin America or were residing there; second, the writings of propagandists in the United States; and third, foreign newspapers, books, and magazines." Only the first of these, which of course, includes the reports of government agents abroad, can be considered in the present paper.

The three-year period immediately follow-

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, 49; also see Wriston, *op. cit.*, 14, in which a plausible explanation is given for Poinsett's lapses from strict attention to his duties as a U. S. intelligence agent: he "had gone to South America partly for adventure. . . . He had no salary, and only half his expenses, an arrangement proposed by himself." And in a personal letter from Chile, 1 Mar 1812, Poinsett writes: Here "all is confusion, revolution, war and rumors of war; it is a gentle state of agitation which pleases . . . and seems as necessary to my mind as exercise to the body." Gilpin Papers, No. 20.

<sup>15</sup>*Special Agents*, III, 1813, J. R. Poinsett, Grp. 59, Archives, 8, 21-24 respectively. Poinsett also sent in a table of the Chilean Regular Army, which has a remarkable resemblance to a modern "T/O & E" (95), a table of the politico-administrative organization of Spanish America (3'), and other interesting items preserved in the same volume.

ing the end of the War of 1812—which also included the last two years of Monroe's tour of duty as Secretary of State—saw a flurry of activity in the despatch of United States special agents to Latin America. One of the first missions, though in no sense related to strategic intelligence and only peripheral to Latin America, was so definitely a clandestine intelligence investigation, of the "special inquiry" type, that it deserves a few words. General Thomas Pinckney, 1 April 1815, was directed to employ an undercover agent or agents to proceed to Bermuda and the West Indies to procure evidence of the sale of slaves captured by the British during the war.<sup>16</sup>

Other agents, assigned to less "romantic" missions during this period included:

<i>Santo Domingo:</i>	Jacob Lewis	1816
	Septimus Tyler	1816
<i>Texas:</i>	George Graham	1818
<i>Buenos Aires:</i>	William G. D. Worthington	1817
<i>Chile:</i>	James Biddle	1817
<i>Peru:</i>	John B. Prevost	1817
<i>Colombia or New Granada:</i>	Christopher Hughes	1816
<i>Peru:</i>	Jeremy Robinson	1817
<i>Spanish Main:</i>	Jacob Lewis	1816
(N. Coast of Venezuela and Colombia)	Charles Morris	1817
<i>Venezuela:</i>	Baptis Irvine	1818
<i>South America:</i>	Joseph Devereux	1816
(in general)	Theoderick Bland	1817
	John Graham	1817
	Caesar A. Rodney	1817
	H. M. Brackenridge	1817

The last four names on this list deserve more than passing attention. Rodney, Graham and Bland constituted a commission of inquiry; Brackenridge was secretary to the commission. They were given a warship to travel upon; their mission was specifically "for obtaining accurate information respecting the conflict between Spain and her colonies," and they were the occasion for the most precise set of instructions yet issued to an American agent being sent to Latin America.

These instructions were of such high quality from an intelligence standpoint that the standard set was not even approached for ten years after 1817. Indeed, they can well be offered as the best example for the entire period, and they are therefore reproduced at length below. They combine an absolutely exact statement of the information sought and a sharp delimitation of the field of action to be covered by the commission, with adequate discretionary powers to permit the members to utilize to the best advantage any unforeseen local opportunities for fact gathering. And they were drafted by an acting Secretary of State, not by Monroe or Adams, though it is to be assumed that the former, as usual, added his own definite ideas. Richard Rush, after outlining the situation as it was seen by the State Department on 18 July 1817, went on to instruct the commissioners as follows:

Under these impressions the President deems it a duty to obtain, in a manner more comprehensive than has heretofore been done, correct information of the actual state of affairs in those colonies. For this purpose he has appointed you commissioners, with authority to proceed, in a public ship, along the coast of South America, touching at the points where it is probable that the most precise and ample knowledge may be gained. The *Ontario*, Captain Biddle, is prepared to receive you on board at New York, and will have orders to sail as soon as you are ready to embark. It is the President's desire that you go first to

<sup>16</sup> *Special Missions*, III, Grp. 59, Archives. A clandestine operation *per se* was no new thing for the Department of State—Silas Deane, Charles Dumas and others operated "secretly" in France during the American Revolution. See Wriston, *op. cit.*, especially 5-8.

the River la Plate, visiting Buenos Ayres and Monte Video. On your way thither, you will call at Rio Janeiro delivering to our minister at that court the despatches which will be committed to your hands. On your return from Buenos Ayres, you will also touch, should circumstances allow it, at St. Salvador and Pernambuco. You will thence proceed to the Spanish Main, going to Margarettia, Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas and as far westward as Carthagena, looking in at any other convenient ports or places as you coast along.

In the different provinces or towns which you visit your attention will be usefully, if not primarily, drawn to the following objects.

1. The form of government established, with the amount of population and pecuniary resources and the state and proportion as to numbers intelligence and wealth of the contending parties, wherever a contest exists.

2. The extent and organization of the military force on each side, with the means open to each of keeping it up.

3. The names and characters of leading men, whether in civil life or as military chiefs, whose conduct and opinions shed and influence upon events.

4. The dispositions that prevail among the public authorities and people towards the United States and towards the nations of Europe, with the probability of commercial or other connections being on foot, or desired, with either.

5. The principal articles of commerce, regarding the export and import trade. What articles from the United States find the best market? What prices do their productions, most useful in the United States, usually bear? The duties on exports and imports; are all nations charged the same?

6. The principal ports and harbors, with the works of defence.

7. The real prospect, so far as seems justly inferable from existing events and the operation of causes as well moral as physical in all the provinces where a struggle is going on, of the final and permanent issue.

8. The probable durability of the governments that have already been established with their credit, and the extent of their authority, in relation to adjoining provinces. This remark will be especially applicable to Buenos Ayres. If there be any reason to think, that the government established there is not likely to be permanent, as

to which no opinion is here expressed, it will become desirable to ascertain the probable character and policy of that which is expected to succeed it.

9. In Caracas it is understood that there is, at present, no government, but that the forces are united under General Bolivar. It might be useful to know, whether any and what connection exists between this chief, and the chiefs or rulers at St. Domingo; also the number of negroes in arms.

Your stay at each place will not be longer than is necessary to a fair accomplishment of the objects held up. You will see the propriety, in all instances, of showing respect to the existing authority or government of whatever kind it may be, and of mingling a conciliatory demeanor with a strict observance of all established usages.

The track marked out for your voyage has been deemed the most eligible; but you will not consider yourselves as positively restricted to the limits or places specified. You will be free to deviate and touch at other places as your own judgments, acting upon circumstances and looking to the objects in view, may point out. In this respect the commander of the ship will have orders to conform to such directions as you may think fit to give him. You will however call first at Rio Janeiro, and not go further south than Buenos Ayres. At this point it is hoped that you may be able to command the means of obtaining useful information as respects Chili and Peru. You will also not fail to go to the Spanish Main, returning to the United States at as early a day as will comport with the nature and extent of your mission. Your observation and enquiries will not be exclusively confined to the heads indicated, but take other scope, keeping to the spirit of these instructions, as your own view of things upon the spot may suggest.<sup>17</sup>

It is unfortunate that such exact instructions did not produce commensurate results. "When the reports from the South American commissioners, Rodney, Graham, and Bland, at last arrived in 1818," writes Professor Whitaker, "they proved to be less helpful guides for Latin American policy than had been hoped for. Though they

<sup>17</sup>Manning, *op. cit.* 43-45.



covered as broad a field as could have been expected (Chile and Montevideo as well as Buenos Aires), the commissioners disagreed with each other so sharply that, instead of submitting a joint report, as had been planned, each of them filed a separate report. Their secretary, Brackenridge, added to the confusion by publishing a book, *A Voyage to South America*, which described the mission and its results from still a fourth point of view.<sup>18</sup>

Even before the completed reports from this mission were in hand (23 October 1818), John Quincy Adams, now Secretary of State,—and a “diplomatic reporter *par excellence*”—had written to Joel Poinsett. The ex-Consul General of the United States at Buenos Aires was deeply engaged in South Carolina politics, and though he had earlier refused a place on the commission, he could not turn down a request from Adams couched in these terms: “I am directed by the President of the United States to request of you such information, in relation to the affairs of South America, as your long residence in that country, and the sources of intelligence from thence which have remained open to you since your return, have enabled you to collect, and which you may think it useful to the public to communicate to the Executive Government of this Union.”

It seems that this short note must have been only a confirmation of earlier discussions, and the report had been some time under consideration, since in the previous

month Poinsett had requested return of, and received, most of the letters and other documents he had sent into the Department of State between 1811-1815, and it is assumed these were among the sources he used.

Be that as it may, the 25,000-word report dated 4 November 1818, which Poinsett turned in, comes far closer to the modern “intelligence survey” than any reports previously noted. Lack of space prevents a detailed description and analysis of this report, which represents a significant transitional step from the raw and disorganized data submitted in 1809, toward the more nearly finished products to be dealt with under the headings of the 1820’s. It is an excellent example of its species, and the reader may look it up for himself in the several convenient places where it has been reprinted. A brief quotation, from the beginning of the section on Chile, is all that can be quoted to suggest that even the geographic-demographic-political arrangement of a modern strategic intelligence survey was partially followed by Joel Roberts Poinsett as early as 4 November 1818:

*The kingdom of Chili* is comprised within the narrow strip of land which extends west from the summit of the Cordilleras de los Andes to the Pacific ocean, and stretches along the coast north and south, from the river Salado and the desert of Atacama to the straits of Magellan. From the chain of frontier posts (which begin at Arauco, on the coast, and extend to the Cordilleras) to the town of Valdivia, the country is in possession of the warlike tribe of Araucanians, who still remain independent; and from Osorno, south, it is inhabited by the various tribes of Patagonia, whose territories have not been explored.

The population of Chili, by the census taken in 1791, was found to be 750,000 souls. From the strong motives of concealment, as the census is taken for the purpose of proportioning the taxes according to the population of each district, the population of Chili cannot be estimated at less than one million.

The distance from the Cordilleras to the Pacific:

<sup>18</sup>A. P. Whitaker, *The U. S. and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830* (Baltimore, 1941), 248. The footnotes on this and the following page go far to explain the discrepancies between the character of the instructions and the character of the reports which the highly prejudiced commissioners and their secretary turned in; they also lead to several standard sources in which the reports may be read. Professor Whitaker regards very highly some of the work of H. M. Brackenridge, but Poinsett’s parallel material appears better from a strategic intelligence viewpoint; cf. 162, 178-181.

ocean is thirty leagues, between the latitudes of 25 degrees and 36 degrees south; and 40 leagues, between 36 degrees and 43 degrees south.

The country comprised between the 25th and 43d degrees of south latitude may be considered the length of the kingdom of Chili, it being unsettled, and even unexplored, farther south. . . .<sup>19</sup>

The report was accompanied by a lengthy private letter, containing what would now be considered as the "recommendations" or "conclusions" of the official document. This constituted a reluctant argument *against* United States recognition of the Buenos Aires government, a position in which he was far from seeing eye-to-eye with some of the President's commissioners. This long argument, considered in the light of Poinsett's well-known sympathies for the revolutionary regimes in Latin America, must have been quite effective. Adams, who was highly pleased, remarked that other agents had stood "looking in ecstatic gaze at South America" but that Poinsett and Graham had "seen more clearly" and had revealed "much of the naked truth."

### *The Receiving End: Collation and Evaluation*

John Quincy Adams succeeded Richard Rush as President Monroe's Secretary of State on 22 September 1817. The two men constituted an unequalled team for the direction of United States foreign relations until nearly the end of the period under review; and from 7 March 1825 to the end it was still conducted by Adams, as President, with Henry Clay serving at the head of the State Department.

Neither Monroe nor Adams had special qualification for dealing with Latin American matters, but both had seen long years of service in diplomatic posts abroad—and

they had every general qualification. "James Monroe made an ideal President. He had in John Quincy Adams a perfect Secretary of State," declares Professor S. F. Bemis, flatly.

The inchoate intelligence network in the field which Adams found to hand has already been sketched. It may be worth while to turn briefly to touch upon the machinery available in his own department. The "Department of Foreign Affairs" in 1789 had occupied two rooms, with a total personnel of from three to five. The Department of State which Adams took over in 1817 at least had graduated into a brick building of its own; "the entire staff . . . consisted of a chief clerk and translator, Daniel Brent, and seven assistant clerks. The total expenditures of the whole Department at home (\$19,410) and abroad (\$103,652.04) . . . was less than the British Foreign Office was spending on secret service alone. . . ." Adams found the department in a disorganized and inefficient condition, and he began at once to straighten things out.

It is obvious that here was the minimum machinery required to receive, register, and file incoming material. Little "collation" could be attempted; and real "evaluation" (the crux of processing) was unlikely at any point while information was passing through the Secretary's subordinate staff. The agents "in the field," of course, were beginning to "pre-evaluate" the material they were sending in; but it is apparent that at this period most of the routine evaluation was done by the Secretary himself—if not by the President of the United States! The best Adams could do when he and the President wanted a cross-check, as occurred in the case of the Bland-Rodney-Graham reports, was to ask some outside expert, like Poinsett, to prepare parallel material. All the elaborate modern structure of Under-

<sup>19</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, II, 1005-1006.

secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, of geographic and functional "desks," of a special assistant "ranking with Assistant Secretaries" for research and intelligence alone—all this was a hundred years and more away from Adams and his toiling contemporaries.

Although the new Secretary was able to improve the administrative operations of his office, he could do only so much when Congress held the purse strings; and as for dealing with Latin American affairs—"as late as 1824 Adams admitted that the State Department had no one competent to translate even a written communication in [Portuguese]."

### *1818-1822. The Problem of Recognition*

As noted above, the commission sent to South America in 1817-18, as well as the request to Poinsett for an independent report, was principally for the purpose of securing information to establish whether the government at Buenos Aires—or, for that matter, any of the new independent governments in South America—were sufficiently stable, and otherwise qualified, to receive diplomatic recognition by the United States. The recommendations of Poinsett and Graham prevailed; recognition was delayed. Nevertheless, the question remained a burning one, on which much oratory and public discussion were expended, until the issue was settled by President Monroe's action in 1822.

The most likely candidates for such encouragement were the governments precariously balanced, or oscillating, in Buenos Aires, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, and it is therefore not surprising that several of the agents dispatched by Secretary Adams had these areas as their targets. To the northern coast of South America, in 1820, went Charles S. Todd, a "confidential agent" who also was directed "to obtain information concerning the condition of affairs in Colom-

bia. . . ."<sup>20</sup> Todd behaved somewhat mysteriously, and had trouble getting along with Pedro Gual, (Foreign Minister of Colombia from March 1821), but is credited with success in his negotiating function, at least. His chief interest to the purposes of the present endeavor is conveyed in a letter of instructions he wrote to a subagent he was appointing, in which he asked for detailed information about Gran Colombia, and—striking a new and most important note—directed him to "procure the best charts of the Country."<sup>21</sup> Another rather ambiguous person involved in agencies between the United States and Venezuela at this time was Dr. Samuel D. Forsyth—perhaps a mild example of a "double agent" since both Venezuelans and Americans considered he represented their respective countries—who gravitated between Washington and northern South America during this period.

The instructions to John M. Forbes, going to "Chile or Buenos Aires," furnished opportunity for a homily by Adams (5 July 1820) on the evaluation of sources: "The more particular and correct the information which you can obtain, the more acceptable it will prove. . . . In recommending [this vigilance] to your attention, I would add the caution, neither to take upon trust what any man shall tell you, without asking yourself what it is to his interest to wish that you believe, nor to give more weight to conjectures than the circumstances under which they are formed will warrant." Forbes served the United States in various capacities

<sup>20</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, 126 fn. Todd followed in the tracks of Baptis Irvine, who since 1818 had been attempting to settle the claims of certain U. S. citizens against the fluctuating governments of Venezuela, New Granada, and Gran Colombia. Irvine also had an information-collecting mission as a secondary function, as did most agents. He wrote a report on Venezuela, but it was never published.

<sup>21</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, II, 1204-1205. Todd's despatches are in *MS Special Agents*, Grp. 59, Archives.

at Buenos Aires until 14 June 1831 when, like so many other American agents sent southward during this period, he died at his post.

Death also terminated the rather special agency of Captain Oliver H. Perry, who may stand representative of whatever good the United States Navy did for their country's strategic intelligence collection during this period. He was instructed "to visit Venezuela and then go on to Buenos Ayres and report all interesting information respecting the condition of the countries, their internal situation and prospects. . . ." Little of value appears to have been derived from the reports of such naval patrols; Dr. Wriston refers to them as a "futile expedient"; Professor Whitaker describes the results of Perry's mission as "disappointing." In general, the chief service of the Navy to United States strategic intelligence work in this period was clearly the sea transportation of civilian agents of the State Department, and of the money with which to pay them.

But once again it remained for an old acquaintance to do the best work along the lines considered in this paper, and in one of the areas of most critical interest: Joel Roberts Poinsett was prevailed upon to make a trip into Mexico, to observe and report on the situation in that country. The results of his journey in the fall of 1822 constitute the closest approximation to a modern strategic intelligence report which has come down from this period.

#### *Poinsett's "Notes on Mexico in 1822"*

"Though President Monroe had announced his desire to extend recognition, the information at hand about the Mexican country and its government was pitifully meagre. The President, therefore, requested Joel R. Poinsett to go to Mexico and report

upon the situation. The choice was an admirable one. His long experience in South America a decade before had fully acquainted Poinsett with the characteristic politics of the area, and his knowledge of the language was perfect. He was sympathetic, but experience had taken the fine edge from his enthusiasm. He was a seasoned and intelligent observer. Landing at Vera Cruz, Poinsett went to Mexico City, and thence to Tampico, where he again took ship. A day-to-day account of his journey . . . makes fascinating reading and impresses one with Poinsett's skill as a mirror of events and conditions. It is slight wonder that his opinions had an important influence upon American policy. . . ."<sup>22</sup>

And Professor Whitaker writes: "... until the publication of Joel Poinsett's Notes on Mexico in 1824, the American people knew less about this next-door neighbor than about almost any important country or region in the West Indies or South America."<sup>23</sup> Professor Manning is also in agreement: "Probably no man in the country had the knowledge and experience which could have so well qualified him for the place as had Joel R. Poinsett. . . . In 1822 he went on the . . . mission to Mexico . . ., was favorably received, learned much of the country and people, and made an intelligent and, as events proved a prophetic report to the State Department. . . ."

Poinsett's official report to the Department occupies sixty manuscript pages, accompanied by an appendix of equal length. It is largely political in content, as might be expected in a report designed as the basis for a political decision. For this reason the popularly published *Notes on Mexico in 1822*, with their broader field of interest, will better

<sup>22</sup>Wriston, *op. cit.*, 434-435.

<sup>23</sup>Whitaker, *op. cit.*, 137-138.



serve the purposes of the present analysis.<sup>24</sup>

It should be stated at the outset that the defect of even the best of these early nineteenth century reports, from the twentieth century viewpoint, is the almost total lack of what present-day practitioners of the intelligence officer's art would consider an indispensable minimum of systematic organization. As will be seen, Poinsett supplied the material for a complete strategic intelligence report on his target area; but, as will also be seen from the most cursory examination of the book, he skipped back and forth from one classification to another, and only the most careful reading of the *Notes* can give one a complete picture.<sup>25</sup> Poinsett's *chef d'oeuvre*, therefore will be discussed under the modern headings proposed in the first section of this paper.

### 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

There are a few paragraphs dealing with this subject scattered throughout the *Notes*, but paper number 3 at the end of the book gives an excellent and very detailed "Historical Sketch" from earliest times through the downfall of Iturbide in 1823. There are also various documents reproduced which would be helpful along this line such as: Iturbide's message to Congress 19 March 1823; Manifest, Addressed to the Mexican People by Regiment No. 1 of the Infantry of the Line, 21 May 1822; Decree of the Executive of Mexico prohibiting all inter-

course with Spain, 8 October 1823. (The official report concentrates on the period starting with February 1821).

### 2. GEOGRAPHIC (INCLUDING TOPOGRAPHIC).

Paper number 2 is headed "Geographical Division"; however, it also contains some demographical material. There are also scattered throughout the book paragraphs dealing with geography, such as page 33 paragraph 1, describing the mountains and altitude, page 35 paragraphs 3 and 4 on the forests, trees, roads, Lake Los Barrios, and the town of Jalapa. Page 40 deals with altitude and description of the countryside. However, on the whole the report is weak in geographical descriptions.

### 3. DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGY.

Population is dealt with fully. There is a most detailed report in the appendix showing the figures for 1779, 1796, and 1823 of the various provinces and important towns. Also, in the letters themselves, Poinsett discusses the population of various towns he travelled through and the population problem.

*Sanitation and Education.* This field is neglected, but chiefly because of the lack of the understanding of disease in those days. He mentions continually the filth of every town and the presence of black vomit and fever and the mosquitoes, but of course the cause of yellow fever was then unknown. He does emphasize the need for carrying one's own bedding and food, and providing a cook for the trip, but there is no detailed plan for circumventing disease. This is a serious omission, as at that time, being given a diplomatic mission to Latin America was tantamount to a death warrant executed by disease. (Poinsett must have had the constitution of a horse, as only once was he "indisposed" and then he only suffered one

<sup>24</sup>The edition used for this paper is the British of 1825: *Notes on Mexico made in the Autumn of 1822*, Accompanied by an Historical Sketch of the Revolution and Translations of Official Reports on the Present State of that Country, by J. R. Poinsett, Esq., Member of Congress, U. S. A., (London, John Miller, MDCCCXXV), 298 pp., Appendix and Index 138 pp.

<sup>25</sup>Indexing in those days was apparently not developed to a point where the index is of much help; there is no entry for "Political," for example, though other major headings may be found. In defense of the *Notes*, it must be admitted that the author himself concedes its lack of organization; but a study of some of his official reports reveals the same defects.

evening from a serious headache). There are similar discussions on the water supply, and of education and the lack of it. The art of letterwriting by public hacks is colorfully described.

*Religion.* All through the letters runs the continual thread of the faith of the Mexican people and the power of the church. He describes in detail the contrast between the beauties of the cathedral of Puebla and the misery of the poor worshippers, the account running on for two pages, concluding with the statement that: "We counted more than one hundred spires and domes in this city." Again from page seventy-three to page seventy-five, we have a minute description of the cathedral of Mexico City, built ironically enough on the ruins of the temple of Mixitli. A few pages further on the convent of La Professa is again contrasted with the misery and wretchedness of the poor. With the fight of the French peasant against the church still within the memory of a middle-aged man, the wealth of the Mexican church, and the salaries paid to its dignitaries would be knowledge of the utmost importance in evaluating the stability of the situation in Mexico. Poinsett, being a burning evangelist of democracy, has not neglected this field or failed to make mention of the Inquisition. He continues with a full explanation of the church laws and perquisites and ends by reprinting article 3 of the proposed constitution: "The religion of the Mexican nation is and shall be perpetually, the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman. The nation protects it by just laws and prohibits the exercise of any other." It can be said that religion is fully covered in this report.

*Customs of the People.* This subject is covered in detail. The people's dress, amusements, inheritance, marriage laws, living customs, houses, smoking habits, caste system, etc., are gone into meticulously, as well as

continued reference to the great contrast between the few rich and the numerous poor, which causes unrest and discontent. The arts are dealt with sparingly, and the calendar is briefly described.

#### 4. POLITICAL.

Quite naturally Poinsett was primarily interested in this division since, as has been said, it was the main point of his mission to ascertain whether the Mexican government was stable or not. In the "Documents" at the end of his book he gives the text of Iturbide's *Message to Congress*, the *Manifest* referred to earlier, the Decree of the Executive of Mexico prohibiting all intercourse with Spain, and the *Projet* of a Constitution, 20 November 1823. Besides this in his letters he goes into the causes of the revolution, and the revolution itself. A Congress, the government, courts, diplomatic customs, and government buildings, and a short mention of government agencies. With the above material, any statesman should have been able to get a fairly good picture of the political organization in Mexico.

*Finances.* A detailed explanation is given of the financial state of the nation. Also in one of his letters he again touches on the matter. The question of taxes is also dealt with in his letters.

*Foreign Relations.* This subject, except for Mexican relations with Spain, is almost entirely neglected. Poinsett does mention fleetingly that the British are winning out in trade matters and that the Emperor expropriates foreign money without the slightest compunction.

#### 5. ECONOMIC.

This field is dealt with rather spottily and from two viewpoints: the possible competition of Mexican goods with those of the United States, and the volume of Mexican production for domestic consumption. Min-

ing was one of the chief industries in 1822, and is described fully. Gold, silver, quick-silver, and salt were then the chief products, with salt being relatively unimportant.

*Manufacturing.* This was in its infancy: cigars, cotton, refining, and leather goods were the only items mentioned of any significance.

*Agriculture.* This was important, both from the viewpoint of internal consumption, and of a later possible threat of competition with the United States. A detailed description is given of the chief products grown in the country while all through the letters short descriptions of crops and animals actually observed are inserted.

*Labor.* This subject is dealt with in a more than customarily disorganized manner. The perversity of the people is mentioned throughout the book, but only in a few places does Poinsett take up the labor question as such. He has a note on slave labor and mentions a little later the extremely low wages received by the worker.

*Communications.* Roads are dealt with at length but mostly by way of complaint as to their inadequacies.

*Housing.* This subject is described as being for the most part inadequate and filthy. Only one good inn, which chiefly recommended itself because it was clean, was mentioned.

*Trade.* This is taken up in a special report in the appendix and also in various letters. All in all the report arrives at a fairly good picture of the commercial situation.

## 6. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL.

This heading is a child of the twentieth century—perhaps its outstanding characteristic. Poinsett's report was written not only in the beginning of a century still largely innocent of the Industrial Revolution, but about a country even backward in this re-

spect for its times. The data under this heading is, accordingly, negligible.

## 7. ARMED FORCES.

The armed forces are not dealt with in detail in the *Notes*. There is one paragraph on the general state of the militia, and a list is given of the number of militia in the various provinces. Poinsett gives some figures in the number of troops in 1804 and in 1822, and in a few places mentions war supplies, or good defensive positions. But on the whole, this category is weak by modern standards. (This is less true of his official reports which gave considerable detail on armed forces.)

In sum, the *Notes on Mexico* are believed to speak for themselves—the best United States strategic intelligence picture of a Latin American nation to the date of its production. When the information supplied to Washington is compared to the type of instructions being generally issued at that time and it is considered that nothing existed to approach the elaborate agent training and briefing provided by all important governments today, the *Notes on Mexico* can be regarded as a truly extraordinary production for the year 1822.

And once again Poinsett made an intelligence officer's "educated guess" about future events: he cast doubts on Iturbide's ability to "maintain himself many months on the throne"—and recommended against the recognition of his regime. President Monroe, however, chose to ignore the warning. He accomplished official recognition of the Iturbide government formally by receiving its envoy on 12 December 1822. This resulted in personal embarrassment to Monroe, and real harm to his country's Latin American policy, for within a few weeks of recognition, as Poinsett had predicted, Iturbide's "empire" collapsed.

*1822-1826. Recognition: First United States Ministers to Spanish America*

Mexico was the second Latin American country to be recognized by the United States. The first wave of recognitions had been touched off by the formal acceptance, as *chargé d'affaires* for Great Colombia, on 19 June 1822, of Manuel Torres, whose long and untiring efforts as a propagandist for Latin American was thus suitably rewarded by President Monroe only a short while before Torres' death.

Mexico's representative was received by the President in December, 1822. Chile and Buenos Aires (La Plata) were next, on 27 January 1823. The Independent Empire of Brazil (from which our minister had been temporarily withdrawn), on 26 May 1824, was fifth. Central America was sixth, 24 August 1824. Last of this earliest group was Peru, still torn by fighting in 1824, and not recognized until 1826. Thereafter occurred the hiatus in recognitions which delayed for more than eight years the further spread of the United States diplomatic "network" of ministers extraordinary and plenipotentiary and their staffs.

The reception by President Monroe of official representatives from the new nations named above had its complement in the despatch of United States Ministers to Latin American countries. Caesar A. Rodney, of the 1817-1818 Commission, was appointed minister at Buenos Aires on 27 January 1823, and Herman Allen to Chile on the same day. Richard C. Anderson was commissioned to Colombia in 1823, and took over in Bogota from Todd, getting on with Pedro Gual better than the latter had done. After a number of political maneuvers, President Monroe designated Poinsett to be minister to Mexico. Thanks partly to the precipitate recognition of the ill-fated Iturbide government, Poinsett was not received with enthu-

siasm by the administration which succeeded that of the "emperor." The South Carolinian faced, in effect, an impossible situation when he reached Mexico City in May, 1825. These difficulties were compounded by his weakness for meddling in the internal affairs of the country in which he found himself, and his recall was demanded in 1829. Other United States diplomatic personnel began to fill out the missions to Central and South America.

Lengthy written instructions by Adams to these new ministers are on record.<sup>26</sup> They constitute what would now be considered an adequate briefing in the background of the nation in question and the United States policy towards it. But, from a modern professional intelligence officer's viewpoint, the information-gathering instructions are still in the realm of glittering generalities: "Our information concerning [Colombia] is imperfect, and among the most important objects of your mission will be that of adding to its stores; of exploring the untrodden ground, and of collecting and transmitting to us the knowledge by which the friendly relations between the two countries may be extended and harmonized, etc., etc."<sup>27</sup>

Instructions similarly stressing the functions of representation and negotiation, rather than of strategic information gathering, were issued by Henry Clay, as one of his first acts as Secretary of State, to Poinsett, on the latter's departure for Mexico in 1825. This is equally true of Clay's letter to John M. Forbes, United States *chargé d'affaires* at Buenos Aires, in the same year. But by April, 1825, Clay was beginning to warm to his work, and telling William Miller, *chargé* in the "United Provinces of the Centre of America" (a splinter from southern Mexico) to look to "the physical

<sup>26</sup>E.g. Adams to Anderson, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 192-208; also see Bemis, *Adams*, 360.

<sup>27</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 208.



condition of the Country, as the moral and political character of the inhabitants. The Geographical boundaries of the Republic, etc.<sup>28</sup>

Toward the end of the period under review on 6 November 1826, Clay wrote a set of instructions in which are to be seen gropings toward most of the elements of a strategic intelligence report, and an especially interesting beginning along certain sociological lines. Elaborating on the instructions to Miller, he continues to James Cooley, appointed *chargé* in Peru: "... the geographical boundaries of the Republic, its connexions with Mexico, Colombia, the Republic of Bolivia, and Chili; the present state of its Government, Revenue, Army and Navy; its prospect of forming a permanent Republican Constitution; the produce of its mines now and formerly; and the state of its relations with European Powers, will all form important matters of enquiry and investigation. You will especially observe [possibilities for commerce, etc.]. . . . We should like, also, to possess accurate information as to the actual condition of the Aborigines within the limits of the Republic. Have they made any, and what, advances in civilization? Are they governed by their own laws. . . .? Have they any civil rights. . . .? Have they a taste for, and a sense of, the value of, property. . . .? What have been, and are now, the means employed to civilize them?"<sup>29</sup> But not until 1827, beyond the scope of this paper, was Secretary Clay getting back to such a logical categorization as Richard Rush had employed in 1817 in briefing the Commissioners Rodney and Graham.<sup>30</sup> No further reports of a quality

to improve on Poinsett's came into Washington during the period under review.

### 1826. Conclusion.

In 1826, the Latin American nations were upon the point of sliding into that state which Professor Whitaker so aptly describes as "Manifest Anarchy"; while the "Manifest Destiny" of continental expansion, by 1827, had plainly turned the faces of the people of the United States towards what was destined to be their own West. For a quarter of a century, the United States Government's strategic intelligence coverage of Latin America was to see little improvement, but even, rather, a recession of effectiveness.

Even as early as 1826, the portents were visible. Good intelligence practice should certainly have called for coverage of the Congress of Panama in that year. Adams, by now President, wanted agents at that important meeting "to spy out" any dangers. But, though agents were tardily appointed, none arrived. England, the Old Master in secret intelligence work, and even the Dutch, were represented by "observers." The great power most immediately concerned, however, had no direct intelligence coverage of the affair.

And the still persisting incompleteness and inefficiency of the American strategic intelligence network of the first quarter of the nineteenth century is further suggested by the fact that it was possible for the news of an event of such "global" importance as the discovery of a new continent to reach the United States Secretary of State first in a private letter from a man who had heard the story at least secondhand. It was some time before the official reports caught up with these private advices.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 277.

<sup>30</sup>Quoted above. Clay's instructions of 12 Mar 1827 are particularly interesting, being to an outright secret agent going to Cuba, exclusively to collect and transmit information, and the categories in it are far closer to modern practice than any previously cited. See Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 282-283.

<sup>31</sup>Whitaker, *op. cit.*, 296-297. The continent was Antarctica, c. 1820.

Nonetheless, it is believed that the evidence presented in the preceding pages indicates that United States strategic intelligence, which had been non-existent in Latin America prior to 1809, by 1826 had reached a degree of organization worthy of being designated a good beginning. Diplomatic representatives were officially and permanently located at key observation and listening posts

throughout the Americas, the procedures of instruction and reporting had greatly improved, and the "network" would continue to grow throughout the nineteenth century until a complete surveillance system for the collection of strategic intelligence and other essential information had been firmly established throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.

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## THE BATTALION OF SAINT PATRICK IN THE MEXICAN WAR\*

By EDWARD S. WALLACE

THE PICTURESQUE suburb of San Angel lies some seven miles to the south of Mexico City. In a section of it (now called Villa Obregon because General Alvaro Obregon was assassinated in a restaurant there in 1928) there stood, and may still stand, a curious wooden cross upon which is inscribed a gamecock, a pair of dice, and a skull and crossbones. This is the only known monument to those members of the Battalion of Saint Patrick who were executed by the victorious Americans in September 1847. The significance of these symbols seems to be that these unfortunate men were brave and fought, gambled, and lost.<sup>1</sup>

It is a curious and unusual story. Desertion has occurred in the United States Army as in any other, but to have a body of men desert and then form a distinct corps in the enemy's army, fighting then against their former comrades with considerable distinction, is unique in American military history. These deserters were called the "Irish Deserters" by the Americans and formed two companies of infantry known as the *Battallon San Patricio* in the Mexican Army. Some sixty-odd of these renegades were captured by the Americans, after desperate resistance, in the fortified convent of San

Pablo at the battle of Churubusco on 20 August 1847; they were later courtmartialed for desertion and convicted; fifty were hanged under dramatic circumstances. Those who escaped the extreme penalty were punished in the following manner as announced by General Winfield Scott (GO N. 340),

"... to forfeit all pay and allowances . . . to receive fifty lashes on the bare back, well laid on, to have the letter D indelibly branded on the cheek with a red-hot iron, to be confined at hard labor, wearing about the neck an iron collar having three prongs each six inches long, the whole weighing eight pounds, for six months, and at the expiration of that time to have the head shaved and be drummed out of the service."<sup>2</sup>

The story of these deserters goes back to April 1846, after General Zachary Taylor had advanced with his small force of about 3,000 US regulars from Corpus Christi to a point on the Rio Grande opposite Matamoros. Mexico had already officially informed President Polk, after the official annexation of Texas, that such a move would be tantamount to a declaration of war as they claimed all the territory between the Rio Nueces and Rio Grande, but when Taylor arrived on the opposite bank of the Rio Grande they delayed an attack for a time and turned loose a flood of propaganda on

\*This article is a revision and amplification of one by the author which appeared in *The Hispanic American Historical Review* for August 1935 and was entitled "Deserters in the Mexican War."

<sup>1</sup>Tom Mahoney, "50 Hanged and 11 Branded; The Story of the San Patricio Battalion," *Southwest Review* (Autumn 1947), XXXII, No. 4, pp. 373-376; G. T. Hopkins, "The San Patricio Battalion in the Mexican War," *Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association* (September 1913), Vol. 24, pp. 279-284.

<sup>2</sup>*The American Star*, Mexico City, 12 November 1847. This was a newspaper edited and published by American soldiers from September 1847 to May 1848 during the occupation of the Mexican capital. It amusingly resembles the *Stars and Stripes* in its style and tone—possibly showing the immutability of the American G.I.—and it carried the general orders for the army.

the foreign-born and Catholic soldiers in the American ranks.

The Mexicans well knew that there existed a great difference of opinion in the United States about the acquisition of more land for the extension of slavery; also of the feeling against the new Irish and German immigrants which had manifested itself earlier in riots in some of the northern cities, and was later expressed politically in the "Know Nothing" party. They knew that the troops of the regular United States Army contained a large proportion of these recent immigrants, so they endeavored to create rifts and dissension within their enemy's ranks in a manner somewhat similar to that employed by the Allies toward the minorities of Austria-Hungary in World War I.

General Ampudia, who commanded Mexican forces at Matamoros, started the ball rolling by a proclamation of 2 April 1846, printed in English, which he managed to have generally distributed among United States soldiers on the north side of the Rio Grande. This proclamation, strangely enough, made no religious appeal, as did many later on, but called on all soldiers of English and Irish birth to resist American aggression, and cited the threatened seizure of Oregon as an outrage similar to the annexation of Texas. It concluded with an additional appeal to those of German, French, and Polish birth, promised good treatment to all deserters, and a trip to Mexico City with all expenses paid.<sup>3</sup>

On 21 April, another proclamation to all Europeans was issued by General Arista who had succeeded Ampudia. This one made a definite offer of 320 acres of land and Mexican citizenship to all privates deserting. The offer was proportionately larger to those of higher rank.<sup>4</sup>

These two proclamations seem to have caused a surprisingly large number of desertions *before* the actual outbreak of hostilities. Among the first to desert was Sergeant John Riley, or Reilly, or O'Reilly, of Company K, 5th US Infantry, who was said to have been formerly a sergeant in the 66th Regiment (British), stationed in Canada, and from which he had previously deserted. He had then enlisted in the United States Army and had served as a drill sergeant at West Point.

Now, Riley, under pretext of going to Mass, obtained a pass and immediately crossed the Rio Grande, where he was received with open arms and commissioned a lieutenant in the Mexican Army. He was soon joined by other renegades; they organized the *Batallon San Patricio*, also called by the Mexicans "The Foreign Legion" and "The Red Company"; the latter name because the men had ruddy complexions and, some of them, red hair.<sup>5</sup>

The *Batallon* took some part in the defense of Monterey, in September 1846, and appeared again near Saltillo, to the south, where it seems to have been used with the artillery. It was then marched to Mexico City where its ranks were further augmented by the enlistment of other foreigners who were residents of Mexico City and in no sense deserters.<sup>6</sup>

After General Zachary Taylor's victorious army occupied the city of Monterey, the local Mexican priests made various attempts to induce further desertions and succeeded in persuading some fifty more men to leave. These men were all US Regulars, for the unruly Volunteers were considered unfit for garrison life and were camped in the bush outside, while the Regulars were quartered in the city proper. Strange to say not a

<sup>3</sup>John R. Kenly, *Memoirs of a Maryland Volunteer* (Philadelphia, 1873), pp. 39-40.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

<sup>5</sup>*The American Star*, 9 February 1848 (Reprint from *New York Commercial*); Hopkins, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup>Hopkins, *op. cit.*



single Volunteer deserted, although nearly a third of their number were Catholics. On the contrary, the latter were so physically violent against the Mexican propagandists that all efforts in that direction quickly ceased. Part of this feeling may have been because of the assassination by the Mexicans of Father Rey, a popular priest serving with the Volunteers. An officer of Ohio Volunteers said of this:

Father Rey was . . . a member of the Society of Jesuits . . . an unpopular order in Mexico . . . It was hinted by some, that while his ostensible mission was to counteract the influence of the Mexican priests and their insidious attempts to cause disaffection among our Catholic soldiers, his object was to secure, in the progress of events, the interests of his order, whose vast estates and possessions had been confiscated upon their banishment.<sup>7</sup>

The next recorded appearance of the *San Patricios* was a strange meeting which took place on the road between Metahuila and San Luis Potosí in February 1847. Sixty men of Kentucky Cavalry had been captured by the Mexicans, while reconnoitering, at the Encarnación hacienda south of Saltillo, where General Taylor awaited with his army the approach of Santa Ana from the south. The American prisoners were marched south under guard and met Santa Ana and his army on their northward trek. One of these Americans afterwards wrote an interesting account of their experiences. His description of Santa Ana, at this time, throws a new light on the habits of the "Napoleon of the South." He wrote:

We met the great army . . . twenty thousand strong, and marching in four divisions. First came his splendid park of artillery of fifty guns; then a body of five thousand infantry; then a huge body of cavalry; then infantry and cavalry, together in large bodies; then Santa

Ana in person, seated in a chariot of war drawn by eight mules and surrounded by his staff elegantly and gorgeously equipt; then fluttered on his rear a bevy of wanton women; and lastly, covering his rear, his baggage train, in the midst of which were five mules loaded with chicken cocks, from the "best coops" of Mexico.

Regarding the *Batallon San Patricio* he made the following comment:

Among the mighty host we passed was O'Reilly and his company of deserters bearing aloft in high disgrace the holy banner of St. Patrick. One of these fellows was a Dutchman, who said to Corporal Sharp of Captain Heady's corps, tauntingly, "Vell, you ish goin to Shan Louish, hey?" "Yes," replied Sharp, "I am and you ish going to Saltillo, hey?" "Yes," replied the Dutchman. "Then you ish goin' to h-ll in ten days," rejoined Sharp. Some of these fellows were swept away by the cannon and musketry of Buena Vista, while others of them were reserved for a more appropriate doom.<sup>8</sup>

At the ensuing battle of Buena Vista (or Angostura as the Mexicans call it), 22-23 February 1847, which resulted from the meeting of the two armies, the men of the *Batallon San Patricio* again acted as artillerymen and skilfully served a battery of heavy guns.<sup>9</sup> After Santa Ana's disgraceful retreat from the field of battle, where he might well have prevailed had he continued the attack, the *Batallon* again lapses into obscurity, so far as United States sources are concerned. The *Batallon* undoubtedly followed Santa Ana on his retreat to Mexico, and it may have taken part in the battle of Cerro Gordo against General Winfield Scott's army advancing from Vera Cruz, though positive evidence in this is lacking.

After the defeat of Cerro Gordo on 18

<sup>8</sup> (Anon.). *Encarnacion Prisoners* (Louisville, Ky., 1848), pp. 44-45.

<sup>9</sup> Manuel Balbontin, *La Invasion Americana* (Mexico, 1883), p. 61; N. C. Brooks, *A Complete History of the Mexican War* (Philadelphia, 1849), p. 218; George Wilkins Kendall, *War Between the United States and Mexico Illustrated* (New York, 1851), p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> (Anon.) *Sketches of the Campaign in Northern Mexico, by an Officer of the First Regular Ohio Volunteers* (New York, 1853), pp. 232-233, 276-277.

April 1847, the provisional president of Mexico, Anaya, conceived the grandiose idea of inducing all the 3,000 odd Catholics in Scott's army to desert. He realized that the Americans would soon occupy the city of Puebla without serious opposition and initiated plans for proselyting Catholics among American troops on a large scale. The aid of priests and leading citizens of Puebla was enlisted; the Mexican leaders were most optimistic as to the success of the scheme. The plan was: after these 3,000 had deserted, which appeared easy to accomplish, the city would rise in insurrection against the decimated American army, to be aided by the forces of Santa Ana who would arrive at a prearranged time.<sup>10</sup> To initiate this plan, Santa Ana issued a proclamation from Orizaba, addressed to the United States Army, in which he promised a bonus of \$10 and 200 acres of land to all deserters. To those who brought their arms and to officers the bonus was proportionately higher. Also an additional bonus of \$5 per head was promised to any person who could bring his friends with him in minimum quantities of one hundred. An equal rank in the Mexican Army would be given to officers, and the men would be organized into companies of their own similar to the *Batallon San Patricio*. A special supplement was appended to this proclamation entitled "From the Mexican Nation to Catholic Irishmen." This addressed them as "Sons of Ireland, a noble race" and asked if they had forgotten the strong tie of religion and their traditional friendship with the Spanish countries. "What!" it read;

Can you fight by the side of those who put fire to your temples in Boston and Philadelphia? Come over to us! . . . May Mexicans and Irishmen, united by the sacred tie of religion and benevolence, form only one people."

<sup>10</sup>Niceto de Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico* (Méjico, 1880), XII, p. 695.

<sup>11</sup>*New York Herald*, 17 October 1847.

This fantastic design brought no appreciable results. The reaction of most Irishmen in American ranks was, as one of them said to General Quitman, that the Mexicans were a lot of "damned black rascals." And certainly the obviously miserable condition of Mexican soldiers was little inducement to join their ranks.<sup>12</sup> However, there were a certain number of desertions, probably not over 200, and these men were incorporated into the *Batallon San Patricio*. All of these men were foreign-born with the exception of one or two who were captured while drunk and impressed into the battalion; the latter being afterward pardoned by General Scott when recaptured.<sup>13</sup>

When General Scott reached Puebla late in May 1847, he decided that two could play the game of enlisting the citizens of the opposing side in one's own army, for he mustered the inmates of the city jail and promised freedom to all those who would enlist in a special body of mounted Mexican scouts. Some twenty-two accepted this means of escape from imprisonment and were duly formed into a body under one Domínguez, a condemned murderer, and were known as *Domínguez's Scouts*. The services of these men were later of great value to General Scott because of their intimate knowledge of the surrounding terrain.<sup>14</sup> The Mexicans looked upon these criminal recruits with the greatest loathing and called them *Pablados*. General Anaya, who had left the presidency for active service and was captured at Churubusco, was so overcome by the sight of these renegades in United States uniforms that he had to be held forcibly by his cap-

<sup>12</sup>Col. Geo. T. M. Davis, *Autobiography* (New York, 1891), p. 276; George Ballentine, *Autobiography of an English Soldier in the United States Army* (New York, 1858), pp. 255-256.

<sup>13</sup>Hopkins, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup>Justin H. Smith, *The War With Mexico*, (New York, 1919), II, p. 362.

tors to prevent a seizure nearly epileptic.<sup>15</sup>

On 7 August 1847, General Scott resumed his march from Puebla toward the capital and was next opposed by Santa Ana at the battles of Contreras and Churubusco on 20 August. It was at Churubusco that the *San Patricios* made their mark in history. They, and two battalions of Mexicans, defended the strongly fortified convent of San Pablo and put up the most desperate and stubborn resistance that the Americans encountered during the entire war. Even when their ammunition was entirely exhausted, the *San Patricios* three times pulled down a white flag which General Rincón, the Mexican commander, had hoisted to stop a useless massacre. The work was finally carried by the Americans, after suffering extremely heavy casualties. The assailants, after some desperate hand-to-hand fighting, succeeded in physically overpowering the defenders who must have realized what their fate would be if captured. Two hundred and sixty odd United States deserters were believed to have taken part in this defense, and it may be assumed that all of these were killed or escaped, except sixty-five who were made prisoners, including their leader Riley.<sup>16</sup>

Within a few days, twenty-nine of these men were tried by a court martial presided over by one Colonel Bennet Riley (no relation to John), a Catholic himself, who had risen from the ranks in the regular US Army through sheer merit and ability. At the trial, all these men pled that they had been captured and forced into the Mexican ranks, but this was disproved by the testimony of other captured foreigners, not deserters. All the men were convicted and sentenced to be hanged, but General Scott,

after a careful review of individual cases, commuted the sentences of seven "to receive fifty lashes each on their naked backs, . . . and to be branded with the letter D high up on their cheek-bone, near the eye, but without jeopardizing its sight." Two were pardoned outright for being legitimately captured and forced into the *Batallon* where they had refused to fight.<sup>17</sup>

Intense dissatisfaction was aroused among the Americans because Riley, commander of the *San Patricios*, was included in the list of those whose sentence was commuted to lashing and branding. They felt that he had been largely responsible for the desertion of the others because of his rank, intelligence, and general influence. General Scott, however, took a literal interpretation of the Articles of War and because Riley, and the six others, had deserted prior to the actual declaration of war, refused to be moved from his decision.<sup>18</sup>

The Mexicans also were greatly stirred by the sentences, but in an opposite way. They considered them to be barbarously severe, and the Archbishop of Mexico, the clergy, and various persons of consequence of Mexico City waited upon the General to beg clemency for these unfortunate men; petitions for mercy were presented by the ladies of the city, and the British Minister made representations asking for mercy; all to no avail.<sup>19</sup>

On 10 September 1847, the sentences were carried out at San Angel. An eye-witness on General Scott's staff wrote of the scene:

Those that were to be whipped and branded were tied up to trees in front of the Catholic church on the plaza, their backs naked . . . and an experienced Mexican muleteer inflicted the fifty lashes with all the severity he could

<sup>15</sup>Zamacois, *op. cit.*, p. 746.

<sup>16</sup>Smith, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 111-117; James Reilly, "An Artilleryman's Story," *Journal of Military Service Institution*, 1903, XXXIII, pp. 438, 477, 1909, XLV, pp. 490-496; Brooks, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

<sup>17</sup>Hopkins, *op. cit.*; Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 224; Zamacois, *op. cit.*, p. 748. (The figures vary but I have taken Hopkins as the best authority.)

<sup>18</sup>Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-226.

<sup>19</sup>*New York Herald*, 17 September 1847.

upon each culprit. Why those thus punished did not die under such punishment was a marvel to me. Their backs had the appearance of a pounded piece of raw beef, the blood oozing from every stripe as given.

Each in his turn was then branded and forced to dig the graves of those subsequently hanged.

After this, sixteen of the condemned men were hanged on a common gallows,—“each being dressed in the uniform of the enemy in which he had been captured, the white caps being drawn over their heads.”<sup>20</sup> The method used was to stand two prisoners on the rear end of a cart drawn by a pair of fleet mules, place the noose around their necks, line up eight such carts in an even line, and start them all together at the tap of a drum. This system worked rather well as all but one Dalton died without a struggle. Dalton, said to have been second in command of the ill-fated *Battallon*, unfortunately was choked to death. Four remaining prisoners were hanged the following day to a tree at Mixcoac, while passing through under guard.<sup>21</sup>

Curiously enough, only seven out of the first sixteen hanged admitted to being Roman Catholics and asked for the last rites from a priest.<sup>22</sup> The more one looks into this tragic affair, the greater is the conviction that the title “Irish Deserters” is a misnomer, at least as far as the rank and file of the *Battallon* were concerned. One observer flatly stated that the deserters were largely English and German, particularly the latter.<sup>23</sup> The roster of names of the sixty-five captured at the convent would seem to confirm this statement. All of the deserters were from Regular US regiments.<sup>24</sup> Only twenty-seven of

the names, including those taken as officers, can definitely be classed as Hibernian. There are five names beginning with “Mc” which could be Scotch, and there is one Wallace. There was a Hezekiah Akles, who was probably about as Irish as Boston Baked beans, and there were various definitely English names like Whistler, Appleby, Parker, Wheaton. The balance were all German, such as Klager, Schmidt, Fogel. But Riley and the other leaders seem to have stamped their nationality upon the whole outfit for posterity.

The remaining lot, thirty-six in number, were tried by another court-martial at Tacubaya, over which a Colonel Garland presided, and all were convicted and sentenced to be hanged. General Scott remitted the sentences of two of these and commuted those of four others to lashing and branding.<sup>25</sup> The remaining thirty were hanged at Mixcoac on 13 September, on the day Chapultepec Castle was stormed and taken by the Americans. They were held standing, with nooses about their necks, upon an elevated gallows from which they could see the entire action. Colonel Harney, in command, told them that the trap would not be sprung until the United States flag was hoisted over the Castle. Their feelings may well be imagined, when, after several hours of bombardment and desperate and sanguinary fighting, they saw the Eagle and Snake slowly hauled down and the Stars and Stripes hoisted in its place. Colonel Harney was as good as his word, for when the flag reached the top of the flagpole, the trap was sprung and all thirty were launched to their death. At the last moment these men showed a flash of real sporting spirit for, as the flag slowly rose, they gave a cheer which was heard across the valley.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>20</sup>Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227.

<sup>21</sup>Hopkins, *op. cit.*; Reilly, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-444; Brooks, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-401; Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

<sup>22</sup>Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

<sup>23</sup>Capt. W. S. Henry, *Campaign Sketches of the War with Mexico* (New York, 1847), p. 249.

<sup>24</sup>The names are listed in Hopkins' article.

<sup>25</sup>Hopkins, *op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup>Hopkins, *op. cit.*; Reilly, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-444; Kendall, *op. cit.*, p. 41



As the victorious Americans surged into the Castle, Captain Tomás Murphy of the Mexican Army, son of the Mexican Minister to Great Britain, who had been wounded and captured, nearly lost his life because of his name and light complexion, for the attackers at first mistook him for another one of the *San Patricio* renegades and threatened to shoot him on the spot. Fortunately, he was able to convince them of his status as a native Mexican.<sup>27</sup>

General Scott now took steps to prevent further inroads by propaganda. In his General Order 296 he referred to a plot of certain Mexicans to make trouble and said:

The conspirators have also the services of several false priests who dishonor the religion which they only profess for the special occasion. Their plan is to . . . entice our Roman Catholic soldiers, who have done honor to our colours, to desert, under the promise of lands in California which our armies have already acquired and which are and forever will remain a part of the United States. Let all our soldiers professing the Catholic religion remember the fate of the deserters taken at Curubusco.<sup>28</sup>

The deserters whose sentences had been commuted were placed at hard labor during the occupation of the city, and it may be assumed that they did not sleep peacefully with those three six-inch prongs protruding from the iron collars about their necks. Mexican newspapers made sporadic comments upon the alleged brutality with which they were treated, and *The American Star* retorted with spirit to these attacks. Various petitions for clemency continued to be received but with no effect. The last official word about them was an announcement in the last issue of the *Star*, of 30 May 1948, which said that they were to be taken to New Orleans and there dishonorably discharged.

A sample of the fate which possibly befell

those who escaped capture is told of by a United States naval officer who traveled across the country from Mazatlan to Mexico City after the American capture of the capital. His humor seems a bit Dickensian. He wrote:

In Salamanca, where we stopped to bait and change horses, a number of beggars surrounded the coach, and in one I at once detected the pure Milesian brogue and visage. He was whining and limping about, with a tattered hat and stick, imploring alms in the most ludicrous attempts at the Castilian tongue. "Why, Pat, you're a deserter" said I, from the top of the vehicle. "Who siz that," quoth he, evidently startled. Forgetting his infirmities, clapping on his sombrero, and clenching the stick in readiness for a fight, or flight, as he peered among the crowd; and stepping up to a miserable leper, whose face had been painfully stereotyped into a broad grin, he poked him sharply in the ribs, and roared out, "Ye lie, ye bastel! I was sick in the hospital, and the general tuk me off in his own carridge." "Here, Pat, I'm your man!" "Ah is it there ye are, Lifinint? You're a paycock of a boy! Will ye give us a rial?" "No, but if you chance to be caught by the Yankees, you'll get a rial's worth of hearty-chokes and caper sauce" I replied, going through a little pantomime with heels and neck for his especial benefit. "No, be jasus! thim Harney blaggards will niver choke me while the Dons is so ginerous!" This was the last I saw or heard of Pat.<sup>29</sup>

One more flurry was said to have come from John Riley after he returned to the States. He was rumored to have had the colossal gall to enter suit against the government, for \$50,000 damages for his flogging and branding, in the United States District Court at Cincinnati. After a week's trial the jury returned a verdict adverse to him and assessed costs on *Colonel Riley, late of the Mexican Army*.<sup>30</sup> John might have gone far on the right path.

<sup>29</sup>Lt. Henry A. Wise, *Los Gringos* (New York, 1850), pp. 246-247.

<sup>30</sup>J. Jacob Oswald, *Notes on the Mexican War* (Philadelphia, 1885), p. 427.

<sup>27</sup>Balbontin, *op cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>28</sup>*The American Star*, 23 September 1847.

A later repercussion came in the presidential campaign of 1852 when Major-General Winfield Scott (incidentally, without resigning his commission) ran on the Whig ticket against the Democrat, Franklin Pierce, who had served under him in Mexico as a brigadier-general. Old "Fuss and Feathers" made frantic efforts to placate the Irish vote which was said to be solidly against him for his treatment of the *San Patricios*. It is impossible to say how much of a factor this was, but Scott was overwhelmingly defeated by the popular Pierce and the Whig party soon afterwards went completely to pieces.

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— AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT —

*This ends the unique story of the deserters, patched together from scraps of evidence gathered, here and there, from available secondary sources, rather confusing in preparation as the accounts are fragmentary and to some extent contradictory. Reference to original court-martial records might well repay inspection with more extensive and definite information. The best account of the actual executions is that of G. T. Hopkins who wrote that he had "managed to get a peep at the testimony given in their defense" and that it was largely based upon notes furnished him by General Frank McCoy. I have followed his account in regard to the number of deserters captured and punished, which number varies in other sources.*

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## THE BATTLE OF SNAKE MOUNTAIN\*

BY BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANK U. ROBINSON

IT IS WITH some reluctance and misgivings that I attempt to write some of the experiences of my past life that happened thirty years ago and more, as I do so entirely from memory. One having only memory and impressions to rely upon is very apt to get things slightly mixed. More especially does the task become very difficult when one is very punctillious about stating the exact facts as they occurred, neither taking from nor adding to them. Other names are connected with all that I have to say and it is far from my thoughts to do any injustice, and I can't see how it would be possible for me to do anything but justice, to those with whom I was connected at this particular time of my life. They deserve nothing but the greatest eulogy and praise. I might err in not giving them enough in a proper way.

It may be as well for me to state here that I am a retired officer of the Army, having spent most of my military service in the Second Cavalry, and at the particular time of which I write I had the honor to be Second Lieutenant, Troop B, of that distinguished regiment. Captain Bates was the Captain and James N. Wheelan the First Lieutenant. Captain Bates was absent on detached service at West Point but joined later, as will appear.

In the spring of 1870, after wintering at Omaha Barracks, Nebraska, my troop was ordered into the Wind River country. We proceeded by rail to Fort Bridger, Wyoming, the Wind River being about 130 miles north of this point. Troop D, Captain Gordon commanding, was already there, as the hostiles were raiding, killing, stealing and committing other depredations. The Wind River country is that line of country lying directly east of the Wind River Mountains which head up near Yellowstone Lake and extend south to the South Pass proper—Fremont's being the principal peak—and being the headwaters of the Big Wind, Little Wind, Popoagies and Sweetwater rivers. The South Pass gold mines and the little mining towns of South Pass City, Atlantic City and Miners Delight were in this belt. Altogether this was a very rich country, the river bottoms being well adapted to agriculture and surrounded by fine grazing lands, making it an ideal place for settlers and settlements. But on the east lay that vast region known as the Sioux Country, stretching far to the Missouri River, and the hostiles were continually raiding and killing the settlers; hence the necessity for troops.

While at Fort Bridger getting ready to march to the north, news came that Captain Gordon of Troop D was in trouble and had had a fight, known as the Battle of the Beaver, in which First Lieutenant Stambaugh and several men were killed. These are all

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\*This article, written in 1907, was originally printed in the *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Order of Indian Wars of the United States*, issue for 1933. It was not read at the meeting.

the facts we could learn, but they were enough. We marched next morning and were soon on the scene, joining Gordon at his camp on Atlantic Gulch between Atlantic City and Miners Delight. These two towns were four miles apart. In the meantime Company B, Fourth Infantry, Captain Bartlett in command, had pushed on up into the valley of the Big Popoagie, about thirty miles further north—where Lander City now is—and established a fortified camp named Camp Brown after Captain Brown of the 18th Infantry who was killed at Fort Phil Kearney. As the government intended to fortify and hold this line of country, orders soon came to build a two-company post. We found a suitable site close by and the post, known as Camp Stambaugh, was soon built. Troops B and D were stationed here for the following three years, scouting, fighting, and giving the settlers all the protection that two small troops of cavalry could, being almost constantly in the saddle.

In 1873 my troop was ordered to Fort Washakie on the Little Wind River, 45 miles north of Camp Stambaugh, infantry taking our place. Here was established the Snake Indian Reservation, Washakie being the principal chief of the Snakes. Fort Washakie was established and the post was erected mostly by Company E, 13th Infantry, Captain Torrey in command. On our arrival we built the cavalry addition. Our work was greatly impeded by the constant raiding of the hostiles. About this time 20 Snake scouts, commanded by Lieutenant Young, 4th Infantry, were added to our cavalry force. Captain Bates had returned from detached service and was on duty with his troop. This was, I am quite sure, in the fall of 1873. It would take volumes to tell all about our numerous scouts and hard riding after the hostile war parties that invaded this line of country during our stay. Something had to be done to hit the hostiles in a vital part and

teach them that they were not perfectly safe in their own country. Heretofore they could dash in and kill some one, steal what stock they could, and then ride hard for their own country. After putting in 75 or 100 miles they were perfectly safe. Our only chance of punishing them was to overhaul them before they could get well out of our lines. That was next to an impossibility for they would usually commit their depredations from 20 to 50 miles from our camp and, by the time we received word and got fairly on their trail, they would be well out of the country. Our force was entirely too small to go further than 60 or 75 miles into the hostile country. Our force at Fort Washakie at this time was Company E, 13th Infantry, Troop B, 2nd Cavalry, and 20 Snake scouts, a force entirely too small, situated as we were directly west of the vast Sioux country in which all the Sioux and hostile Cheyennes and Arapahoes were congregated. It is true we had at this point the Snake Indians as our allies as they were always deadly enemies of the Sioux, but they numbered, I am quite sure, not more than 300 warriors who were not fond of going very far into the Sioux country. It was resolved to make the best of what we had and give the hostiles a lesson teaching them that they could not raid into our line of country with impunity. I should state here that the fortified camp on the Big Popoagie had been abandoned but two companies of infantry still garrisoned Camp Stambaugh. Captain Torrey, 13th Infantry, was in command of the post of Fort Washakie, which was then called Camp Brown, the designation being changed sometime later. When Captain Bates joined he took a lively interest and meant to put a stop to the hostile raids. In this I was with him "hand and glove." The First Lieutenant (Rawolle) of the troop was absent on detached service, so there were but two officers with the troop, Captain Bates and myself.



Lieutenant Young, 4th Infantry, was in charge of the 20 Indian scouts who were attached to the troop. Captain Bates prevailed on Chief Washakie to keep some small parties of his warriors well out into the hostile country and if possible to get wind of and inform us of any raiding hostiles, but more especially to see if they could locate some hostile village or camp that it would be possible for us to reach and surprise. This Washakie did and had scouts well down to the Sweetwater and up toward the head of Powder River. Thus matters went on, we scouting in a small way hoping to strike some war parties before they could get in their work, until the latter part of June, 1874, when word came that Washakie's scouts had located a small village of 40 lodges of hostiles near the head of Norwood River, a small stream heading in the Powder River Mountains and running northwest into the Big Horn River below Owl Creek Cañon, and about 125 miles from Fort Washakie. Having received this information and having the promise of Chief Washakie that he would go with us with a band of his warriors, Captain Torrey concurring, Captain Bates resolved to strike. All was soon ready. Just as soon as it was dark enough so as not to be seen by any scouts of the enemy that might be lurking in the vicinity, our little command started from Fort Washakie the evening of July 1, 1874. It consisted of Troop B, 2nd Cavalry, 56 men, Captain Bates, Lieutenant Robinson, 20 Indian scouts under command of Lieutenant Young, acting assistant surgeon Thomas McGee, four hospital men, a pack train of ten mules with a chief packer, and about 50 Snake warriors under Chief Washakie. Captain Bates was in command. We marched all night and just as soon as the day began to break went into camp in the brush low down on the Little Wind River. Washakie, on intimation, sent out videttes to keep a bright look out during the day, to see with-

out being seen, which the Indians understood to the letter. There are no scouts that could have performed this duty better. We lay very close during the day of July 2nd and just as soon as darkness set in were on the march, pushing at a rapid gait, mostly on the trot, across an undulating sage brush country. Our course was a little north of east. Just as the day was breaking we went into camp in the brush on a little creek which, I presume or am quite sure, was Bridger Creek, named after old Jim Bridger, the pioneer and scout of this line of country. This bivouac was, I am quite satisfied, near the old Bridger Trail leading up into Montana. Here we lay well concealed all that day, taking more precautions than on the preceding day. By this time men, horses, and mules had taken on that quiet business air that is so noticeable when all realize that something serious is at hand. Nothing of note transpiring, we were in the saddle again as darkness set in and marched at a rapid rate around the eastern point of the Owl Creek Mountains. The night was clear and starlit and I noticed, by the stars, that our course was about northeast. Our Indian guides appeared to orient themselves perfectly and evidently knew every inch of the country we were passing over. We crossed over a considerable range of mountains on this night, which I judged to be an offshoot of the Powder River Mountains. The trail was good and we made excellent time, not hearing a sound during the night but the clicking of the horses' hoofs as they occasionally struck a rock. Just at daylight we were entering a rather close valley beyond. Here was the place that our Indian scouts had located the village. A halt was made while our scouts went forward to reconnoiter. It was not very long before they returned with the information that the village was not where it had been located but from the very fresh signs and other indications they felt

quite sure the village was not very far off. This they said was certain, as there was quite a little bunch of ponies grazing further up the valley. Every moment was precious, yes more than precious, so we just could not wait for the pack animals to close up. Bates gave the command to mount and the whole command took the broad trail and broke into a swinging gallop, keeping well close up to Captain Bates, who, accompanied by two orderlies and Norcott the Indian interpreter, was leading. I was with the troop and Young, with the Indian scouts, just in the rear. Washakie with his warriors, except quite a number who were acting as videttes, was in the rear of the scouts. We were entering a rather close country, high hills covered with bunch grass, and deep arroyos, not very precipitous sides, and opening bottoms. To the west lay a narrow undulating sage brush plain. We had travelled in this manner for nearly an hour before day began to break in earnest, it becoming quite light except for a mist which hung about the hills. Some of the videttes, riding furiously in, caused a halt and reported that the village was right ahead but a little to our left and down in a deep arroyo. Captain Bates and party went ahead to reconnoitre, leaving me in charge. The Indians under Washakie having by this time come up, commenced chanting their war chant, decking themselves in their war bonnets and feathers, and making a horrible din. I tried my best to stop them. I cursed and swore, calling on Washakie in Heaven's name to stop them or all hope of surprising the village would be at an end. He did what he could but these Indians were so terribly excited that they could not keep still, so I resolved to push on and join Captain Bates, for now we had not a moment to lose. After proceeding a short distance I met him returning. He told me that the village was about a mile away and was a large one, many more than 40 lodges which we had expected to find. It

proved afterwards that there were 112 lodges, more or less in regular order, besides numerous outside lodges that were not counted. I saw at once that the time of our lives had come and that this Fourth of July, for it was the morning of July 4, 1874, would in all probability be my last on earth. But I felt about as ready as ever I should be so did not worry. On meeting Bates we came down to a walk while he was giving the order for Lieutenant Young and the scouts to branch off to the left and come down on the head of the village. Washakie and some of his warriors went with Young and the rest followed in our rear. We pushed down the line of hills to take or hit the village in flank. I saw at once by these dispositions that Captain Bates understood the situation perfectly, and I felt satisfied that the country would hear a good account of us on that day.

It now became broad daylight so we pushed on at a gallop out to a point on the hill overlooking the village, and there it was with its long lines of lodges. As Bates and I looked at it and then at our handful of men we saw at once that we must hit them and hit them hard or our chance of getting out of the country would be slim. Our men had 80 rounds of carbine cartridges in their belts besides some in the saddle bags. We carried at that time the Springfield carbine, caliber 45, a fine little gun of its kind, excellent for short range but not of much use for over eight hundred yards. We looked for the pack mules carrying additional ammunition but none of the pack train was in sight. We did not give this a second thought then, but I assure you it came in for very serious consideration afterwards, when it appeared that all our extra ammunition had been lost during the night. Besides the carbines, our men were armed with Colt revolvers. On the other side of the village the hills were very much higher and very much more abrupt than the side we were on. A very high rocky point

with many gnarled cedars growing in the crevices of the rocks was just above the lower end of the village, and some way further down was a little creek. The descent on our side was grassy and easy.

The village beneath us, about six hundred yards away, had not yet taken the alarm, so we dismounted to fight on foot. Leaving every fourth man as horse holder, the horses were placed in charge of Sergeant Fuller. Our gallant Surgeon McGee was on hand with plenty of first aid to the wounded and was directed to hold himself in the rear. All this did not take more than two minutes. Then Captain Bates, with only thirty-two men in line and about twenty Indians in the rear, led us down the hill at a double time to the attack. We had gone but a short distance when, seeing such a hot time ahead of us, Bates and I and many of the men threw away our blouses, for we preferred to meet it in blue shirts. After making about half the distance and directing our course to hit the village about midway in the flank, we heard yells and the sharp crack of many rifles at the upper end of the village, showing that Young and the scouts had opened fire. We then doubled our pace and rushed into the village in close skirmish order. When partly down the hill our Indians had halted and by this time had commenced firing over our heads, but we did not fire a shot until we were close to the first tepees, although the enemy had opened fire on us some little time before. Then we came to a halt and the battle opened in earnest. It was almost a perfect surprise. If it had not been we certainly could not have cleaned them up as we did. There was a wide ravine, running down through the center of the village, into which the Indians crowded and were running down to escape at the lower end. Many pushed across and gained the rocks on the other side and opened fire on us from this quarter. Now the fight became deadly. Yells, cries, and curses rang out far

above the incessant rattle of the carbines and the sharp crack of the Winchesters with which the enemy was mostly armed. Part of the time it was hand to hand and in some instances the Indians and our men were wrestling for the same gun. This lasted for about twenty-five minutes, when we were complete masters of the village. In the meantime the firing had ceased at the upper end of the village. Lieutenant Young had fallen badly wounded and I understood one of the Indians was killed and some others wounded. They had fallen back carrying the Lieutenant with them and were up at a point some distance above the upper end of the village. We then had time to look at our losses and found we had only two men killed and eight wounded, which was astonishing considering the way the bullets had been flying. As fast as men were hit they were taken to the rear and the men taking them would bring back the ammunition from the saddle bags. I would say here that after the fight was over we only had left an average of seven rounds of ammunition per man, this owing to the serious loss of the ammunition mule which I mentioned before. The enemy lost, as near as we could count, about 60 killed in the village. There were 17 dead in the main elbow of the ravine.

Surgeon McGee, who did not think he had work enough in the rear, pushed into the village. As he was dressing a wounded man, an Indian, gun in hand, rushed from one of the lodges close by and was taking aim at one of our men. The doctor dropped his bandages, seized the man's carbine and shot the Indian dead, then returning to his work as if nothing had happened. I also noticed Captain Bates killing an Indian with his revolver. I had the honor of doing the same thing during the fight. All being over, Captain Bates gave the order to fall back to the horses and, without disturbing any of the lodges, we gained the hill and found the



horses near where we left them. As our ammunition was at its lowest ebb, and having accomplished much more than we dared to hope for and having eight wounded men to look after, we concluded it would be foolish to cross over and attempt to drive the Indians from their very strong position. It would be little or nothing gained and would very much jeopardize our chances of getting out of the country without having serious trouble, so we decided to start on the return march to Fort Washakie. Our Indians rounded up three hundred and fifty horses and ponies which we took with us. There must have been 1,200 to 1,400 head of stock belonging to this village. We could see their herders, as the attack was about to be made, driving off large bunches. Those we captured were grazing on the upper side and were cut off from the main herd. By this time it was nearly eleven o'clock and the wounded were suffering a great deal. We got them on their horses and, detailing men to hold them from falling off, commenced our long slow march back. This was the 4th of July and it was very hot even for this mountain region. The wounded men suffered terribly but we marched steadily all day, halting often to give them a drink of water.

Captain Bates directed me, with ten of the men who were holding horses and were not in the heat of the fight, as the rear guard.

We were returning by an entirely different route from the one taken on our advance, and it was much shorter. This day we were marching over a sage brush plain with rolling hills.

The enemy had somewhat recovered themselves and were following us in quite a force, but I would hold the rising ground long enough to let the column gain the hill far in advance. As soon as it had disappeared I would take the gallop and hold that point in the same manner. I am quite sure the Indians were as bad off for ammunition as we,

for they did not offer to come close nor attempt to fire a single shot, and besides they had been so roughly handled that they evidently had no stomach for more. Yet I believe they had been reinforced in the meantime by some band in the vicinity. Of course I gave them no chance to get in on us. Thus the day wore on and just as the sun was setting the column halted at a little creek near the eastern end of the Owl Creek Mountains, far to the north. I joined with the rear guard and, as we were making coffee, could see the enemy watching us from the far hills.

The wounded were all doing remarkably well, except one man by the name of French who had his left eye shot out and from the nature of the wound I thought it a little less than wonderful that he was alive, to say nothing of his being cheerful. The day had been very hot and the night set in cold. After about two hours' rest we resumed the march and pushed on over the east end of the Owl Creek Mountains, crossing down near the head of Badwater Creek, arriving here a little after daylight in the morning, thence down the Badwater to Big Wind River, arriving about ten A.M. After posting our pickets we bivouacked and prepared to take a little rest. I need not add that the whole command was completely tired out. Two days and nights constantly in the saddle, except when fighting, with but little to eat in the meantime, had done its work. After lying down all were like dead men. I would add here that Captain Bates, the night before, sent two noncommissioned officers, mounted on fresh Indian stock, forward into the post notifying Captain Torrey of the fight and requesting him to send out ambulances as far as possible for the wounded men. This he did at once and they met us that same evening at the Big Wind River about thirty miles from the post.

We slept about four hours when all were awakened, made some coffee, saddled, and



moved on up the river to the big bend, where quite a number of settlers, who had pushed down to help us, were waiting. Here we met the ambulances for the wounded. The next day we marched into the Fort and our troubles were over for the time being, for other raids and scouts were soon to interest us.

The Battle of Snake Mountain, by which name this fight is known, had been fought and won. Of the officers engaged, Lieutenant Robert H. Young, 4th Infantry, and Surgeon McGee deserve much praise for their gallant conduct throughout. As to the men, with two or three exceptions, their conduct was most gallant and meritorious. No command could have behaved better. The village of hostiles which we attacked was mostly made up of Arapahoes, under Chief Black Coal, some Cheyennes, and also what was known at that time as Dog Soldiers—malcontents from many tribes who joined for rapine and plunder. It appeared that this village was a head center for these raiders who raided not

only along our line of country but along the Union Pacific railroad as well. This whipping that they received almost entirely broke that sort of thing up. It showed them they were not even safe in their own country. Their base was destroyed, as was also their confidence in finding a safe retreat after their bloody raids were over.

In all my experience on the Frontier, which covered many years, I will say that the Battle of Snake Mountain, not because I was in it, was one of the most gallant and spirited little fights that ever occurred in the West.

Too much praise cannot be given to Captain Bates, not only for his gallantry in the fight and for the ability shown in handling the little campaign from start to finish, but for striking this deadly blow to these hostiles and, in a great measure, completely breaking up their bloody raids. He deserves well of his country and the hearty thanks of the settlers in the Wind River country even to the present day.

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# THE RADAR WAR AGAINST THE U-BOAT

By HENRY GUERLAC AND MARIE BOAS

THE German campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant vessels began with the sinking of the British passenger liner *Athenia* on September 3, 1939, the day Great Britain declared war on Germany. Admiral Doenitz, then Vice-Admiral in Charge of U-boats, proclaimed "I will show that the U-boat alone can win this war." Defeat of the U-boat was imperative, first to prevent England from being cut off from the rest of the world, and later to permit the building up of forces in the British Isles for use in the invasion of Europe and the conquest of Germany. In this struggle radar proved to be an outstandingly successful reply to the submarine.

In the First World War a purely defensive counter-measure, the convoy, was the chief weapon used against the U-boat; twenty-years later the convoy was still highly effective. But in the Second World War newly devised offensive techniques were added to convoy protection, and U-boats were sought out and attacked before they could reach the convoys, and improved methods of detection of U-boats at large

were required and employed. In the First World War submerged U-boats were detected by emitting a sound signal in the audible range through the water. When such a signal strikes an underwater body the echo can be picked up by hydrophones and a rough bearing obtained. Between wars echo-ranging equipment was developed using supersonic frequencies; in England this was called *asdic*. In 1943 the term sonar was in use for the supersonic echo-ranging equipment of the U. S. Navy. This gave range as well as bearing and was a most efficient detector up to 600-2000 yards. It was standard equipment for convoy escort vessels.

While submerged, submarines (pre-Schnorkel) operated electrically on batteries at reduced speed. The U-boat in World War II generally operated as a submersible rather than a submarine, traveling on the surface as much as possible to take advantage of the high speed obtainable with its Diesel engines. Even when attempting to behave like a true underwater craft, a U-boat ordinarily surfaced for several hours each day in order to recharge its batteries.

Visual and radar detection therefore became vital. The airplane with its wide field of vision, great range and flexibility, proved an ideal anti-submarine craft. At night, under conditions of restricted visibility, and even in clear daylight, radar soon supplemented visual detection and converted the airplane into a truly formidable weapon. Radar on antisubmarine surface vessels also proved invaluable for detecting surfaced U-boats, for navigating near the convoy, for checking the position of ships within the convoy, and for watching for stragglers.

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*Editor's note:* Although members of and consultants to our Editorial Board contend that there is much partiality in this article, particularly to the *Radiation Laboratory* and to the *First Sea Search Attack Group*, yet to excise all references to prideful memories no doubt tenaciously held by personnel of those two organizations at least would emasculate the article. Any military organization employing such refined if not—by design and test—delicate equipment, owes and will owe much to others,—comrades in arms, in industry, in research. However, this article presents a comprehensive account of a significant aspect of World War II.

Antisubmarine radar was of the airborne search type, the simplest and earliest type of airborne equipment to be developed. When its design fitted it for the detection of shipping it was generally described as ASV radar, the letters standing for "aircraft-to-surface vessel." ASV radar was built to operate on various wave lengths: some sets worked on long wave in the 1 to 1½-meter band; others, medium wave in the neighborhood of 60 centimeters; and still others, the famous "microwave" equipment, had wave lengths as short as 10, 3, and even 1 centimeter. Microwave techniques, made possible by the British invention of the resonant-cavity magnetron, a vacuum tube generator operating on a novel principle, gave radar equipment of unprecedented precision. Development of microwave technique was the chief accomplishment of the Radiation Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

#### THE DEFENSIVE PHASE (SEPTEMBER 1939 TO MAY 1941)

During the first year of the war the U-boats made most of their attacks in the daytime while submerged, largely upon unescorted shipping in waters close to the British Isles. U-boats were detected by *asdic*, of which the Germans appeared miraculously ignorant in the early stages of the war; most of the few U-boats destroyed were attacked by *asdic*-equipped surface vessels. Airplanes were used largely for reconnaissance, although their presence around the shores of Britain had the effect of driving the U-boats out to sea. Aircraft were greatly feared; when a plane was sighted the U-boat immediately crash-dived. Since crash-diving is a strain on the crew, aircraft had nuisance value. Largely because effective methods of patrol and destructive antisubmarine bombs had not yet been developed, aircraft destroyed no U-boats in 1939, and were therefore a purely psychological weapon. For this reason unarmed

Moth planes could be effectively used to supplement the small force of armed aircraft then available. Crude as their tactics were, these early aircraft were able to drive the U-boats out of coastal waters, make unescorted coastwise shipping safe from attack, and lessen the demand upon the inadequate supply of escort vessels.

Soon after the fall of France in June 1940 the U-boat fleet began to operate from French ports on the Bay of Biscay: Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, and La Pallice. The U-boats now began to make nighttime surface attacks using their high surface speed to escape unharmed. With the threat of a German invasion of England, escort vessels were diverted from convoy duty to defend the British Isles. Even the famous fifty over-age American destroyers could not make up the deficiency; losses of merchant vessels steadily rose.

Radar, which was to prove the decisive weapon in the defeat of the U-boat, was putting in its first appearance. British destroyers equipped with longwave radar first became available in November 1940, and were promptly assigned positions on the edge of convoys, in the hope of picking up the surfaced U-boat before it could get well into the convoy for the attack. The first destruction of a U-boat as a result of a radar contact seems to have been the action in which two U-boats, the U-100 and the U-99, both commanded by well-known U-boat "aces," were destroyed on the night of 15-16 March 1941, after sinking five merchant ships out of a convoy. HMS VANOC, which took an active part in the engagement, was equipped with radar.

Another successful method of detection, introduced about this time, was high frequency radio direction finding (H/F D/F). Upon locating a convoy, a U-boat would radio the news to headquarters and often to other U-boats operating within range. This

was picked up by direction-finding receivers on board the convoy escort vessels. The Germans, though aware of the existence of shore based H/F D/F equipment, seem not to have suspected its use on shipboard.

The advent of longer range aircraft permitted increased air cover for convoys, and airborne radar made planes increasingly effective for night work. The Mark II ASV, a longwave (1 to 1½ meter) aircraft-to-surface vessel search set, came into use in British aircraft about September 1940, and the number of installations grew during the succeeding months.

#### THE AIR OFFENSIVE BEGINS (MAY 1941 TO MAY 1942)

It became increasingly obvious that the purely defensive role of convoy escort did not make full use of the airplane. In May 1941 it was decided that air cover should be provided only for those convoys which were actively threatened with a U-boat attack. The aircraft thus freed were promptly used by the RAF Coastal Command for offensive sweeps over the U-boat transit areas—chiefly the Bay of Biscay and the waters north of Scotland.

These offensive sweeps brought immediate results. U-boats, forced to submerge, took several days longer than before to reach the convoy area. In addition there was the knowledge that whenever they surfaced to recharge batteries an aircraft attack might be imminent. And days of low visibility became more dangerous than clear weather since then a radar equipped airplane could detect the U-boat beyond visual range, and make a surprise attack. U-boats could not regain freedom of action until outside the range of land-based aircraft, and at this distance from shore (at this time some 400 miles) the convoys were more difficult to locate. During September 1941, 75 per cent of the shipping sunk by U-boats was outside the area patrol-

led by Coastal Command aircraft. About this time the successful conclusion of the Battle of Britain, together with the German attack on Russia, freed the British of the fear of an imminent invasion of England. There was no longer any necessity of keeping a large number of warships in home waters, and the increased number of available convoy escorts together with the greater effectiveness of aircraft, reduced the number of merchant vessels sunk during the summer of 1941.

The great fear of aircraft attack shown by the U-boats at this time is extraordinary in view of the small amount of damage that airplanes had been able to inflict during the first two years of the war. In 1939 no U-boats were credited as destroyed by aircraft; in 1940 Coastal Command was credited with one kill (a half share in each of two U-boats destroyed in cooperation with surface craft of the Royal Navy); and in 1941 Coastal Command destroyed three U-boats. But air patrol forced the U-boats to submerge much of the time, and any restriction in U-boat activity meant fewer ships sunk.

With their activity in the Eastern Atlantic heavily curtailed by the air patrol, the U-boat fleet began to operate further westward. The practice at this time was for wolf packs, groups of five or more U-boats, to attack convoys. But since convoys were now being escorted all the way across the Atlantic, the escorts found that it was possible on occasions to repel wolf-pack attacks before they could inflict heavy damage.

As the U-boats moved to operate further westward they began to enter what was regarded as the United States strategic area. The United States was still operating under the provisions of the Neutrality Act, but since the Western Atlantic as far east as Iceland was not defined as a combat area, US ships were free to travel there and expect safe passage. In September 1941 the United



States was forced to set up the "neutrality patrol" to provide escort for American merchant ships between the United States and Iceland. To the period of neutrality patrol operations belong the torpedoing of USS KEARNY, followed by the sinking off Iceland of USS REUBEN JAMES on 31 October 1941.

With the entry of the United States into the war the U-boats quickly moved westward and for a time roamed at will off America's eastern seaboard. In February 1942, when eighty-two merchant ships were lost, sinkings by U-boats reached a new high and remained dangerously numerous for many months. The United States was unprepared and pitifully short of escort vessels, as the British had been two years earlier. All antisubmarine forces, American, British, and Canadian, were pooled to provide adequate protection for trans-Atlantic convoys.

With such good hunting in the Western Atlantic, where they were still relatively safe from aircraft patrol, the U-boats grew cautious in the patrolled waters off Europe, making slow submerged passage to the open sea. Sightings by Coastal Command aircraft accordingly decreased. However, immunity from air attack in the Western Atlantic did not last long. Air patrol of coastal waters was speedily set up by the United States Navy, with assistance from the Army's First Bomber Command, activated in December 1941. Patrol by the Army and Navy was supplemented in the summer of 1942 by the Civilian Air Patrol which flew on extreme occasions as far as 100 miles out to sea. The first successful air attacks by United States forces occurred in March 1942, when Navy planes based on Newfoundland sank two U-boats in the Canadian Coastal Zone.

#### THE AIRPLANE COMES INTO ITS OWN (MAY 1942 TO JANUARY 1943)

On both sides of the Atlantic, ocean war-

fare was intensified. The number of U-boats at sea had increased enormously since the early days of the war, and merchant vessel sinkings rose to a frightening figure. But U-boat losses likewise began to be noticeably higher than in previous months.

In the Eastern Atlantic the British introduced a most effective weapon for use over the Bay of Biscay: ten Wellington long range bombers fitted with ASV Mark II and with Leigh lights, searchlights of terrific power. The U-boat's first warning was the blinding glare of the searchlight from an aircraft flying in for the attack less than a mile away. To avoid these night attacks the U-boats began to surface during the day to recharge their batteries, even though in daylight they were almost certain of detection by the numerous day patrol. Operations were highly successful until October 1942 when the Germans began equipping U-boats with search receivers operating at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  metres. This detected the radar signal from the ASV, often before the echo was strong enough to be picked up by the airplane's radar receiver. The U-boat, warned in time, could submerge before an attack could be delivered, and could often submerge before it was detected at all.

With sufficient escort craft finally available, coastwise convoys in the Western Atlantic were set up in May 1942. These, together with increasingly effective air coverage, drove the U-boats to the south. Meanwhile microwave radar was putting in its first appearance on an experimental basis. Shortly after Pearl Harbor the Army had urged the Radiation Laboratory to improvise a 10 cm ASV for installation in B-18 medium range bombers. Under pressure and at speed the Laboratory built and installed ASV-10 sets in ten B-18's during the early months of 1942. By March these planes were stationed at Langley Field, Virginia, where they speedily started a promising career by attacking

one U-boat on 1 April, and a second on 1 May. At the end of May these planes went south, half to Miami and half to Key West, following the southward trend of the U-boats, then operating most fiercely off the mouth of the Mississippi and in the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Nicaragua.

In July these B-18's were made the nucleus of the newly activated 1st Sea Search Attack Group, intended as a test and development unit for new antisubmarine methods and weapons. This group, until its inactivation, on 15 July 1943, pioneered some new methods of search; it flew various types of planes, in an attempt to determine which was best suited for anti-submarine work; and it tried and tested various kinds of detection devices. As they had been the first to fly the ASV-10, so the men of this group were the first to fly with later versions of microwave ASV. The SCR-517 (ASC to the Navy), the SCR-717, and the Navy's ASG were all tested and compared. In addition to radar, the Sea Search Attack Group tested the magnetic airborne detector (MAD) which could detect submerged bodies by their magnetic effect, though unfortunately not from any great distance.

Twice during its existence the Sea Search Attack Group abandoned experiments for practice. From 15-23 August 1942, seven B-18's, each equipped with either the ASV-10 or the SCR-517, flew operational anti-submarine missions of Key West, Florida. Two of the twenty-four missions flown resulted in attacks. Eight B-18's flew eighty-six missions from Trinidad, from 20 September to 21 October 1942, during the time that U-boats were concentrating off Trinidad and near the equator between Freetown and Ascension Island. These missions resulted in three attacks, with one U-boat damaged.

Throughout 1942 radar was demonstrating its value all over the Atlantic. By autumn the British were reporting more radar contacts

than either visual or asdic contacts. Shipborne microwave sets were being installed on ships of both the American and British Navies, and by the end of the year airborne microwave equipment with its increased discrimination was coming into production. Radar equipped planes were being widely used in the Western Atlantic to track U-boats at night, to follow them until they could be finished off by surface craft.

Both the Army and the Navy were still depending largely on longwave ASV (SCR-521 and ASE), but each had an increasing number of microwave installations. The Army had the Radiation Laboratory's 10-cm sets in B-18's, and the Navy had a few microwave sets in PBM-1 Mariners. Western Electric's SCR-517 was hastily developed from an air interception set, the SCR-520, much as the Radiation Laboratory's ASV-10 had been assembled from AI components.

During the summer the Navy had blimps operating out of Lakehurst, New Jersey, and South Weymouth, Massachusetts, equipped with preproduction sets of the ASG, designed by the Radiation Laboratory and built by Philco. As soon as production sets were available, the ASG was adopted by the Navy as the preferred microwave anti-submarine set for aircraft; it was also used widely by the British. When in October the United States First Bomber Command was expanded into the Anti-Submarine Army Air Command its planes were largely equipped with 10-cm ASV. Two B-24 squadrons of this command, fitted with the SCR-517, were sent to St. Eval in Cornwall for operation with the RAF Coastal Command. After some operational experience over the Bay of Biscay they were moved to North Africa in March 1943.

Radar was a proven instrument, although for fear of enemy detection it was used perhaps but about half the time. As early as June 1942, the average number of hours of

patrol for each U-boat sighted was far less for radar-equipped planes than for planes without radar. As the U-boats moved south at the end of the summer of 1942 the air patrol followed to bases on Trinidad and at Natal, Brazil. The Trinidad-based planes, many of which had the 10-cm SCR-517, found radar extremely successful. As the months went on there were progressively fewer aircraft sightings of U-boats, but this was largely because U-boats had taken to the open ocean beyond aircraft range.

The overwhelming success of the U-boats in 1942 was due almost entirely to the fact that with the entry of the United States into the war they had a new area in which to operate, an area in which anti-submarine operations were at first entirely unorganized. U-boats were so successful that they sank more tons of Allied shipping in 1942 than were built during the year, while the number of U-boats at sea almost doubled. But by the end of 1942 the U-boats had been driven away from the coastal waters of the Western Atlantic, to make work-pack attacks upon convoys in mid-Atlantic and upon the Russian bound convoys in the Barents Sea, in areas not yet patrolled by aircraft. The number of Uboats being destroyed month by month was steadily increasing and the percentage of U-boats destroyed by aircraft had increased to nearly 50 per cent of those destroyed by surface vessels. A captured U-boat captain paid tribute to the power of radar-equipped airplanes when he admitted that ASV made surfaced U-boats feel very insecure. He felt that this was most unfair, since the Germans regarded ASV radar as *their secret weapon!*

#### OPERATIONS OFF NORTH AFRICA (NOVEMBER 1942 TO MARCH 1943)

The invasions of North Africa by the Allies in November 1942 brought U-boats flocking to the Mediterranean and the At-

lantic coast of Africa in prospect of kills. With very little fear of air attacks the U-boats operated in coastal waters close inshore, as illustrated by the wolf-pack sinking on 11 November of four merchant ships and one destroyer, all at anchor off Fedala, twenty miles from Casablanca.

Anti-submarine operations were soon organized. The Moroccan towns of Port Lyautey and Casablanca were captured on 9 and 11 November, and on 18 November, PBY Catalinas of the United States Navy, equipped with long and medium wave radar (1½-meter ASE and 60-cm ASB) began antisubmarine patrol from these two bases. There were then known to be sixteen U-boats within four hundred miles of Port Lyautey and Casablanca; by the end of December no U-boats were left in this area. From that time all sinkings of merchant vessels took place more than six hundred miles from the nearest airplane base. Here, in March 1943, there was introduced an even more effective countermeasure, the very long range Liberator—PB4Y's and B-24's equipped with the 10-cm ASG and the SCR-517, respectively. These extremely successful planes made more than half their sightings by radar, a tribute to the efficiency of microwave equipment.

#### THE DEFEAT OF THE U-BOAT IN 1943

With success assured in North Africa, the Allies began building up forces for the strategic bombing of Germany and the eventual invasion of Europe. From January to June 1943 the U-boat fleet made a desperate effort to intercept convoys in the North Atlantic. Large wolf packs attacked fiercely and relentlessly as the convoys traversed the "Atlantic gap" where there were as yet no aircraft to plague them. It was an all-out effort. In March, their most active month for the year, one hundred and seven merchant ships were sunk for a loss of only twelve

U-boats.<sup>1</sup> This approached the staggering losses sustained in 1942 when in June, the worst month of the war, one hundred and forty-one ships were sunk.<sup>2</sup> Such losses were too high to be endured for long.

Once again the crisis was averted and by May 1943—in which month forty-one U-boats were destroyed by all agencies with a loss of only fifty merchant ships—the U-boat menace was no longer alarming. Never again were merchant losses so high. In only half their attacks did the U-boats escape detection and radar was responsible for more than half the sightings. Meanwhile the 8th Air Force was attempting to reduce U-boat production. In the summer of 1942, the bombing of U-boat bases on the Bay of Biscay had top priority; by the beginning of 1943 the emphasis had shifted to U-boat yards in Germany; and after the middle of 1943 the emphasis was on factories. But the bombing of factories had very little more than a psychological effect on production until the spring of 1945.

In the Atlantic in February 1943 there were introduced the very long range airplanes, such as the Liberator, with ASG radar, and the PB2Y-3 Coronado, carrying ASC radar. These aircraft, capable of operating more than a thousand miles from their bases, at last closed the Atlantic gap which the U-boats had regarded as their private preserve. Further protection to convoys in the mid-Atlantic was afforded by CVE's (carrier escort vessels), carrying TBF bombers and F4F fighters. Both the CVE's and the destroyers that accompanied them, carried SC-SG (microwave) radar. The TFB's had 60-cm ASB, not very satisfactory for the detection of U-boats, since it had poor dis-

crimination, was sensitive to vibration and shock, difficult to keep calibrated, and subject to reception by U-boat search receivers. It proved most useful for navigating around the convoy at night or in poor visibility and for homing on the CVE, when German detection was no disadvantage. By the middle of 1944 the TFB's were being equipped with 3-cm ASD, which did not have a markedly successful maintenance record.

By the summer of 1943 aircraft had forced the U-boats to operate in other waters—the Caribbean, the South Atlantic off Brazil and Portugal, and the Indian Ocean. In all these areas except the last, however, aircraft were ready and waiting.

In September 1943 the very long range aircraft and CVE's in the North Atlantic again had opportunity for attack when the U-boats attempted a comeback with a new acoustic torpedo, which homed on the noise of the ship's propellers. Its existence had been known to the Allies for some time and a countermeasure was available. This was a noisemaker known appropriately as "Foxer" which was towed behind the ship to deflect the torpedo. Fortunately the acoustic torpedo was a fairly delicate instrument and not as effective as had been feared.

In the Bay of Biscay the U-boats were as ill-fated as in the Atlantic. In May 1943 Coastal Command set up a barrier patrol, an "unclimbable fence" eighty to one hundred miles wide through which all U-boats leaving French ports had to pass. This barrier was wide enough so that a U-boat could not cross it without surfacing to recharge batteries. It was maintained at night largely by means of a few Wellington airplanes, fitted with Leigh lights and 10-cm radar, of whose existence the Germans had as yet doubtful appreciation. This early 10-cm ASV was all preproduction equipment: modifications of the British blind bombing set (H 2 S) supple-

<sup>1</sup>Captain Samuel Eliot Morison USNR, in *The Battle of the Atlantic* (Boston, 1947) reports 108 merchant ships and 16 U-boats sunk in March. (Appendix I, p. 410 and Appendix II, p. 415.)

<sup>2</sup>Morison gives the figure as 140, in June (*ibid.*).



mented by the DMS-1000.<sup>3</sup> To divert suspicion some aircraft fitted with 1½-meter ASV Mark II, detectable by German search receivers, were also used.

The U-boats which surfaced at night were now more than likely to be attacked without warning by a plane carrying the 10-cm equipment they were unable to detect. The panic of the year before, when Leigh lights were first introduced, was repeated, with the added dismay caused by an unknown "secret weapon." Until August therefore the U-boats surfaced during the day hoping to fight off attack with their anti-aircraft armament. Coastal Command destroyed one U-boat every day during the first five days of August—and the U-boats gave up. They reverted to night surfacing, but with extreme caution, and for such short periods that without radar airplanes would never have found their targets. When air bases were set up in the Azores in October 1943, land-based aircraft covered this last area of U-boat operation previously not covered by them.

In January 1944, when the Anzio action was taking place, U-boats tried desperately to force the Mediterranean by running submerged through the straits of Gibraltar. The density gradient found in the Straits, resulting from the differences in density between the water of the Atlantic and Mediterranean, prevents sonar detection of slowly moving underwater bodies. Here MAD (magnetic airborne detector) found a profitable area of operations, and a squadron of MAD equipped PBV's flew a barrier patrol designed to detect every U-boat within the Straits area. The first sinking as a result of an initial MAD contact was in February 1944. The MAD patrol was later taken over by blimps, ideal because of their slow speed and ability

to fly low over water.

During the early part of 1943 there had been increasing dissatisfaction with the lack of coordinated planning between the various anti-submarine forces in the United States. The upshot was the creation of a Tenth Fleet by the United States Navy in July 1943, charged with the responsibility for all anti-submarine operations. The Army continued anti-submarine patrol only until the Navy was able to take over.

From May onward airplanes were responsible for more U-boat sinkings than all other anti-submarine craft combined; in October over 70 per cent of all U-boats killed were sunk as a result of aircraft attack. This remarkable record is to a large degree attributable to the increased availability and use of radar.

Although both longwave and microwave were in use during 1943, microwave ASV, particularly the ASG, became increasingly more common. By the end of the year the ASG was the most popular of all airborne sets, and deservedly so. Planes equipped with ASG made nearly two-thirds of their U-boat sightings, including daylight contacts, by radar, before visual contact could be established. The ASG was widely used by both British and American aircraft, so much so that in the summer of 1943 the Radiation Laboratory sent a man to England to install radar beacons for use by the ASG squadrons patrolling the Bay of Biscay. Even early in the year, when only a small fraction of the aircraft in use were equipped with microwave ASV, more than a third of the contacts which led to attacks on U-boats were being made by radar. The area effectively searched by microwave radar was four times that which could be searched visually, so that crews were ordered to use their microwave ASV at all times, whatever the visibility. Radar not only gave more contacts: it gave them sooner. Forty per cent of the radar

<sup>3</sup>This was early production 10-cm radar designed at the Radiation Laboratory and manufactured on a small scale by the Research Construction Corporation of Cambridge, Mass.

contacts resulted in kills, as compared with 23 per cent for visual contacts. Radar doubled the effectiveness of an airplane, and the U-boats suffered accordingly. Admiral Doenitz summed up the situation of 1943 when he said "The methods of radio location which the Allies have introduced have conquered the U-boat menace."

### THE RADAR-RADIO WAR

The appearance of any new weapon invites the development of its countermeasure. A most important countermeasure to improved methods of radar search is the development of a device to detect the radar signal, a "search receiver," covering the range of frequencies over which the radar equipment may be supposed to operate.

At the beginning of the war the Germans were aware of the potentialities of radar for surface search and had developed their own equipment on long and medium waves. It was therefore not long before they guessed that the successful method of detection being used by Allied aircraft was search radar. By capturing an ASV Mark II set in Tunisia in the spring of 1942, they learned the frequencies being used and soon developed a search receiver for 1½-meter radar, which Admiral Doenitz ordered installed in all U-boats. This was a hastily built, somewhat makeshift, search receiver known as the R-600.

The R-600 was put in operation in the fall of 1942 and partially nullified the air offensive over the Bay of Biscay. In spite of Allied fears, U-boats operating in the Western Atlantic were not so equipped until the beginning of 1943, though many aircraft operating in that area did not use their long-wave radar for fear the U-boats would detect it and submerge before they could be sighted by the airplane. Frequent reports of disappearing contacts had led to the belief that search receivers were being more widely used

than was the case. Investigation showed that very few of these disappearing contacts were actually U-boats; among other causes, whales were found to be mistaken for submerging submarines.

Well satisfied with the success of the R-600, the U-boats were lulled into false security. The Germans never expected that centimeter radar would be a practicable device because they had been unable themselves to generate the necessary high frequency power. They were therefore totally unprepared for the Allied use of 10-cm ASV. This had been introduced as early as the spring of 1942, but in small quantities, and always side by side with longer wave equipment. By the spring of 1943 10-cm radar installations were a commonplace and Coastal Command was using it with devastating effect in the Bay of Biscay.

The Germans should have been able to infer the existence of microwave radar. Instead their first guess was supersonic modulation, and the R-600 was accordingly fitted with a "magic eye" visual tuning indicator. Unfortunately for the Germans, a few British naval aircraft based on Gibraltar actually were using supersonic modulation, detectable by the modified R-600. This restored temporary peace of mind to the U-boat crews, until it was realized that attacks were increasing, while supersonic modulation was only rarely used. Detection by infra-red rays was a possibility; this idea was favored by the reports current among U-boat crews of "mysterious red glows" emitted by attacking aircraft. An infra-red detector was taken to sea but proved so difficult to operate that the theory could not be disproved. Some U-boats were even coated with special paint which would absorb infra-red radiation. Finally it occurred to the Germans that airborne radar might be used intermittently, a not uncommon anti-interception technique for radio transmission. A receiver that rapidly and

automatically swept through a wide range of frequencies and presented any signal picked up on a cathode-ray tube was the attempted solution.

Meanwhile there seemed no reason why the Germans should not discover that centimeter radar was the mysterious detector. It was the simplest solution to the problem. Moreover, an H 2 S (British blind bombing) set had been captured in March 1943 and in June the German Air Ministry had published and circulated throughout the Luftwaffe a detailed technical description of the set.

Apparently technical knowledge did not readily find its way from the Luftwaffe to the German Navy. If it had, there need never have grown up in the summer of 1943 the almost pathological fear of another possible explanation of the Allied success—detection of U-boats by means of radiation from their own search receivers.

The super heterodyne R-600, which actually did radiate enough to resemble a miniature transmitter, was withdrawn from service and the Wanz receiver substituted. This radiated very little, but with the continued destruction of U-boats it was withdrawn for elaborate modifications. Next the use of radio transmissions was banned, except when the U-boat was submerged; the use of anti-aircraft radar was also forbidden. Finally the crystal detector search receiver *Borkum*, which radiated not at all, was introduced. When the truth was at last brought home to the German Navy, possibly as the result of the appointment of a Navy-Air Force radio and radar coordinator, the problem was solved with the introduction of the 10-cm search receiver *Naxos*. This rather delicate instrument, which had to be passed below on diving, was by no means reliable, but it could detect 10-cm radiation at short range.

Unfortunately the Allies again overestimated the enemy. Once the existence of the *Naxos* receiver was known, the use of air-

borne radar declined. Airplane crews were averse to warning the U-boats of their presence and preferred to trust to undetectable though shorter range visual sightings. But by no means all U-boats were fitted with 10-cm search receivers. Prejudiced by past experience and the great radiation scare, the U-boat commander often decided not to use his search receiver; and when he did, it often failed to work. The psychological effect of the German centimeter search receiver was far greater than its operational value.

By the middle of 1944 two methods became available, which permitted the use of radar in the presence of search receivers. The first, an interim measure, was the "tilt-beam" method whereby the antenna was tilted after the initial target sighting so that only the edge of the principal lobe of the radiation pattern could be intercepted by the search receiver; the energy received was so weak that the interception ranges were very short, and since the intercepted signal did not grow stronger with time, it appeared that the airplane remained unaware of the U-boat.

This method required constant adjustment of the antenna, and knowledge by the radar operator of the maneuvers about to be performed by the pilot. The second method was the use of the Vixen attenuator, AN/APA-22, developed by the Radiation Laboratory. This attenuator made the radar signal received at the U-boat appear to remain constant or even decrease in strength as the airplane carrying the radar approached, without affecting the strength of the echo picked up by the radar receiver. It was found from interrogation of captured U-boat crews that the average range of the search receivers was twelve to twenty miles; since the average range for ASG was eighteen miles, in general an airplane would detect a U-boat before the U-boat's search receiver could detect the plane's radar. Aircraft crews were therefore advised to use microwave ASV day and

night, switching on the attenuator after the initial contact.

Radar decoys in the form of balloons and buoys were used by the Germans in the summer of 1943 and again in the early part of 1944. They seem, on the whole, to have caused very little confusion to Allied radar and proved more of a curiosity than a practicable weapon.

Radar was little used by the U-boats themselves. The U-boat commanders too greatly feared detection by Allied search receivers to use radar when they had it. Such as they had operated on 80-cm. and therefore had poor discrimination compared with the Allied centimeter equipment; it also had a shorter range than centimeter ASV.

#### THE BATTLE AGAINST THE SUBMERGED U-BOAT (1944 AND 1945)

The stage was now set for the invasion of Europe, and U-boats and aircraft paused in suspense. U-boat activity in the first half of 1944 was slight; there were plenty of submarines at sea but they seemed content merely to reconnoiter, and directed few attacks on merchant shipping. It was obvious that the enemy was husbanding his strength for D-day; on the Allied side air and surface craft were made ready to protect, at all costs, the invasion shipping in the English Channel.

The most important German development of this period was the fitting out of U-boats with Schnorkel, an adaptation of Dutch equipment captured in 1940. This was a retractable air intake, controlled from inside the U-boat, through which the U-boat could be supplied with air while proceeding at periscope depth. The U-boat could then travel submerged on its Diesel engines, which gave a submerged speed higher than by battery operation, and at the same time recharge its batteries, which could now be reserved for travelling at great depths. Though an effective reply to radar, Schnorkel had a number

of disadvantages: it required careful attention in order to maintain constant pressure within the U-boat; the pressure was always slightly less than normal atmospheric pressure when "Schnorkelling," and if the head of the Schnorkel dipped under water the pressure inside the U-boat decreased violently, to the extreme discomfort, physical and mental, of the crew; Schnorkel could not be used in very rough seas; the speed and thus the search coverage of the U-boat was much less than when on the surface; and the efficiency of the periscope watch was impaired.

Since the Schnorkel head rose not quite so high above the water as the periscope, it was extraordinarily difficult to detect from the air, either visually or by radar. The German's respect for aircraft is revealed by their willingness to forego the mobility gained by surface operation. Schnorkel, however, did not confer immunity from all attack. The first U-boat to be fitted with Schnorkel, U-264, was sunk on 19 February 1944, seventeen days after sailing from St. Nazaire. But as the use of Schnorkel became widespread aircraft sightings fell off, radar detection was uncommon, and U-boat crews could count themselves safe from air attack.

In the middle of May, 1944, a desperate attempt was made to reinforce the U-boats already in the Bay of Biscay with those stationed in Norwegian ports. These U-boats were compelled to circle far north of Scotland, where daylight was continuous at that time of year. They were therefore visible whenever they surfaced, and since they were not yet equipped with Schnorkel they could not remain submerged indefinitely. Coastal Command turned north. From May through July the duel went on, working farther and farther north, well beyond the Arctic Circle. By August after the Allied successes in France, the migration changed direction as the U-boats from the Biscay ports tried to



escape to Norway. Very few succeeded in making either transit.

When the invasion started in June, Allied air and surface craft established a barricade across the English Channel. This was so successful that the only losses in the invasion area caused by U-boats during June were two escort vessels. The U-boats became cautious and traveled submerged. Thereafter all that aircraft could see was Schnorkel or periscope—difficult targets; but the destruction of U-boats continued. Aircraft were now definitely at a disadvantage, and radar became less successful than visual search. Nevertheless, there were some radar contacts on Schnorkel.

During the autumn of 1944 the tempo of the anti-submarine war slowed considerably. The U-boats were cautious and seldom showed themselves on the surface even to deliver an attack. In October, although four U-boats were destroyed in the Atlantic there were no merchant vessel losses there. But the U-boat which landed two Nazi saboteurs on the coast of Maine at the end of November sank a tanker in the Gulf of Maine on its way to sea. Although the number of U-boats destroyed was small the ability of aircraft to detect Schnorkel was gradually improving, chiefly by dint of practice. Even radar contacts on Schnorkel were somewhat more numerous. Through tests it was found that while 1-cm (K-band) radar would give the best detection of Schnorkel, AN/APS-15 (H2X), the 3-cm blind bombing device so extensively used over Germany, was the best set available for operations.

In December 1944 the Radiation Laboratory, at the request of the Navy, investigated radar detection of Schnorkel (Project Hawkeye). Under this project various modifications were developed for existing equipment, principally ASG and AN/APS-15, to permit identification of the Schnorkel echo and to increase range on small targets. The modi-

fications included the design of a "big dish," an eight-foot by three-foot scanner, for the AN/APS-15. The work done under Project Hawkeye would, of course, have been of no avail if the Germans had continued to coat Schnorkel with anti-radar coverings, as they began to do in 1945. The anti-radar paint absorbed all radiations of some particular band of radar wavelengths, and would have prevented detection by radar operating in the range of frequencies so absorbed.

Coincident with the Battle of the Bulge at the end of December 1944, the U-boat war was suddenly intensified. U-boats, taking advantage of Schnorkel, tried once again to operate in the waters around the British Isles. But in spite of Schnorkel the number of U-boats destroyed exceeded the number of merchant vessels sunk for every month in 1945 after January. Chiefly because of Schnorkel, surface vessels were again far more effective destroyers of U-boats than aircraft. Airplanes had some slight success in the use of sono buoys which detected submerged U-boats by underwater sound and automatically transmitted the results to the aircraft. These devices were only useful where the presence of a U-boat was suspected, since they could only operate for a few hours. Airplanes were still important weapons if only because they enforced the use of Schnorkel which so restricted U-boat activity.

Much of the aircraft's effectiveness in the submarine war must be attributed to radar. It drove the U-boats beneath the surface, blinding and partially immobilizing them. At the end of the war the Germans had largely reduced the threat of air power by the use of Schnorkel but this, like all other counter-measures to radar, reduced the mobility of the U-boat and lessened its destructive power. Without radar linked with air power the U-boat menace could never have been reduced sufficiently to permit the building up of

forces for the offensive operations which finally resulted in the defeat of the Axis powers.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

This account, a chapter in the official History of Radar prepared for the Office of Scientific Research and Development, was based almost entirely upon official sources; many were made available through the courtesy of the Navy Department; the remainder are to be found in the records of the Radiation Laboratory, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The authors would like to make special acknowledgment of valuable assistance offered by Dr. Philip M. Morse, wartime head of the Operations Evaluations Group (OEG), formerly Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG), and by Dr. Jacinto Steinhart, who succeeded him as head of OEG. The chief sources are listed below.

1. Serial publications of the United States Navy: *United States Fleet Anti-Submarine Bulletin*, June 1943 to May 1945, a monthly publication covering all aspects of the submarine war, including technical descriptions of antisubmarine devices and detailed accounts of representative engagements between U-boats and antisubmarine forces of the United States Navy; *U-Boat Crew Information*, a series of pamphlets giving the results of interrogations of captured U-boat crews, and including detailed histories of individual U-boats and some information on technical equipment of U-boats.

2. Official publications of the British Navy and the RAF Coastal Command: *Monthly*

*Anti-Submarine Report*, CBO4050/42 (1) to CBO4050/45 (6), a monthly publication by the Anti-U-Boat Division of the Naval Staff covering operations by air and sea forces in the Eastern Atlantic; *Coastal Command Review*, January 1942 to April 1945, a serial publication covering all activities of the Coastal Command; *Coastal Command Against the U-Boats 1939 to 1944*, a very valuable history of the antisubmarine warfare carried out by the RAF Coastal Command, written at Coastal Command Headquarters.

3. Studies and memoranda by the Operations Research Group; ASWORG research reports and inter-office memoranda; and OEG reports, all available in the files of the Operations Evaluation Group, Navy Department. Particularly important are: *OEG Report 51 "Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War II, Part I, History of Anti-Submarine Operations,"* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, a summary report by the Operations Evaluations Group of the history of U-boat operations in the Atlantic and of the countermeasures used by the Allies; *ASWORG Review of Activity 1 April 1942 to 31 August 1944*, a history of the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group, the reasons for its founding, and an account of its activity.

4. Material from the files of the 1st Sea Search Attack Group, partially available in the Radiation Laboratory files.

5. Radiation Laboratory technical reports and documents, and interviews with Radiation Laboratory personnel, all located in the Radiation Laboratory files.

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Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

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### Reviews

*The Price of Survival*, by Brigadier General Joseph B. Sweet, USA (Ret.) (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1950. Pp. 250. \$2.85).

General Sweet, skilfully combining a scholar's knowledge of military and diplomatic history and a keen appraisal of the present with an analytical perspective of the future, has written a book that to this reviewer is a timely and valuable contribution toward the solution of the current muddled and critical problem of our national security.

*The Price of Survival* is the author's attempt at an "examination, analysis, and evaluation" of our prospects in a "hot war" with the USSR. His thesis is specifically and validly predicted upon the obvious and highly unfortunate fact that by mid-1950 the USSR was apparently ready for total war with the US whereas we were disgracefully and dangerously unprepared for even "police action," much less total war.

In mid-1950 the only tangible, immediately-available asset of the US over the USSR was the atomic bomb. Its importance as a strategic US asset is slowly but surely being minimized by USSR scientific progress. When, and if, the US loses this distinct military advantage, acknowledged communist superiority in mobilized and reserve manpower, geography, raw materials, and in-being industries producing death-dealing weapons such as planes, tanks, and guns truthfully pits David against Goliath in a 20th century setting. General Sweet is acutely aware of the immediate seriousness of the current and deplorable situation, contending that "the issue before us is no less than life and death; we cannot compromise or bargain with it."

Glaring mid-1950 military weaknesses such as (1) mobilized strength of US forces at home (2) mobilization capacity of the US, and (3) mobilized strength of US and allied forces in Western Europe and other trouble areas, are major inadequacies immediately to be remedied in order to avert or survive war with the USSR. Until we take really effective steps to remedy our ridiculous and terrible plight, thinking Americans will continue to live in fear of losing their most cherished possession—the American way of life.

General Sweet makes five major recommendations calculated to help us avert or survive war with the communist colossus. (1) The US must be militarily prepared to defend itself against direct, sustained, and Pearl Harbor-type attack intended to cripple our war potential. (2) The US must be militarily prepared to return with interest a powerful blow intended to cripple Soviet Union war potential. This sequence is based on the accepted theory, adequately supported by history, that the US must be attacked before Congress declares war. It is painfully apparent that (a) our sincere desire to preserve peace at almost any cost, and (b) our steadfast refusal to consider "preventative war" as a means to insure peace for future generations, greatly weakens the US diplomatically and militarily. (3) The US must be prepared to mobilize quickly its manpower, industry, and raw materials. Considerably greater mobilization than we had in mid-1950 is obviously necessary if we are to survive the initial attack; mobilization on a heretofore unparalleled scale is just as obviously necessary if we are to make victory a certainty. (4) The US and its allies must be militarily prepared (a) to defend all or most of Western Europe, or (b) to suffer

the disadvantageous possibility of holding a beach-head such as that held by UN forces in the Pusan area of old Chosen in July-August, 1950. (5) The US must be militarily prepared to obtain quickly and to maintain effectively control of necessary air and sea routes to both our friends and our enemies around the world.

US national security is very necessary and very expensive. National security is vitally necessary for survival. Survival will be paid for in lives and dollars. The cost is regrettable, but understandable. General Sweet is quite dogmatic that it is not too late for the US and the West to prepare adequately for defense against coolly calculated communist aggression. He is equally positive, however, that even a slight delay in the inauguration of a comprehensive defense program could insure disastrous defeat.

From 1939 to 1950 the imperialistic and ideological aggressiveness of the Russian communists was quite apparent to the world in general and to the so-called satellite states in Eastern Europe and the Far East in particular. Since he wrote *The Price of Survival* our government and the governments of many United Nations took deliberate, unprecedented, and praiseworthy action to stop communist-planned aggression south of the 38th parallel in the Korean peninsula. This was but one more premeditated step toward world domination, *a la* Machiavelli, by the heirs of Marx, Lenin, and Mars.

Preparedness is the essence of *The Price of Survival*—preparedness as soon as possible, regardless of cost. Preparedness will give us a national security which "... for Americans [is] a state of freedom, from the danger of loss of essential liberties, resources, and opportunities. It is fundamentally a condition of justified national serenity, when considered from a mutual rather than an individual standpoint." This is what we have to lose. This is what we all want to preserve. The tragic and unnecessary weakness of US armed forces, particularly on land and in the air, is the major cause of our chronic and increasing fear of the USSR. Judging from the printed and the spoken word, American fear is not restricted by race, color, geography, religion, politics, economic or social status. The tragic implication of this deadly fear is further magnified by the fact that until very recently we have done little significantly to augment our armed forces.

General Sweet's book merits serious consideration from all patriotic citizens, and especially from our Congressmen, a great many of whom could

profit from reading *The Price of Survival* and then legislating accordingly. Our country, for the first time since 1783 when Mr. Jefferson's Declaration of Independence became a reality, is faced with an immediate, serious, and undoubtedly skilfully-planned threat of direct attack. There is always the bare possibility that even now it is too late to prepare an adequate defense against a long-prepared enemy. We Americans can only hope it isn't too late, and that the administration in Washington immediately reflect sound public opinion that wants to support a military establishment strong enough to avert or survive war against our only conceivable and declared enemy—the USSR.

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*Les forces alliées en Italie: La campagne d'Italie* by Général Marcel Carpentier.  
(Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949, viii 282 pp.)

General Marcel Carpentier, Chief of Staff of the French Expeditionary Corps in Italy, has written a very interesting book on the part played by the French forces (2nd Moroccan Infantry Division, 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, 4th Moroccan Mountain Division, 1st Free French or 1st Motorized Infantry Division, the Moroccan Goums, and reserve units) in the Italian campaigns. The preface by the Commanding General of the Corps, Army General Alphonse Juin, assures us that his Chief of Staff shared his intimate thoughts.

The first three chapters dealing with the Allied strategic concept, the Sicilian campaign, and the Salerno landing are quite general, and although they are beautifully clear, they contain some ceded Mussolini (p. 31); the effective occupied by the Germans at the time Badoglio succeeded Mussolini, (p. 31); the effective occupation of Italy took place after Badoglio came to power. The statement (p. 37) that the Germans had a garrison of 24,000 men in Rome in September 1943 is greatly exaggerated. Rome had been proclaimed an "open city" on 14 August. It is in the main true that the Salerno landing did not constitute a strategic surprise for the Germans, but it is quite incorrect to state that the Germans knew in advance the date of that landing (p. 40). General Carpentier did not have access to the German records; and his account of



Salerno and of the advance up the Peninsula by 11 Allied divisions against 24 German divisions in Italy (p. 46-47) reveals no appreciation of the way in which the vicious division of command of the German forces between Rommel in the north and Kesselring in the south played into Allied hands.

The author hits his real stride with the arrival of the French forces in Italy in December, 1943. The French forces and commanders had to earn appreciation the hard way. When General Juin and a few staff officers arrived by plane at Naples on 25 November 1943, there was no one to meet them at the air field (p. 53). When General Juin left the Italian theater on 21 July 1944, he bore with him letters of the highest praise from General Alexander and General Mark Clark; General Alexander personally drove Generals Juin and Carpentier to their plane (pp. 238-241). As soon as Juin saw the terrain in southern Italy he was convinced that his corps would find an opportunity to demonstrate its worth:

"When one enters Europe from the south, one strikes mountainous country, that is to say theatres of operations where the classic maneuver (the combination of the action of a supple and ardent infantry and of a powerful artillery) retains all its value." (p. 44).

The book throughout reveals the spirit of the French leaders: their great depression because of the defeat of 1940; but along with this the conviction that the defeat was primarily due to lack of modern matériel, and that if such were supplied them, the combat qualities of the troops, and the solid, traditional knowledge and skill of French general officers in the art of maneuver would be demonstrated. (see particularly pp. vi, pp. 18-22, 70-73, 77, 81, 94-95, 109-113, 145, 249-251).

General *d'armée* Juin had five stars, but served with ardor as corps commander in the U.S. Fifth Army under Mark W. Clark, who in September 1943 had permanent rank of Brigadier General, temporary rank of Lieutenant General (pp. 56-57). Juin and Carpentier came to have a high esteem for General Clark's qualities as a military leader, for General Gruenther as a Chief of Staff, and particularly for General Keyes. Acquaintance with the British general officers was more limited, but these Frenchmen entertained thorough respect for the solid British qualities of General Alexander. The reviewer feels, however, that the brief account of Anzio (pp. 85-93) is neither fair to the late General Lucas, nor sound in its judg-

ments. The contrast of Salerno and Anzio is too pat. Granted that Anzio achieved strategic surprise, what would have happened to the two reinforced divisions of General Lucas' initial force had they made an immediate dash for the Colli Laziali and Highway 7? The German reinforcement flowed into this sector with "astonishing rapidity" (p. 91), one division from the Balkans, three from north Italy, two from the Eighth Army front, one and a half from the Fifth Army front. Kesselring was not fooled by the Anzio expedition, and this time (January 1944) in contrast to the Salerno period, he had full command over the entire Italian theater.

The most interesting and valuable part of the book deals with the role of General Juin in the formulation of the plan for the spring offensive. His conception was to unhinge the Germans from the Cassino position (where they had thrown back the repeated American and British frontal attacks during the winter) by driving through the Aurunci Mountains with the French Corps—a sector where the Germans did not expect the Allied main effort, and for which the French North African troops with their mules and mountain training were peculiarly suited. The maneuver was skillfully planned and brilliantly executed. The German documents in the possession of the Office of Military History, U.S. Army, give much more ample testimony to the surprise and the élan of the French drive than the few scattered captured documents used by Carpentier (pp. 186-188).

General Juin left the Italian theater with regret. He felt in the summer of 1944 that the withdrawal of divisions from Fifteenth Army Group in order to make the attack in Southern France in support of OVERLORD was a mistake. Several British and American generals agreed with him. The book at least provides some interesting arguments on one phase of the much discussed theme of Mediterranean versus cross-Channel strategy (pp. 208-225).

General Carpentier is fully conscious of the fundamental importance of matériel in modern war. "Modern war is a war of matériel," he states on p. 260. The basic forms of strategy and tactics, however, remain the same. "One searches in vain to draw from the Italian campaign new strategic and tactical lessons" (p. 249). The classic principles of Napoleon were valid in Italy as elsewhere, and, on the other hand "each time that the classic principles were violated, their sanction intervened in the form of a check" (p. 251).

The concluding chapter offers some very penetrating remarks regarding the problems of coalition warfare—most pertinent in view of the Atlantic Pact.

HOWARD MCG. SMYTH  
Office of Military History  
Department of the Army.

*Life's Picture History of World War II*, by the Editor of *Life*. (New York: Time Incorporated, 1950. Pp. 368. \$10.00, \$12.50).

This oversize volume includes over 1000 photographs, paintings and drawings, including 64 in full color, as well as 32 maps. Many of the pictures included in this history were formerly restricted or in enemy or Allied picture files. An appendix giving picture credits is included which thus does not detract from the flow of events.

At the beginning of each of the twelve sections from "The Conquest of Europe" to "Victory in the Pacific" there is a brilliantly written summary by John Dos Passos which sets the stage for the events presented graphically and vividly. In addition to this text, Robert Sherrod has succinctly presented descriptive narratives to accompany the pictures in each section.

Both text and illustrations give a clear picture of the major events of this global war as far as it is possible to do under the covers of a single volume.

All writers, artists, and historians, as well as those lightly minded will be interested in this outstanding history.

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*The Blue and the Gray: The Story of the Civil War as told by Participants*, edited by Henry Steele Commager, with a foreword by Douglas Southall Freeman. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. 2 vols. Pp. xxxv, 1201, xv. End papers, illustrations, bibliography and acknowledgments. Boxed. \$12.00).

The richness of the source literature on both sides of the American War of Secession is at once the student's delight and despair. Professor Commager, over a period of some twelve years, with the aid of his graduate students collected, sorted, and evaluated "many diaries, journals, letters, autobiographies, biographies, battle and campaign histories, regimental histories, volumes of learned societies, of historical societies, of

magazines like the *Confederate Veteran* or the old *Century*." Out of these cullings, he has come up with some four hundred and fifty selections which he believes—"... present a well-rounded ..."—though he would not for a moment have us assume a complete "... history of the Civil War in the words of those who fought it."

"I have tried to cover the whole war," says our compiler (Introduction, p. xx), "not only the military, which has attracted disproportionate attention, and the naval, but the economic, social, political, and diplomatic as well. The war was not all fighting; it was public opinion, it was the draft, it was prison and hospital, it was ordnance and supplies, it was politics and elections, it was religion, and even play. Approximately half the material in these volumes records the actual fighting; another half is devoted to the other aspects of the war. I have tried to hold even the balance between Union and Confederate. . . ."

In his introduction, Professor Commager intriguingly suggests specific incidents and questions for the depiction of which and for answers to which an eager reader would want to turn at once to pertinent selections rather than to await their revelation in the course of consecutive reading; but, unhappily, the index is little better than an alphabetized table of contents, and he must find his data the hard way. In some instances the reviewer was never able to discover apposite passages, as in the case of "Barbara Frietchie waving her country's flag." He was disappointed in not finding an account by someone who had seen the lady in the act and had heard the words imputed to her by Whittier.

The compiler put in issue the very fundamentals of the war, and thereby burdened himself with the task of presenting equally the political and philosophical background on each side, when he raised such questions as: "Was the election of Lincoln a threat to the South, and was secession justified? Was secession a revolutionary or a constitutional act, and was the war a rebellion or an international conflict?" As to whether Lincoln's election posed a threat to the welfare of the Southern States, the reader will find in a dozen or so selections a reasonably broad basis upon which to formulate an opinion. But as to whether secession was a revolutionary or a constitutional act, and therefore whether the war was a rebellion or an international conflict, there are only three selections whose subjects would give promise of appropriate information: namely, South Carolina's Declaration of Causes, Lincoln's first in-

augural address, and the decision of the US Supreme Court in *Prize Cases* (1863). From all three of these readings the constitutional expositions have been deleted without explanation. The Declaration of Causes, as quoted, voices only Carolina's complaint in the matter of the return of fugitive slaves and the attempts to exclude slavery from the common territories. Lincoln's inaugural is watered down to those paragraphs pleading, "We are not enemies, but friends." The Supreme Court's decision is reduced to the passages setting forth the well-known tenets of international law relative to civil wars, applicable to any internal strife in any nation, anywhere, at any time. If the compiler really expected the reader to answer for himself the above questions on the basis of material incorporated in these volumes, it would seem that the cited documents should not have been emasculated and that pertinent parts of Davis' inaugural address of 18 February 1861 and his message to Congress on 29 April 1861 should have been included among the selections.

The readings are divided between Union and Confederate about as two to one. Lincoln is quoted fifteen times, Davis twice (but not once from an important state paper), Grant six times, and Lee five times. There are evidences of opinionation and carelessness in the chapter and selection prefaces. For example, he refers (p. 802) to the "350-ton frigate, *Merrimac*" (which later became C.S.S. *Virginia*). According to the official list of the US Navy the burthen of this ship was 3,200 tons, and her name was spelled *Merrimack*. *Merrimac* without the final *k* was an entirely different vessel, being a 684-ton steamer taken into the US Navy in 1864 as a blockade cruiser. There are no critical footnotes to the selections though the need for such as frequently obvious. Often one is unable to determine when the selection was written. In the opinion of the reviewer, we have in *The Blue and the Gray*, a very entertaining collection of source and near-source material but scarcely a well-rounded history of the war. The format is superb.

WILLIAM M. ROBINSON, JR.  
Quincy, Florida.

***Crimes Against International Law.*** By Joseph Berry Keenan and Brendan Francis Brown (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950. Pp. 226 including index. \$3.25).

Here is a studious, well-conceived and well-written treatise on the all-too-neglected subject

of war crimes. It is unfortunate that, in the selection of a title, the authors failed to include a better clue to their text,—in which they discuss the relationship of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to the great field of international law in general.

However, once the book is opened, there is unfolded a learned study of the leading war crimes trial in the Far East, the legal steps taken to place in the hands of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the authority and power to try and punish the accused, and the significance of such authority and power in international law.

The authors point out, at length, the differences between the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, in legal inception, and the Tokyo Tribunal—the latter placing in the hands of one person the same relative powers as those given to the entire Tribunal at Nuremberg. However, this power in itself was not unique, as the book would lead us to believe, since the same power was vested in the commanding generals of the various Allied powers in Germany to punish German war criminals for acts committed against Allied nations and one-time German-occupied nations. Many hundreds of war criminals were tried and convicted at Dachau, Germany, by the exercise of the same powers by the U.S. Commanding General in Germany.

The book dwells at length on the Potsdam Declaration, the London Agreement, the Charter for the Tokyo Tribunal, and the Tribunal itself, justifying them within the body of international legalistic interpretations. In particular do the authors justify the Charter setting up the Tribunal as empowering the trial, sentence, and punishment of Japanese war criminals since "... the London Agreement contained, in quasi-statutory form, non-statutory international criminal law, determined to be in existence, prior to the acts of the Nazi war leaders, by a quasi-judicial process." In other words, the authors take much space to indicate that the Tribunal was legal, that it did not violate the *ex post facto* doctrine, and that the crimes for which the accused were tried were violations of international law,—if not the written law as set forth in treaties, conventions, and the like, then the unwritten common law and customs of mankind.

The law of conspiracy as compared with the "common design" of war crimes is carefully reviewed, as is the administration of criminal justice without statutory law. Both were vitally im-



portant in reply to arguments by the defense challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear war crimes. The authors with painstaking detail indicate the legality, including the "inalienable international law rights" of the individual person, or persons, written and unwritten.

The book proceeds to cover the war of aggression on the part of the Japanese, including the acts of aggression leading up to actual military operations. These acts of aggression were of such deliberate pattern as immediately to stamp them as acts in violation of international law, and particularly, as the authors point out, "when a nation employs deceit and treachery, using periods of negotiations and the negotiations themselves as a cloak to screen a perfidious attack, then there is a prime example of the crime of all crimes."

This is a book primarily for the student of International Law, and should be studied along with works on the Tribunals in Germany. The layman, in reading the pages, will be continually bogged down in legal phraseology to the extent—perhaps—of misunderstanding the context.

Of most value to the student will be the appendices, references, and the index, which are detailed and complete. As a reference book, this work makes an important addition to legal libraries. But as a treatise on crimes against International Law, it must be treated as only a supplement to works already written.

A. H. ROSENFELD  
Washington, D. C.

*The United States as a World Power; A Diplomatic History, 1900-1950*, by Samuel Flagg Bemis. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950. Pp. 491. \$5.00).

A new book by Professor Bemis is always an important event, particularly in the case of his recently published *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (1949), a book of great significance in the field of U.S. diplomatic history. The latest book, by Professor Bemis, however, *The United States A World Power*, is, to quote from its Preface, "essentially a reprint, adapted and slightly revised, of Part III, 'The Twentieth Century,' of my *Diplomatic History of the United States*, Third Edition, 1950." The latter book has been used as a college text for courses in U.S. diplomatic history since 1936. It is of value not only as a text, but stands on its own merits as an historical work that should be required reading for all stu-

dents of international affairs, both amateur and professional.

This "reprint," however, has an introductory chapter dealing with the historical foundations of American Foreign Policy, a sort of briefing to the reader who may not be fully conversant with American diplomacy before 1900. As such, this chapter is newly written material and is not a part of the original textbook. It lists twelve fundamental principles of American foreign policy that were crystallized in the period 1776-1826, and practiced from the years 1826-1898. These principles were:

1. Freedom of the Seas.
2. Freedom of commerce and navigation.
3. Abstention from ordinary vicissitudes and ordinary collisions of European politics and wars.
4. The Non-Transfer principle of 1811.
5. Continental expansion and Manifest Destiny.
6. Self-determination of peoples.
7. No further European colonization in the New World.
8. Nonintervention.
9. The right of expatriation and the wrong of impressment.
10. Suppression of the African slave trade.
11. Pan-Americanism, or "Good Neighborhood."
12. International arbitration by voluntary agreement.

Professor Bemis notes that the United States successfully supported these principles until the twentieth century brought "a tremendous phenomenon in modern history: the simultaneous appearance of three new world powers. They were Germany, the United States and Japan." The bulk of the book then examines the impact of two new powers, Germany and Japan, on the foreign policy of the United States, with the additional impact, of course, of the newly emergent great power, the United States itself, on American policy. The concluding chapters deal with the momentous re-emergence of an old power, Russia, and its up-setting influence on the entire world.

All of the famous problems of the first half of the twentieth century are given careful treatment, this treatment being as objective as possible, yet not drowning Professor Bemis' own convictions and loyalties in a sea of dullness. Fortunately the completely objective historian does not exist; if he did, his works would be unreadable. Even the great von Ranke had his likes and dislikes when it came to the handling of historical material.



Bemis discusses the Open Door Policy; the infamous Platt Amendment; the Isthmian Life Line and the development of the Panama Policy; the troubled Mexican-American relations; Woodrow Wilson, American Neutrality and the first World War; the Great Debate over the League of Nations; the problems of the Pacific and of Oriental Immigration; the Washington and London Naval Treaties; the New Reciprocity; United States relations with Canada and Latin America; Isolation and Neutrality, with the collapse of the latter; then World War II and our war-time diplomacy; and finally "World Family of Democratic Nations versus World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." This brings the reader up to date—to July, 1950, and the landing of three American divisions in Korea.

In regard to Korea, Professor Bemis has this to say:

In opening Korea (1882-1883) to Western commerce and Western political rivalry, the United States had unwittingly stepped on the very threshold of Far Eastern diplomacy. For three hundred years China and Japan had contested for a protectorate over that isolated nation, a buffer among three powers, Russia, Japan, and China. Japan was now resorting to a policy of recognition of the nominal independence of Korea as a means of cutting it loose from any traces of Chinese sovereignty. Once independent, Korea would be weak enough, and close enough to Japan, to pass eventually under the latter's control, if Russia should not intervene. By making a treaty with Korea as an independent state, the United States, followed by the other powers, really played into the first designs of Japanese expansionists. China, resenting this turn of affairs, began to contest Korea's independent status. The result was the disastrous war with Japan of 1894-1895 . . .

But the wheel has gone completely around, and now the United States is reaping the harvest of the treaty of half a century ago, and the re-emergence of another old power, China, coupled with the previously mentioned rise of Russia, will in their combined impact no doubt determine the history of American and of world diplomacy for the second half of the twentieth century.

This book has an adequate index, fourteen maps, nineteen tables and diagrams, but no bibliography. The references in footnotes are a substitute for the latter, and in any edition obviously designed for the general reader this is not too serious a handicap.

It is to be hoped that Americans interested in today's crisis and how it developed will take advantage of this opportunity to read the third part of Professor Bemis' longer work. Their time will be well-spent, and their knowledge enormously widened.

ROBERT WALKER DAVIS  
Washington D. C.

*Paul Revere's Horse*, by A. C. M. Azoy.  
(Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949. Pp. 256. \$2.50).

Colonel Azoy has for some years enlivened the stern and purposeful pages of our service journals with his delightful exposures of the minor heroes of American military history, and these are now gathered together under one cover. No one, least of all Colonel Azoy, will look upon *Paul Revere's Horse* as a serious contribution to the field, but there are very few who will not find it an amusing and colorful one.

Writing with much of the charm that the late Edmund L. Pearson employed in his accounts of famous American murders, Colonel Azoy tells about such story book figures as Molly Pitcher, Nathan Hale, Major Anderson of Fort Sumter, Custer, and Richmond Pearson Hobson. This is no "great captains unveiled" sort of thing, for few of the people covered were captains or even very great. Nor is it the debunking or muck-raking that many authors are wont to attempt. In the main, the stories are fairly and amusingly told and their principal characters come off pretty well, with their reputations cleared up a bit but otherwise unbesmirched.

It is worthwhile to observe that all of the characters and events covered in these tales were forcefully introduced to the American public, and with considerable embellishment, long before Colonel Azoy's time. He found them already celebrated. For this, Paul Revere can thank Longfellow; Lieutenant Rowan owes a debt to Elbert Hubbard; Hale, Molly Pitcher and others to a thousand school books; and even the U.S.S. *Maine* must concede something to James Gordon Bennett and the New York *Herald*. I hope now that the Colonel will turn to other less publicized but equally amusing personalities of our military history and give them a break. I daresay he has considered this and perhaps he feels they could not be brought sufficiently to life. Edmund Pearson—the parallel is unescapable—found that he could write endlessly about the celebrated Borden

Murders, but when he attempted less exploited crimes he was not so successful. Yet the hope for further stories by Colonel Azy leads me to ask that the attempt be made, this time from the springboard of archives and memoirs rather than the poems of Longfellow or the editorials of Bennett.

FREDERICK P. TODD  
Office of Military History  
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*The Far Distant Ships: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in the Second World War.* (Ottawa: The King's Printer, 1950. Pp. 515, including appendices & index. \$3.00.)

At the start of World War II, as Mr. Schull points out, any one of the new German battleships could have blown the entire Canadian Navy out of the water; for it consisted of only five small minesweepers, two training ships (one of them a sailing vessel), and six destroyers, and had an active strength of some 1800 men. The situation was partly one of simple neglect; but mostly it was a reflection of confidence in the British fleet, confidence that so long as Britain interposed a shield between Canada and her potential enemies a Canadian Navy was irrelevant. With the outbreak of war in September 1939 it became clear, however, that Britannia would rule the waves to no avail if Germany were to rule the waters underneath. Canada was called upon for a tremendous naval effort, and the response was magnificent. By the summer of 1942 the Canadian Navy had 188 vessels in operation and just under 40,000 men in uniform. It continued to expand, until, at the end of the war, the Navy comprised nearly 400 ships and 90,000 men. This in itself was an accomplishment fully as notable, if not so thrilling, as the gallant exploits colorfully described in *The Far Distant Ships*. The Navy's growth and organization, its administrative history, the development of strategy, of new weapons, and tactics are briefly touched upon; the spotlight, throughout Mr. Schull's book, remains focussed on the short-lived moments when ship fought against ship. Wherever Canadian forces went, whether in the Caribbean, the North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea, off the coast of France, or in the Mediterranean, the story follows them into action.

But the focus is so sharp that, paradoxically, it tends to blur the Canadian Navy's major role. The winning of the war depended upon success

in the Battle of the Atlantic, in which, for six years, the brunt fell hard upon the ships and men of Canada. In the protection of the North Atlantic convoy lanes and to the achievement of final victory over the U-boat, no nation made greater contribution nor put forth greater effort. Of this, Mr. Schull is rightly aware. Yet he devotes no more space to the Battle of the Atlantic than to OPERATION NEPTUNE, the naval phase of the cross-Channel invasion, in which relatively few Canadian ships were engaged.

In the manner of treatment, also, the story of the long Atlantic battle against the submarine suffers by comparison. Out of the exploits of the Canadian ships involved in NEPTUNE, Mr. Schull has woven together a clear, vivid account of the whole operation. On the other hand, although he describes the battle actions along the convoy lanes in stirring fashion, in each case it is left to the reader to discover for himself the relation of the particular engagement to the campaign as a whole. Why did the counter-attack against the submarines succeed in one instance and fail in another? What lessons were learned from the actions selected for inclusion in the book? The escape of U-517 after two months of depredations in the Gulf of St. Lawrence (pp. 115-120) seems to be a pointed example of faulty tactics on the part of the hunters; whereas, in contrast, it was the persistence and skillful technique of *Skeena* and *Wetaskiwin* that rewarded them with a kill on 31 July 1942 (pp. 131-133). That this was so can easily be missed at first reading. Similarly, a more emphatic treatment of the effect and effectiveness of new weapons in the particular engagements would be desirable. These, however, are matters the author undoubtedly weighed in choosing the road to take. Given the vast amount of material, Mr. Schull had to draw the line somewhere. He chose to tell the story in terms of ships rather than of men, weapons and tactics.

On the strategic direction of the anti-submarine campaign, Mr. Schull makes several slips, the effect of which might be disturbing to some of the more sensitive readers south of the forty-ninth parallel. The division of responsibility which gave the United States operational control of the Western Atlantic Area was not made at the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting of August 1941, nor did American control over Canada's Newfoundland Command "automatically and abruptly" follow (cf. p. 96). The allocation was made in the joint staff conferences of January-March 1941, and not until October did the

United States accept more than a limited measure of responsibility. The Newfoundland Command remained under Canadian control until January 1942, when unity of command was established under Rear Admiral Arthur LeR. Bristol, USN. Likewise, Mr. Schull's interpretation of the measures taken in January-February 1942 (pp. 100-101) and in the spring of 1943 (pp. 166-167) seems open to question. For example, the decision in February 1942 to extend the run of the local escorts was not the result of complications brought on by the previous withdrawal of American warships from escort duty (cf. pp. 98, 100). It reflected partly the increased coverage of shore-based air patrols. But for the most part, the decision was only one of a number of steps taken for the purpose of making possible the redeployment *afterward* of Canadian vessels, as well as American, in order to meet the shifting incidence of submarine attacks.

Anyone who thinks the fighting ships of Canada did nothing but shuttle back and forth across the North Atlantic must certainly read *The Far Distant Ships*. The general reader who wants an exciting, absorbing tale of drama on the high seas will find one here, told without any of the embellishments of sensational reporting. The professional will have to do some methodical digging (in this case without the assistance of footnotes), but the reward will be well worth his effort. This reviewer only wishes the story had been told in two volumes instead of one.

BYRON FAIRCHILD  
Washington, D. C.

(Dr. Fairchild is covering the history of U. S. Army activities in Iceland, Greenland, and the North Atlantic Area for inclusion in *The Defense of the Americas*, a forthcoming official publication of the Office of Military History, U. S. Army.)

*Unit Histories of World War II, U.S. Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy.* (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Army, in collaboration with New York Public Library, 1950. Pp. 141. Not For Sale).

The New York Public Library has devoted considerable effort to building up the outstanding collection of Unit Histories in World War II. Its purpose in presenting this preliminary unannotated near-print edition is to secure additions and additional imprint information. This edition is reproduced by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army in collaboration with the New York Public Library. The

final edition, which will be published by the New York Public Library, will annotate titles for awards, killed in action, route of march maps and unit rosters. Each item is given a number, and arrangement is by type of unit, that is, at first appearance, armies then corps and airborne divisions, armored divisions, infantry divisions followed by groups, brigades, separate battalions and companies. This is followed by histories of individual ships, and the Navy section by a list of Marine Corps Units. Histories of subordinate units are listed under the major unit. However, detailed organizational tables are furnished. For example, under *Infantry Regiments* is a table showing the numbers of regiments which belong to a division, thus 104th Division shows that the 413th, 414th, 415th Infantry Regiments belong to this Division and the history of these regiments are listed under the 104th Division.

This bibliography, containing 1223 items, is perhaps the most complete record existing of unit histories. The New York Public Library obviously has spent a great deal of effort to try to make its holdings of this type of record complete. This bibliography can be enhanced for them and for the use of various military establishments by annotation and addition on the part of historians and veterans having detailed information in the field of this frequently fugitive type of imprint.

WILLARD WEBB  
Washington, D. C.

*History Written with Pick and Shovel*, by William Louis Calver and Reginald Pelham Bolton, with an introduction by Richard J. Koke. (New York: New-York Historical Society, 1950. Pp. 320. \$3.50).

This is a reprinting of thirty-six articles written during the past thirty years or more and published in various periodicals, most of which are now hard to obtain. The usefulness of such a compilation, made possible today by offset printing, is obvious to anyone who has, like this reviewer, spent five times the sum asked for the book in securing a few of the scattered separates. Our new generation of students and collectors can rest assured it is worth every penny of the price.

Mr. Koke, the present curator of the New-York Historical Society Museum, tells of the background of these articles in his introduction. During the closing years of the 19th century a small group of men in New York, notably the two authors plus Dr. Edward Hagaman Hall and



Mr. Oscar T. Barck, undertook a serious archaeological study of Indian, Colonial and Revolutionary War sites in various northern sections of Greater New York City. At that time these areas (now entirely covered by streets and apartment houses) consisted of woods, undeveloped fields or farmland. As their explorations and diggings grew in scope, so did their knowledge of local history and their flair for discovering likely sites. Eventually, in 1918, their work was organized under the sponsorship of the Society by its appointment of the principal participants as a Field Exploration Committee. At about the same time their findings were beginning to appear in print. The articles herein reprinted, therefore, represent over forty years of work by several experts, not merely in New York City, but on up the Hudson Valley to the Canadian border.

Not all of the sites explored or objects uncovered had military significance, but the greater majority did and, what is more important, this archaeological evidence has had its chief impact on military history. Not only has the discovery of regimental insignia here and there indicated what the soldiers looked like, but it has supplemented the usually meager documentary evidence that they were at these places. Locations of camp sites, fortifications and tactical dispositions lost to history were rediscovered by patient exploration and digging. Commencing with Indian remains, the members of the Committee were soon working on material associated with the Revolution and at length they had broadened their activities to embrace forts and camps of the War of 1812 in northern New York State and along the Canadian frontier.

The book is extensively illustrated with photographs of objects unearthed, contemporary pictures, and with drawings of military types by Charles M. Lefferts (who, incidentally, took part in some of the trips) and Alexander R. Cattle of London.

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## REVIEWS IN PROSPECT

Titles to be given future major review coverage will include:

*The Siberian Intervention*, by John Albert White (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1950. Pp. 471, including appendices, bibliography, index. \$6.00).

"... struggle for the Russian Far East, especially the phase which preceded ... the spring of 1920, . . . . . forms the theme and subject matter . . . . . selected as an introductory study of the Soviet Union is the Far East for a number of reasons. The ... most obvious ... is ... the fact that the struggle is the period of transition from the Imperial to the Soviet Regime and therefore forms chronologically a natural introduction to the general subject. In addition, this transitional period exemplifies ... the significance of the Russian Far East in the international ... arena of power politics. Finally, the importance of the intervention period ... is such that it has left its mark on the subsequent history of the relationships both of the Soviet Union and of other powers having East Asiatic or Pacific possessions and interests."

This exceptional book, apparently completed about December 1948 will be reviewed in conjunction with the recently declassified and now open public document of *Final Report of Gen. Wm. S. Graves, A.E.F. in Siberia: July 1, 1919 to March 31, 1920*.

*Breaking the Bismarck's Barrier, 22 July 1942—1 May 1944* (Volume VI of History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II) by Samuel Eliot Morison (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass. 1950. Pp. 463, including illustrations, maps, index).

*Twenty Million World War Veterans*, by Robert England (Oxford University Press (London, Toronto, New York), 1950. Pp. 227 including index. \$3.50).



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following selected bibliography may be used as a checklist of books published since the previous issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* (Winter, 1949), supplementing books reviewed or noted to be reviewed. Departures from accepted form and style in this section are occasioned by haste in committing copy to press, and do not establish a precedent.

*I. Institutions and Culture—Asia*

BELDEN, JACK. *China shakes the World*. N. Y., Harper, 1949. 524p. \$5.00.

A correspondent's view of the confused and complex situation in wartorn China.

CH'EN, TUAN-SHENG. *Government and politics of China*. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. pr., 1950. 526p. \$7.50.

Rise and decline of Nationalist China.

COHEN, JEROME B. *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*. Minneapolis, U. of Minn. Press, 1949. 545p. \$7.50.

This comprehensive study of the Japanese economy from the 1930's to 1948 is valuable for all interested in the Far East.

EBERHARD, WOLFRAM. *History of China*. Berkeley, Univ. of Calif. pr., 1950. 374 p. \$4.50. Political and social growth of China; and her place in the world today.

HAILEY, F. B. *Half of one world*. N.Y., Macmillan, 1950. 207p. \$3.00.

Presents the background and cause of the situation in the Far East; shows in what way this area is important to the Western world.

LATTIMORE, OWEN. *Pivot of Asia*. Bost., Little, Brown, 1950. 288p. \$3.50.

Group study of the confused political situation in Sinkiang.

McCUNE, G. M. *Korea today*. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. pr., 1950. 372p. \$3.50.

Postwar political and economic development in northern and southern Korea.

MILLS, L. A. *New World of Southeast Asia*. Minneapolis, Univ. of Minn. pr., 1949. 445p. \$5.00.

Eight experts on this area bring its problems up-to-date for the general reader.

PAYNE, ROBERT. *Mao Tse-Tung, ruler of Red China*. N.Y., Schumann, 1950. 303p. \$3.50.

A study of the leader of Red China.

REINCOURT, AMAURY DE. *Roof of the World, Tibet, Key to Asia*. N.Y., Rinehart, 1950. 322p. \$3.50.

An investigation of Tibetan religious practices, daily life of the people and an analysis of the present political situation.

ROSINGER, L. K. *India and the United States; political and economic relations*. N.Y., Macmillan, 1950. 149p. \$2.75.

Explanation of India's political and economic policies as they affect the United States.

SANSOM, SIR G. B. *Western world and Japan, a study in the interaction of European and Asiatic cultures*. N.Y., Knopf, 1950. 504p. \$6.00.

Western influence on Oriental culture and the return influence of the Japanese on Western trends.

SIMONDS, RICHARD. *The Making of Pakistan*. Lond., Faber, 1949. 227p. 12s. 6d.

Through the geography, economics and culture of the country, the author gives a fairly complete picture of Pakistan.

TALBOT, PHILLIPS, ed. *South Asia in the world today*. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago, Pr., 1950. 253p. \$4.00.

A collection of lectures delivered at a forum held at the University of Chicago in the Spring, 1949.

YANAGA, CHITOSHI. *Japan since Perry*. N.Y., McGraw-Hill, 1949. 723p. \$6.00.

An intellectual, cultural, social, and economic account of the emergence of Japan as a modern power during the last 100 years.

*II. Institutions and Cultures—Europe.*

ALTAMIRA Y CREVEA, RAFAEL. *History of Spain from the beginnings to the present day*. Toronto, Van Nostrand, 1949. 748p. \$6.75.

ANDERSSON, INGVAR AND OTHERS. *Introduction to Sweden*. Stockholm, Forum, 1949. 311p. 21s.

Complete picture of modern Sweden; its industries, agriculture, government, culture, and social welfare programs.

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. *German peace settlement*. Wash.; Brookings Institution, 1949. 88p. 50 cents.

This pamphlet reprints and brings up to date the problem paper "A" in "Major Problems of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1947."

BEAMISH, TUFTON, V. H. *Must night fall?* Lond., Hollis & Carter, 1950. 292p. 12s. 6d.

Describes the tragic postwar events in Eastern Europe that have ended in the setting up dictatorships in the satellite countries.

BERG, L. S. *Natural regions of the U.S.S.R.* N.Y., Macmillan, 1950. 436p. \$10.00.

First edition in English of the economic and social geography of Russia.

BLACK, C. E. *Twentieth century Europe, a history.* N.Y., Knopf, 1950. 910p. \$7.50.

A study of each modern European nation and its place in this century.

CHURCHILL, WINSTON L. S. *Europe unite; speeches, 1947-1948.* Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1950. 506p. \$5.00.

52 of the principal speeches of Mr. Churchill on international affairs.

CLISSOLD, STEPHEN. *Whirlwind, an account of Marshal Tito's rise to power.* Lond., Cresset press, 1949. 245p. 15s.

COUNTS, G. S. *Country of the blind; the Soviet system of mind control.* Bost., Houghton-Mifflin, 1949. 378p. \$4.00.

How the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party controls cultural and intellectual life in Russia.

DEAN, VERA (MICHELES). *Europe and the United States.* N.Y., Knopf, 1950. 349p. \$3.50.

A survey, with some historical background, of the pattern of present day relations between US. and Europe.

ELLIS, H. S. *The economics of freedom.* N.Y., published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1950. 549p. \$5.00.

The progress and future of aid to Europe.

ESTORICK, ERIC. *Changing Empire, Churchill to Nehru.* N.Y., Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950. 342p. \$3.75.

Survey of what has happened to Britain and her empire.

FRIS, H. K. *Scandinavia, between East and West.* Ithaca, Cornell Univ. pr., 1950. 388p. \$4.50.

How the Scandinavian countries are solving their internal and external problems.

HARSCH, J. C. *Curtain isn't iron.* Garden City, Doubleday, 1950. 192p. \$2.00.

The author's observations on the state of affairs in Eastern Europe.

HERRMANN, LAZAR. *Nine lives of Europe.* N.Y., Funk & Wagnalls, 1950. 278p. \$3.50.

Report on the present economic and political conditions in Europe.

INKELES, ALEX. *Public opinion in Soviet Russia.* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. pr., 1950. 379p. \$5.00.

How the Soviet Union molds the minds of its people through the press, radio, and motion pictures.

KRAVCHENKO, V. A. *I chose justice.* N.Y., Scribner, 1950. 458p. \$3.75.

Revelations of what goes on behind the Iron Curtain.

LOVEDAY, A. F. *Spain, 1923-1948.* Ashcott, Somerset, Boswell pub. co., 1949. 286p. 12s. 6d.

Spanish civil war, its causes and its repercussions, and Spain's behavior during World War II.

MACLEAN, FITZROY. *Escape to adventure.* Bost., Little, Brown, 1950. 419p. \$4.00.

The author describes his adventures in Russia, Central Asia, China and Yugoslavia.

MAYER, J. P. *Political thought in France from the Revolution to the Fourth Republic.* Lond., Routledge, 1949. 142p. 12s. 6d.

MEINCKE, FRIEDRICH. *German catastrophe.* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Pr., 1950. 121p. \$3.00.

A German historian attempts to explain the reasons for Germany's present situation.

MOORE, BARRINGTON. *Soviet politics—the dilemma of power.* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. pr., 1950. 503p. \$6.00.

An analysis of Soviet politics and the change in the Russian attitude toward Marx and his ideas.

ROSSI, ANGELO. *Communist party in action.* New Haven, Yale Univ. pr., 1949. 289p. \$9.00.

Detailed and extensively documented account of the French Communist Party.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *Documents on European recovery and defense, March 1947-April 1949.* Lond., Royal Inst. of Int. Affairs, 1949. 150p. \$2.50.

Brings together in one volume the basic documents on European recovery and defense.

SCHUBART, WALTER. *Russia and western man.* N.Y., Ungar, 1950. 300p. \$3.75.

Presents the point of view of the Russian nationalists on the future of civilization.

SMITH, H. K. *State of Europe.* N.Y., Knopf, 1949. 408p. \$3.75.

Thorough analysis of political and economic conditions in every country in Europe.

STEVENS, EDMUND. *This is Russia uncensored.* N.Y., Didier, 1950. 200p. \$2.50.

The author, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter, tells about the daily life of the Russian people, and the inner workings of the Kremlin.

STEINBERG, JULIEN. Verdict of three decades; from the literature of individual revolt against Soviet communism: 1917-1950. N.Y., Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950. 634p. \$5.00.

Forty selections giving as a whole a complete picture of life under the Soviet regime.

### III. Institutions and Cultures—Middle East

DUNNER, JOSEPH. Republic of Israel, its history and its promise. N.Y., Whittlesey, 1950. 269p. \$4.75.

HITTI, P. K. The Arabs, a short history. Princeton, Princeton Univ. pr., 1949. 224p. \$3.50. An introduction to the Arab world.

KOESTLER, ARTHUR. Promise and fulfilment; Palestine, 1917-1949. N.Y., Macmillan, 1949. 335p. \$4.00.

A study of political and military events leading up to the establishment of the new state of Israel.

PEARLMAN, MOSHE. The army of Israel. N.Y., Philosophical Library, 1950. 256p. \$5.00.

The development of Haganah, the underground defense movement in Palestine.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Information Dept. The Middle East; a political and economic survey. Lond., Royal Inst. of Int. Affairs, 1950. 496p. \$6.50.

Provides a summary of information, political, social and economic, on the region as a whole.

SPEISER, E. A. The United States and the Near East. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. pr., 1950. 283p. \$3.75.

A political and cultural history of the Arab world.

### IV. Institutions and Cultures—Western Hemisphere

AZEVEDO, FERNANDO DE. Brazilian culture, an introduction to the study of culture in Brazil. N.Y., Macmillan, 1950. 562p. \$12.50.

BROWN, G. W. Canada. Berkeley, Univ. of California press, 1950. 621p. \$6.50.

Twenty-four essays covering the field of Canadian history, politics, and social organization.

DAVILA, CARLOS. We of the Americas. Chicago, Ziff-Davis, 1949. 264p. \$3.50.

A one-time Chilean ambassador to the U.S. analyzes the economic interdependence of this country and Latin America.

HUNNICUTT, B. H. Brazil, world frontier. N.Y., Van Nostrand, 1949. 387p. \$6.00.

A political, social and economic survey of the present and future potential of Brazil.

TANNENBAUM, FRANK. Mexico, the struggle for peace and bread. N.Y., Knopf, 1950. 293p. \$3.50.

A brief survey of significant events precedes the analysis of the foreign and domestic policies of present-day Mexico.

TAYLOR, T. G. Canada; a study of cool continental environments and their effect on British and French settlement. Lond., Methuen & Co., 1950. 526p. \$6.25.

### V. Military and Naval Operations, World War II—Land

ANDERS, WLADYSLAW. Army in Exile. N.Y., Macmillan 1949. 319p. \$5.00.

These are the memoirs of the general commanding the Second Polish Corps from 1939 to its dissolution.

CHAPMAN, FREDERICK S. The Jungle is Neutral. N.Y., Norton 1949. 384p. \$3.75.

The story of an irregular British fighter behind the Japanese lines in Malaya.

CLARK, MARK W. Calculated risk. N.Y., Harper, 1950. 500p. \$5.00.

General Clark's account of various aspects of the African and Italian campaigns.

HANKEY, M. P. A. Politics, trials and errors. Chicago, Regnery, 1950. 150p. \$2.50

Critical review of the World War II, policy and unconditional surrender in the light of European history since World War I.

KIPPENBERGER, SIR HOWARD K. Infantry Brigadier. N.Y., Oxford, 1950. 384p. \$4.25.

This is the story of the New Zealand troops of the Eighth British Army as seen by this N.Z. general.

MORGAN, SIR F. E. Overture to Overlord. N.Y., Doubleday, 1950. 302p. \$3.50.

Story of the planning for "Operation Overlord," the invasion of Europe.

SCHULTZ, PAUL L. The 85th Infantry Division in World War II. Washington, Infantry Journal pr., 1949. 240p. \$5.00.

STARR, CHESTER G. From Salerno to the Alps; a History of the Fifth Army 1943-1945. Washington, Infantry Journal. 1949. 529p. \$6.00.

The usual competent World War II history published by the Journal.

### VI. Military and Naval Operations, World War II—Naval

CRESSWELL, JOHN. Sea Warfare, 1939-1945. Lond., Longmans, 1950. 344p. 25s.

An interesting general account of the war at sea.

HINSLEY, F. H. *Command of the sea*. Lond., Christophers 1950. 104p. 7s. 6d.

A brief naval history of Great Britain from 1918 to 1945.

KARIG, WALTER. *Battle report: victory in the Pacific*. N.Y., Rinehart, 1949. 548p. \$5.00.

The U.S. Navy in World War II from Leyte to Tokyo.

McMILLAN, GEORGE. *The old breed; a history of the First Marine Division in World War II*. Washington, Infantry Journal pr., 1949. 483p. \$5.00.

Unit history of the first Marine Division to leave for foreign service in World War II, with an account of its action in the South Pacific.

MORISON, S. E. *History of United States naval operations in World War II: Vol. 4. Coral Sea, Midway and submarine actions, May-Aug. 1942*. Bost., Little, Brown, 1949. 307p. \$6.00.

MORISON, S. E. *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5. Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943*. Boston, Little. 389p. \$6.00.

SATSAMO, KAZUO. *I Attacked Pearl Harbor*. N. Y. Assn. Press. 133p. \$2.00.

The first Japanese war prisoner taken by the U. S., presenting his perspective as a submarine commander who later returned to Japan.

#### *VII—Military and Naval Operations, World War II—Air*

ARNOLD, H. H. *Global Mission*. N. Y., Harper, 1949. 626p. \$5.00.

History of military aviation, and an impressive account of Arnold's effective organization.

HURREN, B. J. *Perchance*. Lond., Nicholson & Watson, 1949. 197p. 10s. 6d.

Short history of British naval aviation.

KENNEY, G. C. *General Kenney reports; a personal history of the Pacific War*. N. Y., Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949. 594p. \$4.50.

His official record based upon a wartime diary.

TURNBULL, A. D. *History of United States naval aviation*. New Haven, Yale Univ. pr., 1949. 345p. \$5.00.

Story of the airplane and the Navy based on official sources.

U. S. OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY. *Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 4. The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944*. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago pr., 1950. 824 p. \$6.00.

#### *VIII—Military and Naval Topics—Since 1945*

ANDREWS, MARSHALL. *Disaster through air power*. N. Y., Rineshart, 1950. 143p. \$2.00.

A denunciation of the Air Force's emphasis on strategic bombing and the B-36 bomber.

BUSH, VANNEVAR. *Modern arms and free men*. N. Y., Simon and Schuster, 1949. 273p. \$3.50.

The author's faith in a free society is kept, in the course of this examination into the technological revolution of warfare.

CLARK, DELBERT. *Again the goose step, the lost fruits of victory*. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1949. 297p. \$3.00.

A critical appraisal of American occupation policies within Germany.

CLAY, LUCIUS D. *Decision in Germany*. N. Y., Doubleday, 1950. 522p. \$5.00.

First hand account of the U. S. administration of postwar Germany.

COLE, D. H. *Imperial military geography*. Lond., Sifton Praed, 1950. 318p. 21s.

10th revised edition of a familiar geography, containing a great deal of up-to-date information.

DE SEVERSKY, ALEXANDER. *Air power: key to survival*. N. Y., Simon & Schuster, 1950. 376p. \$3.50.

The author presents a forceful argument for peace through a powerful long-range American air force.

H bomb. N. Y., Didier, 1950. 175p. \$2.50.

Scientists, politicians, journalists and others answer questions concerning the H-bomb.

HESSLER, W. H. *Operation survival; America's new role in world affairs*. N. Y., Prentice-Hall, 1949. 282p. \$3.00.

Presents an argument for a realistic foreign and military policy based upon the geographic and economic position of the U. S. and its allies.

HOWLEY, FRANK. *Berlin command*. N. Y., Putnam, 1950. 276p. \$3.50.

Former U. S. Commandant in Berlin tells of his four-year struggle with the Russians.

MIDDLETON, DREW. *Struggle for Germany*. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1949. 304p. \$3.00.

Report on the most complex and dangerous problem in U. S. foreign relations.

SIGAUD, L. A. *Air power and unification*. Harrisburg, Military service pub., 1949. 119p. \$2.50.

Discusses Douhet's principles of warfare and their application to the U. S.

SMITH, W. BEDELL. *My three years in Moscow*. Phila., Lippincott, 1950. 346p. \$3.75.

Personal report on what goes on in Russia by a former U. S. Ambassador to Russia.



## IX—National Warfare, U. S.

BROGAN, D. W. Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt; a chronicle of the New Deal and global war. New Haven, Yale Univ. pr., 1950. 382p. \$6.00.

CHESNUT, MRS. MARY B. Diary from Dixie. Boston, Houghton, 1949. 572p. \$5.00.

This new and more complex edition, edited by Ben Ames Williams, presents the Civil War as seen by the diary of the South Carolina wife of a Confederate brigadier general.

COMMAGER, H. S. American mind, an interpretation of American thought and character since the 1880's. New Haven, Yale Univ. pr., 1950. 476p. \$5.00.

DE TOLEDANO, RALPH. Seeds of treason; the true story of the Hiss-Chambers tragedy. N. Y., Pub. for Newsweek by Funk & Wagnalls, 1950. 270p. \$3.50.

EVANS, S. H. United States Coast Guard, 1790-1915. Annapolis, U. S. Naval Inst., 1949. 228p. \$5.00.

History of the Coast Guard's development as a federal agency.

FAULKNER, H. U. From Versailles to the New Deal; a chronicle of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era. New Haven, Yale Univ. pr., 1950. 388p. \$6.00.

FORMAN, SIDNEY. West Point; a history of the United States Military Academy. N. Y., Columbia Univ. pr., 1950. 255p. \$3.75.

An account of the growth of the U. S. Military Academy from its earliest days to the present.

GUNTHER, JOHN. Roosevelt in retrospect. N. Y., Harper, 1950. 410p. \$3.75.

Study of Franklin D. Roosevelt in war and in peace.

NEVINS, ALLAN. The United States in a chaotic world; a chronicle of international affairs, 1918-1933. New Haven, Yale Univ. pr., 1950. 252p. \$6.00.

O'CONNOR, RICHARD. Hood: Cavalier General. N. Y., Prentice-Hall, 1949. 316p. \$4.00.

An excellent biography of the Confederate general.

RAUCH, BASIL. Roosevelt: from Munich to Pearl Harbor. N. Y., Creative Age pr., 1950. 527p. \$4.50.

An examination of the development of the Roosevelt foreign policy in the years between Munich and Pearl Harbor.

ROOSEVELT, ELEANOR. This I remember. N. Y., Harper, 1949. 387p. \$4.50.

An account of Franklin D. Roosevelt's career as

governor of New York and President of the U. S., as his wife saw it.

STETTINIUS, E. R. Roosevelt and the Russians; the Yalta Conference. N. Y., Doubleday, 1949. 367p. \$4.00.

The author makes a good case for the theory that Yalta represented an attempt by the U. S. and England to determine whether long range co-operation with the Soviet Union was possible.

WEYL, NATHANIEL. Treason; the story of disloyalty and betrayal in American history. Washington, Public affairs pr., 1950. 491p. \$4.50.

WILLIAMS, K. P. Lincoln finds a general. N. Y., Macmillan, 1949. 2 v. \$12.50.

Military study of the Civil War.

## X—U. S. Foreign Relations

ABEND, H. E. Half slave, half free. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1950. 304p. \$3.00.

Reviews political conditions in Europe, Asia, and South America.

BROWN, W. A. United States and the restoration of world trade; an analysis and appraisal of the ITO charter and the general agreement on tariffs and trade. Washington, Brookings Inst., 1950. 572p. \$5.00.

BURNHAM, JAMES. Coming defeat of communism. N. Y., Day, 1950. 278p. \$3.50.

The author believes that communism can be defeated without a large-scale war, if the western nations follow some such plan as he presents.

DAHL, R. A. Congress and foreign policy. N. Y., Harcourt, Brace, 1950. 305p. \$4.00.

An analysis of the difficulties in formulating and carrying out a foreign policy in a democracy as opposed to action possible in a dictatorship.

DUGGAN, LAURENCE. The Americas; a search for hemisphere security. N. Y., Holt, 1949. 242p. \$3.00.

An active participant describes the making of U. S. foreign policies in Inter-American relations.

GELBER, L. M. Reprieve from war. N. Y., Macmillan, 1950. 196p. \$3.00.

Sums up the relations between East and West, and the present conditions in the Western bloc.

GROB, FRITZ. Relativity of war and peace. New Haven, Yale Univ. pr., 1949. 402p. \$5.00.

Comprehensive story of the states of war and peace and of the way in which they should be defined from a legal viewpoint.

GUERRANT, E. O. Roosevelt's good neighbor policy. Albuquerque, Univ. of New Mexico pr., 1950. 235p. \$3.50.

A study of U. S.-Latin American relations during the Roosevelt administration.

IRION, F. C. Public opinion and propaganda. N. Y., Crowell, 1950. 782p. \$5.00.

Description and analysis of the forces which help to formulate public opinion.

JAVITS, B. A. Peace by investment. N. Y., Funk & Wagnalls, 1950. 242p. \$3.50.

The author's plan for world peace is based on an investment program of wide scope and perspective.

MONRONEY, A. S. (MIKE), and others. Strengthening of American political institutions. Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press, 1949. 134p. \$2.00.

Five lectures covering programs and projects of federal governmental administrative reforms.

NEVINS, ALLAN. The New Deal and world affairs; a chronicle of international affairs, 1933-1945. New Haven, Yale Univ. pr., 1950. 332p. \$6.00.

PLISCHKE, ELMER. Conduct of American diplomacy. N. Y., Van Nostrand, 1950. 542p. \$4.85.

The author discusses the principles, procedures, and governmental machinery involved in the conduct of our foreign relations.

STRAUSZ-HUPE, ROBERT. International relations. N. Y., McGraw-Hill, 1950. 947p. \$6.00.

Analysis of present-day international relations, focusing on the conflict between democratic and totalitarian worlds.

STUART, G. H. The Department of State; a history of its organization, procedure, and personnel. N. Y., Macmillan, 1949. 517p. \$7.50.

Role played by the State Dept. from its beginning in the 18th century to 1948.

TOMPKINS, PAULINE. American-Russian relations in the Far East. N. Y., Macmillan, 1949. 426p. \$5.00.

A critical evaluation of the "balance of power" system.

### Periodicals

The following items have been particularly noted in periodicals received by the Institute:

*U. S. Military Policy, 1950*, by General Omar N. Bradley, USA, in *U. S. Army Combat Forces Journal*, Washington, D. C., October, 1950.

*British Commonwealth in the Asian Crisis*, by Gwendolyn M. Carter, in *Foreign Policy Reports*, (Foreign Policy Assn.) New York, N. Y., 1 Oct. 50.

*The Lessons of Korea*, by Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, USA (Ret), in *The Freeman*, New York, N. Y., 2 Oct 50.

*Guerrilla*, by Colonel Samuel B. Griffith II, USMC, originally in *Marine Corps Gazette*, reprinted in *Antiaircraft Journal* (U. S. Coast Artillery Assn.) starting in issue for Sept-Oct 50.

*Why World Wars?* by Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller (British) in *Ordinance*, (American Ordinance Assn.) Washington, D. C., Sept-Oct 50.

*Modern Mobile Warfare*, by Lt. Gen. Sir Giffard Martel, in *Armor*, Washington, D. C., Sept-Oct 50.

Book review,—*Rommel by Desmond Young*—by Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, in *Armor*, Washington, D. C., Sept-Oct 50.

*The Defence of Western Europe*, by Major M. D. Malgonkar in *Military Digest*, New Delhi, India, July 50.

*Geopolitical Aspects of the Mediterranean* by Joseph S. Rousek, in *World Affairs Interpreter* (University of Southern California), Los Angeles, California, Autumn 1950.

*Canada and the South African War*, by Colonel C. P. Stacey in *Canadian Army Journal*, issues for Summer 1950 and for Sept 1950.

*The Role of Policy in the Fall of the Roman Empire*, by Arthur E. R. Boak, in *Michigan Alumnus Quarterly* (Alumni Assn., Univ. Michigan), Ann Arbor, Michigan, Summer 1950.

*War Diaries*, Good, Bad and Indifferent, by C. P. Stacey, in *Canadian Army Journal* issue for Summer 1950.

*Economic Warfare*, by Dr. Benjamin H. Williams, in *Military Review* (Command and General Staff College, USA), Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, issue for Oct 50.

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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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### AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION MEETING,

CHICAGO, 28-30 DEC 50

Under its long-standing affiliation with American Historical Association (AHA), the American Military Institute (AMI) joins in the sixty-fifth annual meeting of the Association, at Chicago, Illinois, at Hotel Stevens, extending over the three-day period 28-30 December, 1950.

Foremost among Institute activities at Chicago are:

*Joint Session AHA/AMI*

"North Assembly" Hotel Stevens

*Friday 29 December*

*10:00 AM*

*Topic: Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II*

*Chairman—James Phinney Baxter III, Williams College*

*The Navy Experience—Henry M. Darter, Department of the Navy*

*The Army Experience—James A. Huston, Purdue University*

*The Air Force Experience—Thomas J. Mayock, Department of the Air Force*

*Open Luncheon Date (AHA with affiliated organizations and guests)*

*Friday 29 December*

*1:00 PM*

*Speaker: Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations*

Other events of interest to AMI members are included in the three-day program of

AHA at Chicago. Subordinate to primary consideration of Association members' rights and privileges, the Association permits attendance by Institute members at other events. Attention of AMI members is invited to the following scheduled sessions:

*Thursday 28 Dec 50*

*10:00 AM*

*Public Dining Room No. 2*

*Topic—The Historian and the Federal Government—Research and Publication Opportunities*

*Chairman, Harvey A. De Weerd*

*Presentations by G. Bernard Noble,*

*Kent Roberts Greenfield, Wayne*

*C. Grover, Philip M. Hamer*

*North Assembly*

*Topic—Recent Developments in China Room 12*

*Topic—Business History*

*Presentations include The Winchester Repeating Arms Co.—a case study*

*2:30 PM*

*West Ballroom*

*Topic: World War II Documents*

*Chairman—Harold C. Deutsch*

*Presentations by John Huizenga,*

*Howard M. Smyth, Thomas C.*

*Smith; discussion led by E. Malcolm Carroll*

*Friday 29 Dec 50*

*10:00 AM*

*Room 19*

Topic—The History of Technology

*Upper Tower*

Topic—American Entry into World War II

Chairman, Samuel F. Bemis; presentations by Charles C. Tansill and Dexter Perkins; discussion led by Harry Elmer Barnes and Ruth J. Bartlett

*2:30 PM*

*South Ballroom*

Topic—American Foreign Policy in the XX Century

*West Ballroom*

Topic—The Fate of Historiography at Russian Hands

*Saturday 30 Dec 50, all at 10:00 AM*

*West Ballroom*

Topic—Command Decisions in World War II

Chairman—Bell I. Wiley; presentations by Louis Morton, George E. Howe, Roland G. Ruppenthal; discussion led by James L. Cate and Richard W. Leopold

*Lower Tower*

Topic—Russian-American Relations

*Room 13*

Topic—Indonesia

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#### REPORT OF MONCADO FUND COMMITTEE

A little more than a year ago, the American Military Institute announced the establishment of the *Moncado Revolving Book Fund*, and the opening of a competition for the *Moncado Military History Award* of five hundred dollars designed to stimulate the writing of scholarly works on military sub-

jects. Historians throughout the nation were invited to submit manuscripts dealing with any phase of American military history. The criteria set up for the selection of a winning manuscript included subject matter, organization, treatment, quality of research, and literary excellence, and finally, because the terms of the gift required the fund to be self-sustaining, a potential sales appeal sufficient to insure repayment to the fund of the amount of the award and any other advances made against the principal of the fund.

More than a score of manuscripts were submitted in the competition ending 30 June 1950. Most of them were fine professional contributions to the field of military history. Perhaps it was inherent in the nature of the contest that they were all very highly specialized treatments of subjects with a narrow field of interest. It was with regret that the committee of judges concluded that none of the manuscripts submitted possessed sufficient sales possibilities to permit the Fund to recoup the costs of publication, and the amount of the award as well. In the light of this circumstance, therefore, the committee decided to make no award for this year.

The American Military Institute, at its meeting on 3 November 1950, decided to continue the competition. Entries received on or before 30 June 1951, therefore, will be considered for the award.

The American Military Institute, and the *Committee*, extend their sincere thanks to those who submitted manuscripts for consideration. The interest shown by military historians throughout the nation is deeply appreciated.

ARTHUR J. LARSEN  
Lieutenant Colonel USAF  
Chairman

Washington, D. C.  
20 December 1950



## SECRETARIAL/EDITORIAL NOTE

See Index to Volume XIV (distributed later than the several issues hereof) for biographical information on contributors to this issue.

The Editorial Board of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* meets on the first Friday of each month at 9:00 P.M. in Room 404, George Washington University Library, 2023 G Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. Members who are willing to make a contribution of their time to the publication of the Journal are invited to attend.

## PERSONALS

**LISHCHINER.** In September 1950, a devoted officer of the Institute, Mr. Jacob B. Lishchiner, assumed duties as Historian of Headquarters Command U. S. Air Force. Also, in November, Mr. Lishchiner subscribed himself and was enrolled as a Life Member of the Institute.

**WEST.** Captain Charles J. West, Jr., a member, is desirous of completing his set of a collection of prints of drawings of American Army uniforms,—by H. A. Ogden, copyrighted by Brigadier General S. B. Holabird, Quartermaster General U. S. A., 1885. Captain West requests that anyone willing to sell individual plates, or the complete set, communicate with him:

Captain Charles J. West, Jr.  
Time, Inc.  
9 Rockefeller Plaza  
New York 20, N. Y.

## MARINE CORPS HISTORY

Two official monographs prepared by the Historical Section, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, are now in the final stages of printing—

*Saipan: The Beginning of the End*  
*The Assault on Peleliu*

They will be published in the near future, and will be reviewed in subsequent issues of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

## CANADIAN ARMY HISTORICAL PROGRAMME

The writing of Volumes I and II of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War is proceeding steadily. Sections relating to activities within Canada, and to the campaign in Sicily and the first stage of operations on the Italian mainland, are complete in draft. Preliminary narratives to serve as a basis for the Italian volume have been completed. A similar series for the North-West Europe theatre is complete except for the final stage. Investigation of German documents continues; examination of such material relating to operations in Italy has been finished, and research is now proceeding on the enemy aspects of the campaign in North-West Europe.

The Section provided an officer, Major D. H. Cunningham, to participate in Exercise "SWEETBRIAR," the joint Canadian-American cold-weather manoeuvres held in the Yukon and Alaska in February 1950. He served as Historical Officer, attached to the staff of the Deputy Manoeuvre Commander, and is compiling a record of the operations of the Canadian units in the exercise.

One volume of the inter-service Medical History, dealing with clinical matters, has been circulated in draft to professional readers and is now under revision. No publication date has yet been fixed.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF INDIAN TROOPS IN  
WORLD WAR II

The official story of the part played by the Indian Army in the late War, is being written by the Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan), under the direction of a civilian historian, Dr. Bisheshwar Prasad, M. A., D. Litt. from the University of Allahabad. The Section originally came into existence in the early part

of 1945, but it was not till March 1946 that a full staff and establishment were made available for it to function properly.

Originally, it was a purely Army organisation, but with effect from 1st October 1948, the Section has been re-organized, and placed on a civilian basis. The head of this organization is a civilian Director, who, in administrative matters is assisted by a Secretary. Of the Officer Staff, five are attached from the Armed Forces and the rest are civilians; the latter are mostly experienced historians who are of great help in writing the narratives of the various campaigns in which the forces of un-divided India took part. The staff provided for in this Section includes two editors and eight narrators for writing general history, and one editor with three narrators for treating medical history; also included are a film technician and a cartographer.

In addition, there is of course a well stocked Library and a Record Section. The latter contains the files and other documents pertaining to the activities of the Indian Army units.

A very thorough and detailed study of the numerous documents, files and war diaries in the Record Section has to be gone into before a true and authentic picture of any of the campaigns can be put down on paper. Quite often, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a particular fact, it takes weeks and even months to ascertain the correct state of affairs, before it can be given out as an authentic statement. Occasionally, use is made of the records available with the various Defence Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence. But unfortunately, owing to the political changes in 1947, a very large collection of valuable basic material had been destroyed and is lost for historical purposes. This necessitates occasional reference to the War Office and the Cabinet Historical Section, London, for

data on the operational details or policy matters. This is done through the medium of a Liaison Officer at the Commonwealth Relations Office who works under the control of the High Commissioner for India in England. For material available with the Commonwealth countries and the U. S. A., close contact is maintained with the Historical Sections there and records or narratives are exchanged on a reciprocal basis. Narratives of campaigns in which the forces of more than one country participated in mutual co-operation are sent to the Historical Sections of the States concerned or to their high military officers for purposes of comment.

The function of this Section is not to write the individual history of particular units but to write the official version of specific campaigns and operations in which a fair proportion of Indian troops had played an active role, in order to project the achievements of the Indian formations in the background of the general war effort of the Allies. The story which is being thus worked out in the Historical Section is to be an objective account of the part of India in World War II. A historian's viewpoint is scientific objectivity, and that is the aim of the Section.

The Section has been planned to produce:

- (a) A popular history written by Mr. Comp-ton Mackenzie.
- (b) A comprehensive and detailed documentary history of all operations in which Indian Troops took part.
- (c) Strategic and tactical studies of selected battles in which Indian troops participated.
- (d) A number of monographs on aspects of Organization, installations, expansion of the Services, and allied defense subjects.

Considerable progress has been made under all these categories. The first volume of the Popular History has been completed and will soon be sent to the press. It is expected that the second volume which will conclude the

story will be ready within a year. This work is being done by Mr. Compton Mackenzie, a writer of note in England.

The Historical Section is mainly concerned with work in the other three categories. The plan of work contains narratives of campaigns in Italy, Africa, the Middle East, Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, besides volumes on the defense of India, expansion and organization of the armed forces, technical services, war supply and industries, transport, communication, engineering activities, internal economy and the political movement as affected by the war. The story of the campaigns in Africa and the Middle East has been written, that of Italy is in progress, while the campaigns in Hong Kong, Borneo, Malaya, Burma (retreat) have been completed or are nearing completion. Work is also continuing on the reconquest of Burma and Southeast Asia. Besides, a volume has been written on the Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan. Also volumes on defense of India, expansion of Armed Forces, organization of the Defense Headquarters, supply and industries have been completed. Efforts are also being made to print volumes as they are ready.

It is estimated that the finished work will comprise about 35 Volumes, of which approximately 23 will cover General History while the remainder will deal with the medical aspects of the War.

The Medical History will be a record of progress in medical science during World War II. It will not only be a factual account for medical historians but will also be of instructional value for training the

future medical officers and at the same time will serve as a guide for administrative and specialist officers, both in the Armed Forces as well as in civil practice. One volume will be devoted to auxiliary services like the International Red Cross, Indian Red Cross and Care of the War-blinded Soldiers, etc., along with a pictorial brochure. Highest priority is being given by the Section to the volumes on medicine, surgery, pathology and research so that the knowledge that the late War has produced, in administration and technique, may be made available to the medical profession as soon as possible.

For the guidance of various authors that are engaged in writing the medical aspects of the campaigns, the clinical volumes and the Organization of the Medical Services, a Medical Advisory Sub-Committee was formed in September 1948. All monographs and narratives that are prepared by the Medical Sub-Section are scrutinized and approved by this Committee before the material is finally sent to the press. Similarly, a committee consisting of Joint Secretary (C), Joint Secretary (P), and Deputy Secretary (P) of the Ministry of Defense, India, the Director of Military Intelligence (D.M.I.), a representative of the Pakistan Government and the Director of the Historical Section was formed with effect from 28 February 1949. Its function is to scrutinize all narratives and monographs prepared by the Historical Section and to give final orders for printing the same.

In spite of various difficulties that a work of this nature entails, it is estimated that the Section will have completed its task by the end of 1951.

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# Headquarters Gazette

(continued)

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## MEETING OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP, AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE, AT THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D. C., 3 NOVEMBER 1950

*Meeting convened at 8:45 PM, pursuant to Notice and other documents appended hereto (Annex 1), Colonel Joseph J. Greene USA-Ret, President, in the Chair.*

PRESIDENT: The meeting will please come to order.

I would like to call your attention to the first special rule of order to be applied tonight, and in fact, to all of these. If there is any objection to any of the special rules, I hope that you will speak up.

To participate in the business of the meeting, a member will rise, address the chair and identify himself by name so that the Recorder can get it.

I would like to ask the Retiring Secretary if there is any old business on record that appears appropriate to be reported here.

MR. LISHCHINER: There is none.

PRESIDENT: We will now turn to the reports of the officers of the Institute. The first report will be that of Mr. Lishchiner.

MR. LISHCHINER: Mr. President, Secretary and members, in general I would like to review the events during the time that I held office as Secretary of the Institute.

Along about Spring of '48 I took over from the Acting Secretary Major Lawrence who was also the Editor, and if I may characterize the present situation, it resembles fairly well the unstable state of affairs that existed at the time that I came into office, completing the cycle as it were. The society

was next thing to defunct when I came into office. The magazine had not been published for a while and the membership had been dropping off; the correspondence had been stalemated and people had begun to send in inquiries as to what had been going on and what the plans were, if any, for the future. The status of the Institute was generally flat. We started the ball rolling by getting the magazine back into circulation and got out a few issues in very short order. Much the same thing is being done today.

At that time, General Maloney was Chief of the Army Historical Division. We enlisted his support much more markedly than had been the case previously by any official person in the Defense agencies, or out for that matter. With such backing, we made considerable progress. For example, for the first time in the history of the Institute, we had one full-time officer, namely, Major Lawrence, assigned full time as editor. In addition to that we had access to clerical help in the Army Historical Division itself. As Secretary, I was permitted to use part of my official time for duties as such. Of course, we had access to office supplies and to duplicating equipment. As I said, we began to make considerable progress over and above



what the status was previous to my taking office.

Another of the things that we did was the dropping of a lot of dead wood. As members, they had been carried on the rolls as many as two and three years. Magazines had been going out to them unchecked, and each one represented a drain on our limited budget. At the same time it gave a false appearance of strength to our organization. In addition to that, on the positive side, of course, we launched a membership drive; between the two we eliminated a lot of unnecessary expenses in the form of sending magazines to members that were not paying their dues, and we attracted new members. We began to show a credit in membership, and an increase in revenues at the same time.

Well, that went along pretty well for a time until General Maloney indicated his intention to retire. That posed a problem for us again; at least, it posed a problem for me personally. I went to him with it at the time and questioned him as to what kind of support we might expect. Not knowing definitely just who was coming in to succeed him, he was not then in a position to inform me. Later on, when he became fairly certain that General Ward was to succeed him as Chief of the Historical Division, he indicated to me that we would be getting the same kind of support that he had been giving us. Well, he was the incumbent and his words were encouraging but we still had problems, basic ones, of course—discharging the functions and the duties that had to be covered in connection with getting out the magazine, striving for a greater membership, and related activities.

At that time, we lacked a complete panel of officers. The post of President had been vacant for a long time and I approached General Maloney on that score as well, offering him the Presidency for one. Knowing his own intentions, however, General Maloney

didn't feel that it was opportune that he become President of the Institute. He wasn't certain, for one thing, that he was going to retire; he was also toying with the idea of going overseas on some mission.

Well, as I say—torn between the two—he was not in either case able to consider presidency of the Institute. In turn, I asked him if he had any suggestions for the post and he offered the names of several gentlemen: if I remember correctly, one of them was General Hasbrouk, another was General Baehr; also there were one or two others whose names at the moment I cannot recall. I approached General Hasbrouk for one; negotiated with him for a while and it looked for a while like we were going to enlist him for the post but then, because of some other busy consideration apparently more important to him, he finally decided that he could not consider it. In turn, I eliminated two others. Finally it was left to General Baehr as to whether he would accept. As some of you present at least know, General Baehr did accept and, at the meeting of Trustees held subsequently, he was appointed to the post. Later on, of course, General Ward came into the picture. As I saw things developing—and there is also more in addition to that—it was my conviction from the start anyway . . . that it didn't seem to me that I would be loyal to the Institute. . . .

It then seemed to me that the more honest and also the more loyal thing to the Institute was to bring matters to a head, even if it meant gambling possibly with the existence of the society itself. In consequence I went to the new Chief of the Historical Division—General Ward—and asked forthright if we might not become, legally so to speak, recognized by the Defense agency. Mr. Bonis, who was with me, presented a letter which proposed the issue squarely. General Robinett, Chief of the Special Studies section of the Historical Division, was asked to do a staff

study as a result of the letter which we initiated. I was asked to do a survey of the history of the Institute with what other findings I could make with respect to recommendations. In due course and regular order all of that was accomplished and handed over to General Robinett who (together with Mr. Thomas as an assistant) reviewed the findings that I had submitted along with supplementary material—Treasurer's Report, Editor's Report, Librarian's Report. General Robinett came up with findings that the Society was a worthy institution and worthy of support with certain modifications in its structure, and that the Institute be renamed; but no tangible offer of assistance was made beyond these blanket recommendations. So *that*, essentially, is the outcome: that was not further along the road than where we had been before the staff study had been made. Editorially, in a sense, I might imply here that this had been what the Institute had been suffering from right along. We had again and again offers of recommendations and criticism from the sidelines but not any real assistance was to come from that quarter. It might also be indicated at this point that many, if not all of the criticisms that were offered by one or another of the members or officers or sympathizers were of things that the officers working in the Institute were well aware of but that nothing could be done about—in view of the shortage of personnel, the limited budget, and the restricted resources of the Institute.

Well, the thing came to a head with General Ward's decision to withdraw support of the Army Historical Division from the Institute, and giving us a deadline as of October—I think it was originally—of 1948.

MR. TODD: Was that in the middle of the year when the decision was handed down?

MR. LISHCHINER: To become effective 1 October 1949. However, just as I have indicated informally, we were permitted to com-

plete the volume of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*—with the Winter issue. At first, we were not to have the Editor nor the Secretary use any official time for discharge of their duties—that is, the Secretary. Ultimately, as of the end of the year, the Secretarial help, that is, the clerical help formerly afforded by the Historical Division was also to be withdrawn. Well, we were really at grips with the problem to be solved and it was the feeling of some of our number that we ought to make a clean break at this point, that is to say, wind up the affairs of the Institute, since on the basis of experience and also in the absence of any constructive offer of help for the future, it was held that the most decent thing would be to wind up the affairs of the Institute.

On the other hand, there were those among our number who were more optimistic and felt that we could always do the worst thing if pressed to the wall: as a last resort, we could always wind up affairs with the Institute. It was still felt by some of our number that the Institute could be salvaged and put back on its feet. The champion of that cause is undoubtedly known to some if not all of you. I don't know how desirable it is to enter into personalities. I am leaving it as indefinite in that there is a protagonist in each case. At any rate, there were and are champions in the attempt to salvage the Institute, to rescue it from an untimely death after some thirteen years of existence—with all the good will established and the accomplishments it had to show for its thirteen years. An emergency committee was created for this purpose.

That emergency committee got under way about December 1948. Among other actions, a questionnaire was circulated in June 1949. The questionnaire was circulated to determine what amount of interest and aid could be mustered toward the purpose of perpetuating the society. Again we found, along

with a lot of other general experiences, the fact that everyone was for the continuation of the society but no real constructive offers were made to meet or make possible such a program.

One of the more specific thoughts was the attempt to get sponsorship of the Institute by an institution of higher learning. Among others, Harvard was considered. Princeton was another. Neither Harvard nor Princeton showed too much interest. Columbia, on the other hand, seemed and perhaps is genuinely interested in taking over the affairs of the Society—at least to publish *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, if not wholly interested in taking over the Military Institute. Negotiations have been in progress ever since with Columbia University but, insofar as I know and as of this evening, no ultimate decision has been made. Now, from the protractedness of the negotiations, one can assume, if they had real intent to take over, they would have shown their hand by this time. Of course, on the other side of the picture is the alleged reason that Columbia keeps offering as an excuse for not taking over. That is the monetary consideration: they have contemplated quite an ambitious program in which they are attempting to establish a sizeable budget established for the running of an Institute and publishing *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. Also, one of the related conditions and considerations in connection with the program is the setting up of a chair at Columbia University for the teaching of Military History. At any rate we are left essentially where we have been right along with no evidence of the ultimate taking over of the society and of the journal—and with the further complications of not having any publication for a year, or rather this year at all. Also the hands of the Secretary have been tied, together with those of the other officers for that matter, during the negotiations with Columbia, and, as I

say, with no tangible evidence of Columbia ultimately taking over.

This state of affairs has continued for as long as it has, and has not offered any positive hope of being resolved at least in the near future (whether ultimately or not) and has tried the patience of several of our number. With offers such as they were in view of the ideal solution of Columbia's taking over, there was also perhaps the most extreme of the possibilities, the dissolution of the Society. Another solution was, of course, that of taking up where we had left off before and trying to continue to conduct the affairs of the society on the same voluntary basis as heretofore had existed: with such members as were sufficiently devoted to it and had a measure of time to devote to it and its affairs to carry on as in the past. With that in mind, a meeting of members was petitioned for one thing. Then, as it also happened, Colonel Skelly came along offering to take over the Secretaryship and proposing to give to the affairs of the Society some part of his time, absorbing such duties as were formerly carried on in the Historical Division and with the substantial hope that he would be able to carry on the post of Secretary for at least a period of a year.

For the desperateness of the situation for one thing, and the fortunate coincidence of Colonel Skelly's offer coming at that time, together with thought of Columbia's offer, a meeting of Trustees was called to take action, and was held. At that meeting, among other things, Colonel Skelly was appointed. At least, I don't know how to characterize it in view of not having had a quorum of Trustees to vote on the measure. Shall I say then, informally he was appointed as the Acting Secretary and Editor to take over, as I say, from where we left off; with the specific program to get out four issues of the magazine for 1950, to begin correspondence with members again, and to delve into and

try to build the Society from the point at which we had left it; to enlist Captain Ross' efforts on a voluntary basis again since that had been worked on by the Historical Division and had not been permitted to continue officially any longer; that a general membership meeting be called at which these recommendations and provisions be legally enacted and there, of course, is the reason for being here tonight.

Again, we are facing the same problem, as I say, in the same general situation that has been with the Institute heretofore, namely, trying to operate the society and Institute on a basis of voluntary contributions in the form of time and energy on the part of one or another member of the society.

It is at this point that Colonel Skelly is to take over. I understand that some progress has already been made towards getting out the first issue for distribution and the second issue is at least being worked on and there is a prospect that the other two issues for 1950 will be complete in the near future.

I think that just about brings us up to date and perhaps the situation as it now stands.

PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Lishchiner. I think that was an excellent resume and report of the retiring Secretary. It was a resume of a long and difficult period that our institution has been through.

A motion is in order to accept the report.

MR. GONDOS: I move the report be accepted.

MR. TODD: I would like to ask one question. I'm just not sure when you did take over the office.

MR. LISHCHINER: The old record, as I recall, was that I took over office in early 1948. For the first time I was listed in the magazine as General Secretary in the Summer issue of that year.

MR. TODD: I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: Any discussion?

(No response.)

PRESIDENT: All in favor say "aye."

(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")

PRESIDENT: All opposed?

PRESIDENT: Motion carried. I, myself, am fully aware of the hard, earnest and intelligent work that Mr. Lishchiner put into the job all the way through during his period of Secretaryship.

COLONEL SKELLY: If it please the Chair, a rising vote of appreciation.

(Mr. Lishchiner's report acknowledged by rising vote.)

PRESIDENT: I now call upon Colonel Skelly to make a report and to bring us up to date.

COLONEL SKELLY: On my appointment to office on 23 August, this year, I was admitted during the proceedings of the Trustees meeting on which Mr. Lishchiner has reported and my voluntary offer of services as Secretary and as Editor was accepted. I was directed to call a meeting which is this meeting this evening. I was directed to prepare and arrange for publication of the next issue of MILITARY AFFAIRS at the earliest practicable date. I proceeded to acquaint myself with the affairs of the Institute. As to the statistics pertaining to membership, I found as of that date, that there were 69 members of life and higher classes. There were 668 annual members whose dues were apparently paid through 1949—I say apparently because the method of annotation was uncertain—and there were 45 members paid through 1950. The statistics as to the subscribers (non-members) to MILITARY AFFAIRS, I will leave to Mr. Davis, Assistant to the Secretary, whose report will follow mine. Of these numbers, 507 of the annual members were notified of this meeting, the balance not being notified by reason of their remoteness from Washington, D. C. They will be billed for the membership fees for 1950. A great deal of the mailing was delayed and I have



noted that some members did not receive their notices. I ask indulgence in consideration that formal official demands on my time did not permit more effective attention to my duties for our Institute. The notices of meeting contained bills for dues for 1950, to the annual members. The response to that has been very gratifying. Already over 100 members have remitted and a small quantity of new memberships are included. During my term in office, I have answered 121 pieces of correspondence which represented an attempt to catch up in arrears of technical, special, fraternal and routine correspondence that was apparently in arrears since the month of April, 1950. I still have a mountain of correspondence which I will meet as best I can and as rapidly as I can.

In closing this report, I would like to state that consideration be given at this meeting to action under the last article of the By-Laws: that the By-Laws be suspended particularly to my appointment from 23 August 1950, and at least for the period in which I have exercised the office.

That completes my report, Mr. President.

Mr. President, if it please you now I would like to introduce Mr. Davis, my Assistant, who will supplement my report in reporting on the subscription situation.

PRESIDENT: If there is no objection, we will proceed with the Assistant Secretary's report and take the two together.

MR. DAVIS, Mr. President, Mr. Secretary and members of the Institute: As to subscriptions to *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, total subscribed to for 1949 was 424. Of these 132 have renewed for 1950; 14 for 1951 and 1 for 1952. There are 58 new subscribers at the present time for 1950. The number to be billed for 1950 is 392 and these bills will be sent out in the next few weeks. These figures are all as to non-members.

The annual members paid up for 1949 was 668. Annual members now recorded paid

through 1950 come to 94; the total of life and higher class members comes to 69. Receipts today of annual dues are posted but not fully recorded and constitute additional items to figures reported. Finally then, the total of members of all classes, including those in arrears, is 791; adding to this the total of non-member subscribers of 424, gives a figure of 1215. This figure of 1215, plus a convenient number of copies reserved for backlogs, leaves an estimated number of issues of 1950 at 1350. Complaints concerning subscriptions are being met by sending out annotated copies of the notices of this meeting. Those subscribers to be billed will be notified of publication schedule. That is all I have, Mr. Secretary and Mr. President.

PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Davis. You have heard the report of the incoming Secretary and his Assistant. Motion is in order to accept them.

MR. DOUGLAS: As to the plan of order, I believe according to the Constitution that it is mandatory for the Trustees rather than the membership to appoint officers.

PRESIDENT: You are referring to the appointment of Colonel Skelly and of Mr. Davis?

MR. DOUGLAS: Under Article III, Sections 1 and 2, it states: "They shall be appointed by and be responsible to the Board of Trustees, which may appoint other officers and prescribe their duties" and so on.

PRESIDENT: If it is necessary to take action particularly on Colonel Skelly's offer, I believe we held a meeting of the Trustees at which we did not even have a quorum. I authorized the taking of action, the best action we could with the idea that that would be covered later and as soon as we could hold a meeting. I don't know how that properly should be straightened out—perhaps the Secretary's suggestion at the end of his report—the incoming Secretary's suggestion—

if that is the proper way, I'll be glad to be properly guided in properly covering the appointment of officers made in any way the membership suggests.

MR. GONDOS: I would like to make a motion to suspend the rules in this instance so that the officer so appointed may be approved by this membership here.

PRESIDENT: A motion has been made to suspend the rules to take care of past action that has not been fully authorized.

MR. CHAMBERS: I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: Motion seconded that we suspend the by-laws,—that we suspend the provisions of Article III and then pass upon the appointment of the Secretary and any other officials who may have been appointed without the full authorization of membership, is that correct?

MR. GONDOS: Correct.

PRESIDENT: Is there any discussion?

(No response.)

PRESIDENT: All in favor, say aye.

(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")

PRESIDENT: Those against?

(No response.)

PRESIDENT: Motion is carried.

MR. GONDOS: If it is not out of order, I move that the report of the Secretary as read be accepted.

PRESIDENT: It has been moved that we accept the report of the Secretary as read. Any second?

MR. TODD: I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: Mr. Gondos, do I understand that a vote on your motion will constitute the Secretary as Secretary, is that your motion?

MR. GONDOS: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: I think that would be an excellent way of doing it. Is there any discussion?

(No response.)

PRESIDENT: All in favor, say "aye."

(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")

PRESIDENT: Motion carried.

PRESIDENT: I would like to be advised whether a separate motion on the Assistant Secretary is necessary.

COLONEL SKELLY: It was specified that our reports be considered one report.

PRESIDENT: Then it is felt that a motion is not necessary on that. We will now proceed to the report of the Treasurer, from Mr. Bonis.

MR. BONIS: I should like to submit for the record a balance sheet, a statement of gains and losses since the last balance sheet that I presented as of the 1st of July at the last meeting of the Board of Trustees. I should like the privilege of distributing copies of this document to the members so that they can see the figures themselves.

(Whereupon the Treasurer, Mr. Bonis, distributed copies of the document to members present.) (Copy appended as Annex 2 hereto.)

MR. BONIS: I wish to point out at the present time that there is some \$700 in cash which can be used for putting out the publication and for operating expenses of the Institute. I have included in this report some estimates which I made out with the help of Colonel Skelly and his Assistant, Mr. Davis, to show what conceivably might be the situation if all went well. The citation of 720 members' dues at \$3.50 each and 460 subscriptions at \$3.50 each and taking an estimated \$500 for dividends and coupons, we would have an annual income of \$4630. Our expenses run about \$800 for each issue of MILITARY AFFAIRS. We have about \$200 of miscellaneous expenses, so it appears that we will be able to carry on quite easily. The only trouble is that through lack of personnel and through inability of anyone going out and actually getting the membership in, we have not done so to my knowledge in the past year and half.

The first 18 months we took in almost this much money. The last 12 months, we do not show that. In other words it would be about half that amount which we were continually running back and running back. Like any other institution, this one depends on the members themselves. If we would get out and get the membership in, we can continue in existence. If we don't, we are just going to have to continue what we did which was borrowing from the following year's membership in order to put out the current year's issues, each year dropping short just about half one issue's cost.

I would like to state that if the membership dues do not come in after we put out the first issue, or perhaps the second issue, then I will not be in a position to be able to pay out any funds without digging into the Trust fund. That, on occasion, I have asked permission from the Board of Trustees to do.

I won't bore you by acquainting you with all of the intricate details of the Trust Fund but there are certain leeways that we have and we can use some of those funds for operating expenses. I should like to answer any questions that anybody has and that will be the end of my report.

PRESIDENT: I would like to ask, Mr. Treasurer, how the funds can be used and what particular leeways there are?

MR. BONIS: The Order of Indian Wars Trust Fund can be used to save the institution—in other words, General Roberts told me at the time that the money was turned over that by getting an agreement from some of the members it was possible to use those funds to continue in existence. Of course, that would be only a temporary stopgap. Also the Moncado Book Fund as discussed at our last meeting of Trustees is also a rather nebulous sort of Trust Fund since the man who donated the money is not available for contact. Since we can't query him one way or another, so conceivably we

might use those funds in case of dire necessity but as we stand now, we have enough money for one issue and I understand from the Secretary that we are getting in money from our subscriptions so that we can put out at least one issue in the near future as I see it.

PRESIDENT: Thank you.

MR. TODD: We get approximately \$200 a year in coupons and dividends, is that correct?

MR. BONIS: We have been getting approximately that much or a little bit more because I have not invested the balance of the fund. In other words, if you will look under assets, you will see that there is over \$7,000,—\$7829, the last two items which is just sitting in the bank because I have not invested it. Again, there was the question that I did not want to assume the responsibility of investing these funds myself. I will be glad to do so if I get a go-head signal from the Trustees but I don't think that it is an action that should be taken by the Treasurer without the advice and counsel of the Board. That would bring the income up to \$500 a year instead of \$200.

MR. TODD: Question again. Is that the Treasurer's opinion to invest that money?

MR. BONIS: I might explain that I am only the Assistant Treasurer, not the Treasurer and have been acting for him, General Lawrence H. Whiting of Chicago. He is an insurance banker, I might add. General Whiting feels the same way I do.

MR. GONDOS: You have \$7000 in the banks. You must be getting at least 1½ per cent on that?

MR. BONIS: No, sir. It is in a checking account.

MR. GONDOS: Can't we transfer that to a savings account?

MR. BONIS: We could. At one time, we got to the point where, if we had transferred too much of it, we would not have been able

to actually pay out the money we owed in cash and we did actually dip a little bit into that fund.

PRESIDENT: Wouldn't the bank charges be more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent on a small amount like that?

MR. BONIS: I don't know, sir. It should be.

MR. GONDOS: I think it is more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

PRESIDENT: Charges for writing checks are very high,—bank charges—are very high these days.

MR. BONIS: It should indeed be invested, undoubtedly. If the decision is made which may transfer the institution, then invest it and then turn around and liquidate it, you are just going through a lot of administrative expense. It is not going to do you any good and only cost the members money in the end.

PRESIDENT: We have had the suggestion from the Assistant Treasurer that certain funds be invested. We will defer discussion of that until right after the report is either accepted or rejected.

COLONEL SKELLY: I move that the report of the Treasurer as read be accepted.

PRESIDENT: Any second.

MR. GONDOS: Second the motion.

PRESIDENT: A motion made to accept the report of the Treasurer as read has been seconded. All in favor say, "Aye."

*(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")*

PRESIDENT: Motion carried. Is there any further discussion.

MR. DONNELLY: I notice that we have over \$6,000 in securities at the present time. What is the nature of the type of securities that we are holding?

MR. BONIS: Some stocks, bonds and quite a few United States Savings Bonds—Treasury Bonds.

COLONEL TODD: If we invested these funds, how much could we expect from them approximately?

MR. BONIS: \$500.

PRESIDENT: How do you estimate that roughly?

MR. BONIS: Well, first—

PRESIDENT: What per cent are you using?

MR. BONIS: I think I used 5 per cent on the available funds.

PRESIDENT: I think we might well proceed while we are on money matters, if there is no objection by membership, we might as well proceed on the subject of authorization to invest the uninvested funds.

MR. TODD: I have a question. I think we should first decide what the future of the Institute is before we decide what to do with this money. I think that would logically follow, one on the other! Don't you?

PRESIDENT: That is entirely logical. I thought simply this, that we could be thinking until we come back to it, but if the membership prefers to wait until the rest of the discussion has been heard, my thought was that we should authorize the Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer to invest the uninvested funds in any securities that are authorized in the District of Columbia for Trustees to purchase.

DR. WINNACKER: I hate to be a wet blanket but Article II, Section 1, reads: "The affairs, funds, and property of the Institute shall be managed and controlled by the Board of Trustees."

MR. GLEASON: Several times I have wanted to ask this question. It seems to be pertinent at the moment. Is there a Board of Trustees functioning now?

MR. TODD: The answer is, *partial*.

MR. GLEASON: Well, then, let us make that the first order of business, Mr. President, because without that, you can't function. You can't suspend a law because that is the legal form of incorporation. We don't want that kind of publicity or any other kind and our officers in the calaboose.

PRESIDENT: I don't quite get your point.



MR. GLEASON: That we can't do anything until we elect a Board of Trustees if we have none. I only ask, have we a Board of Trustees to function now.

PRESIDENT: We have two-thirds of a Board which makes a quorum.

MR. GLEASON: Do we have a quorum here?

PRESIDENT: We do not have a quorum here.

MR. GLEASON: Well, I think we will have to vote for a Board. As was pointed out the membership can't do anything on the money matters at all. That is entirely up to the Board of Trustees which, according to the Constitution, would be legal.

PRESIDENT: I think that is a sound point although I do not see or feel that it is inappropos for the membership to discuss and recommend to the Board of Trustees what we do with the money.

The next order of business will be the election of trustees, as you have seen from the material given you. I think we might discuss that later if the membership does not object. I think it was my mistake in not remembering that the Trustees and no one else could act on what we do with the money. Nevertheless, I think that the membership should know about it and if it wants to make recommendations, do so.

We will now move on to the report of the Librarian.

MR. STANSFIELD: I have a brief report. Members should know that I have no control over the collection as such. Very little work has been done on the library since being removed from the National Archives Building in 1948. Ninety per cent of the collection, in 55 wooden locker boxes and over 135 cartons, is in Anderson House at 2118 Massachusetts Avenue. The rest of the books are being used by the Historical Office in their Library and under the very general supervision of Colonel Todd, an Institute

Trustee. I might add that he is the only person anyway near the books. There have been no calls on the collection to my knowledge since I have been at the National War College Library, June 1948 until now.

The problem of what to do with the 7,000 volumes of the Library is one which can be solved after more basic questions have been answered. While it is being put to little use, it is safely stored and can there remain.

Now, I have with me a sample of one of the rare books of the collection and if any of the members are interested, it will give them some idea of the library. The volume is a 1611 Cavalry Manual. I understand that it is one of seven remaining in existence. It is not the rarest book in the collection, however.

PRESIDENT: Motion is in order to accept the Librarian's report.

MR. GONDOS: I move that we accept the Librarian's Report and extend thanks for his past services.

COLONEL SKELLY: Before it being accepted, I would like to ask if the library is catalogued?

MR. STANSFIELD: Technically, the library is partially catalogued. From a strict point of view, considering a good library, it is a very small percentage. Usage of the library by anyone today is complicated by its being in storage. When it was stored in the National Archives, approximately 1,000 volumes were catalogued; there was primarily a shelf control rather than a complete library catalogue and it was very easy to find anything in the basic collection. Additional volumes of our library were also stored in the same room in the National Archives Building, and were arranged chronologically by subject so that it was also very easy to find the bulk of the remainder. There was a very large donation from the old Army War College, some of which has just been kept in the original

packages and nothing done with it. It is possible to use the collection with some difficulty, but I would not say to use the library effectively.

It is somewhat difficult to estimate the number, I might say, of man years time to separate and put the collection in order. For example, we had a discussion this morning of Colonel Conger's collection (which has been considered as a donation to the new Army War College) from the point of view of library cataloguing. There, there are Library of Congress cards placed in order at the time the collection was set up so that it would be possible therefore, if that collection were put on the shelves in a library, to use those catalogue cards; with them, you have almost immediate and complete library control.

I think the problem has been with past librarians. As a matter of having the duties of a librarian in addition to his other functions, I have read previous reports, before the war, where they made starts on doing a thorough library cataloguing job and as yet, I have seen no evidence of a complete and final cataloguing. Now that, of course, is something yet to be done in the distant future because of the lack of persons and time to do it. On the other hand, initial use of time and money would be justified only on the basis of the use of the library, and I would say that at the present time, there has been very little use. We have been able to find the wanted items in the past five years without too much difficulty. I hope that has answered the Secretary's question. If any other members have other questions, I will be glad to try to answer them.

MR. TODD: I acted for the Institute in turning over the books temporarily on loan to the Office of Military History. Mr. Chairman, I am not the man in the Office of Military History responsible for the books. That is Mr. Israel Wice, Chief of General Refer-

MR. STANSFIELD: I said you had very general supervision.

MR. TODD: That is—informal.

MR. STANSFIELD: I want to point out that I am several miles away from the Pentagon in my normal course of business, and that the rest of the collection is in storage several miles away from my normal course of business and from the Pentagon. From the point of view of a member of the Institute, there is at least one watchful eye on what is in storage and nobody goes into the storage place very often from what I could find out.

PRESIDENT: I understand that we have a number of books of considerable rarity. I wonder if the Librarian could give us an idea of their actual sale value.

MR. STANSFIELD: I have here this Melzo Cavalry Manual, Antwerp, 1611. Is I said there are seven copies. I have not checked any catalogue as to the sale value. I think that problem could reasonably come up if you decided to go into the problem. On some of these, I couldn't say whether they were worth \$50 or worth \$500. Part of the other problem is the question of being of value and accessible to military scholars.

PRESIDENT: Of course, as far as keeping the library is concerned. But if we have a number of books that are worth from \$50 to \$500, there is a source of funds that we—none of us to my knowledge—have seriously discussed.

MR. STANSFIELD: May I say one more thing. Acting on general instructions from the Board of Trustees, there has been very little disposal of the library so that it would be possible by evaluation to get funds for material that might not be wanted as being easily accessible in this area. On the other side, I have one of the rarest copies left in this country. It is a 1573 Italian Volume on the Art of War during that period.

PRESIDENT: Thank you. It has been moved that we accept the report of the librarian with

special thanks for his good work. Any second?

COLONEL TODD: I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: Any further discussion?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: All in favor say, "aye."

*(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")*

PRESIDENT: Opposed?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: Motion carried.

We have next the report of the Editor up to August 22, 1950.

CAPTAIN ROSS: Mr. President and members, I didn't know whether I would be called on to make a report or not tonight. I took over as Editor after having only one or two interviews with my predecessor—it wasn't even much of an interview—he just told me where I could find the files and told me to take over. On that basis and to the best of my ability I went ahead with what I presumed to be the editorial policy of the Institute of which I had no other knowledge whatsoever except from reading back issues of the magazine. I fulfilled my duties to the best of my ability until I was formally relieved in November 1949, and continued on an informal basis until about March of this year, at which time I was doing other work in the Office of the Chief of Military History which was too much for me. I haven't done any more work since. I invite questions if anyone has any.

MR. TODD: I would like to ask a question for the record. Could you give us an idea what you think is required of an editor of Military Affairs in the way of the time that he has to put in, assuming that you are the only editor now or you can have an assistant or any number of assistants that you want?

CAPTAIN ROSS: An editor working alone would have to be a full-time editor and then even he could do nothing but edit the maga-

zine and would not be able to assist materially in membership drives and that sort.

MR. TODD: He could do none of the secretarial work, for example?

CAPTAIN ROSS: Absolutely not. An effective editor needs quite a lot of help with book reviews and that sort of thing. If he is going to be a part-time man, I should say that he should have two or three very active assistants and count on giving 12 hours a week I'd say.

PRESIDENT: Any other questions?

MR. GONDOS: Mr. President, in connection with the question asked by Colonel Todd, I want to state that I served on the editorial board of Military Affairs for several years during the war and we conducted Military Affairs as a part time publication and I heartily concur with the statement just made by Captain Ross as far as the time element is concerned. I think that on that estimate, 12 hours is probably correct. However, we had in addition I think four associates on the Board amongst whom the work was parcelled out such as book reviews as were mentioned, editorial corrections, and manuscripts and so forth which I had been handling myself and that required probably somewhat less than that for the associate but it would come out to a full working week of about 40 or 45 hours. That was our experience during the war period when we put out Military Affairs as a part-time proposition. Colonel Todd can certainly add a great deal more to that because he was very successful in editing the magazine before that period.

MR. TODD: Twelve hours is a ridiculously low estimate.

MR. DOUGLAS: As you were speaking I couldn't help thinking back here that it is totally possible on a volunteer basis. Fred and I used to do it. If one is willing to work from 7 o'clock until 1 o'clock the following morning everynight in the week and every week-end, why, he'll just come out even.

MR. TODD: That is just about the answer, Mr. President.

CAPTAIN ROSS: Multiply that 12 hours by 4 different people and you get about 48 hours a week.

MR. GONDOS: I move that the report of the editor be accepted.

PRESIDENT: I know that Captain Ross has a tremendous amount of work and has been extremely loyal and performed his duties in an able manner. I would like to add a note of thanks to the motion.

COLONEL SKELLY: I second the motion and propose it be a rising vote.

*(Whereupon all present rose).*

PRESIDENT: Vote carried. At this time, I think it will be appropriate to have a ten minute break.

*(Recess)*

PRESIDENT: The meeting will come to order. There has been a very sensible suggestion as to the election of the Trustees, since that is a part of the order of business this evening, that we proceed to that election and also filling, incidentally, nominating and filling one more vacancy created by the resignation by telephone today of Dr. Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress. That when we do so complete the election of Trustees, we will have a quorum of Trustees present at this meeting.

PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to proceeding out of the regular order of business?

COLONEL SKELLY: Sir, I would like to put across one point to the membership. I would like to render my report as Editor for the period from 23 August. It is very brief. It is only to state that Captain Ross's services did not terminate with that date because he is my associate now and, were he not, we would not have accomplished what we have;—which is— that the galley proofs of the first issue for 1950 are now in hand, lacking only the Headquarters Gazette, which can

properly be made up as a result of this meeting; and lacking, of course a decision as to the number of copies to print which can only be decided after the current bills are in and we know how many subscribers and members we have to receive it for 1950.

MR. TODD: I think it is very apropos to find out what is considered necessary to issue the magazine for 1950. After all, it would not be in the mails until after the beginning of 1951, if I know anything about it. Why don't we just skip the year, if it is possible. Has it been considered or what?

COLONEL SKELLY: I can go one step further and point out that we have in our possession, aside from the manuscripts included in the issue cited at hand as galley proofs, 15 manuscripts and 2 book reviews of highly acceptable order and 10 other manuscripts of less merit. We could easily make up an annual publication to cover all four issues if that were the sense of this meeting and cover the whole year 1950 with an issue, let us say, approximately four times the size to which the membership has become accustomed.

PRESIDENT: There is a question on the floor.

MR. GONDOS: There is a motion on the floor to proceed with the election of Trustees.

COLONEL SKELLY: Then, if it please the Chair and the membership, I would like to have my report, which was approved in the regular order of business, extended by the foregoing remarks, and then we can go into the election of trustees.

PRESIDENT: I believe, Colonel Skelly, that we still have to approve your election as Editor by the meeting of the Board of Trustees.

COLONEL SKELLY: Very well.

PRESIDENT: We do not have a quorum of Trustees present. Perhaps that can be done and then go ahead and consider your report be given—



COLONEL SKELLY (interrupting): To be inserted in the record.

PRESIDENT: Is that all right? Does anyone object to that?

(No objection).

PRESIDENT: You have the slate before you. I will withdraw from the chair when it comes time to give the question but first we'll have nominations. Does anyone have any nominations to add to this list, to this slate?

MR. GLEASON: I rise only for the information of the general body. The question has come up several times in this discussion about having Trustees at a distance from Washington who are not able, apparently, to attend the meeting which is very understandable. Aside from Colonel Greene and Colonel Douglas, what other of these gentlemen would be around or near Washington?

MR. TODD: I can answer that question.

PRESIDENT: Will you please, sir.

MR. TODD: Dr. Cole works in the Office of Military History, so he is right here. The other two members are men who, I think, have a sufficient interest or sufficient youth to come to Washington and be here.

PRESIDENT: The slate is purely suggestive. We did talk over at considerable length the two non-residents of Washington and there appears to be solid reasons why they would make good trustees, principally as I recall it, from the fact that they had shown so much interest in the past and present in the Institute.

Are there any other nominations?

We need at least one more to fill Dr. Evans' vacancy.

MR. GONDOS: I would like to place Colonel Skelly's name in nomination.

PRESIDENT: Colonel Skelly's name has been placed in nomination. I don't believe that a motion is necessary on that, when nominations are desired. If I am not correct on that point, please let me know.

COLONEL LARSEN: I move that nominations be closed.

PRESIDENT: Any second?

MR. TODD: I second the motion that nominations be closed.

PRESIDENT: All in favor say, "aye."

(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")

PRESIDENT: All opposed, say no.

(No response).

PRESIDENT: Motion carried.

Who would like to have the chair until after the election?

COLONEL SKELLY: Colonel Todd will take the chair.

PRESIDENT: Will you take the chair, Fred?

MR. TODD: Yes.

(Whereupon Colonel Todd assumed the President's chair).

PRESIDENT: Would you like to retire, Jesse?

(Whereupon Colonel Greene, Mr. Douglas and Colonel Skelly retired.)

MR. GONDOS: I would like to suggest, if there is no objection, that we adopt the slate unanimously.

CHAIRMAN: I was going to ask if that were possible. In other words, you should understand the slate,—you all have a list—Dr. Cole, Mr. Craighead, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Dyer, Colonel Greene and Colonel Skelly.

Are there any questions?

MEMBER: One of information. With the resignation of Dr. Evans, we are filling his vacancy also?

CHAIRMAN: That is correct. There are six vacancies and six nominations. I must confess ignorance of when or what panel Dr. Evans is on. Is he on the current panel?

MR. LISCHINER: I can answer that. His term expires as of December of this year.

CHAIRMAN: So, in other words, we are electing Colonel Skelly only for the remainder of his term for this year. The remaining first five that you have on your list

are being elected as of January 1 of this year and will serve for three years thereafter, is that clear? This is the panel that should have been elected last year. We will have to elect five additional sometime in the very near future, presumably in a meeting to be held in December. Are there any questions?

MR. GONDOS: As a point of information, how many Trustees do we have altogether?

CHAIRMAN: Fifteen, serving in three panels of five each, alternating year after year.

MEMBER: I think that it should be made a matter of record that Colonel Skelly is only going to fill the remaining portion of Dr. Evans' term to the end of this year.

CHAIRMAN: I believe that is a matter of record.

MR. DONNELLY: I entertain a motion that we elect the panel of six Trustees so named.

MR. GONDOS: I so move and second the motion.

CHAIRMAN: The move has been seconded that the six persons named be elected Trustees of the Institute.

Any questions?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: All those in favor signify by saying "aye."

*(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")*

CHAIRMAN: So carried.

Acting as President pro tem, I would like to ask if we could not continue with the reports which we are interested in. I believe there is a report due from the present Acting Chairman of the Emergency namely, Dr. Winnacker, dealing specifically with the negotiations which have been carried on last year.

At least, the Secretary told me that could be expected.

DR. WINNACKER: Well, since time is running short, I believe the negotiations have been covered by the former Secretary. What I would like to do is to read to you a letter

that I received from John A. Krout of Columbia University.

He says:

"Thank you for your letter of October 19. I know how impatient you must be over the long delay in the negotiations between the American Military Institute and Columbia University. I can only repeat, however, what I have said to you on numerous occasions that in the present state of the University finances it cannot assume any obligations in connection of the transfer of the American Military Institute to Columbia, unless it has the funds in hand to cover such obligations. I have had several talks with General Edwin Clark and he is most optimistic about the prospects of securing the necessary funds, but up to the present time we are waiting for him and his associates to complete their arrangements. Ed has certainly done a magnificent job for us and I am confident that the funds will be secured.

"So far as your meeting on Friday, November 3rd, is concerned I can only say that Columbia will make definite proposals, along the lines which we have discussed, as soon as it has the requisite funds in hand."

I would say that any additional comments should be reserved for the discussion of the future of the Institute.

(At this point, the newly elected Trustees, including Colonel Greene, re-entered the meeting, whereupon Colonel Todd relinquished the chair, and Colonel Greene, as President, resumed the chair.)

MR. GONDOS: I move that the report of the Special Committee Chairman be accepted.

PRESIDENT: Any questions?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: I think it would be wise to wait until after a discussion of the major topic but all in favor say "aye."

*(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")*

PRESIDENT: Those opposed?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: Motion carried. The next is the Moncado Fund Committee.

COLONEL LARSEN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make apology to our Secretary. The

chairman of the committee did not even know at the moment he spoke to him that the full name of the Committee is the Moncado Revolving Book Fund Committee. That Fund, as you know, was established through a gift by a Filipino who had great love for the American people and presented a sum of \$5,000 to be used for the publication of books pertaining to the field of American Military History.

Unfortunately, the interpretation of the gift was that it was to be a self-sustaining fund. In other words, any awards that were made from it must be made with the idea that the fund itself would repay itself in anything it undertakes.

During the past year and a half, the Committee has been fostering, waiting patiently, and hoping that out of the contest would come a book of major importance in the field of American Military History.

The contest was closed on June 30, 1950. The committee met and considered the 15 or 16—I don't know right off hand—the 15 or 16 entries and it regretfully decided that among these entrants there was not a single one that satisfied the criterion under which the fund was operating. We therefore acknowledged with thanks the contributions of these various contestants and, at the present moment, manuscripts have been returned to the owners of same with the result that the Committee still has the \$5,000 and the Chairman is out some \$16 spent on return postage on the manuscripts.

I'll be glad to answer any questions. I should say in explanation at the outset or of the first statement that the Committee had decided, with the consent of the officers of the Institute, that an award of \$500 would be given outright to the author of any manuscript which satisfied that requirement of being sufficiently versatile and sufficiently important to warrant publication, and the remainder of the sum would be used to ad-

vance the publication with, as I said, the thought of returning to the Fund sufficient proceeds to make the Fund self-sustaining.

PRESIDENT: There is still no reason why the Committee can't still consider manuscripts right on. The criterion should include salability to get the money back.

COL. LARSEN: I think that would be true.

PRESIDENT: I would like to point out that with military affairs becoming increasingly more important, that there is the possibility that one of the manuscripts originally submitted might become saleable, sufficiently saleable if acceptable on other grounds.

Are there any other questions?

MR. GONDOS: I move that the report of the Moncado Revolving Book Fund be accepted as read.

MR. BONIS: I think something should be done about this. I don't know whether the membership or the Board of Trustees is responsible but I will accept a ruling from the chair on the question of funds to pay for issues of Military Affairs. I don't know if I am out of order but can the funds be used for that purpose or not?

PRESIDENT: I think yes.

MR. BONIS: I have sought some legal advice and it would indicate that we make ourselves highly liable to suit for misuse of the Funds.

PRESIDENT: Mr. Gondos.

MR. GONDOS: I make an amendment to my motion to extend that the Committee Chairman be reimbursed for the \$16 spent.

MR. TODD: I make a further amendment that he be thanked and his Committee be thanked for the attention they gave this matter which I understand was considerable.

MR. BONIS: I second the second amendment but not the first. As Colonel Skelly has pointed out to me, reimbursing any and all members of the Institute who do their business on behalf of the Institute is my duty; therefore it should not be part of the

motion but that \$16 should be reported as a regular expense voucher which I will honor.

MR. GONDOS: A motion has been made to accept the report and accept the amendment . . . .

PRESIDENT: . . . with special thanks.

COLONEL SKELLY: I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: Any discussion?

(No response.)

PRESIDENT: All those in favor say "aye."

(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")

MR. STANSFIELD: This \$5000 of funds in the bank, is it invested?

MR. BONIS: They are in the bank.

MR. STANSFIELD: Is that the major item that you are making recommendation that it be invested?

MR. BONIS: Yes.

MR. STANSFIELD: I think that has a great deal of importance that something not be appropriated right away and as the report has been made this evening, they did not recommend any book be received for consideration for appropriation from the funds.

PRESIDENT: It is my idea that just as soon as this meeting is over,—or perhaps we might interrupt this meeting with a brief Trustees' meeting, with the other members present, to discuss the investment of the funds and to approve the action taken by part of the Trustees appointed.

MR. GONDOS: That it should be done by the Board of Trustees, is that your point?

PRESIDENT: We are discussing merely to determine just exactly what part of the funds were being considered for recommendation for investment.

MR. GONDOS: I think that is out of order. It is a matter for the Trustees to decide.

PRESIDENT: I think it is.

MR. STANSFIELD: There is another recommendation and discussion that a number of funds be taken and invested as recommended.

MR. GONDOS: Mr. Chairman, is a motion in order to dissolve this meeting?

PRESIDENT: I think so. We might as well do so and do it now. I so move for a recess for the purpose of the Trustees meeting.

MEMBER: There are not enough Trustees present for a quorum.

MR. GONDOS: Do you move that we recess instead of adjourn?

PRESIDENT: Recess in favor of a Trustees meeting.

MR. GONDOS: May I ask why recess instead of adjourn?

COLONEL SKELLY: I propose that this be addressed to the Chair in explanation of the motion. I believe the members deserve an explanation that it was intended that they have a full voice in this discussion of the future of the Institute,—that it was the intent of this Trustees' meeting in a brief recess of the general members meeting to act on the two questions decisively, and then to go back to the general members' meeting.

PRESIDENT: That is right. That is my idea and as I suggested a while ago—to break into this meeting.

MR. EAST: It appears to me that there are a number of important matters from the floor, not just one but a number of important matters to come before the Trustees, not the least of which will be to legalize some actions previously taken and also to take some action on the sense of this meeting as enunciated so far of which we just hit a point and I will agree that the Trustees could accomplish in a reasonable manner the business that should come before them. I don't think that it would be proper to ask members to stay while that's being done. Furthermore, it seems proper to give some other Trustees who might not be here an opportunity to be at a special meeting if not the annual meeting for 1950, a meeting to be called within a matter of weeks or days, if appropriate, at which time an agenda and an order of business properly



considered by the Board could be presented to the members.

PRESIDENT: I think the point is well taken. We are simply in a position of having heard the report of an Editor who is not an Editor until so made by the quorum of Trustees—a meeting made up of a quorum of Trustees. I thought that we could untangle that part in two minutes—by breaking in with a Board of Trustees meeting on that one point. If you deem it essential that we defer the discussion of the investments, which also seems to be a matter to be accomplished in a minute or two, then I think we should do so but I would like to know how to get around this one point that we do have an Editor at a members meeting giving a report. It appears to me rather academic as to whether or not we approve that report at this time since the approval of that report involves a rather important consideration as to the continuation of the publication as to whether we skip an issue here or whether several issues can be resolved into one. In any event, I don't believe the work of the new Secretary will have been in vain whatever the result of the ultimate decision and that, in itself, seems to me would require some rather lengthy consideration as to what will be best to do with the publication.

I therefore submit that the approval of the Interim Editor, if it is necessary to call him that, be deferred until the Board can consider this proposal and then recommend him to the membership.

MR. TODD: Second the motion.

PRESIDENT: Any other comment.

MR. GONDOS: I think that I made a motion that the report be accepted and I think it was approved.

MR. TODD: It was approved.

PRESIDENT: Of the Secretary?

MR. GONDOS: Secretary and Editor.

PRESIDENT: I believe you are right. That was accepted and it appears that an action

was taken that was not quite legal. I'm sure that we could approve the report of the Interim Editor—I use that term not knowing whether it is appropriate or not—or Current Editor—we certainly could approve his report as legally as we have done some other things tonight. I think the things that were done tonight had to be done in the interest of the Institute but those things have to be legalized at a meeting of the Board of Trustees in the same manner that we have done these other things this evening and I move that we approve the report of the Current Editor subject to consideration of aspects of it that need to be changed by the Board of Trustees.

MR. GONDOS: I'll accept that as an amendment to my original motion.

PRESIDENT: Can you give the original?

MR. GONDOS: We have that in the record. The original of it as read together with the amendment that the Board of Trustees at a subsequent meeting find it acceptable.

PRESIDENT: That has been seconded. Any further discussion?

(No response.)

PRESIDENT: All in favor say "aye."

(Members responded with voice vote of "aye.")

MR. DOUGLAS: The proviso of the By-Laws makes it possible for the President to call a meeting of the Board of Trustees at any time, subject, of course to two weeks notice and so on.

I would like to move that this membership meeting request the President to call such a meeting. I think it is very important for the Board now to get together and clear up some of these things and I agree with Mr. East that now it is rather late to try it.

PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to make a motion of that unless there is objection. We will arrange a date about two weeks from now for a Board of Trustees meeting.

MR. DONNELLY: I assume the meeting

called is predicated on the views of the members to continue on with the Military Institute and that the Board will present at the next meeting their plans on how to do so. At this point, would it be in order for the membership to suggest to the Board that steps be taken to invest such funds of the organization as can safely be done for acquiring additional income.

PRESIDENT: Invested in securities as are authorized for Trustees in the District of Columbia.

MR. DONNELLY: It has been recently established by the court. I think we can get it for the Board of Trustees to function on.

MR. TODD: I don't think that the membership at this meeting has so decided and we will so inform the Board of Trustees. I think that is the whole purpose of this meeting and we have not reached it yet.

MR. DONNELLY: May I then put it in a form of a motion that it is the sense of the membership meeting that the Board of Directors be advised that we wish to continue the Military Institute and that we would like to have the Board make a motion for the investment of the funds.

PRESIDENT: On the order of business that is the most important discussion,—*the future of the Institute*,—and I suggest that you hold the first half of that motion until we come to that order of business; and that the second topic, investment of funds, *which* is the topic of discussion now, can be withdrawn later, if the meeting decides to disband or break up the Institute or anything of that sort.

MR. DONNELLY: I went on the basis of the election of the Board of Trustees that it was the assumption that we would continue to operate.

MR. TODD: Operate in one sense but not necessarily publish a magazine and not necessarily do a lot of other things.

PRESIDENT: The motion is that it is the

sense of the meeting that we continue to issue the magazine?

MR. DONNELLY: Yes, sir. To go right ahead as in the past; and that we go ahead and invest the funds, in accordance with the list of securities as approved for Trustees in the District of Columbia.

MR. GONDOS: Someone here a few minutes ago suggested that for the year 1950 we publish the magazine in one volume for the entire year. That seems to me a very sensible proposition and I think that if the meeting would suggest that the sense of this meeting goes on record as saying that we recommend to the Board that the 1950 issue be a single volume and then start off right with the 1951, it might be a good idea.

DR. WINNACKER: Are we not discussing the future of the Institute?

PRESIDENT: I think we will set aside the Committee reports and take up the main issue, the future of the Institute. Does anyone object to that?

(No response).

MR. DOUGLAS: It appears to me that a body organized as is this Institute cannot function properly without a properly functioning Board of Trustees—the affairs, funds and property of the Institute shall be managed and controlled by the Board of Trustees. The meeting, by election of the Board of Trustees we hope will function, hopes that we will get back into the kind of operation where we will have a program. The future of the Institute, insofar as we can discuss it intelligently since the fact has been decided subject to the involvement of the program and under those circumstances, Mr. President, I will submit that it would be appropriate for us to adjourn and to call a meeting and presentation of a program pertaining to and concerning the future of the Institute by the new Board of Trustees.

MR. BONIS: I would like to back up what Mr. Douglas has said. There are too many

here to handle the problem that you're dealing with. What you have to do, it seems to me—in the past we have never been able to get a group of people sufficiently interested who could act and do the work. We have five new members on the Trustees and if we call a meeting of the Board of Trustees, we will have a quorum and we will be able to act and they are charged with acting and if necessary, they can present the program to the membership and get a vote if they wanted to dissolve or do anything else.

MR. TODD: I've been with this damn thing since 1936 and it isn't a question of the Board of Trustees. It is a question of whether you can get one, or two or three men who will give virtually unlimited time. Now you say we have too many people here—

MR. BONIS (*Interrupting*): I didn't say we had too many people. We don't have enough time.

MR. TODD: The point is to get one man who can guarantee to get the magazine out, but will he take the responsibility for it.

MR. EAST: If you find that the Board of Trustees can't find him, we can find him just as easily right here now.

COLONEL SKELLY: In extension of the remarks of my predecessor, it is idle to discuss the constitutionality of my appointment as Editor in as much as I exercised office as Secretary under the same appointment. Regardless of the constitutional problems, editors of this publication, *Military Affairs* have been so far, employees of the United States under the National Archives or under the Office of Military History of the United States; invisibly, they have enjoyed enormous editorial staffs and boards. Perhaps they didn't appreciate and perhaps they didn't feel lightening of the burden of their work, but those invisibilities were there and the facilities were there that they enjoyed. Now we are creating something again like the society it was at the War College. The editorial

board that is needed to create the type of publication to which the Institute has become accustomed is not less than 25. The quality of manuscripts that come to the publication by the attraction of its virtue—and that virtue has been built up by years of effort by the individuals and groups concerned—requires now more than the spare time of but one or a few men—or women, to invite and encourage and to edit. The kind of book reviews we get of the level of books desired requires again similar discrimination and there is not one man here who could not be used to do such work on an editorial board: if he lives in Washington, I honestly request that he offer his services for that.

I also desire, formally, at the earliest practicable moment, to resign my offices as Secretary and as Editor. I cannot carry these burdens long, but I believe that the Institute . . . that *Military Affairs* is a vital element—with its stature—in the group of publications specially supporting—in one way or another—the defense of the United States.

At this point I would like to go back to the report which was cited previously by a speaker this evening, namely, the report by General Robinett to the Chief of the Army Military History Section, regarding the American Military Institute and its Journal. General Robinett recommended that *Military Affairs* be taken up as *the* joint journal; as *the* learned journal of unification above and beyond the Naval, the Air side, and the Army side of military, historical or technical publications. He further recommended formation of an Institute beyond all institutes and societies and associations, to have as its members not individuals but those organizations. Thus was recognized the virtue and reputation *Military Affairs* possesses.

Sir, that must be maintained and must be continued but it cannot be continued by the kind of voluntary effort which it has enjoyed in the past because of a special situation in

National Archives or in the Office of Military History, or elsewhere within a governmental organization. It must continue now by the efforts of the people who have benefited by it because many of you here have benefited by it. You have grown up with this, and the adoption by the military services of these extensive historical research sections has been in great part the effect of the presence of journals such as *Military Affairs*, and the influence perhaps principally of *Military Affairs* on the Government of the United States and its defense agencies. So, finally, the people who are in this field of military history have all sorts of journals which are official journals. These do not necessarily reflect official opinion but are bound to be influenced by bonds of discipline more than these journals which are outside of the military structure. In particular, it is necessary that there be available at least one learned journal which will attract the learned papers and the contributions of the high academic level intended and desired for *Military Affairs*, which publication would cover the whole field of military effort. There is no other such publication in this country.

It can be continued but it cannot be continued without substantial support by personal efforts.

I recommend consideration among yourselves of an editorial board that can well dispense with my services which I trust and clearly indicated extended for an emergency period only, and can be for an emergency period only.

PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Colonel Skelly, for a very effective and clear statement. I believe that there was one thing you said—that at the proper time you would like to resign.

COLONEL SKELLY: Yes.

PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions?  
(No response.)

PRESIDENT: It is recommended that this

body set aside the order of business at this time and discuss the future of the Institute.

DR. WINNACKER: I believe as the member of the Emergency Committee, we were appointed to that committee to look into the future of the Institute. I will refer to the efforts we made and where we stand in our negotiations. The problem that was given me was to look for a home for the Institute, or better, a home for the Journal. In June 1949, it looked as if we were going to fade out of the picture. In December last year, one of the present Trustees, General Armstrong, decided that possibly his old alma mater, Columbia University, might be interested in taking over the Institute, and he discussed the problem with General Eisenhower. As a result of this discussion, negotiations were started to look into the transfer of the Institute, or at least of the Journal to Columbia University. This project caused lengthy discussion at Columbia. General Edwin Clark was authorized by Columbia to look for possible sponsors who might be willing to finance the project as planned by Columbia. General Clark's negotiations have not yet been concluded.

If it is the meaning of the motion on the floor that any negotiations in that direction would be neglected in the future—that the institute should go on just as it is and not change in any way—then that motion should be reconsidered. As I understand it, the motion simply means to just go ahead as we were before and consider no other way or solution to the problem.

PRESIDENT: I take the motion to mean that we not fold up or suspend or anything of that kind and not necessarily include recommendations to follow the proposal from Columbia University, is that right?

MR. DONNELLY: It was my intention to block any plan to dissolve the group but to continue together. That such proposals as the Columbia University proposal could be



considered for its worth. It is perfectly feasible in the near future that it could be developed but as I understood the meaning tonight, it was a question—*should we stop at this point?* Wouldn't it be the proper thing to continue for a time even if it were a question of having to have assistance? It is perfectly possible from the reports received tonight on the Columbia situation that it may still come through.

MR. WINNACKER: When I started these informal negotiations—in which you too, Mr. President, participated at one meeting with Columbia—the future of the Institute was not too bright. I think that it should be clear to all people that the work of Colonel Skelly in volunteering to continue the magazine has put the Institute in a very much better bargaining position. When we started these negotiations, almost any solution, it seemed, would be a good solution. At the present time, the delay that Columbia has brought upon itself for various reasons is explainable. If the publication of the Journal continues, I would say that the Institute can make some conditions about its future, express its views clearly to a Columbia Board, or think of an Institute in Washington and at the same time look around and investigate the fine proposal which Colonel Skelly just made and gather in people who will devote their time to keeping the Institute going.

In other words, we have time now to "mark time," thanks to Colonel Skelly's efforts, to strike a bargain or find other ways out. I don't want the way closed to anyone making propositions about the future.

PRESIDENT: I would like to get on the record that all the talks and negotiations that have been done with Columbia while I have been Acting President—that I have been cognizant of it.

MR. TODD: In connection with that, I wonder if we couldn't extend a vote of thanks to

Dr. Winnacker for his efforts, including many, many trips which he has made during the past year and a half, plus personal expense. We can express our appreciation for that.

PRESIDENT: I can't think of a motion that would be more appropriate though we do have a motion on the floor at the moment.

MR. EAST: On the motion, sir, I don't see why the investment of funds is a business matter to be decided.

MR. TODD: Isn't it a matter appropriate for the Board of Trustees—and should we direct the Board of Trustees to invest the funds, when, under certain circumstances we might not want to invest the funds? I don't know. It doesn't seem to be a point that requires the motion of anyone or the motions that a half a dozen people might put. It would seem to me that it would clear the air if that motion on investing the funds were withdrawn.

MR. DONNELLY: I am perfectly willing to withdraw that portion of the motion for the sake of expediting this meeting.

COLONEL SKELLY: Second the motion.

MR. GONDOS: I'm willing to drop the question.

PRESIDENT: Any other discussion.

(No response.)

PRESIDENT: There is a motion on the floor that the membership meeting recommend to the Board of Trustees that we continue publication and go ahead as in the past but without limitation as to possible improvement in negotiations with Columbia or for that matter, any other good ideas.

MR. STANSFIELD: The part of the motion relating to whether we shall or shall not publish a journal this year—that is actually the basic question to be decided tonight, is it not?

PRESIDENT: I take that to be included in the motion and the question has been de-

bated in terms of whether we recommend that it be published in one or four issues.

MR. STANSFIELD: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: 1949 and '50.

MR. STANSFIELD: 1950 actually.

PRESIDENT: Any discussion?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: All in favor say, "aye."

*(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")*

PRESIDENT: Against?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: I personally think it is a very good idea to give aid and comfort to the Trustees in this matter. At this time, I think it would be very appropriate to give a vote of thanks to Dr. Winnacker for his really extensive and continuous efforts to improve the situation.

MR. EAST: I second the motion to that effect.

PRESIDENT: Any discussion?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: All in favor say "aye."

*(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")*

PRESIDENT: Against?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: I also would like to add my personal thanks.

MR. TODD: I have a question. I would like to know who is going to get out the magazine. How are we going to do it? Mr. Gondos has related some of the mechanics of getting out the magazine in the past. I am thinking out loud on this . . . there seem to be so many manuscripts that seem to be circulating around, according to the Editor.

Who is going to do this work? I say we can't, and I challenge the Acting Secretary or the Secretary to tell how we can get at them. Why do we discuss something that is manifestly impossible?

DR. WINNACKER: I think the Secretary's and Editor's proposal of about 25 editors is

the future solution of the problem. We have the immediate problem of getting out the magazine for 1950 which Colonel Skelly has already prepared. It is probably a fact that he needs help in preparing the other issues. Now I believe that the Board of Trustees should be directed as a matter of urgency to investigate all possibilities to attain a solution to the future of MILITARY AFFAIRS as well as the Institute if it is at all possible. As long as we are a going concern, and we are a going concern, we will probably find a solution.

MR. TODD: We are not a going concern as far as the Journal is concerned.

COLONEL SKELLY: If the Chair please, may I now call for volunteers to the desired Editorial Board.

*(Whereupon the President nodded assent, and Mr. Davis secured the names of those willing to serve,—Messrs. Chambers, Davis, Donnelly, East, Finke, Gayle, Gleason, Gondos, Greene, Larsen, Ross, Stansfield, Todd, Winnacker.)*

COLONEL SKELLY: The Board will meet monthly, targeting on quarterly issues, in quarterly cycles. At the first meeting, manuscripts will be received and distributed. The second meeting will be for meeting of the minds as to what in particular will be included in the forthcoming next quarterly issue. Certainly there is enough material turned over or to be turned over not later than December 1 for preparation of the first issue of a normal quarterly series for 1951. Those of you who have generously volunteered for the publication of the annual for 1950 I thank, and I trust that your generosity will carry you further into 1951; and I further trust and hope that I may resign my post as Editor and have one of the number who so volunteered accept that position. If there be one or another who is ready to take over, please come to see me after the meeting and I will resign forthwith. I would do so

now but believe it an impropriety. I dare say that most of you have feelings which you do not express publicly so I do not ask now for any particular ones of you to do so. There are a number of you quite capable of taking the office, from the fourteen names collected.

PRESIDENT: I take it that we are now discussing the topic of the future of the Institute. It is apropos to my feelings of the type of proposal that we have with the people at Columbia that you can do a great deal more with \$75,000 a year and particularly get out a far better magazine, with Columbia going forward as it will, than we could regardless of whether we would be a part of it. Were we then to continue we would have two similar magazines, one of which would have a great deal of money and a considerable paid staff to run it. There would, therefore, be no need to publish our magazine, whereas their magazine might be so much the same. The loyal members of this organization might feel that we should continue on with our magazine,—that is also a possibility. We should bear in mind that we may be faced with a situation in which there is another magazine much like ours but with a great deal more backing.

Are there any others who would like to comment in any way about the future?

DR. WINNACKER: Mr. President, did I understand the Secretary to say that we are putting out an annual for 1950 or four issues for 1950?

COLONEL SKELLY: I requested a decision as to whether to put out an annual, if perhaps it is not in my hands. I do propose to put out an annual and I have accepted the services of an editorial board to that end. It is flexible enough. The problem for the Board is in working over these manuscripts and preparing them for the printer. I recommend that there be an annual for 1950 in order to start 1951 clean of arrears of editorial business.

MR. EAST: Mr. President, on this matter of the future of the Institute, I personally don't feel that we have settled the future of the Institute conclusively tonight. I think there is a sense in some people's minds that we will continue negotiations for a settlement with Columbia on some basis or other, still looking at a proposition from Columbia that might be acceptable. Furthermore, the matter of whether we have an annual or four issues for 1950 appears to be a technical question, solution of which depends on some other factors which we might bring out if we stayed here long enough tonight. I feel that that question—of what action and other actions—should bring us back to this same theme. I seemed to be harping all evening for an early meeting of the Board of Trustees, an honest to God working meeting of that Board of Trustees at which time those people having information of the several matter will present them—so that the Trustees *will* act.

PRESIDENT: You spoke a while ago of the Trustees getting up a program. It wasn't a question of what you meant. I got the feeling that you want the Trustees to get together, to get the sense of the membership, and to discuss the possibilities of the future. There is no other program we can settle on as I see it except what we have done here tonight, and to go ahead and publish the magazine, perhaps an annual. This seems to be the more sensible thing for this year, and that it will still be convenient to discuss with Columbia any negotiations.

MR. GONDOS: Is there any motion on the floor at this time?

PRESIDENT: There is no motion.

MR. GONDOS: I move that we adjourn.

MR. TODD: I move to make one motion.

PRESIDENT: It has been moved that we adjourn.

DR. WINNACKER: I want to get a quick report in.

MR. TODD: I would also like to make a motion.

PRESIDENT: Motion to adjourn has to be put, I believe. All in favor say "aye."

*(Minority of members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")*

PRESIDENT: "No?"

*(Majority of members present responded with voice vote of "nay.")*

PRESIDENT: Motion not carried.

MR. TODD: I would like to propose that the minutes of this meeting be recorded on paper and distributed to every member of the Institute in toto.

PRESIDENT: I'm highly in favor of doing that unless the cost is prohibitive. This is the first meeting that I have ever attended in years at which everybody got up and sounded off the way we should at meetings of this kind. I think that it is a very good idea that we get the whole record on paper and distributed to the members. I am in favor of my words appearing just as I have said them or rather spoken them.

DR. WINNACKER: Mr. President, it seems to me that we have pretty well settled tonight or expressed tonight the consensus of opinion that we want to continue. There is one point that has come up that bothers me considerably and I would like to hear a discussion from those present here, . . .

MR. TODD *(Interrupting)*: The motion that I made, . . .

DR. WINNACKER *(Interrupting)*: I beg your pardon. I am out of order.

MR. TODD: I made a motion that the minutes of this meeting be distributed to everyone.

DR. WINNACKER: I second the motion.

PRESIDENT: Any discussion?

DR. WINNACKER: And to be put in proper English as an amendment.

MR. TODD: I do not accept that amendment.

PRESIDENT: There is an amendment to the

motion that the record be put into proper English and is the question for the house.

All those in favor show by raising hands.

*(Minority of members raised their hands.)*

PRESIDENT: Against the amendment?

*(Majority of members raised their hands.)*

PRESIDENT: Amendment voted down. Amendment is not carried.

The motion before the house is that the record, complete record be distributed to the members.

Any further discussion?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: All in favor say "aye."

*(Members present responded with voice vote of "aye.")*

PRESIDENT: Against?

*(No response.)*

PRESIDENT: Motion is carried. I suggest that the Recorder who prepares the record might iron some things out but leave the words as they are and expressions as they are.

COLONEL SKELLY: On the general subject now under discussion and in extension of the remarks of Mr. Douglas, I do not wish to speak anymore at this meeting since you have elected me a Trustee. The members here this evening have suggested that the Board of Trustees prepare a program for the Institute. That is a worthy endeavor and it is appropriate that the Trustees do so but there are many members here this evening who should submit their suggestions and may well do so for the record which will be published because their suggestions will produce more, and produce the human effort that is going to realize them if they speak and—as it were identify their suggestions. Let the Trustees, henceforth, decide, but let the other members present speak their pieces as to appropriate elements for consideration in such a program. I know that some of you know of the numerous elements that have been included in Institute programs in the past—back to the origins of the Institute.



MR. GONDOS: In line with what Colonel Skelly has just said I would like to suggest that in any negotiations with Columbia University—while the university is contemplating publishing *MILITARY AFFAIRS*—there is much left to be desired. The Institute is cautioned that the Columbia people should not have a permanent voting power or whatever other measures are taken in any productions. . . . In effect, whereas Columbia University will recognize a good will in the good name of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, let's not have them take over the Institute lock, stock and barrel.

PRESIDENT: The general idea as I recall it was that the Board of Directors would consist of 30 people which would include a large part of our present Trustees, and General Eisenhower as Chairman of the Board or President of the Institution, which has been discussed with him. The actual executives of the proposed Institute at Columbia are to be the Professor of Military History (occupant of the Chair thereof) and three or four others at Columbia, and the rest of them to be the people who backed the project—15 or 20 people who are not always necessarily there but to start with people who have always supported it and who would probably be the majority of the Trustees. Then, of course, if there were any division in which our own group here on the Board of Directors wanted to do something, we could be outvoted. But probably we would be equal to the actual Columbia bloc. I don't know too much how those things are arranged but I guess it is customary to consider as members of the Board of Trustees those who have a sizable part in founding a new institution. At least, it would seem very reasonable to me. I doubt if we would be in a position of retaining any full control. That, of course, might not reflect the whole view when the time came to act on it.

MR. GLEASON: I don't think it is in the

form of a motion but I would like to make a suggestion that it be the sense of the meeting—the membership at this meeting—that if it is at all possible to go on with the Military Institute in its present form or any substantial form near the present form—we defer consideration of giving over any authority to outside sources, particularly in New York, and I am a New Yorker by birth and raised there, but I have no use for it. I am an American and I don't call New York American at all.

COLONEL SKELLY: Well, I too am a New Yorker, born and raised there. I find no difficulty with the city's Americanism. On the point mentioned, however, Columbia University has proposed something that is affected by the existence of that element within our membership that was the Order of Indian Wars. Returns of membership dues by members come to us from the Order of Indian Wars will, I feel, seriously affect any compromise in the organization to an end wholly apart from whatever their sentiments may be. I think they come among us with a desire to support us with both the funds and sentiments of the Order as it has survived. I felt it necessary to make this comment in view or in extension of the previous speaker's remark.

DR. WINNACKER: I would like to say that the last two sentiments that were voiced by the members of the Institute here are probably the sentiments of everybody concerned. Those of us who saw the difficulties and who have been troubled by the future in the last decade—we have found that this problem of the future of the Institute has been with us for ten years—seventeen years. While it functioned on the enthusiasm of its founders, at the beginning—as I see it—the trouble started after the onset of World War II when the old volunteers, except for some founders, were gone for a while. I remember that in 1946, Mr. Kemper and I talked to Mr. McCloy in New York—and we also

spoke with many others about the Institute and the possible courses that might be followed.

In other words, we were faced every year with the same problems. We would all like to keep the Institute in its old form, but unless we find a way out, we will have to have these membership meetings every month instead of just the editorial board meetings every month. I don't see that we can go on like this, unless we find a home for the Institute or admit defeat and stop publishing **MILITARY AFFAIRS**. That was suggested by various members and Trustees last year. I personally felt that, the world situation being what it was, it would be treason to give up **MILITARY AFFAIRS** in 1949 and I still do. I believe that Columbia offers a way out of the situation. It is not the best way, no matter what it will be eventually. We will have to sacrifice something. As a member mentioned before, I believe that the Trustees should meanwhile—or for the time of grace that Colonel Skelly's efforts have given us—

look around for possible solutions, but just to say that we should continue as we are and not find a solution to the problem is, to me, no way out of the present situation.

At this time I would like to report—for the Activities Committee of the Board of Trustees—that arrangements have been concluded with the American Historical Association for a joint session at the Hotel Stevens in Chicago. The date is 29 December 1950, —10:00 A.M. The topic of the American Military Institute presentation is *Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II*.

PRESIDENT: Are there any further comments?

MR. EAST: I move that we adjourn.

PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for your comments, Dr. Winnacker.

*(Whereupon the motion was duly seconded, carried unanimously by voice vote, and the meeting adjourned at 12:10 A.M. on 4 November 1950.)*

JOHN F. HROZENCIK  
Recorder

MILTON SKELLY  
Secretary

## ANNEX 1

Notice to members of meeting 3 November 1950, with associated documents.

### NOTICE:

#### GENERAL MEMBERS' MEETING AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

at the Pentagon (5 A 1070)

WASHINGTON, D. C.

FRIDAY 3 NOVEMBER 1950

Time: 8:30 P.M.

1. A *General Meeting* of members, to be called at the earliest practicable date was directed by the President following a meeting of Trustees on 23 August 1950. The meeting scheduled for 3 November is the meeting so ordered: *special* whereas petitioned for by members; considered *regular* in view of omission of any regular meeting in 1949.

2. In calling the meeting at the Pentagon, considerations of military security require reply cards to provide for admission of individual members so declaring themselves. Prompt return of the inclosed card is requested. Obviously excepted are those with credentials normally admitting to the Pentagon after regular duty hours.

3. *Qualification of members.*—Until now in 1950, no regular correspondence nor bills for dues, nor issues of *Military Affairs*, have been addressed to members. This notification of *general meeting* is addressed to 1949 and 1950 membership rosters; bills are transmitted herewith to those who have not remitted dues for 1950. Appreciation is extended to those who sent Annual dues without reminder. In justice to the many who remitted 1950 Annual dues, and in justice to classes of membership above Annual, right to vote at the meeting of 3 November will be restricted to members in good standing for the 1950 calendar and Institute year.

4. *Agenda for General Meeting—3 November 1950*

- a. Unfinished business.
  - b. Reports and communications.
  - c. Election of Trustees to fill vacancies (five).
  - d. Special question: The Future of the Institute.
  - e. New business.
5. *Special Information.*
- a. The Pentagon.—Routes are well marked.

The *South Parking Area* will be used for private motor cars. Public services—bus and taxi—admit to the Pentagon Concourse. The *South* (Corridor 3) and *Concourse Entrances* will be used; members will be met there and ushered to the Auditorium 5 A 1070.

- b. Constitution (Certificate of Incorporation) and *By-Laws* of the Institute will be distributed at the meeting.
- c. As to *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, the Journal of the Institute, four issues as usual are planned for 1950, designated numerically rather than seasonally. The *First Issue 1950* is now in preparation and will soon be ready for distribution.

For the President

*Incls.*

- Reply card
  - Bill 1950 AMI
  - SA Env AMI
- (30 Sep 1950)

MILTON SKELLY  
(omitted) Secretary

#### AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION<sup>1</sup>

We, the undersigned, all citizens of the United States, and a majority citizens of the District of Columbia, desiring to associate ourselves as a corporation pursuant to the provisions of Subchapter three (3), of Chapter eighteen (18), of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia,<sup>2</sup> do hereby certify as follows:

First. The name or title by which this corporation shall be known in law shall be AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE.

Second. The term for which it is organized shall be perpetual.

Third. The particular business and objects of this corporation shall be to stimulate and advance the study of military history, especially that of the

<sup>1</sup>As recorded in the District of Columbia Incorporations Record, June 2, 1933, and amended March 24, 1939, and February 28, 1944.

<sup>2</sup>This citation is to the Code published in 1925. Citation to the current Code, the 1940 edition published in 1941, is chapter 6 of title 29.

United States; to diffuse knowledge thereof by publications, displays, and otherwise; and to acquire and preserve manuscripts, publications, pictures, relics, and other material relating thereto.

Fourth. The number of its trustees shall be fifteen (15), and they shall be known as the Board of Trustees.

In Testimony Whereof, we have this first day of June, 1933, hereunto set our hands.

GEO. S. SIMONDS	THOMAS P. MARTIN
A. L. CONGER	JAMES BROWN SCOTT
JOHN R. M. TAYLOR	GEORGE P. AHERN
C. C. BENSON	DUDLEY W. KNOX
CHARLES E. T. LULL	ALLEN R. BOYD

### BY-LAWS<sup>3</sup>

#### ARTICLE I. MEMBERSHIP

Section 1. Any person interested in furthering the objects of the American Military Institute as set forth in the Certificate of Incorporation may, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees, become a member upon application and payment of the dues herein provided.

Section 2. The dues of Annual Members shall be three dollars per annum, payable in advance on the first day of January of each year. Any member whose dues become six months in arrears shall be suspended. New memberships shall become effective as of the beginning of the calendar year in which application is received or, if the applicant so requests, as of the beginning of the following year. (See NOTE below.)

Section 3. The dues of Life Members and of Benefactors shall be a single contribution of fifty dollars and of two hundred and fifty dollars, respectively. (See note below.)

Section 4. All members in good standing shall have the right to attend and participate in membership meetings, shall be supplied without charge one copy of each issue of the journal published while he is a member, and shall have such other privileges as may be prescribed by the Board of Trustees.

Section 5. The annual membership meeting shall be held during December of each year. Special meetings may be called by the President and shall be called by him on the written request of fifteen members. Notice of the time, place, and

purpose of all annual and special meetings shall be mailed by the Secretary to each member not less than two weeks before the date thereof. Fifteen members shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and except as otherwise provided in these by-laws all questions shall be decided by a majority of the members voting.

Section 6. Organizations and institutions shall not be eligible for membership but may subscribe to the journal, *provided*, that the price of such subscriptions shall not be less than the dues for annual membership.

#### ARTICLE II. BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Section 1. The affairs, funds, and property of the Institute shall be managed and controlled by the Board of Trustees.

Section 2. The members of the Institute present at the annual membership meeting shall elect Trustees for a term of three years, said term to begin the first day of January following election, *provided*, that the term of one-third of the Trustees shall end on the last day of December of each year, and unexpired terms may be filled by election at any annual or special membership meeting, *and provided further*, that no person shall be eligible to be a Trustee who is not a member of the Institute, and no Trustee shall receive any compensation from the Institute. Before each meeting at which Trustees are to be elected, the President shall appoint a committee to nominate at least one eligible person for each vacancy, but this shall not prevent any member from making other nominations at the meeting. Election shall be by plurality vote, and the nominees receiving the largest number of votes shall be declared elected.

Section 3. The annual meeting of the Board of Trustees shall be held in January of each year. Special meetings may be called by the President and shall be called by him on the written request of three Trustees. Notice of the time, place, and purpose of all annual and special meetings shall be mailed by the Secretary to each Trustee not less than two weeks before the date thereof, and the officers of the Institute will normally be invited to attend. Seven Trustees shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, Trustees present by proxy being counted for this purpose, and except as otherwise provided by the laws of the District of Columbia all questions shall be decided by a majority of the Trustees voting.

Section 4. The Board of Trustees may ap-

<sup>3</sup>As amended February 25, 1944.



point an Executive Committee from among its members for such term as it may deem proper, not exceeding one year, and may delegate to it such powers as the Board may deem proper and as may be in accord with the laws of the District of Columbia.

### ARTICLE III. OFFICERS

Section 1. The officers of the Institute shall be a President, a Vice-President, a Provost, a Secretary, a Treasurer, an Editor, and a Librarian, each having the powers and duties usually incident to his office.

Section 2. They shall be appointed by and be responsible to the Board of Trustees, which may appoint other officers and prescribe their duties and may combine the offices of Secretary and Treasurer in the same person, *provided*, that no person shall be eligible to hold office who is not a member of the Institute.

Section 3. Officers shall hold office for one year or until their successors are elected and shall submit to the Board of Trustees an annual report and such other reports as the Board may require.

Section 4. The Treasurer shall prepare an annual budget for the approval of the Board of Trustees, and his accounts shall be audited annually by a person or persons designated by the Board.

### ARTICLE IV. SEAL

The seal of the Institute shall be, within an upright elliptical band bearing the inscription AMERICAN MILITARY \*INSTITUTE\*, an ancient field piece on which is perched an eagle head to sinister with wings displayed and inverted partially in front of a Flag of the United States of America, in front of cannon a pile of six cannon balls, all between the year 1933 and the motto HISTORIA MENTEM ARMET.

### ARTICLE V. AMENDMENT

The Certificate of Incorporation, except as otherwise provided by the laws of the District of Columbia, and these by-laws may be amended by resolution of the Board of Trustees and the affirmative vote of a majority of the members voting on the question at any annual or special membership meeting.

NOTE: Action of Board of Trustees, 1 March 1948, changed qualifications of membership, as follows:

- (1) *Founder* membership, contingent on notable special contribution;

- (2) *Patron*, single contribution of \$500;
- (3) *Benefactor*, single contribution of \$250;
- (4) *Life* member, single contribution of \$50;
- (5) *Annual* membership, \$3.50 per annum.

### SCHEDULE OF NOMINEES TO OFFICE AS TRUSTEES AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE FOR TERMS EXPIRING 31 DECEMBER 1952

HUGH MARSHALL COLE:

Military historian; native of Michigan; Ph.D. from University of Minnesota, 1937. Colonel, USA. Presently Chief, European Section, OCMH. Formerly taught Military History at the University of Chicago; was Director of Research, Institute of Military Studies, at University of Chicago. Author of *The Lorraine Campaign* and articles in service journals; member AMI since 1937.

A. M. CRAIGHEAD:

Business man and amateur historian; Yale University circa 1920; engaged in wholesale paper business with the Mead Sales Corporation, Dayton, Ohio; commissioned officer in World War I and World War II; possesses one of the outstanding collections of military paintings and related objects in U. S.; author of articles on military historical subjects; life member of AMI since 1939; Member of Order of Indian Wars.

JESSE S. DOUGLAS:

Native of Salem, Oregon; University of Oregon, BA, MA; further study, University of Minnesota; Staff National Archives 1936-1942; Officers' Reserve Corps from 1937; Managing Editor, MILITARY AFFAIRS, AMI, 1938-42; Military active duty status 1942-48. Separated as Lt. Col. and now Colonel Honorary-Reserve; during WW II with Army Historical Branch, later with Historical Section, JCS; now resident of Wash., D.C. as a research associate of University of Washington; member of AMI since 1937.

GEORGE DYER:

Resident of Bucks County, Pennsylvania; Army officer and writer; Yale University, class of 1925;

Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, 1950; ORC from circa 1936; specialized in Military Intelligence, and until return to active duty in September 1950 as Lt. Col., was engaged in detailed study of history and techniques of Intelligence; member of AMI since 1936; author of the history of the XII Corps, U. S. Army, in collaboration with his wife, also an Army officer; member of AMI since 1936.

JOSEPH I. GREENE:

Resident of Washington, D. C.; graduate U. S. Military Academy, 1923; retired 1945 as Colonel; Associate Editor Infantry Journal, 1938; Editor, 1940; now Sec'y and Gen. Manager of Assn. of the U. S. Army and Editor of Combat Forces Journal; Trustee AMI, 1944 to 1949; President AMI, 1944-1949; Vice-President AMI 1949 to date; Acting President 1950.

The nominees listed above were reported at the meeting of Trustees on 23 August 1950, and are announced to the membership, under provisions of the By-Laws (Article II, Section 2).

For the President:

MILTON SKELLY  
*Secretary*

Washington, D. C.  
3 November 50.

AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE  
MEETING, GENERAL MEMBERSHIP,  
3 NOVEMBER 1950  
SPECIAL RULES OF ORDER

1. To participate in the business of the meeting, to speak, a member will please rise, address the Chair, and identify himself by name.
2. The privilege of the floor is limited to two minutes unless extended by the presiding officer.
3. Reports and communications will be read from the original documents, or rendered orally from notes or ex mentem. If read, the report in full will not be included in the proceedings but attached thereto as an exhibit; otherwise the report will be included in full in the record of proceedings, as also will be included any oral remarks supplementary to documents.
4. All proceedings, except Committee of the Whole, are on the record.

(In going into Committee of the Whole, a chairman for that Committee will preside. On conclusion of the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole, of which no record will be made, the chairman thereof will dissolve the Committee and surrender his chair to the presiding officer of the regular meeting. The presiding officer of the regular meeting will then call it to order. The chairman of the Committee of the Whole will then submit the report of his Committee to the presiding officer of the regular meeting.)

## ANNEX 2

### REPORT OF STATUS OF FUNDS AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

Balance Sheet as of 1 Nov 1950

ASSETS		LIABILITIES	
Coupons Due .....	\$ 600.00		
Cash .....	91.93		
In Trust Funds .....	2,829.31		
Moncado Book Fund .....	5,000.00		
	<hr/>		
Total Cash .....	\$ 8,521.24	Total Liabilities .....	\$ .00
Securities in Trust Fund .....	6,230.00	Net Worth .....	14,761.24
	<hr/>		<hr/>
Total Assets .....	\$14,751.24	Total Liabilities and	
		Net Worth .....	\$14,751.24

#### GAINS AND LOSSES

1 July 1950—1 November 1950

Income—Total .....		\$ 166.35
Coupons .....	\$ 50.00	
Dues and Subscriptions Received .....	95.29	
Dividends .....	21.06	
Expenses—Total .....		25.00
Moving .....	\$ 25.00	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Net Gains .....		\$ 141.35

#### ESTIMATES

Annual Income .....		\$4,630.00
Dividends and Coupons .....	\$ 500.00	
Members' Dues (720 at \$3.50 each) .....	2,520.00	
Subscriptions (460 at \$3.50 each) .....	1,610.00	
Annual Expenses .....		3,400.00
Issues of MILITARY AFFAIRS (4 at \$800.00 each) .....	\$3,200.00	
Miscellaneous .....	200.00	
Annual Surplus .....		\$1,230.00

AUSTIN J. BONIS  
Assistant Treasurer AMI

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# Headquarters Gazette

(continued)

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## TACTICAL USE OF AIR POWER IN WORLD WAR II

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STUDIES PRESENTED

AT

JOINT SESSION

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

CHICAGO ILLINOIS 29 DECEMBER 1950

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DR. KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD PRESIDING FOR AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

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### I. THE ARMY EXPERIENCE

By JAMES A. HUSTON

### II. NOTES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AAF TACTICAL AIR DOCTRINE

By THOMAS J. MAYOCK

### III. THE NAVY EXPERIENCE

By HENRY M. DATER

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## TACTICAL USE OF AIR POWER IN WORLD WAR II: THE ARMY EXPERIENCE

By JAMES A. HUSTON\*

Air power as applied by the Army Air Forces in World War II took two general forms: strategic and tactical. Strategic bombing was that aimed at the enemy's war-making potential—his industrial capacity. Tactical aviation, on the other hand, was that used against more immediate military objectives; its pattern was coordinated more directly with operations on the surface.

A memorandum prepared for the Chief of Staff in September 1940 listed five kinds of aviation support for ground troops. It made no effort to suggest rigid priorities nor to establish precise limitations. Concepts changed during the course of the war, but this statement remains a rather useful expression of the scope of tactical air power. It divided air support as follows: (1) close, direct support fire missions on the immediate front of ground forces; (2) air defense of friendly ground forces and installations in the combat zone; (3) air attack against targets in hostile rear areas; (4) support of airborne forces; (5) reconnaissance, observation, liaison.<sup>1</sup>

Differences of opinion among responsible military leaders on the relative merits of strategic and tactical air, and on how each should be used, persisted from the beginning to the end of the war. American doctrines on the tactical use of air power at the beginning of the war have been described by Lt. Gen. E. R. Quesada, a tactical air force commander during the war, as "conducive to

hysterical acceptance of the doctrines employed by the German Air Force."<sup>2</sup>

The error in the use of the *Luftwaffe*, in General Quesada's view, was in violating the principle of mass and committing it to direct support of ground forces without first cutting off the immediate battle zone. Only in the later stages of the North African campaign and in the invasion of Italy was the Army's tactical air power beginning to be used "correctly." General Quesada concludes: "The final victory is, in itself, sufficient evidence that our tenets of Tactical Air Power were superior to those of our adversaries."<sup>3</sup>

This conclusion could lead to the questionable assumption that everything which the American did was right, or superior, while everything that the German or Japanese did was wrong, or inferior. The results of the German campaigns in the Low Countries and in France in 1940, compared with those in North Africa in 1943 make it rather obvious that something other than the use of tactical air power must have been at work to bring about such different outcomes. Perhaps more than in most other fields of current interest, persons in military affairs appeal to history for proof of the soundness of doctrine or the correctness of procedures. A great deal of care is necessary in interpreting evidence offered for far-reaching conclusions. Perhaps in no other field is it easier for one to find whatever he may be looking for.

Actually, on the eve of World War II, Army aviation seemed to be based upon a concept of a well balanced force. Pooled into

\*Dr. Huston is a professor of history at Purdue University. During World War II he served with the Infantry, attaining the grade of major.

<sup>1</sup>Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops in The US Army in World War II* (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1947) p. 101.

<sup>2</sup>Lt. Gen. E. R. Quesada, *Tactical Air Power, The Air University Quarterly Review*, I (Spring 1948), 37.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 42.

a GHQ Air Force, it included *striking forces*, for offensive operations far from their bases (strategic bombing); *defense forces*; *support forces*, to support directly the operations of ground troops; and *special forces*, for coastal defense and other special tasks.<sup>4</sup>

Later statements of organization and doctrine reflected the growing autonomy of the Army's air arm. In June 1941 a reorganized Army Air Forces superseded the GHQ Air Force, and its leaders continued to press enthusiastically for the recognition of a principal role for air power in the waging of the war. Ground Commanders became concerned as they saw more and more emphasis being placed upon training and equipment for strategic bombing and thus relatively less effort being made to develop tactical support aviation. Strategically, Army Air Forces seemed bent upon pursuing its ambitious bomber offensive against Germany to prove its ability to force a decision against Germany from the air. Tactically, it seemed determined to concentrate air units outside the control of ground commanders, and as much as possible to avoid close support of ground units.<sup>5</sup>

These trends of the Air Forces toward independence of control and operation reached a climax in mid-1943 with the publication of Field Manual 100-20, *Command and Employment of Air Power*. This small pamphlet of fourteen pages, abandoning the sedate style generally associated with such publica-

tions, screamed its doctrines in the first three paragraphs of capital letters:

LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER.

THE GAINING OF AIR SUPERIORITY IS THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY MAJOR LAND OPERATION . . . LAND FORCES OPERATING WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY MUST TAKE SUCH EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST HOSTILE AIR ATTACK THAT THEIR MOBILITY AND ABILITY TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY LAND FORCES ARE GREATLY REDUCED. THEREFORE, AIR FORCES MUST BE EMPLOYED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE ENEMY'S AIR FORCES UNTIL AIR SUPERIORITY IS OBTAINED.

THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER, IS ITS GREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLE AIR POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN TURN . . . CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER . . . THE SUPERIOR COMMANDER WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR FORCES TO UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH GROUND FORCE UNITS ARE OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISOLATED BY DISTANCE OF LACK OF COMMUNICATION.

In theaters of operations, air forces would be divided into a strategic air force and a tactical air force. One might be used to reinforce the other when necessary. Made up of light and medium bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance planes, the tactical air force, according to the field manual, would be assigned a mission consisting of three phases listed according to priority. *First* priority would be "TO gain the necessary degree of

<sup>4</sup>War Dept. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, 1 Oct 39, Par 65.

<sup>5</sup>Kent Roberts Greenfield, *Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team*, AGF Study No. 35 (Washington: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948) (Lithographed), pp. 5-7. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), II, 211-12, 288. FM 100-15, *Larger Units*, 29 Jun 42 pars 213, 214, 234, 236. FM 100-5, 22 May 41 par 79. FM 31-35, *Aviation in Support of Ground Forces*, Apr 42 pars 2, 4-7, 52, 109. FM 1-10, *Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack*, 20 Nov 40, pars 203-9.

air superiority. . . . The primary aim of the tactical air force is to obtain and maintain air superiority in the theater. . . . Air superiority is best obtained by the attack on hostile airdromes, the destruction of aircraft at rest, and by fighter action in the air. This is much more effective than any attempt to furnish an umbrella of fighter aviation over our own troops." Second priority was *Isolation of the Battlefield*—"The disruption of hostile lines of communication . . . , the destruction of supply dumps, installations, and the attack on hostile troop concentrations in rear areas will cause the enemy great damage and may decide the battle." Third priority was given to *combined actions with ground forces*—"The destruction of selected objectives in the battle area in furtherance of the combined air-ground effort. . . . Massed air action on the immediate front will pave the way for an advance. However, in the zone of contact, missions against hostile units are most difficult to control, are most expensive, and are, in general, least effective. . . . Only at critical times are contact zone missions profitable."<sup>6</sup> The very term "air support" was deleted from the official vocabulary.

Based largely on General Montgomery's *Notes on High Command in War*, FM 100-20 reflected General Montgomery's statement of principles but it did not portray accurately the application of those principles in operations of the British Eighth Army and Royal Air Force units in the Western Desert.<sup>7</sup> It was published without the approval or agreement of Army Ground Forces, and it tended to confirm Ground Forces officers in their view that the Air Staff was indifferent to cooperation of air with ground troops.<sup>8</sup>

### *Doctrines Applied: Air Superiority*

The ultimate success of the Air Forces in achieving air superiority—not just locally, but throughout the theaters where they operated—cannot be questioned. The pre-invasion tactical bombing of Sicily drove out about half the German and Italian planes based there, and air superiority was practically complete before the invasion began.<sup>9</sup> During 1943 and early 1944 the Japanese air force in New Guinea was being systematically and completely destroyed. A Japanese staff officer estimated a loss of 800 planes there—about half being destroyed on the ground, about 30 per cent lost in aerial combat, and about 20 per cent attributed to operational losses.<sup>10</sup> Troops who went ashore in Normandy as well as those invading Luzon could be assured that any concentrations of aircraft which might appear overhead would be friendly.<sup>11</sup> Control of the air permitted the execution of plans and the extension of lines of communication which otherwise hardly would have been possible. Moreover, it permitted close air support of ground troops far beyond anything envisaged, at least by the Air Staff, in the earlier months of the war.<sup>12</sup>

### *Isolating the Battlefield*

Hardly less impressive was the Air Force's record in isolating the battlefield to seal off reinforcements and supplies from enemy troops facing American ground forces. Landings on a hostile shore traditionally has been

<sup>9</sup>Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, II, 485.

<sup>10</sup>US Strategic Bombing Survey (hereafter USSBS) (Pacific), Naval Analysis Div, *Interrogation of Japanese Officials*, II, 404.

<sup>11</sup>Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force (cited hereafter as Gen. Eisenhower's Report) (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1946), p. 20. USSBS (Pacific), Naval Analysis Div, *The Campaigns of the Pacific War*, p. 289.

<sup>12</sup>See Orvil A. Anderson, *Air War in the Pacific*, in *Air Affairs*, I (Summer 1947), 556.

<sup>6</sup>FM 100-20, par 16.

<sup>7</sup>Greenfield, *AGF and the Air-Ground Battle Team*, 47-8.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 49.

regarded as among the most difficult of military operations, yet in the Southwest Pacific Area alone Allied forces were able to make nearly eighty separate landings with almost negligible losses. No enemy counterattack ever was able to drive a major American amphibious landing back into the sea. The Japanese defended Cape Gloucester, New Britain, over a wide area; on Corregidor they occupied some of the best prepared defenses in the Pacific. Ground losses were relatively light in both. A number of factors contributed to this result—a paratroop drop on Corregidor, naval gun support, geography, the Japanese defensive attitude, but certainly the pre-assault air attacks and their isolation of the battle-field helped make those achievements possible.<sup>13</sup>

Planes of the Fifth Air Force which struck at roads, bridges and tunnels on southwest Luzon before the American assault over the Lingayen Gulf created serious difficulties for General Yamashita when he sought to shift his defense forces. That interdiction of lines of communication was another outstanding example of planned isolation of a beachhead area.<sup>14</sup>

By the time Allied troops hit the beaches of Normandy, only two bridges over the Seine below Paris remained intact.<sup>15</sup> By 20 July 1944 it was reported that there were no rail bridges left standing nor any rail line uninterrupted in the area bounded by the Loire river, the Seine river and the Paris-Orleans gap.<sup>16</sup>

It took the German 275th Infantry Division a week to travel the 150 miles from

Fougeres to the front. Two panzer divisions, shifting from the east, traveled from Poland to France in no more time than it took them to move from eastern France to Normandy. Men of a German Air Force unit left the Hague by train on 18 June and, after a circuitous tour through Holland, Belgium, the Rhineland and eastern France, were able to reach the battle area only on 3 July.<sup>17</sup>

Some of the lessons for tactical air power which the experiences in northern France seemed to indicate were the value of widespread rail cutting and of armed reconnaissance (seeking out and attacking all targets that can be found in enemy areas), but the temporary effect of the bombing of railway marshaling yards, and the relative ineffectiveness of bombing towns to interrupt enemy road movements.<sup>18</sup>

Tactical air support for the Normandy invasion had been on a grand scale. On D day alone Allied tactical air forces flew 5,276 sorties, while planes of the strategic air forces flew another 5,309 sorties on tactical missions. During the first week of the campaign the tactical forces flew some 35,000 sorties, and in the days which followed they continued to fly, when weather was good, as many as 4,000 sorties a day.<sup>19</sup>

When the German counteroffensive broke through the Ardennes in December 1944, all available air power was called upon to help stop the drive. Specifically, its major task again was to isolate the battle area. In order of priority, air attacks were aimed at (1) railway bridges on lines leading toward the battle area; (2) concentrations of supplies in rail yards within the line of interdiction; (3) all communication centers and junctions; (4) a continuous harassment by fighters and

<sup>13</sup>USSBS, Military Analysis Div., *The Fifth Air Force in the War against Japan* (Jun. 1947), p. 76.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.* Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War (Cited hereafter as General Marshall's Report), pp 75-80.

<sup>15</sup>General Eisenhower's Report, p. 28.

<sup>16</sup>Informational Intelligence summary (Washington: AC of Air Staff, Intelligence, AAF), 10 Aug 44, p. 18.

<sup>17</sup>General Eisenhower's Report, p. 28.

<sup>18</sup>Lewis H. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1946), p. 298.

<sup>19</sup>General Eisenhower's Report, pp. 20, 28.



fighter-bombers of all rail and road movement. At first the air attacks were concentrated in the area Cologne-Coblenz-Trier, and later were extended southward to the area Coblenz - Kaiserlautern - Saarbrücken - Trier. It was estimated that traffic practically was brought to a standstill in the first area, and was seriously dislocated in the second. Comparing the results obtained in this relatively small area with those of the widespread, heavy attacks which had been carried out farther east, the Working Committee of the Combined Strategic Target Committee recommended that these concentrated attacks be repeated on other selected areas. The Committee estimated that continued heavy attacks on transportation in larger areas could not produce strategic effects on the German war economy in less than eight months or a year.<sup>20</sup> Here, after two years of intensive strategic bombing, the *Wehrmacht* had been able to assemble troops, equip them, and move them to mount a major counteroffensive in the West. Tactical air power, directed against rail lines serving the battle area instead of deep within Germany, against the supply dumps and communications instead of the factories, and against military forces instead of cities, had been able to help blunt that counteroffensive within a few weeks. Perhaps he was speaking with some exaggeration, but von Runstedt was reported to have said that but for the savage Allied strafing attacks the German counteroffensive would have driven on to Paris.<sup>21</sup>

One difficulty in the attacks against transportation was the tendency to *overbomb* certain areas. In December 1944 Allied air forces dropped 17,113 tons of bombs on the Cologne area, when, according to estimate of

the US Strategic Bombing Survey, 1/50 of that tonnage would have been enough to do the job. In other words, about 16,770 tons of bombs were virtually wasted on Cologne alone in December 1944.<sup>22</sup>

Late in February 1945 air forces began a systematic isolation of the industrial Ruhr valley. The area was to be completely isolated by cutting eighteen key bridges or viaducts on every railway in a wide arc from Bremen in the north, down the Weser river, through Bielefeld, and to Coblenz in the south. Heavy bombers were assigned to six of the major targets, including Bielefeld, while mediums and fighter-bombers were to take the others. Between this line and the Ruhr, every rail yard, line, and center of any importance was to be attacked heavily and repeatedly. Finally, fighter-bombers were to create local stoppages over wide areas by attacking trains and cutting lines. Here was a case where strategic and tactical objectives overlapped. The strategic objective was to prevent raw materials from moving into the Ruhr war industries and to keep finished materials and coal from moving out. The tactical objective was to prevent the reinforcement and supply of troops defending the area. By 24 March, when the Northern Group of Armies attacked across the Rhine, the isolation was practically complete. Of the eighteen bridges and viaducts selected on the outer arc, sixteen had been cut; twenty of the twenty-five important railway centers and marshaling yards on the periphery of the valley had been heavily damaged, and tactical air forces claimed the destruction of 113 bridges, 4,000 locomotives, 28,000 cars, and 5,000 rail cuts.<sup>23</sup>

It was found that intensive fighter-bomber activities against bridges, small stations, and main line trackage outside of stations was

<sup>20</sup>USSBS, Transportation Div., *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Transportation*, 2d ed. (1947) p. 14.

<sup>21</sup>AAF, *Pilot Training Manual for the Invader A-26* (15 Aug 45), p. 4.

<sup>22</sup>USSBS, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Transportation*, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15.

much more effective in paralyzing German rail transportation than were the attacks of heavy bombers against marshaling yards. Line cutting was the only effective way of reducing movements of troops and supplies in complete trains.<sup>24</sup>

Yet isolation of the battlefield, with all its remarkable success, could not paralyze completely the movements of enemy forces nor the movement of supplies to them. As General Arnold wrote:

The Air Force could not completely dry up the flow of essential supplies to the Germans in Italy. They lived off the country, regardless of the attitude of the inhabitants. The German's frugality and will power—like the Japanese emerging stolidly from island caves, with their thin bags of rice or dried fish "field rations," after Napalm flames had been poured for weeks into their hideouts—made it possible for him to maintain himself in apparently impossible circumstances. While we isolated the battlefield, in so far as supplies and reinforcements were concerned, we did not always force the Germans to surrender.

When we were operating against the eight German divisions still south of Rome, . . . we cut practically every railroad and road south of the Pisa-Rimini line. We even attacked important railroad centers north of the Appennines. We were destroying motor transports on the road at the rate of twenty to thirty a day, which represented a monthly loss of 50 per cent of all motor transportation available to the Germans in Italy. Yet, somehow or other, those eight divisions held out and fought—fought well—for a remarkably long time.<sup>25</sup>

Something more apparently was needed than isolation of the battlefield. The next step was close support for ground troops.

### *Close Support*

The problem of the tactical use of air power which gave the greatest difficulty, especially early in the war, was that of the

close support of ground troops (or *cooperation* as the Air Forces preferred to call it). Sometimes the term *close-support* may be used to refer to closeness in space, that is, to the air attack of targets close to the lines or columns of troops on the ground. Sometimes this term refers more to closeness of command, communication, and cooperation. Usually it includes both.

Experiences in North Africa left much to be desired as far as American ground commanders were concerned. General Brereton, who commanded American Elements in the Western Desert Air Force, on the other hand, was highly impressed by that force's cooperation with the British Eighth Army during the summer of 1942. There the air force's task was to defeat the enemy air forces and maintain air supremacy. "The next and equally important task," in the words of General Brereton, was "to assist in the ground operation by destroying enemy troops, artillery, transport and supply."<sup>26</sup> "Fighter-bomber technique was not taught in the States," General Brereton noted in his diary. "Indeed, there existed a school of thought prior to our entry into the war which considered such employment uneconomical and ineffective."<sup>27</sup> American ground commanders arriving in north-west Africa in the months following considered that school of thought still prevalent in the Air Corps.

In December 1942 the commander of a combat command of the 1st Armored Division wrote to General Marshall as follows:

My regiment has fought well, has had rather severe losses, but can go on. I have talked with all ranks possible and am sure that men cannot stand the mental and physical strain of constant aerial bombings without feeling that all possible is being done to beat back the enemy air effort. News of bombed cities or ships or ports is not the answer they expect. They know what they

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>25</sup>H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), pp. 449-500.

<sup>26</sup>*The Brereton Diaries*, p. 143.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*

see and at present there is little of our air to be seen.<sup>28</sup>

Ground commanders were not impressed by dogmatic statements of Air Forces staff officers on the ineffectiveness of close air support. They felt sure that close support could be highly effective. They felt sure because they saw the effect of German air attacks upon themselves. As a result of his observations in North Africa, John J McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, concluded:

It is my firm belief that the Air Forces are not interested in this type of work, think it is unsound, and are very much concerned lest it result in control of Air units by ground forces. Their interest, enthusiasm and energy is directed to different fields.<sup>29</sup>

The perfection of air-ground cooperation depended not upon statements of doctrine in Washington, but upon the practical application of teamwork in combat.

On Guadalcanal air and ground officers worked together to plan and carry out close support missions. When artillery could not reach defiladed Japanese positions, dive bombers would be called in to do the job.<sup>30</sup> During an attack for the ridge known as *Gallop Horse* in January 1943 air support came to the aid of units meeting difficult resistance. Soon after the attack of one battalion bogged down, the regimental commander sent the air support commander to see what could be done. After a talk with the infantry battalion commander, the air officer agreed to bomb the objective hill; an artillery smoke shell was to mark the target and to be the signal to bomb. When the airplanes arrived the battalion commander called

for the artillery shell; to his dismay it fell on the wrong hill—near his own observation post. Quickly he ordered his 81mm mortars to mark the correct target. Not misled by the short round, the pilots flew in to bomb the correct positions, and shortly thereafter it was in the hands of the infantry.<sup>31</sup>

Plans had been made for close air support of ground operations on New Georgia, but soon it became apparent that the dense jungle growth made normal procedures impracticable. Neither air liaison officers on the ground nor observers in spotter aircraft overhead could identify enemy positions. A solution to the difficulty might have been found by adapting artillery fire adjustment methods and talking the pilots onto the targets, but the lack of good maps and the lack of reliable radio communication ruled that out.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless the heaviest air bombardment in the South Pacific up to that time supported the final attack on Munda airstrip on 25 July 1943; yet the Japanese held out another eleven days. Results of air support in New Georgia had been rather disappointing. This was due partly to the ability of the Japanese defenses to withstand the attacks. But it may also have been due in part to the lack of enough cooperation. The operations officer of the Strike Command felt that the ground commander did not appreciate the usefulness of air power, and when requests did come the targets were usually 1,000 to 2,000 yards in front of the lines.<sup>33</sup> Here perhaps it was the ground commander who was taking too seriously the doctrine laid down in FM 100-20!

As elsewhere, the question of liaison and communication limited close air support during the Buna campaign in New Guinea. The

<sup>28</sup>Pers. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Paul McD. Robinett to Gen. Marshall, 8 Dec 42, quoted in Greenfield, *AGF and Air-Ground Battle Team*, p. 19.

<sup>29</sup>Memo Mr. McCloy for Gen. Lear, 15 May 43, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>30</sup>John Miller, Jr., *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, in The US Army in World War II* (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1949), p. 260.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 268.

<sup>32</sup>Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, IV, 231-2.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 233.

procedure of sending requests for air strikes back through ordinary command channels—through regiment, division, corps, army—was slow and cumbersome. Closer coordination could be had when pilots were sent to ground units to act as observers, and ground officers were attached to the air headquarters. As soon as mobile very high frequency radios could be had, support Air Parties came into being. Now air observers could send their requests by voice radio (monitored by corps and army) directly to the air task force headquarters, and then could talk to the pilots to direct them to the targets.<sup>84</sup>

For ground support operations in the Pacific the Fifth Air Force found the fighter-bomber and the light attack bomber to be the most useful instruments. The fighter-bomber could strafe, skip bomb, or dive bomb. The mountainous country of New Guinea and the Philippines often made dive bombing tactics necessary and, because of its accuracy, this procedure ordinarily was used against pinpoint targets close to ground troops. In some cases effective attacks were made within one hundred yards of friendly ground troops. Even more destructive were the attack bombers when they could come in low in a surprise attack to drop parachute bombs and to strafe with machine guns and cannon. The A-20 was used extensively at first, but the ultimate for low altitude work probably was the A-26, "Invader" which appeared late in the war.<sup>85</sup> The A-26 was said to be as fast as a fighter at its altitude, it carried more bombs than any medium bomber, and no other plane equalled its strafing power. In its bays it could carry sixteen bombs—up to 6,000 pounds—or it could carry two torpedoes. On its wing racks it could carry four 500 pound bombs or chemical tanks, or it could carry fourteen rockets

there. In addition to six or eight .50 caliber machine guns in its wings, it could carry any of a number of combinations of guns—from six .50 caliber machine guns to two machine guns and a 75mm cannon—in its nose.<sup>86</sup> One of the more fearsome, and more effective, developments was the napalm, or jellied gasoline fire bomb. Weeks of probing by ground troops in the Ipo Dam area, west of Manila, had failed to uncover any weak spots in a series of five Japanese strongholds in an area about one mile square. Five fighter groups then flew 646 sorties to drop 200,000 gallons of napalm. Afterwards the infantry was able to move into the Japanese strong points standing up.<sup>87</sup>

This new air weapon was also a major factor in reducing the Japanese defense works—in pillboxes and caves—on the Marianas.<sup>88</sup> The campaign in the Marianas was the first in the Central Pacific in which land-based planes were used in direct support of ground troops, and their attacks on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam appeared to be of considerable value to the operations on the ground.<sup>89</sup>

Air-ground cooperation had not been perfected in the Pacific, but it had been made effective. In a slow-moving ground situation the demand for speed of communications and for speed in response to requests for air support was not as urgent as in other situations. The scarcity of suitable targets for strategic bombing reduced another possible point of contention. Moreover the objectives of ground operations were of direct interest to the air forces in obtaining more advanced airbases. For close-in cooperation, reports

<sup>84</sup>AAF, *Pilot Training Manual for the Invader A-26*, pp. 4, 51-4.

<sup>85</sup>USSBS, *The Fifth Air Force in the War against Japan*, p. 75.

<sup>86</sup>Clive Howard and Joe Whiteley, *One Damned Island After Another* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 228.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 230. Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, IV, 690-3.

<sup>84</sup>USSBS, *The Fifth Air Force in the War against Japan*, pp. 76-7.

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 76-6.



from the South and Central Pacific suggested that Navy and Marine aviation was working well with Army ground units and it appeared that their close-in cooperation with ground troops had developed somewhat beyond that achieved in those areas by Army aviation.<sup>40</sup> But in spite of the statement of FM 100-20 that *only at critical times are contact zone missions profitable*, and although some advocates of independent air power questioned the usefulness of close air support for ground troops, that very use of air power often was practically indispensable in the Pacific. The very nature of important objectives, the dispositions of Japanese defenses, and the limitations of artillery and naval gun fire often demanded air strikes as the only means for forcing an early decision.<sup>41</sup>

Meanwhile, further experience in the Mediterranean had been pointing up weaknesses in close support as well as some of its possibilities. In Sicily planes sometimes bombed and strafed friendly troops, and ground troops too frequently fired on friendly aircraft. At other times pilots had to withhold fire against concentrations of enemy troops because of their lack of information on the exact location of friendly troops. Yet Kesselring, the German commander, attributed the Allied success there "in the first place" to the air forces—<sup>42</sup> a judgment which possibly was colored by a hope of justifying his own defeat. In the words of the official Air Force History the most important development of air operations in Sicily was not that a plane sometimes bombed friendly troops, nor that troops sometimes fired on friendly planes, most important was— "... the fact that tactical air missions were controlled by the air arm and not by ground commanders and were

under a centralized operational control which kept air power from being frittered away piecemeal and permitted it to use its greatest qualities of mobility, flexibility, and concentration."<sup>43</sup>

The pattern of Allied air support for the British invasion of the Italian mainland followed what was coming to be regarded as more or less "normal." Until D minus 7, air attacks were to be directed against enemy airfields in order to obtain air superiority. From D minus 6 to D minus 1, the air assault would be aimed at isolating the assault areas, interdicting into the area, and reducing defenses. On D Day, all planes of the North African Tactical Air Force would be committed to direct support missions. From D plus 1 to D plus 3, 40 per cent of the planes would be in direct support, while the other 60 per cent would strike at airfields and communications. Thereafter 20 per cent would remain for direct support.<sup>44</sup>

But again, American ground commanders in Tunisia and Sicily never had been satisfied with their air support. They generally hoped that the air units needed for support in critical operations could be put under control of division commanders, but FM 100-20 forbade that. Most criticism related to poor communications and the slowness of response to requests for air support.<sup>45</sup> After the landings at Salerno the Fifth Army and XII Air Support Command worked out arrangements for closer cooperation. The two headquarters were to be located near each other habitually, and ground liaison officers were to assist in briefing the pilots. Fifth Army would receive requests from lower units and coordinate them. Requests would go from the divisions directly to army by radio, while corps monitored. Scheduled missions would

<sup>40</sup>Greenfield, *AGF and the Air-Ground Battle Team*, pp. 94-5.

<sup>41</sup>R. A. Ofstie and J. A. Field, Jr., *War in the Pacific*, in *Air Affairs*, I (Dec. 1946), 214-5.

<sup>42</sup>Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, II, 485-6.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 486-7.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 493.

<sup>45</sup>Greenfield, *AGF and the Air-Ground Battle Team*, p. 78.

be planned together each evening for the following day. Additional aircraft then would stand by for special *on call* missions. That improvement over the situation in Tunisia and Sicily had been obtained was evident when it could be reported in November that no missions were being refused except on technical grounds—that no mission had been refused as one being directed against an unprofitable target. However, these measures were strictly limited, for 85 per cent of the missions continued to be flown at the direction of higher air headquarters, and only 15 per cent in response to plans worked out with Fifth Army. Communication still was too slow, but it was considerably better than it had been. More important was the spirit of cooperation which developed between air and ground officers. This system was based principally upon the experience of the British Eighth Army and the RAF units supporting it. Curiously, then, the doctrines of FM 100-20 which had served to drive American air and ground forces farther apart, and now the devices which were operating to bring them into closer cooperation both were based upon the same British experience.<sup>46</sup>

Generally speaking, tactical air operations in close support of ground troops may be said to fall into three categories. In the first would be those large-scale operations planned by higher headquarters to concentrate massive power at a decisive point with the intent of blasting a hole in the enemy's defenses with a single tremendous blow. These would include such operations as the bombing of Cassino, of Cherbourg, and the strike near St. Lo before the breakthrough. A second category would be special missions extending over some time for an Army, such as the protection of the Third Army's right flank by the XIX Tactical Air Command. The third category would include specific missions,

scheduled or on call, flown at the request of ground commanders.

After the first battle for Cassino, early in February 1944, had ended in failure, the Allied Command called upon bombers to destroy the Abbey on dominating Monastery Hill and to repeat their bombing of the town. But the second ground assault which followed found German resistance just as determined as ever. A third attempt was planned for 15 March with the benefit of an all-out aerial bombardment. The infantry drew back five miles; then between 8:30 a.m. and noon medium and heavy bombers dropped some 1,400 tons of bombs intended for an area about one mile square. But when the infantry got back to the town about 1:00 o'clock, once more they found the Germans still there. About the only result seemed to be the creation of great piles of rubble which served as cover for the defenders and as obstacles for the attackers. Not all the bombs dropped on the target area. A number fell among friendly troops. The caravan headquarters of the British Eighth Army's commander, three miles away, was demolished. A formation of heavy bombers mistook Venafrò for Cassino, twelve miles distant, and dropped its load on the French corps headquarters there. The ground battle continued for eight days, and again had to be broken off. Not until 17 May did Allied troops occupy Cassino.<sup>47</sup>

The first large scale bombing in support of ground troops in Normandy was at Cherbourg. There, on 22 June 1944 ten squadrons from the 2d Tactical Air Force (RAF) and 562 fighter-bombers and 387 light and medium bombers of the US Ninth Air Force bombed and strafed positions in front of US 9th and 79th Divisions. Again, however, results were disappointing, and again, in spite

<sup>47</sup>Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, *The Second World War* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 271-3. General Marshall's Report, p. 22.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 76-79.

of a bomb line 1200 yards short of the target, there were casualties among friendly troops. German casualties had not been heavy, and no immediate breakthrough resulted.<sup>48</sup>

Heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force were called upon to join with fighter-bombers and medium and light bombers of the Ninth Air Force for an all out carpet bombing in front of American troops poised for the breakthrough west of St Lo in July 1944. After a false start on 24 July—during which some thirty-six heavy bombers dropped their bombs about 3,000 yards short—had been called off because of bad weather after bombing already had started, the full attack came the next day. Front line troops withdrew 1200 yards to the north of the target area and, at 9:40 AM, fighter-bombers began striking a 300-yard strip along the St Lo-Periers road. Then came the 1,500 heavy bombers to drop about 3,000 tons of bombs on a target area approximately one mile by five miles. More fighter-bombers and medium bombers followed. Flying east to west, parallel to the front, the fighter-bombers ran little risk of bombing short. The heavies, however, flew in over the friendly troops, and a number of them dropped their bombs far short. Apparently the drift of smoke laid down to mark the bomb line caused some confusion, and some bombardiers mistook a parallel road for the one which was supposed to be their guide for the north limit of the target. Unfortunately, the short bombs caused serious casualties in some of the forward infantry battalions, in one of the tank battalions, and some artillery installations received direct hits. Reserve battalions replaced those hardest hit, and after a delay of an hour and a half, those units moved forward in the

ground attack. As at Caen a week earlier where a similar carpet bombing had preceded a British attack—and where also friendly troops had been hit by bombs falling short—the effects of the bombing on the German defenders seemed to be only temporary, and casualties were not heavy. Precisely to what extent the massive carpet bombing contributed to the breakout which followed is impossible to say.<sup>49</sup>

American air commanders in Europe considered it unwise to use heavy bombers on close support missions; General Spaatz, particularly, objected to the diversion of heavy bombers from their strategic bombing offensive.<sup>50</sup> But it was an example of the exploitation of the *inherent flexibility* of air power, and of faithful fulfillment of the principle of mass.

The value of any of the major attempts at massive carpet bombing may be seriously questioned. Certainly it is difficult to justify, in terms of immediate results, the tremendous expenditure of resources in the tonnage of bombs dropped at Cassino, or at Caen, or at St. Lo. Perhaps this simply was the logical extreme of the principles of mass, flexibility, and concentration. *Flexibility enables air power to be switched quickly from one objective to another in a theater of operations*, FM 100-20 had stated.<sup>51</sup> Perhaps the same resources decentralized to lower units, and operating in close communication with ground elements, would have been considerably more effective.

<sup>48</sup>Maj. Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Utah Beach to Cherbourg, in American Forces in Action Series* (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1947), pp. 171-3. AAF Informational Intelligence Summary, 10 Aug 44, p. 19.

<sup>49</sup>First US Army, *Report of Operations 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44*, pp. 98-100, 120-1. General Eisenhower's Report, pp. 36-7. General Marshall's Report, p. 35. *The Breton Diaries*, pp. 313-6. Field Marshal Sir. B. L. Montgomery, *Normandy to the Baltic* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), pp. 135-8. Greenfield, *AFG and The Air-Ground Battle Team*, pp. 87-8. Fuller, *The Second World War*, pp. 300-4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1948), p. 272. Ernie Pyle, *Brave Men* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944), pp. 430-9.

<sup>50</sup>*The Breton Diaries*, p. 317.

<sup>51</sup>Par. 9 e. FM 100-20.

Air-ground cooperation reached new heights of achievement as the armies sped across France during the summer of 1944. Most spectacular was the cooperation with tanks to build a team for real *blitzkrieg* operations. Each advancing armored column of the First Army had the cooperation of four fighter-bombers, as a general rule, flying cover for it. The planes could report enemy movements and could attack enemy formations wherever they appeared. When the alert planes found an air target too big for themselves, the flight leader could call for reinforcements by direct radio to the air operations officer. Tank battalion commanders and air officers riding in leading tanks could communicate with the pilots overhead as well as with air support party officers at division and corps headquarters.<sup>52</sup> Similar arrangements added impetus to the Third Army's spectacular drive. A fighter-bomber group of the XIX Tactical Air Command worked directly with each armored division. The Air Command continued its attacks to seal off the battlefield, and then it received the task of protecting the long, exposed right flank of the Third Army along the Loire River by breaking up any enemy concentrations which might appear in that area.<sup>53</sup>

It seemed that effective air-ground cooperation and the application of close tactical support was being achieved in spite of the Field Service Regulations.

### *Night Attacks.*

Far-reaching improvements in tactical air power never did mean perfection to the point of completely denying major enemy troop movements and the transportation of

equipment and supplies. Always certain loopholes were apparent; and the greatest of these was movement by night. To drive the enemy to movement at night might have been to inconvenience him, and even to put heavy burdens on his organization and facilities, but it did not stop him. In a letter to General Marshall, 19 February 1944, General Eisenhower wrote: "For the past five days there has been good weather in Italy and our reports show an average of 1,000 sorties per day. Yet with only two main roads and a railway on which to concentrate, our reports show a steady stream of traffic by night to the south and southeast of Rome."<sup>54</sup>

American intelligence officers on Okinawa found it difficult to interpret Japanese troop movements south of Shuri, partly because a large proportion of the troops were moving at night.<sup>55</sup>

The question of night intruder missions received some attention in a study prepared by the Ninth Air Force. That study, unfortunately, remains inaccessible under security classification. Ironically, training doctrine for American ground forces had taught the importance of moving at night in order to avoid air attack, but in Europe that was the very time when the German Air Force was most dangerous. Thus soldiers of the 35th Division rested and played baseball one sunny afternoon near the end of the Normandy campaign in order to await nightfall for a movement by motor truck. Friendly planes commanded the skies throughout the day. But when the truck convoy was on the road that night German raiders appeared, as many of the soldiers had learned to expect, and they caused casualties, damage, and delay in the division.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>52</sup>First US Army, *Report of Operations*, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, p. 121.

<sup>53</sup>General Eisenhower's Report, pp. 47-8. *The Brereton Diaries*, pp. 321-4. H. M. Cole, *The Lorraine Campaign in The U. S. Army in World War II* (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1950), p. 20. See also George S. Patton, Jr., *War as I Knew It* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), p. 108.

<sup>54</sup>In War Dept Operations Division files, case 217.

<sup>55</sup>Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, *Okinawa: The Last Battle, in The US Army in World War II* (Washington: US Govt Printing Office, 1948), pp. 389-93.

<sup>56</sup>See James A. Huston, *Biography of a Battalion* (Gering, Nebr.: Courier Press, 1950), pp. 63-4.



It was a curious thing how similarities in sayings and nick-names spread among theaters of operations thousands of miles apart. On Guadalcanal men harassed nightly by single or small groups of Japanese air raiders dubbed the intruders "Washing Machine Charlie."<sup>57</sup> Japanese night raiders on New Georgia had similar effect.<sup>58</sup> In Normandy single or small groups of German raiders were so regular in their calls—about 11 o'clock each evening—that they were called "Bed Check Charlie," and ground soldiers wondered why night fighters were not stopping them, and they wondered if night raiders were attacking German columns every night.<sup>59</sup> Likewise Japanese night intruders on Saipan received the appellation, "Bed Check Charlie."<sup>60</sup> Given the great size of the American tactical air forces, their perfection of night intruder technique might have gone far toward making their total effect much more decisive.

A similar problem was that of overcoming the obstacles of bad weather. With the benefit of the poor visibility prevailing in Europe in mid-December 1944, the German army in the Ardennes was able to prove the possibility of launching a major offensive without the benefit of air superiority, statements of FM 100-20 to the contrary notwithstanding.

### *Air Defense*

Fulfillment of the air defense responsibilities of tactical aviation depended primarily upon the successful execution of its first priority missions, that is, the maintenance of general air superiority. Offense was considered to be the best defense against enemy bombardment. Air forces found it easier to

attack a surface target than to defend it from attack, and it soon became evident that defensive measures alone would not ordinarily stop a strong and determined air attack. Therefore the practice was to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft on the ground and to render unusable the enemy's air bases.<sup>61</sup> Interceptor aircraft still was needed, nevertheless, for direct protection against an enemy pursuing similar tactics or striking at ground troops. This problem of defense introduced the question of the role which anti-aircraft artillery should play. Success of German air support during 1939 and 1940 gave impetus to an unparalleled expansion in American anti-aircraft artillery.<sup>62</sup> Between 1941 and 1943, while the infantry was expanding six fold, the anti-aircraft artillery was expanding by 1,750 per cent.<sup>63</sup>

Difficulties in coordination recommended that all anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and barrage balloons be attached to the interceptor commands of the Air Forces for the air defense of the United States. This policy was accepted in 1941, and General McNair's recommendation that the same principle be extended to combat zones received official sanction later, though it was not carried out.<sup>64</sup> Combat divisions retained control of attached anti-aircraft units for their own defense. The doctrine outlined in FM 100-20 in 1943 recognized this distinction—that anti-aircraft units assigned to the defense of an area should be under the responsible air force commander, but those attached to ground combat units should remain under the ground commander.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>61</sup>USSBS, *The Fifth Air Force in the War against Japan*, p. 87. Anderson, *Air War in the Pacific*, in *Air Affairs*, I, 544-5.

<sup>62</sup>Lt. Col. Alvin M. Cibula, *Antiaircraft Command and Center*, AGF Study No. 26, 1 Sep 45 (lithographed), p. 2.

<sup>63</sup>Greenfield, et al., *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 418.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 124-5.

<sup>65</sup>FM 100-20, par. 18.

<sup>57</sup>Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, IV, 84.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>59</sup>Huston, *Biography of a Battalion*, pp. 43, 49, 51, 63.

<sup>60</sup>Howard and Whitley, *One Damned Island After Another*, p. 231.

A suggestion by War Department G-3 in February 1943 that the Antiaircraft Command be transferred from Army Ground Forces to Army Air Forces had the support of G-1 and G-4 as well as of General Arnold, commander of Army Air Forces. But General McNair, Ground Forces Commander, opposed the move though two years earlier he had urged air force command over anti-aircraft units during operations, and no change in jurisdiction ever came about.<sup>66</sup>

### *Tactical Reconnaissance*

The principal use of military aviation originally had been in observation for ground armies and in denying observation to the enemy. From the point of view of Army Ground Forces, this continued to be an important function during World War II. This work included visual observation, aerial photography, and aerial adjustment of artillery fire.

Again ground commanders were disappointed as to the effectiveness of air support. Reorganization of Air Forces reconnaissance units in 1943 indicated a primary interest in photography and observation toward air objectives rather than in missions of more direct interest to ground forces. Failures, as in any military operation, sometimes were the result of vexing oversights in seemingly minor but obvious details. In the first week of February 1943 American commanders on Guadalcanal were anxious to know whether Japanese troops were being reinforced preparatory to counterattack or whether they were being evacuated. Aerial photographs would have given the answer, but they could not be had. The Army Air Forces reconnaissance squadron which had relieved the 2d Marine Air Wing of reconnaissance duties had arrived with good P-38 planes and good cameras; but

it had neither filters for the cameras nor paper on which to print its pictures.<sup>67</sup>

More often the lack of photo coverage in the early years of the war seemed due to the low priority of tactical missions for ground operations. An Army Ground Forces observer reported from North Africa that though no photomaps and very few photographs had been provided for ground operations up to 28 April 1943, "hundreds of photographs of bombing actions" were found in the files of air headquarters, and "many excellent photographs" of successful bomb strikes were posted on their walls.<sup>68</sup>

This situation improved markedly, however, in the campaigns which followed. Photo coverage, both for photomaps and for pinpoint photographs generally was sufficient through the campaigns in Italy and in the European Theater, but criticism remained of the lack of speed in filling requests.<sup>69</sup> Some of the delays in Italy during September 1943 were due to the distance from Air Force headquarters in North Africa, though on one occasion there a division requested some pinpoint photographs and within six hours the pictures had been taken, developed, interpreted, and the target fired on by artillery.<sup>70</sup> Other delays apparently were due to lack of immediate attention. After a tour in the European Theater, the Army Ground Forces Air Officer reported that, in the photographic laboratories, "Air Forces photographs (for example, those used to assess bomb damage to distant targets) in every case have priority over air photos taken for ground units."<sup>71</sup>

<sup>67</sup>Miller, *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive*, pp. 338-40.

<sup>68</sup>Greenfield, *AGF and the Air-Ground Battle Team*, p. 55. (Quotations from report of Col. Henry V. Dexter, 11 Jun 43.)

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 92-3.

<sup>70</sup>Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, II, 537.

<sup>71</sup>Greenfield, *AGF and the Air-Ground Battle Team*, p. 93. (Notes on Air Reconnaissance for Ground Units, incl. with memo of Lt. Col. Roy C. Flannagan for G-3 AGF.)

<sup>66</sup>Greenfield, *et al.*, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 420.

Of even more direct concern was the matter of air observation for the adjustment of artillery fire. Here a solution was found in the assignment of light liaison airplanes to field artillery units. But it was a solution which met determined opposition from the Army Air Forces from beginning to end. Based upon what appeared to be more feeling for branch prestige than for demonstrated results, Army Air Forces made repeated efforts to capture control of artillery liaison aviation even after it had been well established, and air officers looked with sharp disapproval on any attempts to extend the benefits of light observation planes for infantry and armor. This extension was successfully forestalled until mid-1945.<sup>72</sup> The Air Forces seemed to adhere to policies which would assure to itself control over everything which could fly, regardless of mission. In January 1944 General Arnold signed a memorandum for the Chief of Staff which attacked organic field artillery air observations as "over-extended, wasteful of resources, and unsound in principle."<sup>73</sup>

General McNair, not sold on the idea himself at first, replied as follows:

The basic memorandum contains a number of debatable statements. However, the main issue really is satisfactory air observation for field artillery. The present system is outstandingly successful—one of the remarkable developments in connection with the effective artillery support which is being given the infantry in all theaters. On the other hand, field artillery air observation by the air forces has been unsatisfactory since the advent of military aviation. There is abundant reason to doubt that the results would be otherwise if this task were returned to the air forces now. Especially would it be hazardous to make so radical a change at this particular time. The cost of liaison aviation, regardless of who mans it, is microscopically small as compared with the

cost of the air forces as a whole, and is hardly a material factor in the discussion.<sup>74</sup>

Even such an enthusiast for independent air power as de Seversky had recognized the desirability of retention of certain transport and local reconnaissance aviation in the Army organically.<sup>75</sup>

How effective artillery liaison planes could be was demonstrated in the campaigns in Europe in 1944 and 1945. Ground soldiers came to attach an almost phenomenal importance to the little spotter planes, and insisted on having them aloft almost continuously.<sup>76</sup>

A German soldier wrote in a letter in December 1944:

The artillery observers destroy our positions. Here our artillery is shooting a little more, but the answer always comes, and in much greater quantities. We all would be very happy to see a few of our fighter planes which would bring an end to the *stueren* which we call the artillery observers. Without any interference these dogs fly around all day in our sky. Against that one can only hide like a little mouse and do the rest at night.<sup>77</sup>

Here was an eloquent expression of the ground soldier's demand for local air coverage as well as testimony to the effectiveness of artillery light observation planes.

### *Airborne Operations*

One of the more spectacular uses of aviation which appeared in World War II was in the mounting of airborne operations. Actually General William Mitchell had planned a paratroop drop against Metz in World War I, but the Armistice had made that proposed operation unnecessary,<sup>78</sup> and it was

<sup>72</sup>Memo, Gen. McNair for the Chief of Staff, 16 Feb 44, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>75</sup>Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky, *Victory Through Air Power* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1942), p. 259.

<sup>76</sup>See Huston, *Biography of a Battalion*, p. 32.

<sup>77</sup>Quoted in 161st Field Artillery Battalion (35th Division), *Lessons Learned* (mimeographed), pp. 11-2.

<sup>78</sup>The *Brereton Diaries*, p. 309.

<sup>72</sup>Greenfield, *AGF and the Air-Ground Battle Team*, pp. 23-28, 57-67.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 65.

left for the Germans to introduce this technique in actual combat in 1940. The American airborne effort took new impetus after the German airborne seizure of Crete, but difficulties arising from the competition of other programs and differences among the agencies concerned limited the rapidity and the extent of its development. A shortage of transport aircraft for the training of parachute troops appeared early in the program and persisted almost continuously.<sup>79</sup> Demands for the strategic bombing offensive against Germany limited the resources which could be put into the troop carrier aircraft necessary for airborne training and operations. Moreover, many troop carrier units which were activated and trained were diverted to other kinds of missions, such as carrying cargo for striking air units in the Pacific and in North Africa, and carrying supplies for ground troops, in greater or less amounts, in all theaters.

The first American airborne operations in North Africa and in Sicily were disappointing. Scattered drops and lack of coordination indicated a need for more training than had been available. Paratroopers dropped as far apart as fifty and sixty miles in Sicily, and few hit the drop zones which had been selected. Yet the airborne phase contributed materially to the success of that invasion. The most unfortunate incident of that operation was the following night when friendly ground and naval units fired on transport planes bringing in airborne reinforcements.<sup>80</sup> A good deal of disillusion followed the Sicilian venture. General Eisenhower wrote that he did not believe in the airborne division, but felt that the difficulties of providing air

transport and of maintaining control on the ground made it desirable to limit airborne units to the size of regimental combat teams.<sup>81</sup>

Actually airborne operations grew in size and scope. For the Normandy invasion General Marshall and General Arnold tried to sell General Eisenhower and his lieutenants on establishing an *airhead* deep inside France. That is, airborne troops would spearhead an invasion to seize airfields and key points in north-central France; succeeding waves then would fly-in infantry divisions (stripped of heavy equipment) to build up an attacking force. The main effort, in other words, would be a large-scale airborne invasion far inland instead of a seaborne assault against the beaches of Normandy. Much to the disappointment of General Marshall and General Arnold, Eisenhower turned down the proposal as being too risky.<sup>82</sup> In the attack as carried out, airborne troops, as in Sicily, were widely scattered, but they accomplished their assigned tasks.<sup>83</sup>

The missions of troop carrier aviation were defined broadly as follows:

- (1) The primary mission of troop carrier units is to provide air transportation for airborne forces into combat; and to re-supply such forces until they are withdrawn or can be supplied by other means.
- (2) The secondary mission of troop carrier units within the combat theater is:
  - (a) Emergency supply and evacuation
  - (b) Ferrying of troops and supplies
  - (c) Routine transportation of personnel, supplies and mail.

- (3) Troop carrier units must be diverted from

<sup>79</sup>Ltr., Gen. Eisenhower to Gen. Marshall, 20 Sep 43, Misc. Exec. file, Book 12, case 80, extracts in Combined Planning Staff files 91/1, 19 Oct 43, ABC 322.

<sup>80</sup>Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co, 1950), pp. 203-5, Ltr., Gen. Eisenhower to Gen. Marshall, 19 Feb. 44, in WD Operations Division file, case 217.

<sup>81</sup>First US Army, *Report of Operations 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44*, pp. 44, 119.

<sup>79</sup>Greenfield, et al., *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 94-6. *Report of the Board on Airborne Operations*, 6 Sep 43, in AGF files 353/17 (A/B).

<sup>80</sup>Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, *Airborne Warfare* (Washington: The Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 1-15.



secondary missions, by the highest headquarters in a theater, in ample time to allow complete preparation to accomplish the primary missions.<sup>84</sup>

Competition between those secondary and primary missions rose sharply during the summer of 1944 as ground commanders racing across northwest Europe demanded more and more air transport to replenish their dwindling supplies. Attempts to meet those demands seriously limited airborne operations.<sup>85</sup>

One outstanding development in the European Theater was the organization, in August 1944, of the First Allied Airborne Army to bring together under a single command both airborne and troop carrier units. It was the major example during the war of the application of the principle of unified command between air and ground forces on any continuing basis below the level of the theater commander. Later, suggestions arose that a similar organization be set up within the United States to direct training and coordinate policies. Some officers suggested the creation of an independent *Airborne Forces*. Some Air Force officers, like General Arnold and General Brereton (commander of the First Allied Airborne Army) thought that airborne divisions should be made a part of the Air Forces, while some Ground Forces officers, on the other hand, raised the possibility of including the Troop carrier command in Army Ground Forces.<sup>86</sup> None of these proposals ever was carried out.

The First Allied Airborne Army's first mission was one designed to exploit the attractive possibility of turning both the Rhine

and the Siegfried Line. The British 1st and the American 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were to seize a series of bridges which would open the way for armor of the British Second Army to drive to the Zuider Zee. After preparatory bombardment of enemy airfields and flak positions in the area on the preceding night and morning, the great aerial fleet, carrying approximately one-half the strength of the three divisions, took off from bases in England on the morning of 12 September 1944. This was the first major airborne attack in daylight, and it was the most ambitious of them all. A total of 1,544 troop carrier aircraft, British and American, and 478 gliders formed two streams. No German aircraft intercepted the columns, but flak claimed thirty-five American planes and thirteen gliders. All units did not hit their drop zones precisely, but in most cases they were massed, and control could be established quickly. For the next nine days troop carrier aircraft flew resupply and reinforcing missions while the troops on the ground fought vigorously to consolidate the narrow corridor which would threaten the German position in Holland. On 20 September the 82d Airborne Division captured the Nijmegen bridge intact and the tasks assigned the American divisions had been accomplished. For completion of the mission there remained only the problem of effecting contact with the British airborne troops at Arnhem and seizing the crossing of the Lower Rhine. That, however, proved to be the unsurmountable obstacle. After dominating the north end of the Arnhem bridge for three days, the British had lost control of it on 20 September. They held out until 25 September, but, with no hope of ground relief, survivors were withdrawn southward across the river on the nights of 25-26 and 26-27 September. A total of 34,876 troops had gone into the battle by air. In addition, airplanes had carried

<sup>84</sup>War Department Training Circular 113, 9 Oct 43, par 2b.

<sup>85</sup>General Eisenhower's Report, p. 49.

<sup>86</sup>*The Brereton Diaries*, pp. 217, 366. Talk of Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor to AGF staff, Army War College, 18 Dec 44. Air Historical Office, I Troop Carrier Command, *The Operational Training Program* (ms), pp. 396, 401-2. AGF M/S, G-3 to Chief of Staff, 31 Jan 45, in AGF G-3 (Airborne BR.) files.

more than 5,200 tons of supplies, including 568 artillery pieces and 1,927 vehicles.<sup>87</sup>

The final airborne operation in Europe was in the crossing of the Rhine, 24 March 1945. The objectives were much more limited than had been those in the air invasion of Holland, but the air fleet marshalled was even more impressive. It was the greatest air lift of troops of the war: two airborne divisions were in the air at the same time. A column of 699 airplanes and 429 gliders carrying the British 6th Airborne Division from eleven fields in England converged south of Brussels with the stream of 903 planes and 897 gliders which was taking off with the 17th US Airborne Division from twelve airfields in northern France and Belgium. While 1,253 fighters of the Eighth Air Force patrolled east of the Rhine and provided cover for a diversionary bombing attack by the Fifteenth Air Force on Berlin, 900 fighters of the British 2d Tactical Air Force flew cover over the target area. Another 213 fighters of the RAF escorted the northern column of troop carriers, and 676 fighters of the Ninth Air Force escorted the southern column. Less than one hundred German fighters appeared over all of northwestern Germany, and none molested the troop carriers. Parachute and glider landings continued from shortly before 10:00 AM to shortly after 1:00 PM. Following the troop carriers, 240 heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force brought 582 tons of supplies. By midafternoon the two airborne divisions had made contact, and they linked up with the ground forces advancing from the Rhine before nightfall.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>87</sup>First Allied Army, *Narrative of Operation Market*, 9 Oct. 44, mimeo. copy with report of Lt. Col. F. E. Ross, 6 Dec. 44, in files of office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. General Eisenhower's Report, p. 68.

<sup>88</sup>First Allied Airborne Army, *Narrative of Operation Varsity 24 March 45*, copy incl. with report of Col. M. A. Quinto, 5 May 45, copy in files of Office of Chief of Military History. General Eisenhower's Report, p. 100.

It was called the most successful airborne operation carried out to date.<sup>89</sup> Unquestionably the complexities of getting the massive aerial fleet into the air at the proper time and of delivering paratroops, gliders, and supplies at the designated spots on schedule required planning, coordination, and skill of execution of a high order. But in view of the relatively light opposition to the assault boat crossings of the Rhine and the rapid advances made on the ground, it does not appear that the airborne phase was essential to the success of the river crossing operation. Indeed, had the same resources been employed on the ground, it is conceivable that the advance to the east might have been even more rapid than it was.

Airborne operations in the Pacific and Far East were not as extensive as those in the European Theater. Tactical drops were on a scale of no more than a regimental combat team in any one operation. More often than not aerial supply became the principal mission of troop carrier aircraft, and in many cases supply by air was the major support for ground actions. Most notable of the parachute drops in those areas was the one on Corregidor, 16 February 1945. There the problem was not one of mass, but of dropping a battalion on an old parade ground, less than 300 by 150 yards in area, above some 3,000 Japanese defenders who waited in caves and pillboxes along the hillsides. Planes had to make several passes over the target, dropping only about six paratroopers at a time, to avoid having them fall into the sea or down the sides of the cliffs. The amphibious assault which followed was able to complete capture of the island with surprisingly light casualties.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>89</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>90</sup>Gavin, *Airborne Warfare*, pp. 123-6.

### *Command and Employment of Tactical Air Power*

Meaningful appraisals of the uses of tactical air power in World War II are difficult to make, but certain issues need to be noted. Probably the greatest limitation on the scale of tactical air power was the competition for resources of the strategic bombing offensives. Somehow strategic bombing has come to be considered in popular thinking as a short-cut to quick victory—as the ultimate in lightning war. Possibly future developments will tend to support that notion, but in World War II strategic bombing was a weapon not of blitzkrieg, but of attrition.<sup>91</sup> Unable to knock out a major power with a few great air attacks, strategic bombing, like blockade, tended to promote a creeping paralysis in a nation's economy. Even if gigantic bombing attacks were able to destroy most of a nation's heavy industry at a single blow, that in itself would not immediately stop well-equipped armies already in the field nor would it make impossible retaliation in kind. It would not do that any more than a sudden devastating attack against Detroit, for example, would immediately leave the United States without any motor transport. Several weeks, or even months, must pass before the effects of even successful strategic bombing can be noticed in the combat forces themselves. And in Germany war production continued to increase, in spite of impressive totals of sorties flown and tonnage of bombs dropped, until after mid-1944.<sup>92</sup> It was tactical air power, rather, which was more the instrument of blitzkrieg. Tactical air power could have effects immediately noticeable upon the enemy combat forces.

Frequently, of course, strategic and tac-

tical objectives and results overlapped. The maintenance of air superiority in Europe was due in part to strategic attacks against oil and it was due in part to tactical attacks against airfields, offensive combat in the air, and interceptor aircraft. Tactical aviation might also have important strategic results. The spectacular successes of the *Luftwaffe* in 1939 and 1940, particularly, had so impressed American planners that they scheduled the activation of 800 battalions of anti-aircraft artillery. Even a reduction of this figure to 575 battalions in October 1943 left an authorized anti-aircraft strength more than 2½ times as great as all armored divisions and tank battalions combined.<sup>93</sup> This diversion of resources to anti-aircraft defense was as effective in limiting American offensive power, at least for the time being, as would have been the destruction of a number of American tank factories by long-range bombers.

Throughout the war Air Force officers seemed anxious to avoid any restrictions on Air Forces autonomy which might limit their strategic bombing offensives. Statements of doctrine given in FM 100-20 suggested this major interest. But from the ground officer's point of view, it would have been as logical for Army Ground Forces to have obtained publication of doctrine stating that long-range, high-altitude bombing usually is unprofitable, as it was for Army Air Forces to obtain publication of FM 100-20 without Ground Forces concurrence, stating that air strikes in the zone of contact usually are unprofitable. Ground commanders were impressed by results obtained on the ground, and if close support aviation seemed an indispensable instrument for the carrying out of their own missions, they felt that it should not be denied them.

<sup>91</sup>See B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare* (New York: Yale University Press, 1947), pp. 26-7.

<sup>92</sup>See USSBS, *Over-All Report (European War)*, and *Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy*.

<sup>93</sup>Greenfield, et al., *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 423.

The conflict between those advocating centralization of control and those urging decentralization of tactical aviation had a parallel in the history of the Armored Force. There the conflict had been between those who saw tanks as weapons which should be used in mass independent of the infantry and those who wanted tanks for close support of infantry. For a time it seemed that the concept of massed armor was to gain the advantage when the Armored Force was established as a semi-autonomous force. Armored Force officers liked to regard their status as similar to that of the Air Corps. But demands continued for tanks to accompany infantry. Later the Armored Force lost much of its autonomy, and armored organization recognized *both* functions. There would be armored divisions, but there would also be tank battalions for attachment to infantry divisions.<sup>94</sup> Post-war organization then made tank companies organic to infantry regiments in addition to organic tank battalions in infantry divisions. Army aviation, however, failed to follow that pattern. On the contrary, it moved toward complete independence.

Ground Forces officers saw in that trend further threats to the possibility of having tactical aviation with aircraft of suitable types in sufficient quantities, and with crews correctly trained, to give the close support to ground operations which they considered indispensable. A board of officers of Army Ground Forces recommended in 1945 that aviation for close support, immediate air defense, tactical reconnaissance, and airborne and air supply operations be assigned organically to Army Ground Forces. There was no objection to having aviation for strategic bombing, long-range tactical missions, long-range reconnaissance, general defense, and transport in a separate air force, but they felt

that air power needed for ground support should be made available to ground forces to free it of some of the competition of other aviation missions. The sentiments which assistant Secretary of war McCloy had expressed in 1943 seemed yet to be pertinent. Then he had written:

What I cannot see is why we do not develop this auxiliary to the Infantry attack even if it is of lesser importance [than strategic bombing]. . . . It may be the wrong use of planes if you have to choose between the two but to say that air power is so impractical that it cannot be used for immediate help of the Infantry is nonsense and displays a failure to realize the Air's full responsibilities. It is just as bad as was the tendency of the Ground Forces, some time ago, to confine air operations to such work.<sup>95</sup>

It is difficult to appraise anything at once so broad and so varying from time to time and from place to place as was the use of tactical air power in World War II. As in most human affairs, almost never is it possible to separate the multiplicity of factors present in a given situation. What results would have been obtained by a different use of tactical air power—with more, or less planes—with different types of aircraft—with different methods of attack—with different organization—cannot be said with any finality. Yet it is pertinent to inquire into the possibilities, for history without some consideration of alternatives can have little immediate meaning. Thorough analyses, free of personal bias and service prestige, need to be made of the whole story. The making of valid interpretations and of correct evaluations of the Army's experience with tactical air power in World War II already have become matters of life and death.

<sup>95</sup>Memo, Mr. McCloy for Gen. Lear, 15 May 43, quoted in Greenfield, *AGF and the Air-Ground Battle Team*, p. 50.

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 56-72.



# NOTES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AAF TACTICAL AIR DOCTRINE

BY THOMAS J. MAYOCK\*

While the somewhat obvious fact has been obscured by the laurels gained in strategic air warfare and by that warfare's present-day implications, and further through the curious habit of ascribing to "strategic" and "tactical" a qualitative difference when only a difference in kind exists, World War II was for the Army Air Forces predominantly a tactical air war. To fall back on definitions, the bulk of the AAF combat effort expended itself "in conjunction with the operations of surface forces in common zones of action." Frequently the surface forces were Navy or Marine, but mainly, as its name implied, the AAF operated with the Army. In view of its well-known accomplishments, the rules by which the Army and the AAF carried on their joint warfare are of some historical importance.

The tactical air doctrine which prevailed in the Army during the greater part of World War II was developed during the African campaigns, by American perceptiveness out of British experience. Basically it consists of a set of congenial command relations between air and ground forces, some general principles of employment which maximize the effectiveness of the air force, and a preconceived scheme of maneuver for the destruction of enemy ground forces. The command relations and general principles of employment have been laid down by an unusually eloquent field manual:<sup>1</sup>

The inherent flexibility of air power is its

greatest asset. This flexibility makes it possible to employ the whole weight of the available air power against selected areas in turn; such concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle-winning factor of the first importance. Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited. Therefore, the command of air and ground forces in a theater of operations will be vested in the superior commander charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command of air forces through the air force commander and commander of ground forces through the ground force commander.

The scheme of maneuver contemplates assault on the following objectives: First, the opposing air force, so that friendly aircraft may live in the air and be free to cooperate with ground forces; second, targets attack on which restricts the enemy's supply and reinforcement and so readies him for destruction; third, enemy ground forces, attacked in conjunction with friendly ground forces.<sup>2</sup> A rather unfortunate nomenclature — *Phase One, Phase Two, Phase Three* — has sprung up to describe operations against these objectives. Attack on enemy ground forces *Phase Three* is not the lowest form of tactical air activity; rather it is the end towards which the air force works, the enemy's air force and his supply and reinforcement being intermediate objectives. Moreover, in practice all three objectives are usually attacked concurrently. A high degree of dislocation of the first two is nevertheless held prerequisite to

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<sup>1</sup>War Department Field Manual 100-20, *Command and Employment of Air Power*, 21 July 1943, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 10-12; War Department Field Manual 31-35, *Air-Ground Operations*, August 1946, p. 14.

the destruction of the opposing enemy ground forces.

This is the modern doctrine. When in 1942 the AAF entered the African theaters—Egypt in June in the guise of the United States Army Middle East Air Force,<sup>3</sup> Morocco and Algeria in November as the Twelfth Air Force—many of the trends which went to produce it were already in motion. The Army was accustoming itself to regarding the AAF as a co-equal partner. The signs could be read in Panama where in 1941 General Frank Andrews developed a Caribbean Air Force tied to no island commanders but available for a concentrated blow for the defense of the Canal.<sup>4</sup> At home by the reorganization of 9 March 1942 AAF headquarters gained a semi-autonomous position in the War Department. Capping the structure, Arnold already sat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the spring of 1942, the War Department had set forth tactical air doctrine in a field manual which attempted to compromise long-standing divergences between air and ground viewpoints.<sup>5</sup> As a result much of it, especially as regarded employment, differed little from principles invoked today. There was, however, no "phasing," no scheme of maneuver, no priority of targets beyond the statement that the most important target at a particular time would be that chosen by the ground commander as constituting the most serious threat to the operations of the supported ground force.<sup>6</sup>

As the ground commander was the ultimate authority on targets, the manual's warnings against misuse of aircraft must be

regarded as addressed primarily to him. Air attacks on small targets or on those in reach of ground force weapons were frowned upon unless the added firepower and moral effect were expected to prove decisive. The maintenance of "air alert," aircraft standing by over the supported ground force, was declared to be generally uneconomical.<sup>7</sup> The fact that air force effort shrank rapidly during all-out operations was cited as a reminder that only decisive actions, limited in time, justified continuous maximum air force employment.<sup>8</sup>

The manual duly recited that local air superiority was essential, but the difficulty here lay in the current air force organization which assigned air fighting primarily to an "Interceptor Command." The "Air Support Command" had fighters attached to it when an interceptor command was absent or ineffective. In April 1942 the only aircraft organic to an air support command were observation units.<sup>9</sup> By January 1943, light and dive bombardment had also been made organic.<sup>10</sup> This separation of fighters and tactical bombers made a quick *exitus* under battle conditions.

Although the air support manual had to be read in concert with the current regulations on the use of Larger Units<sup>11</sup> which laid great stress on the maintenance of air superiority as the air force's first task, on the importance of offensive air action, and on the inherent flexibility of air power, from the AAF's point of view these excellent admonitions were jeopardized by the ground commander's authority over target selection and

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 1, 6; letter, Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz to Arnold, 7 Mar. 1943.

<sup>10</sup>War Dept., Army Air Forces Field Manual 1-5, *Employment of Aviation of the Army*, 18 January 1943, pp. 23, 38, 39.

<sup>11</sup>War Department Field Manual 100-15, *Field Service Regulations, Larger Units*, 29 June 1942, pp. 74-78, 81-84, and especially the prefatory note, p. ii.

<sup>3</sup>Redesignated the Ninth Air Force, 12 November 1942.

<sup>4</sup>W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume I*, (Chicago, 1948) pp. 257-264.

<sup>5</sup>War Department Basic Field Manual 31-35, *Aviation in Support of Ground Forces*, 9 April 1942.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 11.

by the general command provisions. Command and employment of air power—it was understood as well then as now—are indivisible. On the subject of command arrangements, the War Department manual on air support was at once succinct and repetitious:

An air support command is habitually attached to or supports an army in the theater.

When the operation requires, aviation units may be specifically allocated to the support of subordinate ground units.

Aviation units may be attached to subordinate ground units.

The decision as to whether or not an air support mission will be ordered rests with the commander of the supported unit.<sup>12</sup>

When the United States Army Middle East Air Force arrived in the field, it found on the premises in the RAF's Western Desert Air Force an air force operating with an army on a basis of cooperation and equality, an air force whose resources were centralized under its own command, and whose recent successes on these bases had been most impressive. The Western Desert Air Force comprised all the aircraft necessary for its mission, fighters, reconnaissance types, and light bombers. Heavy and medium bombers were on call, if needed. This force was in process of demonstrating that it was possible to give excellent air support to beaten armies as well as victorious ones; its mastery over Rommel's air and its offensive against his onrushing columns were instrumental in preventing the retreat to Alamein from becoming a rout.<sup>13</sup>

The Western Desert Air Force had not arrived at this position solely by virtue of its

being part of a coordinate service.<sup>14</sup> Desert doctrine had been learned the hard way, by trial and error, by give and take between army and air force. Air superiority, or, if not possible, at least moral superiority in the air, had always been prized and fought for, and for the most part held from the days of Wavell's bluffs before the Italians on the Egyptian frontier to the days of the retreat from Gazala. Isolation of the battlefield was second nature—one glance westward took in the naked desert and the sea through or over which all enemy sustenance must initially pass. From modest beginnings, intimate support of ground troops had reached a very respectable proficiency; but targets and their attack had to be remunerative because aircraft had to be husbanded in far-off Egypt.

When Montgomery took over the Eighth Army, far from disturbing the position, he expanded the area of cooperation.<sup>15</sup> By February 1943, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham,<sup>16</sup> the commander of Western Desert Air Force, could state from Tripoli, with the authority of 1400 victorious miles behind him, the current Eighth Army-Western Desert Air Force command doctrine as follows:<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Without knowledge of British documents it is dangerous to generalize on WDAF and RAF tactical air development. However, the following references are instructive: Clifford, *The Conquest of North Africa*, pp. 181-184, 290-293; *RAF Middle East Review*, No. 1, p. 26; Air Chief Marshal Longmore's Despatch, 1 Nov. 1941, in *London Gazette Supplement*, 17 Sept. 1946, pp. 4676-4677; Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 203, 209, 342, 811, 812, and *The Hinge of Fate* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 587, 848, 852-853, 905; DeGuingand, *Operation Victory*, pp. 123-124, 255-264; Philip Guedalla, *Middle East 1940-1942: A Study of Air Power* (London 1944), pp. 85-86.

<sup>15</sup>DeGuingand, *Operation Victory*, p. 138.

<sup>16</sup>Coningham was lost enroute to Bermuda in January 1948. See Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder in *The Times*, 14 Feb. 1948.

<sup>17</sup>Talk of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham to assembled British and American general and senior officers at the end of the second day of the Army Exercise, Tripoli, 16 Feb. 1943. The same theme is dwelt on by Montgomery's "Notes on High Command in War."

<sup>12</sup>War Department Basic Field Manual 31-35, *Aviation in Support of Ground Forces*, 9 April 1942, pp. 1, 3, 13.

<sup>13</sup>Report to AAF Hq. by General Lewis H. Brereton, Direct Support in the Libyan Desert; Francis de Guingand, *Operation Victory* (London 1947), pp. 123-124; Alexander G. Clifford, *The Conquest of North Africa 1940-1943* (Boston 1943), pp. 290-293.

The Soldier commands the land forces, the Airman commands the Air forces; both commands work together and operate their respective forces in accordance with a combined Army-Air plan, the whole operations being directed by the Army Commander.

While the Eighth Army and the Western Desert Air Force<sup>18</sup> had been relieving Egypt and Cyrenaica of the Axis armies, Eisenhower's hastily-improvised Allied Force, which had originally been scheduled to capture Tripoli from the west, had ground to a halt in Tunisia, stretched too thin to do more than take its first objectives. By the end of 1942 it was obvious that the Axis could not be dug out of Tunisia until spring and that coordinated use of the Allied forces converging on Tunisia from east and west would be necessary for the campaign. This meant that a reorganization had to take place to integrate certain Middle East forces with those in Northwest Africa. The RAF, Middle East, and the Western Desert Air Force had to be included in these plans. At Casablanca in January the combined Chiefs of Staff approved a plan which set up the Middle East version of a tactical air force to control all available support air forces and work in co-operation with an Army Group commander.<sup>19</sup> It was expected that Air Marshal Coningham would command this enlarged tactical air force<sup>20</sup> and it could be foreseen that he would wish to operate vis-a-vis army commanders according to his bringing up in the Western Desert.

At about the time that this plan was approved but before the intricate general reorganization could be accomplished, the American XII Air Support Command, originally brought into Morocco with a view to possible operations near the Strait of Gibralt-

ar,<sup>21</sup> became heavily engaged in Central Tunisia where it moved early in January to support II U.S. Corps operations. To the north was the RAF 242 Group which had largely covered the initial Allied surge towards Tunis and which was currently supporting the British First Army. XII Air Support Command was ill-equipped to demonstrate the effectiveness of any tactical air doctrine. Its pilots by and large were inexperienced and no breaking-in period could be afforded. Proper employment of its light bombers and fighters was being worked out day by day. Worst of all, no air superiority had been won for it by any interceptor command and it lacked a radar net which could be used offensively.<sup>22</sup>

The Germans did not allow II Corps to assume the initiative. They presently hit out at the French sector which was located between II Corps and First Army and which did not possess any support aviation of its own.<sup>23</sup> During the first days of the attack what air help the French got came from 242 Group which had geographical responsibility. At one point, II Corps was supposed to have refused to approve a request for air reconnaissance on the ground of lack of interest in the area.<sup>24</sup> At any rate, there was a rush to activate the already-blueprinted tactical air force headquarters, which, according to plan, was given control of all available tactical air forces in Tunisia and placed on a parity with a superior ground force headquarters.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup>Letter, Brig. Gen. James H. Doolittle to Eisenhower, 4 Oct. 1942; letter Col. Hobart R. Gay to Brig. Gen. J. K. Cannon, 17 Oct. 1942; Message, London to AGWAR, #4138, 27 Oct. 1942.

<sup>22</sup>Messages, XII ASC to Twelfth Air Force, #816, 9 Jan. 1943 and Twelfth Air Force to XII ASC, unnumbered, 12 Jan. 1943; interview with Lt. Col. Philip G. Cochran, 3 June 1943.

<sup>23</sup>Message, Twelfth Air Force to XII ASC, #1335, 17 Jan. 1943.

<sup>24</sup>Report to Arnold, by Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, Organization of American Air Forces, 12 May 1943.

<sup>25</sup>Messages, AFHQ to Air Ministry, #ACSA 108, 22 Jan. 1943, AASC to Allied Air Force, #A136, 7 Feb. 1943.

<sup>18</sup>By now including substantial American units.

<sup>19</sup>CCS 163, 20 Jan. 1943.

<sup>20</sup>Message, AFHQ to Air Ministry, #ACSA 108, 22 Jan. 1943.



The setting up of this headquarters meant that, so far as Tunisia was concerned, a distinctive feature of the American air support system had disappeared overnight—for, on paper at least, XII Air support Command had been detached from the operational control of II Corps. But no sudden change in the philosophy and tactics of support aviation overtook II Corps and XII Air Support Command.<sup>26</sup> All hands were involved in the heavy fighting which accompanied the German victories at Faid Pass and Sidi bou Zid. The active German Air Force had used the Stuka with effect in the fighting for Tunis in November and December; it repeated its performance against II Corps late in January.<sup>27</sup> The XII Air Support Command obliged to devote a good share of its efforts to protective umbrellas. Its losses to the opposing German air became serious without the ground forces gaining appreciably in security.

In mid-February, the reorganizations having at length been accomplished, Coningham took over, holding in relation to General Alexander the same position he had formerly held with Montgomery. Almost his first act was to discontinue the use of the defensive umbrella except on his personal approval—later on, he had difficulty making this stick with Patton.<sup>28</sup> He brought to bear on the final Axis thrust at Kasserine all available air resources without regard to previous attachments; for this purpose he was given control of most of the available heavy bombers.<sup>29</sup> After the threat had receded, he set about reorganizing his command.

In March the allied air forces undertook a systematic campaign which soon knocked out the Axis air force in Tunisia. In cooperation with the Royal Navy, they reduced Axis supply and reinforcement to a trickle. Finally, they mounted a climactic air attack on enemy positions in the Medjerda valley, intimately coordinated with the ground force blow which reduced the Tunisian campaign to a mopping-up of isolated enemy pockets. By late April Allied ground forces operating against the European Axis had tasted that high degree of freedom from enemy air attack which was preserved for them until VE Day.<sup>30</sup>

Thus the system of air support with which the American army entered the war never really got started in the Mediterranean and European theaters. As a system based on no direct combat experience, it could not compete with the methods and philosophy developed in the Middle East in two years of bloody experiment, and recently applied with brilliant success. Americans above all people find it hard to argue with success. The system adopted in Tunisia went through many refinements in subsequent operations against German-held Europe, but its doctrine did not change nor did its success leave much room for argument.

American air commanders in the theater recognized the shortcomings of the air support command and were enthusiastic about the new doctrine. AAF headquarters was not slow in realizing the implications and sought eagerly after the distillate of African experience. In Washington General Arnold saw that it went "full ball" through the War Department.<sup>31</sup> In July 1943 a new field manual

<sup>26</sup>XII ASC, Report on Operations, Tunisia, 13 Jan.—9 April 1943.

<sup>27</sup>Memo, OPD to CG, AGF, AAF, SOS etc., sub., Defense against Dive Bombing, 22 Dec. 1942; Kuter Report as cited in note 24; David Rame, *Road to Tunis* (New York, 1944), pp. 228-229.

<sup>28</sup>Message, Air Hq. 18th Army Group to XII Bomber Command, et al #A26, 19 Feb. 1943; draft history, Twelfth Air Force, chap. 10.

<sup>29</sup>Messages, NAAF to NATAF #1334 and 1631, 20 and 24 Feb. 1943.

<sup>30</sup>Craven and Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume II* (Chicago, 1949), Chapter 6.

<sup>31</sup>Brereton Report as cited in Note 13; letter, Spaatz to Arnold, 7 Mar. 1943; message, AFHQ to AGWAR, #2904, 25 Feb. 1943; letter Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer to Arnold, 7 May 1943; memo for Cin C, Allied Force, from Dept. AC/S for Air, AFHQ, 23 Dec. 1942; draft letter, Arnold to Spaatz, circa 5 June 1943.

opened with the following words (in large capitals): *Land Power and Air Power are co-equal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other.*<sup>32</sup> That field manual was a milestone on the road to air force parity, for its basic principles govern the rela-

tionship between air and ground forces today. The AAF thus got from the RAF another assist towards equality with US naval and ground forces. Without the AAF's demonstration that an air force under air command could work successfully with an army it is unarguable that equality would have come hard.

<sup>32</sup>War Department Field Manual 100-20. *Command and Employment of Air Power*, 21 July 1943.

## TACTICAL USE OF AIR POWER IN WORLD WAR II: THE NAVY EXPERIENCE

BY HENRY M. DATER\*

The tactical employment of air power obviously covers a broad field. To take up all aspects of the Navy's experience in World War II, cannot well be done in a single brief paper. I shall therefore limit myself to the discussion of how the Navy arrived at the form which it ultimately gave to its carrier forces without going into the techniques it employed in attacking the enemy. The latter part of the story is well known but the development of the fast carrier task forces and of the escort carrier groups which accompanied amphibious forces has been but little discussed.

From the many discussions and from observation of what occurred, the combat use of aircraft is generally divided into two categories: strategic and tactical. So far as I know, there has never been an explanation of just how these terms became applied to the employment of aircraft; and it is certain that the dictionaries have not yet caught up with the peculiar twist given them in connection with air operations. Strategic refers to those operations which are independent of other forces, which have for objective no other purpose than the harm that may be done to any enemy through the use of aircraft and their weapons alone. Since such operations are the peculiar province of the world's air forces and since the word strategic itself derives from an

old Greek term meaning general, there have been persons unkind enough to suggest that strategic air operations are those involving a superfluity of general officers. The most common form of strategic air attack is directed against an enemy's war potential: his industry, means of communication, and will to resist.

Tactical air operations deal directly with the support of other forces on land and sea. For my purposes I have excluded a large field of activity in transportation, logistics, and utility services which aircraft furnish to the military establishment. I have also omitted such tactical manifestations of air power as occur in antisubmarine warfare, long-range patrol and reconnaissance, and aerial spotting of ship's gunfire.

Tactical air power has four distinctive missions. *First*, if it is to operate at all, it must provide for its own defense. This is by no means a light problem for it clearly implies the protection of bases from which the airplanes themselves are operating. During the war it was rare for any air force, no matter how effective, so to reduce its opponent, that the latter could not launch a few aircraft and try a counter-attack. *Second*, and this is closely related to the first, comes the assertion of air superiority over the operating areas. If this is established, friendly ground and surface forces can go about their business free from fear of interference from enemy air, except sneak attacks which, while they may be

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annoying can hardly be effective. *Third*, having established air superiority, tactical air forces are in a position to isolate the objective area. They must keep the enemy not only from building up his own air forces but also by attacks on lines of communication prevent him from bringing up ground and surface reinforcements and supplies. *Fourth*, aircraft will come to the assistance of friendly forces by attacks on military installations, destruction of enemy armored vehicles, and in general furnishing close support.

Study of pre-war exercises shows that the Navy possessed at best a limited view of the tactical possibilities of air power before 7 December 1941. This does not mean that much was not learned during the 'twenties and 'thirties. From the naval viewpoint the whole technique of how to operate planes from a carrier was the product of intensive experiment and investigation between the two World Wars. More than that, the tactical employment of individual aircraft was thoroughly explored and such techniques as dive- and torpedo-bombing devised. Upon these foundations the Navy built its task forces in World War II.

What the Navy lacked more than anything else was sufficient numbers of carriers to form an effective task force. At no time did a fleet commander exercise more than three carriers and even then, so far as existing records show, no real attempt was made to operate them together in the form of a task group. The handling of individual ships had received ample attention and the techniques of aircraft attack upon targets had reached a high state of efficiency, but the concentration of power in a true carrier task force remained to be developed.

Much, of course, might be accomplished by the construction of more carriers. In retrospect, it can also be seen that certain technical developments, many of which had their beginnings prior to Pearl Harbor, were

equally important. Perhaps after the airplane itself, no innovation had greater effect upon operations at sea than radar. In carrier aviation it radically altered the division between offensive and defensive effort. Since the first mission of any tactical air force is protection of its base, it must divert part of its power to that purpose. Before the introduction of radar, this involved an extensive system of aerial patrols about the force and the stationing of fighters over the force-center which were vectored toward an attacking enemy when one of the patrols had made a visual sighting. This requirement continued to be reflected in the aircraft complements of United States fleet carriers well into 1942. Half the planes aboard were scout bombers which performed the dual function indicated by the name. The remainder were equally divided between fighters and torpedo bombers—18 of each.

As early as January 1939, however, the Navy had begun tests with primitive radar equipment on the battleship *New York*, and by mid-1940 radar appeared in the Fleet aboard USS *California*. A further great impetus to what later became known as fighter direction grew from the Battle of Britain which conclusively demonstrated the importance of early warning in the defense of a limited area by a relatively small number of aircraft. Exchange of technical information with the British and the dispatch of observers to England not only made the experience of the RAF available but also acquainted the Navy with the successful adaptation of RAF techniques to carrier operations in the Mediterranean. It was from these beginnings that developed the elaborate systems of World War II for the control of aircraft. Its importance here is that it obviated the necessity for elaborate scouting around the force and by reducing the number of planes required for defense increased the offensive potential. As early as March 1941, the commanding of-



ficer of USS *Yorktown* reported that in radar exercises fighters had been reliably directed to intercept incoming raids. By June of the same year radar ranges of more than 60 miles had become common as compared with the 25 miles which had been the outside limit of visual scouting by aircraft patrols.

In the field of operating techniques the refuelling of ships at sea was of outstanding importance. If the full capabilities of carrier aircraft were to be exploited, and especially if amphibious operations were to be supported over continuing periods, the carriers themselves could not well spend a large portion of their time shuttling back and forth to a base in search of fuel. In the Pacific, long distances and the lack of available bases west of Hawaii aggravated the situation and led the Navy to develop methods for transferring fuel at sea. During the war, this means of replenishment was gradually extended to include aircraft, personnel, ammunition, and general stores.

When the Japanese gave a conclusive demonstration of striking power of carrier aircraft at Pearl Harbor, the United States was by no means unready. It knew how to operate aircraft from its ships. In its radar equipped vessels it had the nucleus of an effective system of defense. Beginnings had also been made in the techniques of air support for amphibious landings and with the ways to keep carrier forces at sea for long periods. It lacked mostly the experience which could only come from war itself. Its high command had never had available a sufficient number of carriers to investigate large scale employment, and, like other enthusiasts of air power—and this fallacy seems to have been common in all air forces and among all nations—its aviators had exaggerated ideas of what they could accomplish with a handful of aircraft.

In the absence of actual conflict, ideas of how aircraft would be employed in naval op-

erations were many. British experience had been instructive particularly in such matters as the use of radar and in the effectiveness of aerial torpedoes; it had not taught much about what would occur when one fleet with carriers came up against another similarly equipped. Nor did it set any precedent for action across a wide area or on an amphibious campaign. Meanwhile the Fleet commanders had to plan with what they had on the basis of what they knew. In June 1941, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet assigned one of his three carriers to the battle force where it was expected to protect the battle-line, to serve as eyes for the big ships, and launch attacks on enemy fleet units not so much for the purpose of sinking them as to slow them down with bomb and torpedo hits so that heavy surface units might overtake and finish them off with gunfire. The second carrier he planned to operate with cruisers for scouting purposes, while the third was to become the center of a striking force raiding enemy island bases. Such use was typical of naval thinking at the time.

Sometimes the best laid plans go by the board. In one blow the Japanese deprived the United States temporarily of its battle-fleet and thrust the burden of defense on the untried carriers, all three of which were absent from Pearl Harbor that fateful morning. Reinforced by two additional carriers transferred from the Atlantic, these five vessels steamed over 180,000 miles in seven months and, at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May and the Battle of Midway early in June 1942, reversed the course of the war.

The pre-war foundations proved solid, solid enough to cause a revolution in the art of war at sea. Battles were won and lost without surface fleets sighting much less engaging one another. The cost of these operations and those which followed from August through October in defending United States forces

on Guadalcanal came high. By December 1942 the United States had lost three of the five carriers mentioned above and also USS *Wasp* which had arrived during the summer. The Japanese on their side had lost six of the nine carriers with which they had commenced the conflict. Other carriers had received extensive damage and the small number of carrier-trained aviators had been considerably reduced. It was not to be wondered at that both belligerents withdrew their forces and strove to prepare for the next phase. In any such race the United States had the advantage of its great industrial productivity and technical ingenuity, to which in this case it added the advantage of better planning.

The ten months between late October 1942 and late August 1943 saw carrier operations at a virtual standstill and gave an opportunity to study the experience so far acquired. Efforts were made to strengthen the carriers themselves against the damage caused by bomb or torpedo hit. Other innovations sought not only to improve the radar equipment of ships, but also to provide better installations for rapid plotting, and dissemination of the acquired information to officers in tactical command. Numbers and types of antiaircraft guns on board carriers and screen vessels were increased, to give better protection against enemy aircraft that slipped past aerial defenders to reach the force. Not only were the aircraft complements changed to double the number of fighters but modifications were incorporated in the plane types coming off the assembly lines. Finally, since war is an affair of men as well as machines, many lessons were subjects for consideration by those responsible for training both aviators and ships' crews.

Important as all these were, another topic caused lively discussion all through these months. With the new *Essex*- and *Independence*-class carriers coming off the ways and

completing their initial shakedown and training, larger numbers would soon be available than ever before, and the Navy would have opportunity to adopt new forms of tactical organization. The principal question revolved around the operation of two or more carriers within a screen, the whole of which maneuvered together. Such a formation had been tried on 10 March 1942 when planes from *Lexington* and *Yorktown* raided the New Guinea ports of Lae and Salamaua. At the Battle of the Coral Sea in May of the same year, enemy attack caused each carrier to resort to independent evasive action and the supporting screen of cruisers and destroyers spontaneously and without previous plan followed one or the other carrier. Some observers felt that the failure to keep formation contributed to the loss of *Lexington* and damage to *Yorktown*. Others were by no means so certain; in reviewing the action Admiral King limited himself to the comment that "screening vessels should definitely be assigned to each carrier so that in case they are separated during attack due to maneuvers or air operations they would each have their own screen." Such was the thought in mid-1942. It indicated that coordinated maneuvering of a multi-carrier formation had not yet been achieved.

Beginning in August with the landing on Guadalcanal, the four available carriers moved to the South Pacific to prevent Japanese surface forces from interfering with troops ashore. Instead of being operated in a single formation or even in pairs, the carriers were assigned to four separate task forces. To achieve air coordination when in action, the task forces steamed within visual distance of one another. This half-solution in itself led to more controversy. After the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 23-25 August 1942, the commanding officer of *Enterprise* wrote that difficulties with communications and compli-

cations of tactical handling made the joint operation of two carrier task forces virtually impossible. He believed that no amount of training and indoctrination could overcome these handicaps. As for a multi-carrier formation, he said it should seldom be necessary and should always be avoided if possible.

These were the opinions of a veteran aviator, not of a battleship admiral. They were not concurred in by his superior, Vice Admiral F. J. Fletcher, who in his endorsement entered a vigorous dissent. He denied that two, three, or even four groups were difficult to operate, pointed out that the benefits derived from concentration of air power would more than offset any possible disadvantages, and concluded prophetically: "The tendency will be to operate more and more carriers together as our offensive gains momentum."

Each engagement in which the carriers were involved renewed the discussion. After the Battle of Santa Cruz, 25-26 October 1942, Rear Admiral G. D. Murray, commander of a single carrier task force whose flagship USS *Hornet*—had been sunk, repeated the arguments used earlier by the Commanding Officer of *Enterprise*. His superior, Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, set forth the opposite point of view in the following words:

On the contrary by having two carriers together, one carrier can take care of all routine flying while the other maintains her full striking power spotted and ready to launch on short notice. If the carriers are separated then each must fly its own inner air patrol and combat air patrol and make its own search. Exactly the same number of turns into the wind are required, the spot must be frequently broken and the maximum striking force is not available.

When these reports reached headquarters, they again received scrutiny, and from Admiral King's office there emerged a compromise between the views. The ideal carrier force would be two carriers, which should re-

main tactically concentrated until attacked, at which time they should separate to a distance of 25 to 30 miles, only to reconcentrate immediately after the attack had withdrawn. Furthermore, two such carrier task forces should not operate in close proximity to one another under a single OTC (Officer in Tactical Command). Preferably they should operate 50 to 100 miles apart and be coordinated from a tactical command ashore. Finally, the Admiral delivered himself of an aphorism: *Joint support causes joint exposure when separation is small.*

It may perhaps be argued that Washington was not exactly the place to settle such matters. Officers in the Pacific had gained experience, complete assessment of which would take time. In any event, by late 1942 the question had become for the time being academic. Four of six available United States fleet carriers had been sunk. Original carrier squadrons required rest and replacement. There was time for thought further stimulated by the fact that large numbers of new carriers of superior characteristics were on the way and would appear equipped with better aircraft, especially in the fighter field, and with new air groups composed of fresh, young pilots in whose training had been incorporated the hard lessons of aerial combat learned in a year of struggle from Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal.

Long before 1941 United States' naval strategists had doubted that the Philippines could be held against the initial Japanese attack. They expected to regain those islands and to bring about the defeat of Japan itself by a campaign across the Central Pacific through the mandated areas. In the first year of the war, as it actually turned out, the Japanese called the strategy; the United States reacted. Perhaps the real turning point came at Midway in June (expert opinion among the Japanese thought so, after the war) but,



before the Navy could return to the Central Pacific concept, it had to check Japanese advance in the south and to secure the supply lines to Australia. This objective was accomplished through the landing on Guadalcanal and the subsequent naval operations in the Solomons area which culminated in mid-November at the Battle of Guadalcanal. A lot of fighting remained for both ground and naval elements assigned to that theater, but the issue was no longer in doubt. The Navy returned to its original idea of how to win a Pacific War.

In 1943, the new carriers moving westward toward Pearl Harbor found themselves in a numerous company: new, fast battleships, more powerful cruisers, improved destroyers, auxiliaries—many of new types with highly specialized functions, amphibious vessels and craft unconventional in design and anything but trim in appearance. They all existed to carry out the old strategic concept, but the planning staffs in Hawaii busily worked over new tactics for their employment. Aircraft had virtually revolutionized many traditional practices, and Admiral King had laid it down that a naval force could not fulfill its mission without command of the air. In the Central Pacific, distances rendered impossible air cover from land bases. The Fleet had to carry its air force along on the decks of its carriers. This was the key to the whole campaign and, if impracticable, the Navy's long-held strategic concept might prove unworkable and the war greatly prolonged.

Through the spring and summer of 1943 the Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet, ran exercises with his new carriers not only to train crews and air groups but also to determine their operating characteristics and to try out various combinations. He had at his disposal the new *Essex*-class ships of 27,000 tons, the *Independence*-class of 10,000 tons built on cruiser hulls, and three types of escort

carrier. The last were essentially merchant vessels equipped with flight decks and had originally been designed for antisubmarine warfare, training of pilots, and transport of aircraft. The use of four of these ships at the landings in North Africa in November 1942, when no other carriers were available in the Atlantic, had given to some naval officers the idea that they might be used in combat. Escort carriers could not, however, be employed in the same formations as the fleet carriers because of their slower speed, about 19 knots as compared with 30 or more of the fleet types. Their vulnerability also made it doubtful that they should be operated in an area where heavy air opposition was probable.

Their use depended in large part upon the ability of the larger, fast carriers to establish air superiority over an objective area. Since it had also become evident that carriers rather than battleships were likely to decide fleet engagements, the concentration of a maximum offensive force became a paramount consideration. This could be achieved by reducing the share per carrier of defensive effort. If carriers were organized in task groups of two or more within a single screen, they could be protected by the same patrols of defensive fighters. During 1942, the doctrine that carriers should disperse under attack and concentrate for offense had not proved successful. If the ships were retained in a group, the volume of antiaircraft fire would be considerably increased, even with a smaller number of screening vessels per carrier. Since the outbreak of war in December 1941, greater numbers of improved guns had been added to all ships of the Fleet and new methods of radar fire control had rendered them more effective. All arguments pointed toward the possibility that organization of fast carriers into task groups of two or more with a strong supporting screen would provide the best means of employing the new *Essex*- and *Independence*-



class ships.

Exercises also showed that group organization was feasible. Better communications, radar plotting for station keeping, and greater experience, all contributed to obviate the objections raised by Rear Admiral Murray and others. The only certain test, however, would come in combat. On 31 August 1943 a small force consisting of 2 large carriers and light carrier, with a battleship, 2 light cruisers, and 10 destroyers raided Marcus Island. This was the first of a series of strikes against Japanese Islands designed to train ships and air groups in the new methods. On 5-6 October two carrier task groups, operating under the tactical command of a single task force commander, attacked Wake.

All of this was preliminary to the seizure of Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama Atolls in the Gilbert Islands, the first step in the long awaited Central Pacific Campaign. Four task groups were employed,—three with three carriers each and one with two. Not only did the fast carriers destroy all enemy aircraft in the Gilberts, but they also intercepted raids from the Japanese land bases in the Marshalls. Under this protective cover eight escort carriers accompanied the amphibious forces and assisted in landing support to the troops ashore. Much remained to be done in the way of perfecting techniques, but the foundations had been laid both for the fast carrier task force and the air support of landings from the smaller escort type carrier.

The real test would come when the Navy approached a relatively large land mass where the enemy had a considerable number of aircraft. The successful seizure of Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok in the Marshalls, and hit-and-run raids on Truk, the Palaus, and the Marianas in February, March, and April 1944, all gave encouragement but did not provide the real test which was needed. Nor did the support furnished Southwest Pacific

forces at Hollandia in New Guinea because the Army Air Forces had already practically nullified existing enemy air power in the area there, and the Japanese made no serious efforts to bring up reinforcements. The seizure of the Marianas in June 1944 finally provided the real opportunity to show what the Navy's carriers could do.

The Marianas presented a much larger land mass than the coral atolls which had been attacked previously. They were an essential link in the Japanese line of communications between the Empire and the islands of the South Pacific which made probable that an invasion would provoke a reaction by the Japanese Navy. Finally, aerial reinforcements could be flown in: either from the north through the Bonin Islands, or from the large Japanese forces in the Philippines by way of the Palaus. Against the Marianas the Navy sent its fast carrier force of 7 large and 8 light carriers on which were embarked 483 fighters and 415 dive and torpedo bombers. Its mission was to gain air superiority and to soften up military installations before the arrival of the amphibious forces on 15 June. Against the carrier task force, the Japanese possessed about 300 aircraft in the Marianas, and another 200 within easy staging distance in the Palaus or the Bonins.

Over the course of a few days Task Force 58 performed all the missions expected of a tactical air force. It began on 11 June—four days before the landing—with a fighter sweep intended to assert air superiority, and succeeded in reducing the enemy's air force by about one third. For purposes of protection, four destroyers were stationed as radar pickets some 20 miles west of the force. Each of these had a small combat air patrol which it directed at snoopers or incoming Japanese attacks. Further to limit Japanese activity, night fighters flew over his airfields during darkness, and pre-dawn fighter sweeps sought

to catch his planes before they could take off. This type of protection reduced Japanese air activity to the point where the few enemy aircraft which did sortie were easily disposed of by the combat air patrols. The remaining strength could then be employed striking ground installations—such as airfields, pill-boxes, beach defenses, gun emplacements, and storage depots.

On 14 June, two of the four task groups in the force moved northward to raid enemy airfields in the Bonins. It was hoped in this way to cut down on aerial reinforcements staging from Japanese home islands, and further to isolate the objective area. While this was going on, reports began coming in that the Japanese Fleet was on the move. It had sortied from its base at Tawi Tawi and passed through Philippine waters. The two task groups were recalled from the Bonins and the Task Force reconcentrated to meet this threat. Support of forces ashore and protection of the numerous ships engaged in landing supplies across the beaches was turned over to the 11 escort carriers with their 300 aircraft. For the occasion the Japanese made an all-out effort with 9 carriers, assisted by the remnants of their Marianas air forces and such reinforcements as they had been able to slip into the islands past our vigilance.

The engagement was a two day affair known as the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The first enemy effort was to knock out the fast carrier force, and in the resulting conflict on 19 June the new aerial defenses of the task groups received a thorough testing. Incoming raids were successfully detected in plenty of time not only to vector out standing patrols but also to scramble additional fighters from the carrier decks. The few planes which did get through did little damage and 19 of them were destroyed by antiaircraft fire. If this sum is added to the 366 shot down in aerial combat and the 17 destroyed on the air-

fields of Guam, the Japanese losses amounted to 402 aircraft. The United States forces on the same day lost 25 aircraft in combat and 7 operationally. Three ships received superficial damage, too small to force their retirement. The second day saw the fast carrier task force in pursuit of the retreating Japanese: it was late in the day when search planes made contact, and sufficient daylight remained only for a single strike at extreme range. Having expended his air force the previous day, the enemy put only 35 planes into the air and 22 of these were shot down. Attacking United States dive bombers and torpedo planes sank 1 carrier and 2 oilers, and damaged a battleship, 4 carriers, and another oiler. After that contact was lost.

The remainder of the Marianas campaign really belongs to the troops ashore. The fast carriers continued to furnish them air support on reduced scale until August, transferring the main burden of this work first to the escort carriers and later, when captured fields had been put into operational shape, to land-based air forces. Troop support missions flown by carrier aircraft were similar to those flown by any other type of air force. They might consist of interdiction missions, of call strikes against enemy emplacements, or of attacks on targets of opportunity. The Navy found that for this work its long preoccupation with the accurate methods required to hit ships proved valuable. It also evolved a control system built around the amphibious command ship, which was basically a vessel fitted out with radar and communications equipment in such quantity that all relevant information might be filtered through a single organization and presented to the tactical commanders. It was here, for example, that a ground unit might appeal for assistance and, after assessing the target and also looking at what was available, controllers made a decision as to whether ground artillery, ships'

gunfire, or aerial bombardment should be employed.

The Marianas showed the Navy's tactical air system coming of age. It is safe to say that virtually everything which appeared later in the war already existed, at least in embryo. In essence the Navy divided its tactical air force into two interdependent parts: (1) the fast carrier task force whose missions were primarily to gain air superiority, commence softening up defenses, and prevent the enemy from bringing up reinforcements; and (2) the escort carriers upon which fell the principal responsibility for close support of landing troops and for protection of amphibious forces. These two up to a certain point could be used to support one another. When maxi-

mum effort was required against shore installations, as for example on the day of a landing, the fast carriers added their power to that of the escorts. In the Marianas, when the fast carriers concentrated on intercepting the Japanese fleet, the escort carriers took over all their other duties.

The success which this system of tactical air achieved in World War II hardly needs restatement here. I would like only to point out that it was flexible enough to defeat the threat of suicide tactics—the first large scale experience of any military force with guided missiles—that it was resilient enough to operate for over 80 days at Okinawa. In a word, it proved adequate for all demands that were made upon it.

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# Appendix

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## GUIDE TO THE WRITING OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY



### PART THREE BIBLIOGRAPHY

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#### NOTE

*At the request of members, this reproduction in full of Part Three of the Guide to the Writing of American Military History (published in condensed form in Vol. XIV, No. 1 of MILITARY AFFAIRS) is offered under the same qualifications as proposed in the remarks which preceded the text offered in that recent issue of MILITARY AFFAIRS.*

*Changes in Chapters I and II as edited in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, since the publication of the recent issue of MILITARY AFFAIRS cited, occasion the republication of those chapters hereinafter.*



## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

The bibliographical aids, books, publications, and source material listed herein contain many references to additional works or source material. The researcher will find the lists rather incomplete. Nevertheless, they will prove useful as a beginning. He must use his own ingenuity in developing a bibliography suitable to his needs.

#### BASIC WORKS BEARING ON MILITARY PROBLEMS

There are a number of works that have had and still have an important influence on American military thinking. There are others, not so well known, which deal with problems of significance to military men and are important because of their provocative nature. For this reason they deserve a special place in even a limited bibliographical listing of works. Among these are the following:

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## Chapter II

### SOURCE MATERIAL FOR THE WRITING OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY: GENERAL WORKS

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## Chapter V

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## Chapter VI

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## Chapter IX

# SOURCE MATERIAL FOR THE WRITING OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY: 1919-1948

### GENERAL

The period 1919-1948 presents a number of major problems for the historian of American military affairs. It represents a time span in which the published materials, with the exception of printed government documents, memoirs, and periodical literature, are rather meager.

From 1919 to approximately 1942 contemporary military affairs received little serious attention from scholars and historians. As a result of this situation the chief sources of American military history covering the period between 1920 and 1942 are the vast collections of original records and documents of the various agencies of the military establishment of those years. These, supplemented by the wide variety of government documents bearing on military affairs and by contemporary periodical literature, constitute the major working materials for the historian of American military affairs in the decades preceding World War II.

The period from 1942 to 1948 presents a similar problem. For the most part the major source materials remain in the voluminous files of records and documents. In addition to the problem created by the volume of material the physical location of the numerous collections is more widely scattered than is that for the 1920-1942 period. But this original source material is being exploited at an unprecedented rate by historians of the Office, Chief of Military History. During the period 1942-1948 a large number of published works in the form of memoirs, biographies, unit and organizational histories, diaries, personal narratives and experiences, and monographs relating to various aspects of World War II were produced. This material supplements the collections of original documents. It presents, however, a special problem if used in preparing sound and scholarly history. Written by participants soon after the events recorded, such works are apt to lack essential detachment and critical use of all possible sources. Hence the problem of selection and evaluation of recently published works, although they were authored by leaders and participants in the war, is particularly difficult. This

is especially true of memoirs and personal narratives.

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








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